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Ironclads  in  Action 

31  Qketctj  of  tyctval  *$avfave 


FROM    1855   TO  1895 


RONCLADS  IN  ACTION 


FROM    1855  TO  1895 
WITH   SOME   ACCOUNT   OF  THE 

DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE   BATTLESHIP  IN 
ENGLAND 


H.   W.  WILSON 

Sometime  Scholar  of  Trinity  College,  Oxford. 

WITH  AN   INTRODUCTION  BY 

CAPTAIN     A.    T.     MAHAN,  U.S.N. 

AUTHOR  OF  "  THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  ON  HISTORY,"  ETC. 


WITH    MAPS,    PLANS,    AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 

IN    TWO    VOLUMES — VOL.  II. 


FIFTH  EDITION. 


LONDON 

SAMPSON  LOW,  MARSTON  AND  COMPANY 

Limited. 
§kt.  ©un6fan6+6  &ou6e+ 
FETTER  LANE,  LONDON,  E.C. 
1897. 


First  Edition,  December,  1895. 
Second  Edition  (corrected),  January,  /< 
Third  Edition,   February ,  i8g6. 
Fourth  Edition,  March,  i8g6. 
Fifth  Edition,  October,  1897. 


LONDON  • 

PRINTED   BY   HORACE  COX,  WINDSOR  HOUSE,   BREAM'S  BUILDINGS,  E.C. 


35^ 
V.A 

MAPS   AND  PLANS. 


Map  Face  page 

XIX.  The  Bombardment  of  Sfax  and  the  Battle  of  Foochow  2 

XX.  Descent  of  the  Min  and  Torpedo  Action  of  Sheipoo    .  12 

XXI.  Caldera  Bay.     Insets,  Chilian   Littoral,  Valparaiso 

Bay,  Torpedo  Action       .       .       .       .       ,  .21 
XXII.    Rio  de  Janeiro  Bay  36 

XXIII.  Sta.  Catherina  Bay     .......  44 

XXIV.  Attack  on  the  Aquidaban.    Elevation  of  Aquidaban, 

showing  Injury.        .......  46 

XXV.  Theatre  of  the  War  in  the  East  and  Wei-hai-wei      .  52 

XXVI.    TheYalu,  I.       .   88 

XXVII.    The  Yalu,  II.,  Ill   .  90 

XXVIII.  The  Yalu,  IV.,  V.      .......  92 

XXIX.  Naval  Formations.      .       .       .       .       .       .  .156 

XXX.  Accidents  to  the  Grosser  Kurfurst  and  to  the  Victoria  194 


ILLUSTRATIONS   AND  ELEVATIONS. 


Plate  Face  page 

XIX.  Japanese  Sailors  at  the  Yalu       .       -        .  Frontispiece 

XX.  The  Wei  Yuen  and  King  Yuen  .       .       .       .  14 

XXI.  Elevation  of  Blanco  Encaloda     ...  .28 

XXII.    The  Itsukushima        .   58 

XXIII.  Elevation  and  Deck  Plan  of  Ting  Yuen  and  Chen  Yuen  62 

XXIV.  The  Yoshino  68 

XXV.  The  Tsi  Yuen's  Conning  Tower  .....  70 

XXVI.  Elevation  of  the  Naniiva      ......  74 

XXVII.    Admirals  Ting  and  Ito  82 

XXVIII.  The  Matsushima's  Officers.         .....  94 


409766 


viii  ILLUSTRATIONS    AND  ELEVATIONS. 

Plate  Face  page 

XXIX.  The  Chen  Yuen  in  Battle    .  100 

XXX.  The  Chen  Yuen's  Side  after  Battle      .       .       .  .no 

XXXI.  The  Chih  Yuen  114 

XXXII.  The  Ting  Yuen  122 

XXXIII.  The  End  of  a  Battleship     .       .       .       .       .  .172 

XXXIV.  H.M.S.  Victoria  197 

XXXV.  Diagram  of  the  Victoria  just  before  she  capsized.       .  202 

XXXVI.  The  Last  of  the  Victoria  204 

XXXVII.  English  Ironclads,  I  .       .  .220 

XXXVIII.  Systems  of  Protection  228 

XXXIX.  English  Ironclads,  II.  .       .       .       .       .       .  .232 

XL.  Early  and  Modern  Breech-loader        ....  246 

XLI.  Eight-inch  Quick-firer  250 

XLII.  French  Ironclads         .......  262 

XLIII.  The  Battleship  Neptune  264 

XLIV.  The  Battleship  Formidable  266 

XLV.  The  Cruiser  Alger      .   268 

XLVL  The  Submarine  Boat  Gustave  Zede     ....  270 

XLVII.  The  United  States  Cruiser  Columbia  ....  288 

XLVIII.  The  Cruiser  New  York       ......  290 

XLIX.  The  Battleship  Indiana      ......  294 

L.  The  Battleship  Kearsarge    ......  296 


TABLES. 


(Pages  316 — 340.) 


I. 
II. 
III. 

IV. 
V. 
VI 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
X. 
XI. 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 
XV. 
XVI. 
XVII. 
XVIII. 
XIX. 
XX. 
XXI. 
XXII. 


XXIII. 
XXIV. 
XXV. 
XXVI 


United  States'  Naval  Ordnance,  1861-5. 

Union  Fleet  at  New  Orleans.  Confederate  Forts  and  Squadron. 
Union  Fleet  at  Fort  Sumter,  April  7,  1863,  and  Confederate 

Forts. 
Union  Fleet  at  Mobile. 

Union  Fleet  at  the  Second  Bombardment  of  Fort  Fisher. 
The  Southern  Commerce  Destroyers  and  their  Prizes. 
Italian  Fleet  at  Lissa. 
Austrian  Fleet  at  Lissa. 
Comparison  of  Fleets  at  Lissa. 

Types  of  French  Ironclads  in  1870.    German  Ironclads. 
Fleets  of  Chili  and  Peru,  1878. 

Ships  which  took  Part  in  the  Bombardment  of  Alexandria. 
Armament  of  the  Alexandria  Forts. 

Shot  and  Shell  Expended  at  Alexandria  by  the  British  Fleet. 

French  and  Chinese  Ships  at  Foochow. 

Congressional  and  Balmacedist  Squadrons,  1891. 

Fleets  in  Brazilian  Civil  War. 

Chinese  Fleet  at  the  Yalu. 

Japanese  Fleet  at  the  Yalu. 

Comparison  of  Fleets  at  the  Yalu  and  Notes  on  Guns. 
Details  of  Japanese  Losses  at  the  Yalu. 
Leading  Types  of  English  Battleships. 

1.  Progress  in  Size,  Dimensions,  and  Armour. 

2.  Progress  in  Armament. 
Progress  in  English  Cruisers. 
English  Heavy  Guns. 
Summary  of  Torpedo  Operations. 
Types  in  the  United  States  Navy. 


409766 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
French  Naval  Operations  in  Tunis  and  the  East. 


page 

Difficulties  between  France  and  Tunis       .....  i 

Sfax  bombarded.    July  io-i6th,  1881   2 — 3 

Capture  of  Sfax.    July  16th,  1881   4 

Hostilities  between  France  and  China   4 

Courbet  at  Foochow    .........  5 — 6 

The  French  attack  the  Chinese.    Aug.  23rd,  1884      ...  7 

The  Chinese  squadron  destroyed       .       .              .       .       .  8 — 9 

Descent  of  the  River  Min.    Aug.  25-28th,  1884.       .       .       .  11 — 12 

Torpedo  affair  of  Sheipoo.    Feb.  15th,  1885      .       .       .       .  13 

The  Chinese  ships  sunk      ........  15 

Rice  contraband .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  15 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
Naval  Events  of  the  Chilian  Civil  War. 

The  revolt  of  the  Chilian  fleet.    January,  1891  .       .       .       .  16 

Balmacedist  and  Congressional  fleets.       .....  17 — 18 

Physical  features  of  Chili    .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  18 

The  Blanco  Encalada  hit  at  Valparaiso     .....  20 

Balmacedist  torpedo-vessels  leave  for  Caldera  ....  22 

The  attack  on  the  Blanco  Encalada.    April  23rd,  1891     .       .  23 

Congressionalist  account.    The  Blanco  sunk     ....  24 — 6 

Captain  Goni's  report        ........  27 

Action   between    the   torpedo   vessels   and  the  Acongagua. 

April  23rd,  1891  .       *   29 — 30 

Subsequent  torpedo  operations   .       .              .       .       .       .  31 

Fall  of  Balmaceda   32 

The  case  of  the  Itata   33 — 4 


XII 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 
The  Civil  War  in  Brazil. 

PAGE 

Revolt  of  Admiral  Mello.    September  7th,  1893        ...  35 

Ships  and  resources  of  Mello  and  Peixoto  .               .       .       .  36 — 7 

The  Melloist  ships  pass  the  Rio  forts  ......  37 — 40 

Peixoto  acquires  a  fleet   40 

Worthlessness  of  his  fleet,    Collapse  of  the  revolt  at  Rio  .       .  41 — 2 

Torpedo  attack  upon  the  Aquidaban.    April  i5-i6th,  1894       .  43 

The  Aquidaban  discovered  ........  44 

She  is  torpedoed  by  the  Gustavo  Sampaio  .....  45 

Melloist  version  ,       .  46 — 7 

The  value  of  the  battleship   49 

Lessons  of  the  war      .........  50 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
The  Struggle  in  the  East. 

Outbreak  of  war  between  China  and  Japan.    July  29th,  1894   .  51 

The  Japanese  revival  .........  52 — 3 

The  effeteness  of  China      ........  54 — 5 

The  state  of  the  Chinese  Navy  .......  56 

Renders  tactical  conclusions  uncertain       .....  57 

The  ships  of  the  Japanese  ........  57 — 61 

Japanese  merchant  marine,  and  docks       .....  61 

Organization  of  the  Chinese  fleet       ......  62 

The  Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen      ......  63 — 4 

Other  Chinese  ships   64 — 5 

Chinese  Merchant  Marine,  and  Docks       .....  65 — 6 

CHAPTER  XX. 
The  Action  off  Asan  and  the  Sinking  of  the  Kowshing. 

Chinese  and  Japanese  ships  off  Asan  ......  67 

The  Naniwa  engages  the  Tsi  Yuen.    July  25th,  1894        .       .  68 — 71 

The  state  of  the  Tsi  Yuen  after  the  action   72 

The  Kwang  Yi  and  Tsao  Kiang  destroyed  or  captured      .       .  72 

The  Naniwa  meets  the  Kowshing      .               .       .       .       .  73 

The  Naniwa  sinks  the  Kowshing.    July  25th,  1894   ...  75 

Violation  of  International  Law   .       .               .    ,    .       .       .  77 

The  position  of  the  Kowshing   78 

Admiral  Ting  puts  to  sea   ........  80 

Orders  of  Li  Hung  Chang  to  Admiral  Ting  ....        .        .  81 


CONTENTS. 


xiii 


CHAPTER  XXI. 
The  Yalu  and  its  Lessons. 

PAGE 

The  Chinese  despatch  transports  to  the  Yalu  River  ...  83 

Ting  with  the  fleet  convoys  them   84 

Japanese  fleet  in  the  Gulf  of  Korea   85 

The  two  fleets  sight  one  another         ......  86 

Preparations  of  the  Chinese   86 — 87 

The  battle  opens.    September  17th,  1894   88 

The  two  lines  of  battle   89 

The  Chinese  roughly  handled     .......  92 

Both  sides  draw  off     ........  95 

The  Matsushima's  share  in  the  battle        .....  96 

Fortunes  of  other  Japanese  ships       ......  97 — 99 

The  Chinese  ships  in  detail        .......  99 — 103 

Alleged  misbehaviour  of  the  Tsi  Yuen       .....  103 

The  Yalu  compared  with  Lissa          ......  104 — 6 

Losses  of  the  Japanese       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  108 

Losses  of  the  Chinese         ........  109 

Does  naval  warfare  grow  bloodier   no 

Guns  of  the  Chinese   .        .       .        .       .        .       .        .       .  112 

Broadsides  of  the  two  fleets        .        .       .        .       .        .       .  112A 

The  Japanese  Canet  guns  ........  112B 

Size  and  speed  in  the  two  fleets  .        .       .               .        .       .  n  2D 

The  ram  and  the  torpedo  not  used      ......  114 — 5 

Value  of  deductions  from  the  Yalu     ......  116 

Line  abreast       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  118 

The  value  of  armour    .........  119 

The  gun  still  the  predominant  factor  .       .        .       .       .       .  123 

Tactical  value  of  speed  in  the  battle   .       .       .       .       .       .  124 

Training  and  discipline  the  secret  of  victory       .       .       .       .  125 


CHAPTER  XXII. 
Naval  Operations  at  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-wei. 


The  Chinese  fleet  retires  to  Port  Arthur    .       .       .       .       .  126 

The  Japanese  capture  Port  Arthur.    Nov.  21st,  1894.       .       .  127 

Wei-hai-wei  bombarded   128 

Torpedo  attack  upon  the  Chinese  Fleet.    Feb.  4th,  1895    .       .  130 

The  Ting  Yuen  torpedoed  .   131 

Torpedo  attack  of  Feb.  5th,  1895   132 

Surrender  and  suicide  of  Admiral  Ting,  Feb.  12th,  1895    .       .  133 


xiv 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

The  Naval   Battle  of  To-morrow. 

PAGE 

Little  material  for  induction       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  136 

A  special  class  of  ships  to  fight  in  the  line  necessary  .       .       .  138 

The  cruiser  and  the  battleship   139 

Inferiority  of  the  cruiser      ........  141 

Cruisers  are  of  three  classes       .......  143 

Weak  ships  in  line  a  disadvantage     .       .       .       .       .       .  144 

Examples  of  the  division  of  a  fleet   146 

Sphere  of  torpedo  craft  in  battle.    The  torpedo-gunboat   .       .  147 

The  torpedo-boat  in  battle                                                      .  148 

The  ram  in  battle       .........  150 

The  pneumatic  gun    .........  150 

The  position  of  the  Commander-in-Chief   151 

Battle  dispositions       .       .       .    t   .              .       .       .       .  153 

Line-abreast  and  bow-and-quarter  line      .....  155 

Groups       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  156 

Line  ahead :  its  advantages        .       .               .       .       .       .  157 

Manoeuvring  before  and  during  battle   158 

The  value  of  the  ram  .       .       .       .       .               .       .       .  160 

The  value  of  the  torpedo    .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  161 

The  warship's  top-hamper  ........  162 

Effect  of  the  long-range  fire       .       .       .            .   .       .       .  163 

Fires  in  action   165 

Percentage  of  hits  in  battle        .        ......  166 

Maintenance  of  internal  communication  on  board  ship      .       .  167 

The  conning-tower     .........  168 

Perforation  of  armour  in  action  .......  170 

The  encounter  at  close  quarters  .              .....  172 

Loss  of  life  in  battle    .........  173 

Duration  of  battle   175 

Losses  of  ships    ..........  176 

The  type  of  battleship  best  adapted  to  this  forecast   .       ...  178 

The  armament  of  the  ideal  battleship        .       .       .       .       .  179 

Devolution  of  command  during  battle        .       .       .               .  181 

Summary   182 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 
Ironclad  Catastrophes. 

The  Captain   183 

She  goes  to  sea  with  the  Channel  Squadron       .       .       .       .  185 

She  founders  during  the  night.    September  6 — 7th,  1870   .       .  168 


CONTENTS. 


xv 


PAGE 


Story  of  the  survivors  .       .       .       .       .       .       .  .  187 

Verdict  of  the  court-martial   189 

The  Vanguard  is  rammed  by  the  Iron  Duke.    September  1st, 

1875   190 

She  sinks     .    ...  191 

Verdict  of  the  court-martial.       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  192 

The  Grosser  Kurfurst  rammed  by  the  Kb  nig  Wilhelm.  May 

31st,  1878   193 

Effect  of  the  collision  :  the  Grosser  Kurfurst  sinks     .       .       .  194 

The  Victoria   196 

A  dangerous  manoeuvre  ordered  .......  197 

The  manoeuvre  executed      ........  199 

The  Camperdown  rams  the  Victoria.    June  22nd,  1893     .       .  200 

Efforts  to  save  the  Victoria  ........  202 

Splendid  behaviour  of  the  Victoria, } s  crew  .....  203 

The  ship  capsizes  with  grievous  loss  of  life  .       .       .       .       .  204 

Finding  of  the  court-martial   206 

Loss  of  the  Reina  Regente.    March,  1895   .....  207 

CHAPTER  XXV. 
The  Development  of  the  English  Battleship. 

Great  changes  in  the  implements  of  naval  war    ....  209 

These  changes  due  to  steam        .       .       .  .       .       .  210 

Growth  of  displacement       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  212 

Number  of  engines  on  board  ship        .       .       .       .       .       .  214 

Specialization  in  the  type  of  ship  .       ......  215 

The  application  of  armour  to  ships   217 

The  Gloire  and  the  Warrior       .......  219 

Captain  Coles  invents  the  turret  .......  220 

The  central-battery  ironclad        .......  221 

The  Sultan  .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  222 

The  Alexandra  and  Temeraire     .......  223 

Early  turret-ships        .........  224 

The  Devastatian  class  .........  226 

The  armour  deck  .    227 

Unarmoured  ends  :  the  Inflexible       .       .       .       .       .       .  228 

The  "  echeloned  "  turret-ship      .......  229 

The  "  Admirals "   230 

The  Victoria  and  Sanspareil       .        .       .  •      .       .  .  232 

The  Nile  and  Trafalgar      ........  233 


xvi 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

The  Royal  Sovereign  class  .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  234 

The  Centurion  and  Barfleur   236 

The  Renown        .       .       .        .       .  .       .       .       .  237 

The  Majestic  class       .       .       .       ....       .       .  238 

Summary  of  progress  in  ironclad  construction    ....  239 

Reappearance  of  moderate  armour     .       .       .       .       .       .  241 

English  and  foreign  types  of  battleships  compared     .       .       .  242 
The  development  of  artillery       .       .  -  .       .       .       .  245 

The  rifled  gun  and  the  early  breech-loader        ....  246 

Resistance  of  early  ironclads  to  artillery  246 

The  monster  gun        .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  247 

The  muzzle-loader  abandoned  in  England  248 

The  new  breech-loader  249 

The  quick-firer   .       .       .  250 

Improvements  in  projectiles        .......  252 

Improvements  in  armour     .       .       .       .       .    '   .       .       .  253 

Progress  in  engineering      .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  254 

The  first  cruisers         .........  255 

The  Esmeralda  and  fast  cruisers        ......  255 

The  belted  cruiser       .........  257 

The  torpedo-boat        .       .       .       .       .       .  .       .  257 

The  torpedo       ,       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .  258 

Appendix  I.  The*  Development  of  the  French  Navy,  1855 — 1895  260 — 275 
Appendix  II.    Report  of  the  French  Committee  in  1870  upon 

the  practicability  of  attacking  the  Prussian  littoral      .        275B — 76 
Appendix  III.    The  Progress  of  the  United  States  Navy  .        277 — 301 
Appendix  IV.    British  Ironclads       ......    302 — 3 

Appendix  V.  Leading  Authorities  consulted  .  .  .  304 — 313 
Appendix  VI.    Illustrations       .......  314 

Tables  I.— XXVI  316—340 

Index     I.    Actions   .........  341 

II.    Names  343 

III.    Subject- Matter  and  Technical  Terms    .       .       .  385 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

French  Naval  Operations  in  Tunis  and  the  East, 
1881— 1884-5 

In  i 88  i,  difficulty  with  the  Khroumirs,  a  Tunisian  tribe  on  the 
Algerian  frontier,  and  the  fact  that  the  Bey  of  Tunis  was  in 
secret  abetting  them,  led  France  to  take  vigorous  measures 
against  Tunis.  In  the  last  week  of  April  the  army  on  land 
commenced  operations  whilst  the  fleet  supported  it.  On 
April  25th,  Tabarka,  an  island  on  the  coast  of  Tunis,  which 
was  protected  by  an  antiquated  castle,  was  bombarded  by  the 
gunboat  Hyene,  supported  by  the  Surveillante,  Tourville} 
Chacal  and  Leopard.  A  very  feeble  resistance  was  offered 
by  the  Arabs,  and  next  day  a  detachment  of  troops  landed 
and  occupied  the  place  A  week  later  Bizerta  was  seized  to 
serve  as  a  base  for  the  French  operations.  On  May  7th,  Beja 
was  captured,  and  it  was  supposed  in  France  that  the  war  was 
over.  A  few  days  later  the  Bey  practically  accepted  the 
protection  of  France,  and  about  the  middle  of  June  the  French 
army  was  recalled.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Arab  popula- 
tion was  by  no  means  ready  to  submit  to  France.  Fostered 
by  Mussulman  agitators,  an  insurrection  against  the  Bey, 
who  was  accused  of  selling  his  country,  broke  out  in  the 
south.  Sfax  was  seized  and  occupied  by  the  insurgents,  and 
the  foreign  residents  in  the  country  were  in  grave  danger. 

The  French  did  not  quietly  acquiesce  in  these  proceedings, 
On  the  contrary,  as  might  be  expected,  they  at  once  made 

Vol.  II  B 


2  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1881 

preparations  to  re-conquer  Tunis.  For  operations  on  the 
coast  they  had  a  formidable  squadron  ready  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean under  Vice-Admiral  Garnault  and  Rear-Admiral  Martin. 
The  first  had  for  his  flagship  the  Colbert,  the  second,  the 
Trident.  The  other  ironclads  of  the  squadron  were  the 
Galissoniere,  Friedland,  Marengo,  Surveillante,  Revanche, 
Alma,  and  Reine  Blanche.  With  these  were  the  unarmoured 
vessels  Tourville,  Hirondelle,  Desaix}  Voltigeur,  Hye~ne, 
Chacal,  Leopard,  and  Gladiateur.  To  the  force  thus  con- 
stituted the  Intrepide,  Sarthe,  and  Pique  were  added. 

On  July  5th,  the  Reine  Blanche  and  Chacal  appeared  off 
Sfax,  and  the  latter  reconnoitred  the  place,  and  bombarded  it 
at  a  range  of  5000  yards,  directing  her  fire  especially  upon 
the  water  battery,  which  was  some  little  distance  from  the 
town  wall,  and  making  a  breach  in  it.  Only  eighteen  shots 
were  fired  in  reply.  Next  day  two  more  formidable  vessels, 
the  Reine  Blanche  and  Alma,  opened  upon  the  town,  early  in 
the  morning.  They  continued  to  shell  it  till  midday  when  they 
were  joined  by  the  gunboats  Pique  and  Chacal.  As  the  reply 
of  the  Tunisians  was  exceedingly  feeble  and  ill-directed,  the 
gunboats  ventured  in  to  2400  yards  ;  in  the  evening  the  Hyene 
arrived.  This  day  the  batteries  only  fired  thirteen  shots. 
On  the  7th,  the  Reine  Blanche  and  Alma  resumed  their  slow 
bombardment  of  the  town,  assisted  by  the  Hyene  and  Chacal. 
A  lighter,  mounting  one  14-centimetre  smooth-bore,  was  also 
employed,  and  was  of  great  value,  since  it  drew  very  little 
water  and  could  therefore  be  taken  close  in  to  the  town. 
The  depth  of  water  in  the  Bay  of  Sfax  was  indeed  the  chief 
difficulty  which  the  French  had  to  face,  as  it  prevented  their 
heavier  and  more  powerful  ships  from  playing  that  part  in  the 
operations  which  would  have  been  expected  from  vessels  of 
their  size  and  strength. 

On  July  8th,  a  boat  attack  was  made  upon  the  place.  The 
boats  approached  within  1000  yards  of  the  land  and  opened  a 
vigorous  fire  upon  the  Arab  trenches  and  lines.  They  were 
supported  by  the  Chacal  and  Hyene.    After  this  some  days 


VSFAX > 

Vv^VBATTERY 
/  Wharf 

/ 

/  ( 

(7 Pique 
:  ^Chacal 
:  Hye'netf  0  Leopard 

/       /          Alma^  ^Galissoniere 

:                    \            tfDesa'u  Intrepide^ 

•   /'                 /                                                   Friedland  q 

.-•*"   Surveillante  ^Revanche 
/  /                /                   /           0     °    0  ^Colbert 
/    /            /                 /  Marengo  Trident 

BOMBARDMENT  OF  SFAX 

&.  FhjJjjp  Sc.  Son, 


1881]         THE  FRENCH  FN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST. 


3 


of  inaction  followed,  during  which  the  two  ironclads  shelled 
the  town  from  time  to  time. 

On  July  14th,  the  rest  of  the  French  squadron  arrived,  and 
on  the  following  day  the  bombardment  was  resumed  with 
increased  vigour.  The  attack  was  delivered  by  the  ironclads, 
gunboats,  and  boats  of  the  squadron.  The  ironclads  anchored 
according  to  their  draught  at  a  mean  distance  of  6500  vards 
from  the  town.  They  were  in  two  groups  :  *  in  the  first, 
furthest  out,  were  the  Marengo,  Surveillante,  Colbert, 
Revanche  and  Friedland ;  in  the  second,  the  Alma,  Reine 
Blanche  and  Galissonlere,  with  the  unarmoured  cruisers 
Desaix,  Sarthe  and  Intrepide.  Nearer  in,  at  a  distance  of 
2200  yards,  were  the  gunboats.  Finally,  the  boats  of  the 
squadron,  armed  with  Gatlings  and  machine-guns,  moved  to 
and  fro  only  500  yards  from  the  shore.  The  boats  were 
supported  by  two  lighters  on  one  of  which  was  a  16-centimetre 
rifle,  and  on  the  other  a  14-centimetre  smooth-bore.  The  Are 
maintained  by  the  ships  was  slow  and  steady,  and  did  much 
damage  to  the  town. 

On  the  next  day,  the  16th,  it  was  decided  to  effect  a  landing. 
The  beach  was  of  soft  yielding  mud  and  the  shallowness  of 
the  water  made  approach  difficult,  but  this  was  overcome  by 
the  construction  of  a  temporary  floating  jetty.  Six  of  the 
ironclads  had  been  ordered  each  to  prepare  a  raft  of  spars 
and  topmasts  on  the  evening  of  the  15th.  When  ready,  these 
rafts  were  towed  in  separately  by  launches  and  fastened 
together  as  close  to  the  shore  as  possible.  The  boats  laden 
with  men  were  to  be  ranged  as  near  in  as  they  could  go  by 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and,  at  a  given  signal  *from  the 
gunboats,  were  to  dash  in  and  land  the  men  on  the  jetty. 
There  were  eighteen  boats  in  all,  armed  with  four  12-centi- 
metre and  one  4-centimetre  gun,  besides  thirteen  various 
machine-guns.  By  daylight  the  preparations  were  completed, 
and  at  4.30  a  shot  from  the  Colbert  opened  an  unusually 
fierce  bombardment.  . . 

*  See  Plan. 

B  2 


4  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1881 

The  boats  were  massed  500  yards  from  the  batteries  and 
only  waited  the  signal  to  dash  in.  The  landing  party 
numbered  3000  men,  and  was  composed  of  1600  sailors  and 
1400  soldiers.  At  three  in  the  morning  the  raft  was  secured 
firmly  inshore  about  400  yards  from  the  mole  ;  at  six,  the 
signal  for  the  troops  to  land  came,  and  they  made  for  the 
shore  with  some  little  confusion.  The  Arabs,  however,  had 
been  unable  to  hold  the  trenches  under  the  fire  of  the  ships 
and  boats,  and  to  add  to  their  discomfiture  a  great  quantity 
of  esparto  grass  near  their  lines  was  set  on  fire  by  shells,  and 
burnt  fiercely.  The  French  sailors  and  soldiers  quickly 
carried  the  water-battery,  and  forced  the  gates  of  the  town. 
The  loss  of  the  fleet  was  not  heavy.  In  all  it  amounted  to 
eleven  killed  and  fifteen  wounded. 

The  attack  upon  Sfax  was  well  conceived  and  well  executed, 
but,  of  course,  little  resistance  could  be  offered  by  the  Arabs 
to  the  powerful  artillery  of  the  French  squadron.  Here,  even 
more  than  at  Alexandria,  the  attacking  force  was  so  much 
stronger  than  the  defence  that  the  result  of  the  fighting  was 
bound  to  be  very  one-sided.  No  damage  was  done  to  any  of 
the  ships. 

In  1884,  France,  provoked  by  the  attitude  of  China  towards 
the  corps  of  Black  Flags  or  freelances  on  the  Tonkin  frontier, 
proceeded  to  acts  of  hostility  against  that  power.  Without 
any  previous  declaration  of  war,  the  port  of  Kelung  in  the 
island  of  Formosa  was  bombarded  and  occupied  on  August  6th. 
Nine  days  later  the  Chinese  Government  issued  a  declaration 
of  war  against  France. 

A  French  squadron  under  Rear-Admiral  Courbet  had, 
before  the  declaration,  ascended  the  River  Min,  on  which 
stands  the  city  of  Foochow,  where  was  the  most  important  of 
the  Chinese  naval  arsenals.  The  ships  which  Courbet  com- 
manded included  the  Duguay- Trouin,  a  large  composite 
cruiser,  the  Villars  and  E stain  ?y  both  wooden  third-class 
cruisers,  the  Volta± a  wooden  sloop  which  carried  the  admiral's 
flag,  and  three  gunboats,  the_LynXj  Aspic,  and  Vipere,  all 


1884]  THE  FRENCH  IN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST.  5 

composite,  and  all  of  about  450  tons  displacement.  In  addi- 
tion, at  the  mouth  of  the  Min,  lay  the  armoured  cruiser 

Triomphante,  a  central-battery  and  barbette  vessel  protected 
by  iron  armour,  6  inches  to  4!  inches  thick.  Her  commander 
was  busy  lightening  her  for  the  ascent  of  the  river,  as  he  had 
received  Courbet's  permission  to  attempt  it.  Including  this 
ship,  the  squadron  mounted  six  9/4-inch,  eight  7'6-inch,  fifty- 
one  5"5-inch,  and  nine  4-inch  breech-loading  rifled  guns.  The 
weight  of  one  discharge  from  these  would  amount  to  a  little 
over  6,ooolbs.  Two  torpedo-boats  were  present  with  the 
squadron  ;  their  numbers  were  45  and  46,  their  speed  was 
sixteen  knots,  and  they  were  armed  with  spar-torpedoes, 
containing  a  bursting  charge  of  281bs.  of  gun-cotton.  The 
total  of  the  French  crews  was  1830  men. 

Ascending  from  the  coast,  the  River  Min  at  first  takes  a 
south-westerly  direction,  but  about  a  mile  below  Foochow,  at 
Pagoda  Point,  makes  a  sharp  bend  to  the  north-west.  At 
this  point  no  less  than  seven  channels  or  waterways  converge, 
the  main  channel  of  the  river  alone  having  sufficient  depth  of 
water  to  permit  the  movements  of  large  ships,  and  then  only 
at  flood-tide,  which  lasts  at  this  point  four  hours.  Admiral 
Courbet  anchored  his  ships  at  the  angle  of  the  stream,  the 
Voltgjbemg  just  abreast  of  Pagoda  Point,  the  two  torpedo- 
boats  on  her  port  quarter,  and  the  three  gunboats  astern. 
The  other  ships  were  lower  down,  in  the  centre  of  the  stream. 
On  Pagoda  Point  were  Chinese  batteries,  whilst  other  works 
protected  the  arsenal,  which  is  2000  yards  above  the  Point. 

pn  the  River  Min  was  moored  a  considerable  Chinese 
squadron."*  This  included  one  moderate  composite  cruiser,  the 
Yang  Wjiq,  which  acted  as  the  Chinese  flagship  ;  six  very 
indifferent  wooden  sloops,  Foo_PoOj  Chi-an,  Fei  Yuen,  C/iing 
Wei,  Foo  Sing  and  Yu  Sing ;  two  transports  ;  two  Rendel 
gunboats,  each  mounting  one  heavy  gun  in  the  bow,  the  Qhen 
Sing  and  Fuh  Sing;  seven  launches  fitted  with  spar-torpedoes  ; 
and  eleven  war  junks,  sailing  vessels,  armed  only  with  smooth- 

*  Vide  Table  XV.  for  details. 


6 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION, 


[1884 


bore  guns.  This  flotilla  was  as  badly  manned  and  commanded 
as  it  was  armed.  The  eleven  steamers  of  any  size  included  in 
it,  carried  only  1190  men,  whilst  the  artillery  on  board,  ex- 
cluding smooth-bores,  comprised  one  18-ton,  two  16-ton,  one 
6^-ton,  eleven  3^-ton,  twenty-four  45-pounder,  and  two 
40-pounder  guns,  mostly  muzzle-loaders,  and  of  inferior  power 
and  penetration  to  the  French  breech-loader^]  The  weight  of 
metal  discharged  by  them  was  under  45oolbs.  The  French 
had  thus  a  superiority  of  one-third,  which  would  probably  have 
given  them  the  victory  over  well-trained  opponents,  but  the 
men  whom  they  were  to  fight,  a  disciplined  force  themselves, 
had  neither  skill,  discipline,  nor  courage.  Add  to  this  that 
the  Chinese  captains,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  were  as 
ignorant  and  as  cowardly  as  their  men,  and  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  work  before  Admiral  Courbet  was  not  of  a  very 
difficult  nature. 

The  Chinese  flotilla  was  thus  disposed  :  *  Abreast  of  the 
E stain  g,  and  lowest  down  the  Min,  lay  the  Oiling  Wei ; , 
abreast  of  the  Villars,  the  Chi -an  ;  and  abreast  of  the  Duguay 
Trouin,  the  Fez  Yuen.  In  a  backwater  of  the  river  between 
Pagoda  Point  and  the  mainland,  lay  nine  of  the  junks  ;  two 
others  with  the  torpedo  launches  were  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  river,  thus  flanking  the  Volt  a  and  the  French  gunboats. 
The  rest  of  the  squadron  lay  above  the  Volt  a,  between  her 
and  the  Arsenal,  and  the  leading  ships  Yang  Wop  and  JFoo 
Sing  were  400  to  600  yards  ahead  of  her.  In  the  river  were 
several  French  mercantile  steamers,  the  English  warships 
Champion,  Surprise,  and  Merlin,  and  an  American  squadron 
composed  of  the  Enterprise,  Juniata,  Trenton,  and  Monocacy. 
These  vessels  were  either  above  or  below  the  hostile 
squadrons,  and  kept  well  out  of  the  way,  in  view  of  a  French 
attack  upon  the  Chinese. 

/For  day  after  day  the  two  enemies  confronted  each  other, 
whilst  the  neutrals  expected  every  hour  to  see  the  attack 
begin.     The  French  were  always  cleared  for  action  ;  their 

*  Vide  Plan,  p.  2. 


1884]  THE  FRENCH  IN.  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST.  7 

upper  masts  were  struck,  their  cables  ready  for  slipping,  and 
their  crews,  in  watches,  relieved  one  another  at  the  guns. 
Each  day  brought  rumours  that  this  was  the  appointed  time, 
and  as  each  day  passed  without  incident,  the  vigilance  of  the 
Chinese,  never  very  remarkable,  was  relaxed  more  and  more. 
The  French  were  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  Triomphante  • 
the  Chinese  close  under  their  enemy's  guns,  perhaps,  imagin- 
ing that  the  French  did  not  really  mean  business.  They  were 
to  be  terribly  undeceived.  On  Friday,  August  22nd,  in  the 
evening,  Courbet  summoned  his  officers  to  his  flagship,  and 
there  made  known  to  them  his  plans.  Next  day,  just  before 
two  o'clock,  when  the  tide  ebbed,  the  ships  were  to  weigh  and 
get  to  work.  A  signal  from  the  admiral  would  tell  the  torpedo- 
boats  to  steam  forward  and  attack,  No.  45,  the  .Yang  Wnn 
and  No.  46,  the  Foo__Sirig.  A  second  signal,  and  the  ships 
were  to  open  fire,  the  D^Estaing,  VJlLcws,  and  Dugua^z, 
Trouin  upon  the  Chinese  steamers  which  lay  abreast  of  them, 
with  their  port  batteries,  whilst  their  starboard  guns  played 
upon  the  junks  off  Pagoda  Point.  The  Dug  nay-  Jj^mm 
when  this  work  of  destruction  was  completed,  was  to  settle 
the  launches  and  support  the  Volt  a,  which  in  the  meantime 
would  cover  the  torpedo-boats,  and  with  either  broadside 
assail  the  junks.  Finally,  the  three  gunboats  were  to  steam 
forward  and  sink  the  Chinese  vessels  off  the  Arsenal. 

j^The  morning  of  the  23rd  dawned  cloudless  and  intensely 
hot,  the  strong  sun  causing  the  men  at  the  guns  of  the  French 
ships  no  little  discomfort.  Courbet  early  gave  notice  to  the 
consuls  and  others,  that  he  intended  to  attack  the  Chinese 
soon  after  noon,  so  that  he  gave  his  enemy  some  warning. 
To  the  watchers  on  board  the  Enterprise,  the  hours  seemed  to 
go  slowly  beyond  endurance,  and  it  appeared  as  though  the 
French  were  never  going  to  begin.  At  9.30,  the  flood-tide 
was  in,  and  soon  after,  steam  was  up,  and  the  French  crews 
took  a  meal.  J  At  1.30,  silently  the  men  went  to  quarters,  and 
the  Chinese  followed  suit.  A  quarter-of-an-hour  later,  anchors 
were  weighed,  and  the  preparations  were  completed.  At  1.50, 


8 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


the  TriomphaTite.  came  in  sight,  and  there  passed  some  signals 
between  her  and  Courbet.  Six  minutes  later,  the  stillness  was 
broken  by  the  rapid  discharge  of  the  Hotchkiss  in  the  Lynx s 
top,  and  almost  simultaneously  the  Citing  Wei  replied  with  a 
broadside.  At  the  signal,  the  torpedo-boats  had  dashed 
forward,  and  only  twenty-seven  seconds  after  the  first  shot, 
the  sound  of  a  terrific  explosion  dominated  the  uproar  of  the 
engagement.  No.  46  had  exploded  her  torpedo  under  the 
Yang  Wads  side,  amidships.  Of  270  men  on  board  the 
Chinese  vessel,  only  fifteen  escapecT^and  so  great  was  the 
force  of  the  explosion  that,  it  has  been  stated  by  an  eye- 
witness, mutilated  bodies  were  found  after  the  engagement  on 
the  roofs  of  houses  a  mile  away  on  shore.*  ^The  Yang;  Woo 
drifted  away,  an  utter  wreck,  and  as  the  French  continued  to 
pour  in  a  hail  of  shells,  caught  fire  and  sank.  The  boat  which 
had  dealt  the  blow,  reversed  her  engines,  but  was  struck  by  a 
shell  and  disabled.  Having  lost  one  sailor,  killed  by  a  bullet, 
she  drifted  slowly  down  stream  and  anchored.  No.  45  was 
not  so  successful.  As  she  ran  forward  to  attack  the  Foo  Singj 
a  Chinese  torpedo-launch  encountered  her,  and  forced  her  to 
swerve  to  one  side.  Thus  she  failed  to  strike  the  Foo  Sing 
amidships,  and,  embarrassed  by  the  Chinese  boat,  caught  her 
bow  in  the  Foo  Sing's^  side.  A  hot  fire  was  poured  in  upon 
her  by  the  Chinese.  Her  commander  was  dangerously 
wounded,  and  one  of  her  crew  had  his  arm  broken.  At  last 
she  got  clear,  and  retired  down  streamjtowards  the  Enterprise, 
whose  surgeon  went  to  the  help  of  her  wounded,  feer  crew 
were  bespattered  with  blood  from  head  to  foot,  but  their  boat 
had  received  no  serious  injury.  They  had  not,  however, 
disabled^the  ^00  $ing+  which  was  slowly  steaming  ahead, 
when  a  second  torpedo  attack  was  made  by  a  launch  from  the 

Volt  a.  The  torpedo  this  time  exploded  close  to  her  screw, 

and  completely  disabled  her.    She  drifted  slowly  down  stream 


*  Messrs.  Roche  and  Cowen.  "The  French  at  Foochow,"  p.  25.  The 
statement  seems  to  me  most  improbable,  but  I  give  it  for  what  it  is  worth. 


THE  FRENCH  IN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST. 


9 


upon  the  French  vessels,  which  received  her  with  a  terrible 
fire.  A  minute  or  two  later  she  was  boarded  and  carried,  but 
she  was  too  much  injured  to  float,  and  quickly  went  to  the 
bottom. 

Meantime,  the  French  fire  upon  the  Chinese  was  terrific. 
In  the  stillness  of  the  air  the  smoke  hung  heavily  about  the 
ships,  but  it  could  not  save  the  unfortunate  Chinese.  The 
Volta  was  hotly  engaged  with  the  junks,  and  had  a  shot 
through  her  chart-house,  which  killed  her  pilot,  and  all  but 
killed  Admiral  Courbet.  She  retaliated  by  sending  the  junks  to 
the  bottom,  and  even  when  they  were  helpless  and  sinking,  con- 
tinued to  fire  her  machine-guns  into  them.  The  Chi-an  and^JV/ 
Yuen  could  offer  no  resistance  to  the  Villars  and  Dugnay, 
and  they  were  quickly  on  fire  and  sinking,  whilst  the  Chinese 
crews  fled  ashore.  The  Ching  Wei  alone  showed  heroism, 
and  for  a  time,  faced  the  D'  E stain g  bravely.  But  now  the 
Triomphante  was  coming  on,  having  passed  the  Chinese 
batteries  with  the  interchange  of  only  a  few  shots,  and  as  she 
neared  the  Ching  Wei,  fired  her  9/4-inch  guns  at  her.  A  shell 
from  one  of  these  struck  the  Chinese  vessel  in  the  stern,  and, 
passing  the  whole  length  of  the  ship,  burst  with  a  tremendous 
cloud  of  smoke  in  her  bow,  lifting  her  in  the  air  and  setting 
her  on  fire.  The  gunners  thereupon  jumped  overboard,  but 
the  officers  stuck  to  the  ship,  working  her  guns  with  their  own 
hands.  They  made  a  desperate  effort  to  run  her  alongside  of 
the  D'  E stain  g  and  sink  their  enemy  with  them,  by  exploding 
the  Ching  Wei's  magazine.  Attempting  this,  they  received  a 
tremendous  broadside  from  the  Villars ;  fresh  fires  broke  out  ; 
the  small-arms'  ammunition  exploded ;  and  the  Ching-  Wei 
went  to  the  bottom,  but  not  before  she  had  fired  one  lasf 
parting  shot  as  she  vanished  in  the  water.  In  seven  minutes 
from  the  first  shot  the  action  was  virtually  over,  and  every 
Chinese  ship  was  sunk  or  sinking.  The  Foo  Poo  had  run 
away  up  stream  at  the  commencement  of  the  fight.  Her 
captain  drove  her  ashore,  breaking  her  baxk,  gave  her  crew 
leave  of  absence   and  then  fled  himself.    A  second  Chinese 


io  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1884 

captain,  after  firing  one  broadside,  left  his  ship  with  his  crew, 
having  first  set  her  on  fire.  The  Lynxl  Aspic,  and  Vipere, 
proceeding  up  stream  after  the  Chinese  sloops,  were  now 
busied  in  shelling  the  Arsenal  and  the  shore  forts,  and  traces 
of  their  handiwork  soon  began  to  drift  down  the  river  towards 
the  heavier  ships.  At  2.8  a  Rendel  gunboat  came  round 
Pagoda  Point,  and  fired  her  16-ton  gun  at  the  Duguay,  but 
missed  her.  Immediately  the  guns  of  the  fleet  were  concen- 
trated upon  this  luckless  craft,  and  the  torrent  of  descending 
and  exploding  shells  was  so  great  that  it  literally  stopped  her 
way.  Two  minutes  she  remained  almost  stationary,  a  helpless 
target  ;  then,  with  a  crash,  her  magazine  exploded,  and  she 
dived  headlong  to  the  bottom.  At  2.20  a  mine  the  Chinese 
had  laid  under  the  dock  at  Foochow  exploded,  fired  either  by 
inadvertence  or  the  French  shells.  At  2.45  the  French  fleet, 
which  had  slackened  its  fire,  again  opened  on  the  Chinese 
forts.  All  the  while  burning  Chinese  vessels  were  drifting 
down  past  the  neutral  shipsT]  One  sloop  was  seen  in  a  great 
blaze  with  crowds  of  Chinamen  close  under  her  stern  clinging 
to  her  hissing  rudder-shaft  ;  one  of  these  had  had  his  thigh 
shot  close  off,  and  many  were  terribly  wounded.  The  water 
was  full  of  wreckage  and  Chinamen,  six  or  seven  together, 
clinging  desperately  to  masts  or  timbers.  Many  were  rescued 
by  the  English  and  American  launches. 

The  French  machine-guns  were  extremely  effective.  "  The 
continued  hail  of  shell  from  Hotchkiss  cannon  in  the  tops  of 
the  French  men-of-war  upon  their  antagonists,  swept  them 
down  like  wheat  before  the  mower.  Relays  of  men  could  not 
be  brought  up  from  below  fast  enough  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in 
the  gun-crews.  The  diminutive  shell  came  crashing  through 
the  sides  and  bulwarks  of  the  ship.  Splinters,  flying  in  every 
direction,  killed  many  more."* 

^About  four  o'clock  the  French  ceased  their  fire,  when  at 
once  the  land  batteries  redoubled  their  exertions.  Flaming 


*  Roche  and  Cowen,  43. 


1884]  THE  FRENCH  IN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST. 


11 


rafts,  set  loose  by  the  Chinese,  came  drifting  down  upon 
Admiral  Courbet's  ships.  Courbet  re-opened  the  duel  with  the 
forts,  whilst  the  rafts  were  caught  and  towed  aside.  At  4.55 
the  fleet  anchored  for  the  night  out  of  range.  The  ships  were 
not  much  injured.  The  Volt  a  had  one  hole  a  little  above  the 
water-line.  Her  pilot  and  two  men  at  the  wheel  were  killed, 
whilst  six  powder  passers,  on  the  berth  deck,  had  been  cut 
down  by  the  shot  which  hulled  the  ship  on  the  water-line. 
The  Duguay  _2lt\6.  the  other  ships  had  the  most  trivial  hurts. 
The  French  loss  is  reported,  by  eye-witnesses,  to  have  been 
twelve  killed,  though  in  the  official  despatch  of  Courbet  it  is 
only  given  at  six  killed,  with  twenty-seven  wounded.  The 
Chinese  loss  is  returned  at  521  killed  and  150  wounded  ;  and, 
in  addition,  there  were  a  large  number  of  men  missing!! 

This  fight,  if  fight  we  can  call  it,  has  been  described  by 
French  writers  as  a  most  splendid  achievement.  "  The  great 
glory  of  Foochow,"  is  the  title  given.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
was  little  more  than  slaughter — necessary  no  doubt,  but  yet 
deserving  no  extravagant  laudations.  It  may  be  placed 
in  the  same  class  writh  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria.  Both 
operations  were  undertaken  against  men  who  lacked  training, 
and  in  each  case  very  heavy  loss  was  inflicted  by  the  Western 
force  upon  its  Oriental  opponent.  Courbet's  great  reputation 
rests  rather  upon  his  professional  ardour,  and  the  skill  with 
which  he  formed  his  plans,  than  upon  great  performances  on 
e  scene  of  action.  His  enemy  was  contemptible^ 
The  day  after  the  battle  the  French  once  more  bombarded 
the  Arsenal.  That  night  the  Chinese  attempted  a  torpedo 
attack,  but  on  being  discovered  by  the  search-lights  of  the 
fleet  ran  ignominiously.  On  August  25th  Courbet  moved  his 
flag  from  the  Volt  a  to  the  Duguay,  and  prepared  to  descend 
the  river,  his  ships  being  placed  in  the  following  order : 
Triomphante,  Duguay,  Villars,  D' Estaing,  Volta,  and  the 
three  gunboats.  A  succession  of  Chinese  batteries  fringed  the 
banks,  but  most  of  the  guns  pointed  down  stream,  and  little 
preparation  had  been  made  against  the  possibility  of  an  attack 


12 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


from  above.  The  French  ships,  except  the  Triomphante,  had 
ascended  the  river  before  the  declaration  of  war,  and  thus  they 
were  in  a  peculiarly  favourable  position  to  effect  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  forts.  For  this  they  used  their  0/4  and  7'6-inch 
guns,  the  5-5  and  4-inch  weapons,  being  too  small  to  make 
much  impression.  Whilst  they  were  at  work  the  cannon  of 
the  Galissoniere  and  Bayard,  two  ironclads  similar  in  type  to 
the  Triomphante,  could  be  heard  bombarding  the  forts  on  the 
lower  reaches.  On  the  25th  a  battery  on  Couting  Island  was 
silenced  by  fire  from  the  rear,  and  its  one  8-inch  gun  burst 
by  a  landing-party.  The  fleet  then  entered  the  narrows  of 
Mingan,  on  which  a  number  of  works  bore.  On  the  26th 
these  were  attacked  in  succession  by  the  Duguay  and  Triom- 
phante,  and  silenced  one  by  one.  On  the  27th  landing  parties 
destroyed  the  guns  with  gun-cotton,  after  which  the  ships 
weighed  and  proceeded  to  the  Kimpai  Narrows.  On  the 
afternoon  of  that  day  a  battery  there  was  silenced,  and  during 
the  night  a  number  of  junks  loaded  with  stone,  which  had 
been  placed  in  readiness  to  block  the  channel,  were  attacked 
and  destroyed  by  the  French  boats,  covered  by  the  gun- 
vessels. 

Next  day  the  squadron,  reinforced  by  the  Sdone  and  Chateau 
Renault,  proceeded  to  force  the  narrows.  The  passage  here 
is  little  over  400  yards  wide,  and  on  either  side  of  it  wooded 
hills  rise  steeply.  Two  strong  works,  armed  with  7-inch  and 
8J-inch  guns,  had  to  be  silenced.  This  operation  was  very 
skilfully  conducted.  The  Duguay  and  Triomphante  anchored 
with  springs  to  their  cables.  These  were  paid  out,  till, 
dropping  down  stream,  the  ships'  batteries  would  bear  upon 
the  first  embrasure.  On  this  the  whole  fire  was  concentrated, 
and,  needless  to  say,  at  such  short  range,  the  work  quickly 
crumbled  away,  and  the  gun  was  silenced.  These  tactics 
were  repeated  with  embrasure  after  embrasure,  till  at  noon 
on  the  28th  the  Chinese  had  abandoned  their  forts.  Courbet 
then  led  his  fleet  through  the  narrows,  and  after  forty  days' 
absence  rejoined  the  ships  which  had  remained  below. 


Map  XX. 


1885]         THE  FRENCH  IN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST.  13 

The  next  important  action  in  the  East  was  the  affair  of 
Sheipoo,  which  took  place  on  the  night  of  February  14th — 15th, 
1885.  Two  Chinese  vessels,  the  cruiser  Yu-yen,  mounting 
one  8J-inch,  eight  6-inch,  and  twelve  4' 7-inch  Krupps,  and 
the  despatch-boat  Tchen  Kiang,  carrying  one  6'3-indi,  and  six 
47-inch  guns,  had  been  cut  off  by  the  French,  and  were 
lying  between  Sheipoo  and  Tungnun  Island.  They  were 
watched  by  the  French  warships  Eclazreur,  Nielly,  Bayard, 
Aspic,  and  Sdone,  which  effectually  prevented  their  escape. 
As  the  navigation  of  these  waters  is  intricate  and  difficult  for 
heavy  ships,  Admiral  Courbet  decided  to  attack  them  with 
torpedo-boats,  on  the  night  of  the  14th.  For  the  command  of 
the  two  launches  selected,  he  designated  Lieutenants  Gourdon 
and  Duboc.  The  boats  were  30  feet  long,  carrying  spar- 
torpedoes  loaded  with  281bs.  of  guncotton  ;  the  engines  wTere 
constructed  to  work  silently,  and  picked  coal  was  burnt. 
The  colour  of  the  hulls  was  black. 

At  eight  o'clock  the  boats  were  made  ready,  and  at  11.30 
M.  Gourdon  started  from  the  Bayard.  At  12,  M.  Duboc  was 
to  follow.  M.  Gourdon*  gives  us  the  following  account  of  the 
expedition.  "  The  moon  was  new,  and  the  night  absolutely 
dark,  so  that  it  was  a  matter  of  great  difficulty  for  the  vidette 
boat  and  launch,  which  were  accompanying  my  torpedo  vessel, 
to  keep  together.  We  repeatedly  lost  and  found  one  another. 
Our  difficulties  were  increased  by  the  fact  that,  from  fear  of 
injuring  the  spar-torpedo,  I  could  not  go  close  to  the  vidette 
boat,  and  the  strong  south-easterly  current  was  another 
disturbing  factor.  A  turn  brought  us  clear  of  the  Ngew  Tew 
Straits  ;  then  leaving  these  narrows  we  tested  our  conductors 
and  their  insulation,  and  ran  the  spar  in  and  out.  All  worked 
well.  And  now  we  go  straight  for  the  Chinese,  but  they  are 
not  at  the  anchorage  which  they  occupied  during  the  day. 
They  have  disappeared.  It  is  3.15  a.m.,  and  we  steam  in 
search  of  them.     At  3.30,  I  see  a  great  black  mass  in  front 

*  I  have  compressed  the  account  given,  but  without,  I  trust,  losing  the  spirit 
of  the  narrative  or  impairing  its  accuracy. 


i4  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1885 

of  Sheipoo,  with  four  or  five  lights  on  shore.  The  vidette 
boat  is  detached  to  inform  Duboc  of  her  whereabouts.  I  get 
her  three  masts  in  line  and  move  slowly  on.  On  shore  there 
are  numerous  lights  ;  are  they  signals  ?  The  loud  rattle  of 
my  boat's  engines  prevents  me  from  hearing  anything.  When 
200  yards  from  the  Chinese,  I  run  out  my  spar,  and  connect 
the  firing  wires  with  the  battery,  then  '  Full  speed  ahead.' 
The  frigate  lights  up  ;  on  port  and  on  starboard  there  are 
spurts  of  flame.  Are  these  the  Nordenfelts  ?  On  we  go 
swiftly.  Then  the  order  'Astern,'  and  a  violent  shock.  The 
torpedo  has  exploded  ;  the  boat  is  violently  lifted  and  strikes 
the  enemy's  side,  catching  in  it.  ' Astern  quickly,'  is  my 
order.  The  quarter-master  is  trying  to  push  us  clear,  when  a 
Chinaman  looks  out  of  a  port-hole  and  gets  his  fist  in  his  eye. 
All  the  while  the  boat  is  stationary,  and  steam  escaping  from 
her  valves.  The  oil  feed  has  been  smashed  by  the  shock  ;  I 
plug  it  with  a  bayonet ;  still  the  boat  does  not  move.  Our 
spar  has  caught  and  must  be  abandoned.  It  is  freed  and  falls; 
the  boat  goes  astern  at  last,  and  leaves  the  lights  of  the  frigate. 
Duboc' s  boat  has  come  up  now,  and  I  wait  to  help  it,  in  case 
it  needs  assistance.  Meanwhile,  the  Chinese  ships  are  firing 
on  each  other,  and  the  men  ashore  on  both.  A  marine  falls 
killed  by  a  bullet.  Through  the  hail  of  projectiles,  Duboc 
advances,  passes  to  starboard,  and  explodes  his  torpedo,  then 
retires.  We  meet ;  '  What  news  ?  I  have  a  man  killed.' 
'  We've  not  a  scratch.'  We  cannot  find  the  vidette,  which 
was  to  show  a  red  light.  I  take  Duboc  in  tow,  and  we  are 
off."*  Whilst  retreating,  the  boats  experienced  some  little 
delay  through  the  towing  rope  getting  caught  in  the  screw  of 
the  leader,  and  then  through  Gourdon's  craft  running  aground. 
He  got  her  off,  and  rejoined  the  Sdone  soon  after  ten  o'clock 
that  morning.  The  vidette-boat  saw  the  explosions,  and 
waited  till  six  o'clock,  but  then  as  the  boats  did  not  re- 
appear, gave  them  up  for  lost.  It  was  a  welcome  surprise 
when  they  returned  safe  and  sound. 

#  Loir,  215-8. 


The  Chinese  Sloop  Wei  Yuen 

See  p.  132. 


Plate  XX. 


The  Chinese  Cruiser  King  Yuen. 

See  p.  64. 


1885]  THE  FRENCH  IN  TUNIS  AND  THE  EAST. 


15 


On  reconnoitring  the  two  Chinese  ships,  it  was  discovered 
that  both  had  sunk.  As  only  one  had  been  torpedoed,  this 
must  have  been  due  to  the  carelessness  of  the  Chinese,  who 
doubtless  fired  into  friends  in  the  hurry  and  excitement  of  the 
attack.  This  is  a  serious  danger  in  all  night  engagements 
with  torpedo-boats,  as  the  English  manoeuvres  have  shown. 

One  or  two  questions  of  importance  in  international  law 
were  raised  during  the  war.  On  October  20th,  1884,  Courbet 
proclaimed  the  blockade  of  all  the  ports  and  roads  of  southern 
Formosa.  England,  however,  protested  against  this  blockade 
as  inefficient,  and  the  proclamation  was  withdrawn.  On 
February  20th,  1885,  the  French  Government  declared  that  it 
would  treat  rice,  when  bound  for  open  Chinese  ports,  as 
contraband.  Four  days  later  this  declaration  of  contraband 
was  restricted  to  cases  where  the  rice  was  being  conveyed  to 
the  northern  ports  of  China.  In  a  note  the  French  Govern- 
ment explained  that  the  stoppage  of  supplies  would  bring 
China  to  reason  with  less  injury  to  neutral  trade  than  would 
be  inflicted  by  a  close  blockade  of  the  Chinese  ports.  Protests 
were  made  both  by  the  English  minister  at  Pekin  and  the 
English  Government  at  home,  but  the  war  came  to  an  end  on 
April  7th,  1885,  before  the  point  at  issue  had  been  settled. 
In  the  course  of  the  war  French  cruisers  seized  lead  on 
English  ships  as  contraband,  though  it  was  a  regular  article  of 
trade  with  China.  They  also  used  Hong  Kong  as  their  base, 
coaling  and  refitting  there. 


CHAPTER  XVIJ 


Naval  Events  of  the  Chilian  Civil  War. 

January — August,  1891. 

In  January,  1891,  the  Chilian  fleet,  which  was  lying  off 
Valparaiso,  declared  against  the  government  of  President 
Balmaceda,  who  was  accused  by  the  Congressional  party  in 
Chili  of  aiming  at  a  dictatorship.  On  the  6th,  the  ironclad 
Blanco  Encalada,  which  we  have  met  before,  the  fast  Elswick- 
built  cruiser,  Esmeralda,  which  had  replaced  Arturo  Prat's 
gallant  little  craft,  the  O' '  Higgins  and  Magallanes,  put  to  sea. 
That  night  they  were  joined  by  the  Cochrane,  and  returning 
on  the  next  day,  took  possession  of  the  Huascar,  which  was 
lying,  out  of  commission,  in  the  harbour.  Having  prepared 
her  for  sea,  they  added  her  to  their  squadron,  of  which  Captain 
Montt  took  command.  They  also  laid  their  hands  upon  every 
steamer  which  carried  the  Chilian  flag,  including  some  mail 
steamers  of  the  South  American  Steamship  Company.  The 
Imperial,  however,  the  fastest  vessel  of  the  line,  happened, 
with  another  vessel,  to  be  laid  up,  and  consequently  escaped 
seizure. 

President  Balmaceda  was  thus  left  without  a  sea-going 
warship  on  the  coast.  He  had  the  Imperial,  which  he  armed, 
and  which  could  perhaps  accomplish  fifteen  knots  an  hour, 
and  he  had  a  dozen  torpedo-boats  of  various  patterns,  mostly 
equipped  with  spar-torpedoes.  Two  torpedo-gunboats  of  the 
most  recent  design,  were  on  their  way  out  from  Europe. 
Their  names  were  the  Almirante  Condell,  and  the  Almirante 
Lynch.    They  were  steel  vessels  of  750  tons  displacement, 


1 891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  17 


built  by  Messrs.  Laird,  of  Birkenhead,  and  launched  in  the 
previous  year.  With  water-tube  boilers  they  had  steamed 
twenty-one  knots  under  forced  draught  on  the  measured  mile, 
and  with  a  bunker  capacity  of  175  tons,  could  carry  coal 
enough  for  2500  knots  at  economical  speed.  Their  armament 
consisted  of  two  14-pounder  Hotchkiss  quick-firers  placed 
en  echelon  forward  on  their  deck,  and  one  aft,  besides  four 
3-pounder  quick-firers  and  two  Maxims.  They  carried  four 
torpedo-tubes  for  the  discharge  of  the  14-inch  Whitehead 
torpedo.  The  Capitan  Prat  was  building  for  the  Chilian 
Government  in  Europe,  but  was  not  ready  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  ;  and  two  other  cruisers,  the  Presidente  Errazuriz, 
and  the  Presidente  Pinto,  were  detained  at  La  Seyne,  in 
France,  till  the  French  Supreme  Court  should  decide  whether 
they  were  to  be  permitted  to  depart.  Week  by  week  the 
Balmacedist  papers  reported  the  movements  of  these  ships,  as 
if  they  were  actually  on  their  way  to  Valparaiso,  and  thus, 
perhaps,  deceived  the  people  of  Valparaiso  and  Santiago,  if 
not  the  Congressionalists.  Balmaceda  held  the  forts  of 
Valparaiso,  where  numerous  heavy  guns  were  mounted,  and 
had  at  his  back  an  army  of  40,000  men. 

The  Congressionalists  had  the  ironclads  Blanco,  Cochrane, 
and  Huascar,  of  which  full  details  have  already  been  given. 
All  three  had  been  re-armed  with  the  8-inch  Armstrong  breech- 
loader, and  the  two  central-battery  ships  carried  each  four 
6-pounder  quick-firers,  four  Nordenfelts,  and  two  Gatlings,  in 
addition  to  their  heavy  guns.  The  speed  of  the  three  cannot 
have  exceeded  eleven  knots.  Perhaps  the  most  formidable 
vessel  of  the  squadron  was  the  Esmeralda,  the  first  fast 
protected  cruiser,  launched  at  Newcastle  in  1884,  of  3000  tons 
displacement,  and  18*3  knots  speed  on  the  measured  mile.  She 
carried  an  end-to-end  i-inch  steel  protective  deck,  a  little 
below  the  water-line,  under  which  were  boilers,  engines,  and 
magazines.  Above  the  water-line  she  had  considerable 
protection  from  her  coal-bunkers.  Fore  and  aft  were  mounted 
1  o-inch  25-ton  breechloaders,  and  amidships,  six  6-inch  breech- 
Vol.  11.  C 


ig  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1891 

loaders,  three  on  each  side  in  sponsons,  with  steel  bullet-proof 
shields.  In  her  bunkers  she  carried  600  tons  of  coal,  which 
would  enable  her  to  steam  2000  miles  at  ten  knots.  She  was 
a  good  sea-boat  though  so  heavily  gunned,  and  her  speed, 
which  was  in  1891  sixteen  knots  or  a  little  less,  made  her  a 
dangerous  enemy  to  the  craft  which  Balmaceda  possessed. 
The  other  Congressional  ships  took  little  part  in  the  struggle, 
or  have  been  already  described.  The  Aconcagua,  however, 
deserves  a  word.  She  was  a  mail  steamer  of  4100  tons  gross, 
and  had  been  armed  with  two  5-inch  guns,  one  40-pounder, 
and  several  machine  guns.    Her  speed  was  twelve  knots. 

The  physical  configuration  of  Chili,  to  which  we  have 
already  alluded,"*  rendered  sea  power  of  peculiar  importance  in 
this  civil  war,  as  in  the  struggle  between  Peru  and  Chili. 
Since  1880,  the  Chilian  frontier  had  been  moved  north 
450  miles  by  the  annexation  of  the  arid  and  waterless  Peru- 
vian provinces  of  Tacna  and  Tarapaca,  and  the  Bolivian 
department  of  Antofagasta,  territories  which  are  rich  in 
nitrate  and  guano  deposits,  and  which  for  that  reason  are  a 
source  of  great  wealth  to  the  country.  Dues  levied  on  the 
export  of  these  commodities  formed  no  inconsiderable  part  of 
the  Chilian  revenue,  so  that  whoever  held  the  north  held  the 
purse  strings.  Land  communication  between  the  nitrate 
ports  and  Valparaiso  or  Santiago  there  is  none  ;  in  fact,  the 
towns  along  the  coast  might  be  regarded  strategically  as  a 
series  of  small  islands,  each  separated  from  the  other  by  seas 
which  are  represented  by  deserts.  The  Congressionalists 
with  their  mobile  naval  force  were  thus  at  an  enormous 
advantage,  of  which  they  proceeded  to  make  the  fullest  use. 
The  small  Balmacedist  garrisons  in  the  various  nitrate  ports 
were  attacked  one  by  one  and  compelled  to  surrender. 

The  first  interchange  of  shots  was  at  Valparaiso  on  the  9th, 
when  pickets  on  shore  fired  on  a  boat  in  the  harbour,  to 
which  the  warships  replied  from  their  tops.    The  Congres- 


*  Vol.  i.  314. 


1819]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  19 

sionalists  procured  their  supplies  from  the  ships  which  they 
had  seized,  and  from  the  coast  to  the  north  and  south,  whither 
their  vessels  were  despatched  to  raise  recruits  and  obtain  food. 
At  a  later  date  they  actually  drew  coal,  stores,  and  provisions 
from  Valparaiso  itself,  by  a  most  ingenious  use  of  neutral 
ships.  These  would  come  into  the  harbour  and  load  the 
stores  most  required  by  the  insurgents,  and  then  proceeding 
up  the  coast  would  be  brought  to  by  Congressional  warships, 
and  would,  under  the  pretext  of  compulsion  to  satisfy  their 
consuls,  sell  coal  and  food.  President  Balmaceda  knew 
perfectly  well  what  was  happening,  but  owing  to  the  presence 
of  strong  foreign  squadrons  on  the  coast,  found  it  expedient 
to  shut  his  eyes. 

On  January  16th  the  only  Congressionalist  ship  in  Valparaiso 
Bay  was  the  ironclad  Blanco,  which  was  quietly  lying  at  her 
moorings.  Her  business  off  the  port  was  to  procure  supplies 
and  forward  them  north.  There  was  no  blockade  as  yet,  and 
indeed,  when  the  Congressionalists  endeavoured  to  close  the 
harbour  and  to  stop  all  trade  at  a  later  date,  the  foreign 
consuls  refused  to  permit  such  action.  She  was  distant  from 
Fort  Bueras,  which  was  on  her  starboard  beam  150  feet  above 
the  water  level,  600  yards,  and  from  Fort  Valdivia  1200. 
Suddenly,  at  5  a.m.,  these  two  forts  and  Fort  Andes  fired  each 
a  round  at  her.  In  Fort  Bueras  a  20-ton  10-inch  muzzle- 
loader  was  used,  firing  a  common  shell  of  450  lbs.  weight, 
filled,  and  fitted  with  a  time  and  percussion  fuse.  The  charge 
on  this  occasion  was  i3olbs.  of  pebble  powder,  a  very  heavy 
one.  The  shell  struck  the  8-inch  armour  on  her  starboard 
battery  just  upon  a  bolt,  and  bursting  outside  drove  the  bolt 
through.  It  disabled  an  8-inch  gun  and  made  a  large  hole  in 
the  deck  above,  but  did  no  other  damage.  The  shell  from 
Valdivia  was  fired  from  a  Krupp  8-2-inch  10-ton  gun,  with  a 
charge  of  ioolbs.  powder,  and  weighed  25olbs.  It  struck  the 
Blanco's  stern  outside  the  armour,  and,  entering  a  compart- 
ment, where  a  number  of  the  crew  were  sleeping  on  deck  or  in 
hammocks,  was  shattered  by  the  5-inch  iron  bulkhead  which 

C  2 


2o 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


[1891 


protects  the  central  battery  from  raking  fire.  Fortunately  for 
the  forty  men  asleep  in  the  compartment  it  was  charged,  not 
with  powder,  but  with  sand,  yet  even  so  it  killed  six  men  and 
wounded  six  others,  three  mortally.  One  of  the  killed,  who 
was  in  the  line  of  fire,  was  horribly  mutilated.  On  its  way 
into  this  compartment  the  projectile  had  passed  through  the 
captain's  cabin,  and  carried  the  pillow  of  an  officer  sleeping 
there  from  under  his  head,  without  hurting  him.  The  third 
shell  missed.  After  this  the  Blanco  slipped  her  moorings  and 
stood  in  to  the  town,  making  fast  to  a  buoy  off  the  Custom 
House.  Here  she  could  not  be  fired  at  without  the  risk  of 
projectiles  dropping  into  the  town.  At  night  she  left  the 
harbour,  and  henceforward  watched  it  from  a  distance.  The 
0)  Higgins  joined  her,  and  pitched  some  shells  from  time  to 
time  at  the  torpedo  depot  outside  the  bay.  Meanwhile 
Balmaceda  fitted  out  his  torpedo-boats,  which  were  not  much 
the  worse  for  the  Oi H iggins'  fire,  and  armed  the  Imperial 
and  Maipo,  both  merchant  steamers. 

About  the  same  date  the  rest  of  the  Congressionalist  squad- 
ron was  busy  in  the  north  laying  its  hands  upon  the  nitrate 
ports.  Iquique  was  the  first  place  to  be  attacked,  but  in  it  was 
Colonel  Soto,  with  a  Balmacedist  garrison,  who  gave  no  signs 
of  willingness  to  surrender.  A  blockade  was  maintained  by 
the  Cochrane  and  other  ships  for  some  days,  and  the  Con- 
gressionalists,  concentrating  their  troops,  marched  upon  it  by 
land  from  Pisagua.  After  a  check  the  town  was  captured  on 
the  1 6th  of  February,  but  three  days  later  the  Balmacedists 
re-entered  the  town,  driving  the  Congressionalists  to  the 
Custom  House.  The  rebel  ships  supported  their  men  ashore, 
and  vigorously  bombarded  the  town,  the  possession  of  which 
was  of  vital  importance  to  them.  In  the  afternoon  a  dynamite 
magazine  blew  up  and  the  town  took  fire.  On  this  the  English 
commander  on  the  Pacific  Station,  Rear-Admiral  Hotham, 
invited  the  Balmacedist  and  Congressional  commanders  to  a 
conference  on  board  his  flagship,  and  succeeded  in  arranging 
aii  armistice.    Next  day  Soto  evacuated  the  town,  though  he 


Map  XXI. 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  21 

should  have  held  to  it  to  the  last ;  and  the  insurgents  obtained 
control  of  the  richest  of  the  nitrate  ports. 

On  January  27th  an  attempt  was  made  by  a  steam-launch  of 
the  Blanco  to  destroy  the  armed  steamer  Imperial  with  a 
Whitehead.  The  torpedo  missed  the  Balmacedist  vessel,  pass- 
ing unpleasantly  near  the  British  mail-steamer  Britannia. 
After  this  the  torpedo  boats  in  the  harbour,  which  had  so  far 
remained  inactive,  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of  Balmaceda's 
officers  to  be  permitted  to  take  them  out  against  the  enemy, 
were  more  on  the  alert  and  patrolled  the  harbour.  On 
March  8th  the  Maipo,  an  armed  steamer,  was  carried  off  by 
her  crew  to  the  Congressionalists.  On  March  21st  the 
torpedo-gunboats  Lynch  and  Condell  arrived.  They  were  in 
very  bad  order,  as  their  English  engineers  had  left  them  at 
Buenos  Aires,  not  caring  to  face  the  risks  of  war,  and  the  men 
who  had  brought  them  on  had  damaged  their  boilers,  burning 
through  many  of  the  tubes.  These  were  replaced  at  Valparaiso, 
and  a  French  torpedo  artificer  was  engaged  to  handle  and 
adjust  the  Whiteheads. 

At  last  they  were  ready,  and  on  April  1 6th  left  Valparaiso 
in  the  company  of  the  Imperial.  On  board  this  ship  was  Mr. 
Hervey,  the  f<  Times  "  correspondent,  whilst  Captain  Moraga, 
of  the  Condell,  was  in  command  of  the  small  squadron.  Under 
him  was  Captain  Fuentes,  in  charge  of  the  Lynch.  Both  these 
officers  had  passed  through  the  torpedo  school  at  Valparaiso, 
and  both  were  admirable  disciplinarians,  men  of  dash  and 
determined  courage,  beloved  by  their  crews.  Just  before  he 
left  Valparaiso,  Mr.  Hervey  had  somewhat  indiscreetly 
telegraphed  to  the  "  Times"  that  he  was  leaving  with  a  torpedo 
expedition,  and  the  news  had  been  cabled  back  from  Europe 
on  its  appearance  to  Chili,  and  on  April  21st  it  was  published 
in  the  Congressionalist  journal  "  Patria."  Hence  the  in- 
surgents received  some  warning  of  what  was  to  be  attempted. 

After  some  days  of  constant  small-arms  and  torpedo  practice 
at  sea,  the  three  vessels  left  Quinteros  Bay  on  April  21st,  the 
Condell  and  Lynch  hugging  the  shore,  and  the  Imperial 


22  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1891 

further  out.  No  lights  were  carried  at  night,  the  better  to 
escape  the  Congressionalist  ships,  though  of  these  there  was 
only  one,  the  Esmeralda,  faster  than  the  Imperial,  and  even 
she  would,  in  fine  weather,  have  been  distanced  by  the  torpedo- 
gunboats.  The  destination  of  the  squadron  was  Caldera  Bay, 
450  miles  north  of  Valparaiso.  According  to  the  information 
which  Captain  Moraga  had  received,  the  revolted  fleet  was 
at  anchor  there,  without  its  torpedo-nets,  which  had 
been  left  at  the  outbreak  of  the  insurrection  in  store  at 
Valparaiso.  On  the  22nd  the  Imperial  lost  sight  of  the 
gunboats  at  dusk,  and  heaving-to  off  Caldera  waited  for 
signals  from  them.  The  night  passed  without  any  being 
made,  but  an  officer  on  board  believed  that  he  heard  firing 
towards  Caldera. 

The  gun  boats  reached  Huasco  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd, 
where  news  was  received  that  at  Caldera  were  the  Blanco, 
Cochrane,  and  Huascar,  with  a  corvette  and  three  transports. 
Captain  Moraga,  therefore,  summoned  Captain  Fuentes  on 
board  his  vessel  and  arranged  with  him  the  plan  of  attack. 
He  did  not  stop  to  take  Mr.  Hervey  on  board,  as  had  been 
agreed,  but  went  straight  on  to  Caldera.  A  little  later  the 
Lynch,  which  had  been  running  her  torpedoes,  spoke  a  boat 
and  received  the  intelligence  that  three  Congressionalist 
vessels  had  already  left  Caldera,  and  that  if  the  torpedo- 
gunboats  wanted  to  catch  the  others  they  would  have  to  make 
haste.  The  two  boats  increased  their  speed,  steaming  abreast, 
and  at  half-past  three  in  the  morning  found  themselves  well 
to  the  north  of  Caldera.  The  plan  decided  upon  was  as 
follows  : — Entering  the  bay  from  the  north,  the  Condell  was  to 
lead  by  200  yards.  Both  vessels  were  to  make  for  the 
insurgent  ships,  the  Condell  upon  the  starboard  side  and  the 
Lynch  upon  the  port  side.  They  were  to  creep  up  as  close  as 
possible,  and,  first  of  all,  to  use  their  bow  tubes  ;  then  after- 
wards, the  training  tubes  abeam.  The  night  was  dull  and 
cloudy,  and  though  there  was  a  moon,  it  was,  from  time  to 
time,  hidden  by  the  clouds, 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  23 

At  3.30,  just  as  the  day  was  dawning,  Moraga  led  the  way 
into  the  harbour.  In  the  uncertain  light  the  hostile  ship 
could  be  discerned  from  the  bridge  of  the  Condell,  lying  at 
anchor  in  the  western  curve  of  the  bay.  The  Lynch  was  very 
close  astern,  not  more  than  twenty  yards  off  her  leader. 
When  the  position  of  the  enemy  had  been  ascertained  by 
Moraga,  he  headed  at  half-speed  for  the  larger  of  the  two 
vessels,  which  he  imagined  to  be  either  the  Blanco  or 
Cochrane.  Astern  of  her  was  the  Biobio,  a  small  transport, 
which  he  mistook  for  the  Huascar.  When  only  a  hundred 
yards  off  he  fired  his  bow  tube  at  the  ironclad,  but  the  torpedo 
just  missed  her,  going  astern,  and  passed  very  close  to  the 
Biobio.  An  instant  later  he  turned  his  helm  hard  to  starboard, 
and  ordered  Lieutenant  Vargus,  who  was  in  charge  of  the 
port  tube,  to  fire  a  second  torpedo,  which,  he  thinks,  hit  the 
target.*  Just  at  this  moment  the  ironclad  opened  a  sharp  fire, 
using  small-arms,  quick-firers,  and  heavy  guns.  The  Condell, 
going  full-speed,  now  discharged  her  third  torpedo,  which 
missed.  But  the  Blanco 's  gunners  had  not  noticed  the  Lynch 
creeping  up  behind  the  Condell,  and  had  concentrated  all 
their  fire  upon  the  latter.  The  Lynch  was  able  to  come  on 
unmolested  till  within  150  yards  of  the  big  ship,  when  she 
fired  her  bow  torpedo,  which  missed.  Turning,  she  fired  her 
broadside  tube  and  hit  the  Blanco  amidships.  The  torpedo 
exploded  with  great  violence,  and  two  minutes  later  the  Blanco 
went  to  the  bottom.  The  Biobio  lowered  her  boats,  and  others 
put  off  from  the  shore,  saving  between  them  ninety-six  officers 
and  men.  When  the  ironclad  opened  fire,  and  it  was  clear 
that  the  torpedo  vessels  were  discovered,  they  replied  to  her 
discharge  with  deadly  effect  from  their  Hotchkiss  14-pounders 
and  3-pounders.  Seven  minutes  only  elapsed  between  the 
discharge  of  the  first  and  last  torpedoes.  After  the  Blanco 
had  sunk,  the  two  torpedo-gunboats  left  the  bay  at  full  speed. 

*  In  this  he  was  probably  mistaken.  The  Congressional  account  mentions 
only  the  bow  torpedo  of  the  Lynch,  and  does  not  allude  to  these  two,  which 
perhaps  dived.    But  inconsistencies  in  such  a  matter  are  only  to  be  expected. 


24 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


The  above  is  Captain  Moraga's  official  account  of  the  action. 
Mr.  Hervey  adds  some  interesting  details.  The  first  torpedo 
fired  by  the  Lynch  went  straight  to  the  bottom  ;  a  second 
steered  wide  ;  and  the  third,  which  had  always  run  badly  in 
practice,  alone  struck  the  Blanco*  A  torpedo  was  after- 
wards picked  up  in  the  bay,  and  was  found  to  be  a  Mark  IV. 
Fiume  Whitehead,  set  for  600  yards  and  to  sink.  The  pistol 
had  been  altered  unskilfully. 

What  was  the  Blanco  doing  to  be  thus  taken  off  her  guard? 
we  may  ask  ;  and  to  her  proceedings  and  the  Congressionalist 
accounts  we  may  now  turn.  To  begin  with,  her  Captain,  Senor 
Goni,  was  under  the  impression  that  he  was  outside  the  range 
of  Balmaceda's  torpedo-boats,  and  never,  apparently,  gave  the 
least  thought  to  the  fast  and  formidable  gunboats.  He  may 
also  have  imagined,  as  is  said  to  be  the  case,  that  the  Presi- 
dent's boats  would  never,  from  patriotic  motives,  go  to  the 
length  of  sinking  a  Chilian  ship.  If  so,  he  was  singularly 
deceived.  On  this  particular  night  he  was  on  shore  with  a 
force  which  was  attempting  to  capture  Copiapo,  according 
to  one  account ;  according  to  other  stories,  at  a  banquet.  In 
his  official  report  he  speaks  as  if  he  had  been  on  board,  and 
his  own  evidence  must  be  accepted.  The  following  is  the 
drift  of  the  Congressional  account :  The  ship  was  left  moored 
to  a  buoy,  with  enough  steam  up  to  move  her  engines.  Her 
armament,  in  addition  to  her  six  8-inch  breechloaders,  con- 
sisted of  three  6-pounder  Hotchkiss  quick-firers,  mounted  one 
on  each  side  of  the  forecastle,  and  one  on  the  poop.  She 
had  four  i-inch  Nordenfelts,  which  were  placed,  two  on  the 
fore-bridge,  one  on  the  after-bridge,  and  one  on  the  poop ;  one 
Hotchkiss  quick-firer  in  her  top  ;  and  two  Gatlings.  Of  her 
crew,  which  numbered  nominally  300  officers  and  men,  the 
greater  portion  were  ashore,  leaving  only  eighty  of  her 
original  complement.  The  vacancies  on  board  had  been  made 
up  to  288  by  adding  raw  recruits,  who  neither  knew  the  ship 


*  Hervey,  322.    According  to  Moraga,  the  Lynch  only  fired  two  torpedoes. 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN  WAR. 


nor  her  weapons,  and  could  not  therefore  be  expected  to  per- 
form well  in  the  trying  emergency  of  a  torpedo  attack.  Of 
her  two  steam-launches  one  was  undergoing  repair  on  deck, 
and  the  other  was  in  bad  order.  Neither  was  employed  on 
patrol  duty  on  the  night  of  the  22nd,  though  this  is  stated  to 
have  been  exceptional.  Seven  men  formed  the  total  of  her 
watch,  and  the  officers  on  deck  were  Commander  Gonzalez 
and  Aspirant  Aguilar.  At  about  4  a.m.,  or  probably  before, 
the  torpedo  vessels  were  seen  at  a  distance  of  no  less  than 
2000  yards.  The  alarm  was  given  at  once,  but  the  crew  were 
slow  in  going  to  quarters,  as  they  thought  that  this  was  merely 
a  false  alarm  to  practise  them.  It  is  also  said  that  the  bugler 
made  a  mistake,  and  sounded  the  ordinary  morning  call, 
instead  of  the  summons  to  go  to  quarters.  In  any  case  the 
leading  torpedo  vessel  was  500  yards  off  before  the  Blanco 
opened  fire.  This  does  not  altogether  agree  with  Captain 
Moraga's  version,  according  to  which  the  Blanco's  guns  were 
not  fired  till  the  Condell  was  well  within  a  hundred  yards.  Either 
then  the  Congressional  officers  over-estimated  the  distance, 
or  having  mistaken  the  Condell  for  a  friend,  and  allowed  her 
to  approach,  they  waited  till  her  torpedo  showed  her  to  be  an 
enemy.  Their  inaction  is  certainly  hard  to  explain  Accept- 
ing the  Congressional  statement,  an  interval  of  five  minutes 
at  least,  the  time  required  by  the  Condell  to  cover  1500  yards 
at  half  speed,  must  have  elapsed  between  the  giving  of  the 
alarm  and  the  commencement  of  fire.  The  Blanco  did  not 
use  her  search-light,  either  because  it  was  out  of  order,  or 
because  the  growing  daylight  was  strong  enough  to  enable  her 
men  to  see  their  enemy.  Nordenfelts  and  6-pounders  were 
the  first  to  open,  and  the  assailants  at  once  replied.  On 
giving  the  order  to  "  Man  and  arm  ship,"  the  port  engine  had 
been  ordered  to  go  ahead  and  the  starboard  one  to  go  astern, 
to  turn  the  ship  a  little.  The  engines  were  just  in  motion 
when  the  torpedoes  struck  her.  The  Lynch  and  Condell 
having  now  drawn  very  close,  the  Condell  fired  her  bow  tube, 
but  the  torpedo  ran  ashore  and  exploded,  after  which  the  two 


26 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


seemed  to  stop  their  engines.  Probably,  this  was  at  the 
moment  when  they  were  turning.  An  instant  later,  the 
Lynch  went  on  full  speed,  passing  the  Blanco* s  starboard 
quarter,  and  as  she  passed,  fired  simultaneously  two  torpedoes 
at  a  distance  of  100  yards*  The  Blanco  was  struck  on  the 
starboard  side,  near  the  dynamo  room.  The  shock  was 
tremendous.  Every  light  in  the  ship  was  extinguished,  one 
of  the  8-inch  guns  was  thrown  off  its  trunnions,  and  a  large 
number  of  men  were  killed.  Portions  of  iron  and  machinery 
flew  about  in  the  engine-room,  and  killed  or  wounded  six 
engineers.  The  only  one  who  escaped,  was  carried  by  the 
violent  rush  of  water  up  a  ventilator.  Though  orders  had 
been  given  to  close  all  water-tight  doors,  it  is  almost  certain 
that  this  had  not  been  done.  The  Blanco  began  to  heel 
heavily  to  starboard,  exposing  her  decks  to  the  pitiless  hail 
from  the  quick-firers  of  the  torpedo-gunboats,  which  mowed 
the  men  down  as  they  poured  up  from  below.  A  shell  from 
a  14-pounder  Hotchkiss  burst  in  her  fore  compartment,  killing 
Lieutenant  Pacheco.  The  ironclad  fired  one  of  her  heavy 
guns  in  reply,  but  the  shot  passed  over  the  torpedo  gunboats. 
The  ship  began  to  go  down  very  fast,  and  a  minute  later  the 
order  to  abandon  her  was  given.  At  that  moment,  the  sills 
of  her  battery  ports  were  level  with  the  water.  Of  her  total 
crew,  which  mustered  288  officers  and  men,  eleven  officers 
and  171  men  were  killed  or  drowned.  Forty  of  these  were 
said  to  have  fallen  victims  to  the  machine-guns  of  the  torpedo 
vessels. 

As  the  Blanco  sank,  her  men  saw  the  Lynch  steam  round 
under  her  stern  and  fire  a  torpedo  at  the  Bioblo.f  This 
missed,  as  it  was  said  to  have  passed  under  her.  The  gun- 
boats then  left  the  bay  apparently  uninjured.  The  only 
damage  done  to  either  of  them  by  the  Blanco,  was  the 

*  Apparently  from  Captain  Moraga's  account  she  only  fired  one  torpedo  at 
the  Blanco  in  this  position,  and  not  two  as  the  Congressional  version  and 
Mr.  Hervey  represent. 

f  This  movement,  if  it  took  place,  is  not  shown  on  the  plan. 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN  WAR. 


cutting  of  the  electric  tiring  apparatus  of  one  of  the  tubes 
just  after  the  torpedo  had  been  discharged.  Both  vessels 
had  gone  into  action  with  five  loaded  torpedoes  on  their 
decks,  so  that  a  hit  before  they  had  got  rid  of  any  of  them 
would  almost  certainly  have  been  fatal.  The  worst  damage 
was  self-inflicted,  caused  by  the  firing  of  their  14-pounder 
Hotchkisses,  which  jarred  them  so  much  that  some  of  their 
boiler  tubes  burst. 

The  official  report  of  Captain  Goni  was  as  follows  : 
"  To  my  regret,  I  have  to  inform  your  Excellency  that  the 
ship  under  my  command  was  sunk  this  morning,  at  half-past 
four  o'clock,  by  the  combined  attack  of  the  torpedo  vessels 
Lynch  and  Condell,  which  succeeded  in  hitting  the  Blanco 
with  six  out  of  seven  torpedoes  fired.  We  have  lost  one-half 
of  our  crew,  including  amongst  the  officers, Paymaster  Guzman, 
Lieutenant  Pacheco,  Aspirants  Soto,  and  Aguilar,  and 
numerous  engineers.  I  have  also  to  lament  the  loss  of  Don 
Enrique  Valdes  Vergara.  The  torpedo-gunboats  received  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  Blanco  before  she  went  down,  and  after- 
wards from  the  Aconcagua ,  when,  on  leaving  Carrizal,  she 
entered  the  harbour.  We  are,  however,  unable  to  ascertain 
what  damage  they  have  suffered.  The  ship  is  lying  on  her 
starboard  side,  with  the  tops  of  her  bridges  out  of  water.  1 
believe  we  shall  be  able  to  recover  the  guns  on  the  upper 
deck,  and  the  others  later.    I  have  a  diver  here." 

There  is  some  discrepancy  as  to  the  number  of  torpedoes 
which  hit  the  Blanco  and  exploded.  According  to  Moraga 
six  were  fired  and  three  exploded.  Goni's  statement  that 
six  struck  her  is  probably  a  loose  exaggeration.  It  is  even 
doubtful  whether  more  than  one  torpedo  struck  the  Blanco. 
Her  hull  was  carefully  examined  by  the  diver  of  the  Champion, 
a  British  cruiser  which  was  present  on  the  coast.  It  was 
found  in  about  sixty  feet  of  water,  lying  on  the  starboard  side. 
The  port  side  was  intact,  but  on  the  starboard  side  was  a  large 
hole  blown  through  the  bottom  of  the  ship,  fifteen  feet  long 
and  seven  feet  broad.    The  ship,  having  been  wood-sheathed 


28 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


and  cased  with  zinc,  the  iron  skin  had  been  detached  near 
the  hole  from  the  wood-sheathing,  and  much  of  the  zinc  was 
torn  off.  The  scuttles,  on  the  port  side,  were  found  open,  only 
the  officers'  ports  being  closed.  From  this  account  it  looks  as 
if  the  injury  had  been  inflicted  by  one  torpedo  alone,  unless 
two  or  more  happened  to  strike  exactly  in  the  same  place — a 
most  unlikely  supposition.  The  uproar  and  confusion  which 
prevailed  can  readily  explain  mistakes  in  the  accounts  of  eye- 
witnesses. 

This  is  the  first  occasion  on  which  the  Whitehead  was 
successfully  employed  against  an  ironclad,  where  we  possess 
full  details.  Once  before,  during  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  a 
ship  had  been  sunk  by  it  according  to  the  assertions  of  the 
Russians;  but  whereas  then  the  Turks  denied  their  loss,  now 
the  fact  was  beyond  dispute,  and  the  hull  of  the  sunken  ship 
could  be  seen  and  examined.  Once  more,  as  so  often  in  these 
minor  struggles,  we  have  exceptional  circumstances  which 
would  not  be  likely  to  recur  in  a  European  conflict.  For  an 
ironclad  to  be  at  anchor  without  nets  out,  without  launches  to 
protect  her,  without  a  search  light,  and  with  a  very  insuffi- 
ciently trained  crew  on  the  top  of  all  this,  points  to 
singular  carelessness  on  the  part  of  her  commander,  who  had 
had  warning,  be  it  remembered.  If  he  had  chosen  to  trouble 
himself  he  had  ample  time,  between  the  publication  of  the 
intended  attack  at  Iquique  on  the  21st,  and  the  morning  of 
the  23rd,  to  have  constructed  a  boom,  or  again  he  might  have 
taken  his  ship  to  sea  for  the  night  and  cruised  in  the  offing 
with  lights  out,  when  he  would  have  been  comparatively  safe. 
The  torpedo-gunboats  were  handled  with  courage  and  cool- 
ness, but  the  task  before  them  was  not  difficult.  Smaller  and 
weaker  vessels  could  have  destroyed,  with  less  risk,  this  iron- 
clad at  anchor.  If  captains  choose  to  imperil  their  ships  as 
Captain  Goni  imperilled  the  Blanco  they  will  lose  them.  But 
French  or  English  ironclads  are  not  likely  to  lie  in  open 
harbours  without  taking  the  most  elementary  precautions. 
We  may  notice  that  the  inexperience  or  want  of  smartness  of 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN  WAR. 


the  Blanco *s  men  rendered  her  quick-firers  and  machine-guns 
almost  useless.  If  they  had  stood  smartly  to  their  Nordenfelts 
and  Hotchkisses  they  might  have  sunk  or  disabled  the  gun- 
boats before  they  got  close,  and  we  may  be  certain  that  a  hail 
of  shells  would  not  have  improved  the  aim  of  the  men  at  the 
torpedo-tubes. 

For  the  Lynch  and  Condell  the  fighting  was  not  yet  over. 
As  they  stood  out  of  the  Bay  they  saw  what  they  thought  was 
the  Imperial,  and  went  towards  her.  When  they  got  closer 
they  discovered  that  it  was  not  the  Balmacedist  vessel,  but 
the  Congressional  armed  transport  Aconcagua.  Her  decks 
could  be  seen  crowded  with  troops.  She  carried  no  flag,  and 
was  at  once  attacked  by  the  two  gunboats  with  their  Hotch- 
kisses. They  poured  into  her  such  a  furious  fire,  that  the  roll 
of  it  resembled  the  rapid  discharge  of  small-arms  rather  than 
heavy  guns.  At  first  they  separated  and  prepared  to  assail 
her  one  on  each  beam,  but  realising  that  this  would  enable 
her  to  bring  both  her  broadsides  into  play  they  drew  together 
again  and  fought  her,  keeping  on  her  starboard  beam.  The 
Aconcagua  replied  vigorously  with  her  5-inch  guns  and  small 
quick-firers.  After  some  minutes,  finding  that  she  was  getting 
the  worst  of  it,  and  that  from  the  great  speed  of  the  gunboats 
she  could  not  well  retreat,  she  headed  towards  Caldera, 
probably  hoping  that  the  Blanco  would  come  out  to  her 
support,  but  the  Blanco  was,  of  course,  at  the  bottom.  At 
last,  after  an  hour-and-a-half,  she  stopped  her  engines, 
according  to  Captain  Moraga,  and  had  apparently  surrendered. 
The  gunboats  were  on  the  point  of  steaming  in  when  a  large 
cruiser  was  seen  on  the  horizon.  This  they  supposed  to  be 
the  much  dreaded  Esmeralda,  and  therefore  at  once  retreated. 
The  tubes  of  one  of  the  CondelVs  port  boilers  were  leaking 
heavily  and  neither  vessel  was  in  condition  for  a  fresh 
action  with  a  powerful  cruiser.  Soon  afterwards,  when  their 
prey  had  got  safe  into  Caldera,  they  discovered  that  the 
approaching  vessel  was  the  British  flagship  Warspite 
and    not    the    Esmeralda,    and    the    chagrin    of  Captains 


3o  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1891 

Moraga  and  Fuentes  was  unbounded.  Neither  of  the 
torpedo-gunboats  was  much  the  worse  for  the  fighting, 
though  considering  the  loaded  torpedoes  which  they  had 
about,  it  was  a  most  foolhardy  adventure  to  attack  the 
Aconcagua  in  broad  daylight.  They  fired  more  than  400 
projectiles,  of  which  only  eight,  or  two  per  cent.,  hit  her. 
All  these  struck  her  above  the  water-line,  and  the  damage 
they  did  was  most  trifling.  Of  the  crowd  of  men  on  board 
only  four  were  slightly  wounded,  two  by  a  shell  which  struck 
the  upper  part  of  the  funnel  casing.  The  Aconcagua  fired 
137  rounds,  seven  from  her  5-inch  guns,  and  with  these 
probably  scored  an  even  lower  percentage  of  hits  than  the 
Lynch }s  and  CondelV s  guns.  The  captain  of  the  Aconcagua 
in  his  official  report  drew  attention  to  the  worthlessness  of  the 
torpedo-gunboat  for  open  and  straightforward  fighting.  She 
is  built  to  act  by  surprise,  and  except  when  so  acting  is  of 
little  value.  Had  these  boats,  however,  been  armed  with  a 
heavier  quick-firer  than  the  14-pounder,  the  4' 7-inch  gun, 
for  instance,  as  in  the  British  service,  the  hits  might  have 
been  as  numerous,  since  the  men  would  have  fired  more 
carefully,  whilst  the  damage  done  would  have  been  infinitely 
greater.  The  medium  quick-firer,  for  such  we  may  call  the 
12-pounder  and  14-pounder,  is  not  of  much  value  except  for 
the  attack  upon  torpedo-boats,  but  the  larger  weapons  of  that 
type  can  do  a  great  deal  of  damage.  The  Yalu  confirmed 
this  conclusion,  as  the  small  projectiles  fired  on  that  occasion 
had  little  effect.  This  action  would  also  point  to  the 
comforting  fact  that  merchant  steamers,  well  equipped  with 
medium  quick-firers,  have  little  to  fear  from  torpedo-craft. 
This  has  an  important  bearing  upon  the  defence  of  our 
commerce. 

The  Imperial,  after  waiting  hours  for  her  two  consorts, 
returned  to  Valparaiso,  where  she  found  them  all  safe.  The 
next  occurrence  was  an  attempt  of  the  torpedo-boat,  Guale> 
which  was  employed  by  the  Balmacedists  to  patrol  Valparaiso 
Harbour,  to  run  off  and  join  the  Congressionalists.     She  did 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  31 

not,  however,  get  very  far,  as  the  Lynch  was  sent  in  pursuit, 
and  quickly  overtook  her.  She  was  taken  back  to  Valparaiso, 
where  her  crew  were  shot  for  their  disloyalty. 

On  May  14th,  the  Condell,  with  the  Imperial  and  Lvnch. 
was  off  Iquique,  endeavouring  to  repeat  her  performance  at 
Caldera.  The  Congressionalists,  however,  had  learnt  by 
experience,  and  were  quite  ready  for  them.  Though  there 
were  no  warships  in  the  roads,  booms  and  numerous  sunken 
torpedoes  had  been  placed  about  the  anchorage,  so  that  there 
was  nothing  to  be  done.  The  Congressionalists,  since  the 
loss  of  the  Blanco,  steamed  out  to  sea  every  night.  Thence 
the  Condell  proceeded  to  Caldera,  off  which  port  she  arrived 
on  the  ni^ht  of  the  16th.  It  could  be  seen  that  there  were  a 
large  number  of  vessels  inshore,  and  with  everything  ready  for 
the  attack,  she  ran  in.  Mr.  Hervey,  the  "  Times  "  corre- 
spondent, was  on  board,  and  has  given  a  vivid  picture  of  the 
suspense,  the  breathless  anxiety,  of  those  whose  fate  it  is  to 
be  boxed  up  in  these  fragile  cases  of  machinery  with  hundreds 
of  pounds  of  gun-cotton,  in  the  shape  of  torpedoes,  covering 
the  deck.  When  the  Condell  got  close  in,  she  found  that 
once  more  the  insurgents  had  been  too  clever  for  her.  Two 
lines  of  ships  were  moored  in  the  bay  :  the  inner  line  towards 
the  shore,  composed  of  armed  transports  ;  the  outer  line,  of 
neutral  sailing-ships  ;  and  the  worst  of  it  was  that  the  outer  line 
was  so  disposed,  as  to  cover  the  transports.  It  was  therefore 
impossible  to  use  the  torpedo,  and  though  Moraga  was 
anxious  to  give  his  tubes  an  airing,  and  neutrals  a  lesson,  he 
was  dissuaded  from  a  course  which  would  have  certainly 
embroiled  his  government  with  powerful  enemies.  A  few  days 
later  he  had  an  opportunity  of  sinking  the  O' Higgins ;  he  had 
caught  her  in  harbour  at  night, *  and  apparently  off  her  guard, 
and  was  advancing  to  the  attack  upon  her,  when  one  of  his 
crew  told  him  that  he  had  a  brother  on  board.  With  touching 
tender-heartedness,  Moraga  abandoned  the  attack  and  with- 


*  At  Pacocho.    Hervey,  213-4. 


32  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1891 

drew ;  the  act  deserves  to  be  remembered,  though  in  war 
there  is  small  room  for  consideration  such  as  this. 

The  torpedo  gunboats  made  one  more  attempt  to  ensnare 
their  opponents.  On  June  4th  the  Imperial  started  north. 
At  night  she  steamed  ablaze  with  lights,  whilst  astern  of  her 
in  absolute  darkness  followed  the  gunboats.  It  was  hoped 
that  the  Congressional  cruisers  would  see  her,  and  stand 
towards  her  when  she  was  to  surrender.  Whilst  the 
Congressionalists  were  lowering  boats  the  torpedo  craft  were 
to  attack  them  off  their  guard,  and  sink  their  ship  or  ships. 
But  the  plan  came  to  nothing  as  no  Congressionalists  showed 
themselves. 

The  final  downfall  of  the  Balmacedist  Government  came  in 
August,  and  was  the  result  of  a  combined  military  and  naval 
expedition  against  Valparaiso.  Having  week  by  week  col- 
lected more  and  more  troops  in  the  north,  armed  them  with 
repeating  rifles,  and  obtained  German  generals,  the  Congres- 
sionalists were  ready.  The  whole  insurgent  fleet  collected  100 
miles  north  of  Valparaiso,  and  as  there  was  little  to  fear  from 
Balmaceda's  torpedo-vessels,  steamed  to  Quinteros  Bay.  It 
was  off  the  bay  on  the  night  of  August  19th,  and  next 
morning,  after  a  search  for  mines  conducted  by  the  smaller 
vessels,  the  troops  carried  on  board  were  landed.  Meanwhile, 
on  the  19th,  the  Esmeralda  had  engaged  the  Valparaiso  forts 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  Balmacedist  troops.  On  the 
20th,  in  the  morning,  two  of  Balmaceda's  torpedo-boats  came 
out  to  see  what  was  happening,  but  were  quickly  driven  back. 
The  troops  having  been  put  ashore  by  means  of  large  punts, 
which  had  been  conveyed  from  the  north,  fastened  bottom 
outwards  to  some  of  the  ships,  at  Concon  on  the  21st, 
supported  by  the  fire  of  the  ships,  drove  back  the  Balmacedists, 
and  a  week  later  captured  Valparaiso.  Thus  ended  the  naval 
struggle  on  the  Pacific. 

The  Chilian  Civil  War  is  important  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  because  then  the  Whitehead  for  the  first  time  sank  an 
ironclad  ;  secondly,  because  of  the  admirable  strategy  of  the 


1891]       NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN    WAR.  33 

insurgents.  They  used  their  fleet  sparingly  against  fortifica- 
tions, making  no  attempt  to  capture  Valparaiso  by  bombard- 
ment from  the  sea.  They  recognised  a  truth  which  is  some- 
times forgotten,  that  fleets  cannot  act  on  land,  though  they  do 
exercise  a  very  marked  influence  on  land  actions.  They  were 
confronted  by  a  naval  force  which  lacked  all  capacity  of  action 
except  by  surprise,  and  they  showed  that  such  a  force  is 
powerless  to  change  the  issue  of  a  war,  though  it  may  destroy 
individual  ships.  We  may,  perhaps,  wish  that  Balmaceda  had 
been  able  to  place  in  line  the  two  cruisers  detained  at 
La  Seyne.  In  that  case  we  should  have  seen  what  we  are 
particularly  anxious  to  see — a  contest  between  fast,  lightly- 
armed  vessels  on  the  one  hand,,  and  slow,  heavilv-armed 
vessels  on  the  other.  Such  a  contest  would  have  taught  us 
much  concerning  the  value  of  speed,  and  the  practicability  of 
raiding  the  enemy's  coast,  in  the  face  of  a  superior  but  slower 
force. 

Efforts  were  afterwards  made  to  raise  the  Blanco,  but  they 
were  unsuccessful. 

One  other  incident  of  the  war  deserves  mention,  though  it 
concerns  the  lawyer  rather  than  the  sailor.  At  the  outbreak 
of  the  struggle  the  Congressional  party  had  despatched  a 
commission  to  purchase  arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the 
United  States.  The  I  tat  a,  a  Congressional  steamer,  was  sent 
to  embark  these  at  San  Francisco,  but  through  a  mistake 
arrived  too  soon,  and  lay  waiting  in  harbour  there.  The  sus- 
picion of  Balmaceda' s  representative — who  was,  of  course,  the 
official  representative  of  Chili,  as  the  Congressionalists  had 
not  received  recognition — was  aroused,  and  a  watch  was  kept 
on  the  I  tat  a,  to  prevent  her  loading  with  contraband.  Seeing 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  take  a  cargo  on  board  at  San 
Francisco,  the  Congressionalists  embarked  the  arms  on  board 
two  American  schooners,  which  were  to  meet  the  Itata,  and 
tranship  their  cargoes  to  her.  outside  the  three-mile  Limit.  In 
the  meanwhile  the  Itata,  proceeding  south,  ran  short  of  coal, 
and  put  into  the  United  States'  port  of  San  Diego.    As  it  was 


u 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1891-3 


believed  that  she  intended  to  take  the  military  stores  on  board 
there,  a  United  States  marshal  was  sent  on  to  her  to  detain 
her.  This  was  on  May  5th.  On  May  6th,  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, she  slipped  her  cable,  went  out  to  sea,  met  the  schooners, 
and  transhipped  the  arms.  Two  days  later  she  put  the  United 
States'  marshal  ashore.  Indignant  at  this  outrage  to  their 
flag,  the  United  States'  Government  issued  orders  to  their 
officers  on  the  Pacific  Station  to  seize  her  when  she  reached  the 
Chilian  coast.  She  was  surrendered  at  Iquique  on  June  3rd  to 
the  American  Admiral  Brown.  The  incident  very  nearly  led  the 
Congressionalists  to  come  to  blows  with  the  United  States. 
In  the  end  the  case  of  the  Itata  came  before  the  United  States' 
Supreme  Court,  which  returned  the  ship  and  arms  to  their 
owners,  on  their  giving  bonds  for  120,000  dollars.  The 
Balmacedist  Government  had  fallen  by  then,  and  the  Con- 
gressionalists had  become  the  legitimate  rulers  of  Chili. 


In  July,  1893,  a  revolution  broke  out  in  the  Argentine 
Republic,  the  Radicals  under  Colonel  Espina  rising  against 
the  Government.  On  September  26th,  the  torpedo  boats  in 
the  harbour  at  Buenos  Aires  declared  for  the  rebels,  and 
attacked  the  other  Argentine  men  of  war.  They  were, 
however,  beaten  off  without  the  slightest  difficulty,  and 
recaptured.  At  the  same  time  the  rebels  succeeded  in 
gaining  possession  of  the  old  ironclad  monitor  Los  Andes, 
a  vessel  of  1460  tons,  launched  in  1875,  and  armed  with  two 
1 1 -inch  muzzle-loaders,  two  4j-inch,  and  four  smaller  guns. 
She  had  9  and  8-inch  armour  on  her  turret,  3^  to  6-inch 
armour  on  the  water-line,  and  a  one-inch  deck.  She  was  on 
her  way  to  Rosario  with  arms  and  ammunition  for  the 
Government  troops,  when  the  officers  and  crew  rose  on  the 
captain  and  seized  her.  They  proceeded  to  Rosario,  and 
handed  over  to  the  insurgents  their  valuable  cargo. 

The  Government  at  once  despatched  the  powerful  little 
ironclad    I  ndependencia,    launched    in    England    in  1891, 


1 893]      NAVAL    EVENTS    OF    THE    CHILIAN  WAR. 


and  armed  with  two  9'4-inch  guns,  four  47-inch  and  four 
3-pounder  quick-firers,  besides  four  Maxims,  of  2510  tons 
displacement,  and  plated  with  8-inch  steel  on  her  turrets  and 
water-line,  to  look  after  the  Andes.  With  her  went  the 
torpedo  gunboat  Espora,  of  515  tons,  armed  with  two 
14-pounder  quick-firers  and  five  other  small  guns.  On 
September  29th,  they  arrived  at  Rosario,  and  the  Indepen- 
dencia  lost  no  time  in  attacking  the  Andes.  The  latter  was 
the  first  to  open  fire  with  her  11-inch  Armstrong.  The  firing 
of  the  Andes  was  fast  and  wild;  that  of  the  Independencia 
not  much  better,  as  of  382  shots  which  she  discharged  at  her 
enemy,  only  one  or  two  struck.  After  an  hour-and-a-half  of 
this  the  Andes  hauled  down  her  flag.  Her  chief  engineer,  an 
Englishman,  was  wounded  by  a  fragment  of  one  of  the 
Independencia? s  shells,  but  the  ship  was  little  or  none  the 
worse. 


Vol.  II. 


CHAPTER 


XVIII. 


The    Civil    War    in  Brazil. 
July,  1893 — April,  1894. 

The  close  of  the  civil  war  on  the  Pacific  coast  was  but  the 
prelude  to  the  outbreak  of  a  fresh  struggle  upon  the  Atlantic. 
Since  the  fall  of  the  Empire  Brazil  had  been  in  a  more  or 
less  disturbed  state,  and  considerable  ill-feeling  had  arisen 
between  the  army  which  supported  Marshal  Peixoto,  and  the 
navy  which  was  in  favour  of  Senor  Custodio  di  Mello.  The 
trouble  came  to  a  head  on  July  6th,  when  Admiral  Wandenkolk 
of  the  Brazilian  navy  seized  the  merchant  steamer  Jupiter 
at  Montevideo.  With  a  large  number  of  sympathisers  he 
steamed  to  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  captured  two  diminutive 
Brazilian  warships,  and  issued  a  proclamation  in  which  he 
invited  his  brother  officers  of  the  fleet  to  join  him.  His 
career  was  short  and  unsuccessful.  On  July  20th,  the  Republica 
and  Santos  came  up  with  him  and  compelled  him  to  surrender; 
but  a  more  serious  attempt  had  to  be  faced  on  September  yth, 
1893,  when  Admiral  Mello,  assisted  by  thirty-six  naval  officers 
and  six  or  seven  members  of  the  Brazilian  congress,  seized 
the  warships  in  Rio  Harbour.  Amongst  these  were  the 
following  vessels  :  the  A  quid ab  an,  a  sea-going  turret-ship  of 
a  design  similar  to  the  Aj'ax,  with  two  turrets  amidships 
placed  en  echelon ;  she  had  been  built  in  England  and  carried 
as  her  heavy  armament  four  g-2-inch  guns  ;  the  Javary,  a  low 
freeboard,  coast-defence,  ironclad,  carrying  four  10-inch  muzzle- 
loaders  in  two  turrets  placed  fore  and  aft  ;  the  small  river 
monitor  A I  ago  as  ;  the  cruiser  Almirante  Tamandare,  which 

D  2 


36  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1893 

had  been  disabled  by  injuries  to  her  machinery ;  and  was 
armed  with  quick-firers  which  were  protected  by  thin 
armoured  casemates  ;  the  Elswick  cruiser  Republica  ;  the  old 
cruisers  Guanabara  and  Trajano  ;  two  ancient  gunboats ; 
two  transports ;  three  large  sea-going  torpedo-boats,  of 
twenty -five  knots  maximum  trial  speed  ;  four  smaller  ones  ; 
and  a  host  of  armed  merchantmen.* 

Though  this  very  miscellaneous  squadron  only  included  two 
ships  of  any  real  power,  the  Aquidaban  and  Tamandare, 
Marshal  Peixoto  found  himself  quite  unable  to  oppose  it  at 
sea  at  the  outset  of  the  war.  The  Riackue/o,  which  closely 
resembled  the  Aquidaban,  was  in  Europe,  as  also  was  the 
cruiser  Benjamin  Constant.  On  the  South  American  coast 
he  had  the  Elswick  gunboat  Tiradentes,  which  was  in  dock  at 
Montevideo,  with  a  not  too  trustworthy  crew  ;  the  Bahia,  a 
very  indifferent  coast-defence  monitor,  and  five  small  gunboats 
or  cruisers.  The  torpedo  gun-vessel  Aurora  was,  however, 
expected  from  Europe,  where  she  had  just  been  completed  by 
the  Armstrong  Company.  She  was  of  480  tons  displacement, 
equipped  with  three  torpedo-tubes,  two  20-pounder  quick- 
firers,  and  four  3-pounders.  Her  trial  speed  was  eighteen 
knots. 

The  contest  that  followed  was,  in  its  initial  stages,  one 
between  ships  and  forts,  and  almost  entirely  destitute  of 
incidents  of  either  tactical  or  strategical  importance.  The 
Melloist  ships  lay  in  the  Rio  Harbour,  and  day  by  day 
exchanged  fire  with  the  Peixotoist  forts.  The  ships  were 
short  handed,  as  the  total  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  insur- 
gents was  only  1500  men,t  and  though  Admiral  Mello  had 
numerous  adherents  in  the  southern  provinces  of  Brazil,  he 
was  quite  unable  to  equip  a  land  army.  He  started  with  a 
considerable  advantage  in  being  able  to  control  the  sea,  as  it 
is  needless  to  state  that  the  vast  extent  of  the  Brazilian  coast 

*  See  Table  XVI J. 

\  The  naval  force  of  Brazil  consisted  of  3020  marines,  990  sailors,  3300  firemen 
and  naval  apprentices. 


1893]  THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN   BRAZIL.  37 

renders  communication  difficult  between  the  various  points  by 
land.  He  endeavoured,  following  the  strategy  of  the  Chilian 
Congressionalists,  to  establish  himself  in  the  south,  but  did 
not  meet  with  their  success.  Peixoto,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
at  his  disposal  considerable  financial  resources,  which  the 
Melloists  lacked,  a  formidable  military  force  of  24,800  officers 
and  men  armed  with  breech-loaders,  and  all  the  forts  com- 
manding the  harbour  of  Rio,  with  the  sole  exception  of  that 
on  the  island  at  Villegagnon,  by  far  the  most  heavily  armed. 
This  was  at  first  neutral,  but  later  declared  for  Admiral 
Mello.  Numerous  foreign  ships  of  war  were  present  in  the 
harbour  and  their  commanders  prevented  Admiral  Mello  from 
enforcing  a  strict  blockade,  which  might  perhaps  have  reduced 
Rio.  They  also  did  all  in  their  power  to  avert  a  bombard- 
ment of  the  city. 

On  the  morning  of  September  17th,  the  Republica  and 
Diaz  ran  out  of  the  harbour,  past  the  forts,  unharmed,  and 
were  followed  next  day  by  the  Pallas  and  a  second  ship,  with 
equal  success.  From  September  14th  onwards,  there  was 
constant  firing  between  the  forts  and  the  ships,  but  the  powder 
used  by  both  sides  was  extremely  bad,  and  though  there  was 
a  liberal  expenditure  of  ammunition,  extraordinarily  little 
damage  was  done.  In  this  hot  climate  explosives  deteriorate 
greatly  by  years  of  storage,  and  it  was  never  certain  how  any 
gun  would  shoot  with  the  stuff  from  the  magazines.  On 
September  23rd,  Fort  Santa  Cruz  fired  eighty-five  projectiles 
without  harming  anything  but  an  old  wooden  hulk.  On 
September  30th,  the  Aquidaban  was  under  fire,  and  was  hit 
several  times,  receiving  very  slight  damage.  A  6-inch  shell 
came  through  her  deck  and  exploded  in  the  admiral's  cabin, 
but  did  not  set  her  on  fire.  A  6-inch  shot  entered  her 
starboard  side,  and  struck  a  shell  which  was  standing  in  a 
shot-rack,  ready  loaded  and  fused.  This  exploded,  wounding 
an  officer.  A  third  shell  entered  the  admiral's  bath-room,  and 
a  fourth  burst  in  a  coal-bunker,  penetrating  the  unarmoured 
side,  but  only  made  a  round  hole  of  the  diameter  of  the 


38  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1893 

projectile.  Fragments  from  this  shell  were  driven  through  the 
inner  wall  of  the  bunker  and  wounded  a  man.  A  fifth 
projectile  struck  the  shield  of  a  6-inch  gun,  but  did  it  no  harm. 
Other  shots  struck  the  armour,  leaving  only  dents.  On 
October  6th,  Fort  Villegagnon  joined  the  insurgents,  and  co- 
operated with  them  in  bombarding  the  other  forts. 

On  the  night  of  October  12th,  an  incident  of  more  interest 
occurred.  The  armed  merchant  steamer,  Urano,  with  200 
Melloist  troops  on  board,  attempted  the  run  out  to  sea,  past 
the  Peixotoist  forts.  The  mouth  of  the  harbour  is  not  more 
than  a  mile  wide,  and  is  commanded  by  three  forts — Santa 
Cruz,  which  mounted  two  Armstrong  10-inch  muzzle-loaders  ; 
Sao  Joao,  with  one  10-inch  muzzle-loader;  and  Lage,  with 
three  6-inch  Whitworths.  As  she  went  by,  the  forts  fired  into 
her,  Santa  Cruz  hitting  her  several  times,  and  she  lost  forty 
killed  or  wounded.  She  was  riddled  by  machine-gun  bullets, 
and  the  men  on  board  her  were  demoralised,  and  fled  on  shore. 
A  few  days  later  the  Melloists  scored  a  success  to  counter- 
balance this  loss,  as  the  cruiser,  Republican  rammed  the  Rio 
de  Janeiro,  which  was  conveying  1100  troops  south,  for 
Marshal  Peixoto.  Five  hundred  soldiers  are  said  to  have 
been  lost,  but  details  are  wanting.  On  the  25th,  a  Melloist 
magazine  was  blown  up  by  the  fire  of  the  forts,  and  on  the  3rd 
of  November,  a  depot  on  Gobernador  Island,  containing  100 
tons  of  powder,  was  destroyed  by  an  emissary  of  Marshal 
Peixoto.  Five  officers  and  seamen  from  the  British  squadron 
happened  to  be  near  the  magazine  and  lost  their  lives.  On 
November  20th,  a  field-gun  on  shore  struck  a  torpedo-boat 
which  was  lying  in  the  harbour  close  to  the  Aquidaban,  and 
sank  it.  On  the  22nd,  the  Javary  was  hotly  engaged  during 
the  morning  with  the  forts.  In  the  afternoon,  whilst  off 
Villegagnon,  she  was  discovered  to  be  sinking.  Efforts  made 
to  tow  her  into  shallow  water  were  unsuccessful,  and  her  crew 
were  compelled  to  abandon  her,  though  not  before  an 
audacious  seaman  had  fired  two  of  her  heavy  guns,  which  had 
been  left  loaded  at  the  forts,  only  a  minute  or  two  before  she 


1893]  THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN    BRAZIL  39 

capsized  and  sank.  She  was  an  old  vessel,  and  had  probably 
been  shaken  badly  by  her  own  fire,  though  it  is  just  possible 
that  one  of  the  enemy's  projectiles  had  damaged  her,  as  a  shell 
from  Fort  Sao  Joao  fell  either  on  her  deck  or  close  to  it,  just 
before  she  went  down. 

On  November  29th,  the  Aurora  arrived  from  Europe,  and 
was  taken  over  by  Marshal  Peixoto  at  Pernambuco.  Her 
name  was  changed  to  Gustavo  Sampaio,  but  as  yet  she  was 
not  brought  round  to  Rio,  probably  through  want  of  men  to 
work  her.  On  the  night  of  November  30th — December  1st,  at 
12.30,  the  ironclad,  Aquidaban,  accompanied  by  the  armed 
steamer,  Esperanga,  ran  past  the  forts.  The  Aquidaban 
manoeuvred  to  draw  the  fire  in  the  glare  of  their  search-lights, 
and  received  the  attention  of  all  their  guns,  herself  returning 
their  fire.  The  gunners  in  the  forts  knew  that  she  was  coming 
and  were  ready  for  her,  but  in  spite  of  this  could  inflict  no 
damage  upon  her.  Not  a  man  on  board  was  killed  or  wounded, 
and  only  a  single  shell  struck  her  hull.  This  burst  in  a  coal 
bunker.  Some  small  projectiles  also  dropped  on  her  deck. 
The  Esperanga  was  hulled  by  a  shot  which  passed  through 
her  engine-room,  and  lost  her  chief  engineer,  killed,  besides 
one  or  two  men  wounded  ;  but  was  quite  able  to  continue  her 
voyage.  Admiral  da  Gama  was  left  in  charge  of  the  vessels 
in  harbour,  and  on  December  3rd  engaged  the  forts  with  the 
Tamandare.  On  the  4th  another  armed  steamer  ran  past  the 
forts.  On  the  22nd  the  Tamandare  was  again  in  action, 
using  ballistite  for  her  quick  firers.  The  new  explosive  per- 
formed well,  and  it  was  most  demoralising  to  the  men  in  the 
forts  to  find  shells  dropping  amongst  them  with  no  premonitory 
warning,  such  as  is  given  by  the  smoke  from  an  ordinary 
charge  of  pebble  or  brown  powder.  The  Tamandare  was 
often  hit  but  not  damaged.  About  this  time  the  Republica 
had  a  brush  with  the  Peixotoist  transport,  Itaipu. 

On  the  12th  of  January,  1894,  the  Aquidaban  ran  past  the 
forts  at  dawn  without  being  touched.  Steaming  up  the 
harbour  she  was  hit  twice  with  very  trivial  damage,  and  the 


4o  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

loss  of  two  men,  wounded.  Admiral  Mellowas  not  on  board, 
having  remained  in  the  south  to  organise  a  military  force. 
In  this  he  was  unsuccessful,  as  there  were  numerous  insurrec- 
tions on  hand,  each  with  a  separate  leader,  competing  for 
support.  On  January  16th  Mucangue  Island,  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Government,  was  recaptured  by  the  Melloists. 
January,  and  the  first  days  of  February,  passed  without  more 
than  an  intermittent  cannonade,  but  on  the  gth  of  February 
the  insurgents  made  a  desperate  attempt  to  carry  the  Armacao 
battery,  on  the  east  side  of  the  harbour.  They  were  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss,  and  the  gunboat,  Liberdade,  was  repeatedly 
hit  whilst  covering  the  landing  party. 

In  the  meantime  Peixoto  had  been  busy  acquiring  an 
improvised  fleet.  In  the  United  States  he  had  purchased  a 
collection  of  naval  curiosities,  which  he  now  prepared  to  use 
against  the  Melloists.  One  of  his  purchases  was  Ericsson's 
submarine  gunboat  Destroyer,  renamed  the  Piratiny.  This 
was  a  small  steamer,  with  a  gun  built  into  the  bow,  from  which 
a  torpedo,  thirty  feet  long,  could  be  fired.  Above  the  com- 
partment which  contained  the  gun,  was  a  thin  armour-deck, 
and  above  this  again  a  compartment  filled  with  inflated  india- 
rubber  air-bags.  The  engines  and  boilers  were  protected  by 
two  stout  armour-plates,  inclined  at  an  angle  of  twenty-three 
degrees,  forming  an  athwartship  bulkhead  above  the  water- 
line.  This  vessel  had  been  built  for  the  United  States' 
Government,  but,  the  Ordnance  Department  having  changed 
heads,  in  1 88 1 ,  the  new  chief  refused  to  purchase  her.  A 
similar  gun  to  the  one  carried  on  the  Destroyer  was  sent  to 
the  Peruvians  in  1880,  but  never  used;  the  weapon  was  also 
experimented  with  by  the  British  Government.  Besides  the 
submarine  gun  she  carried  a  Howell  training  torpedo  tube  and 
two  Hotchkiss  1 -pounders.  On  the  steamer  Nictheroy 
(formerly  El  Cid,  of  the  Morgan  line),  a  Zalinski  pneumatic 
gun  had  been  fitted  forward,  for  the  discharge  of  aerial 
torpedoes  containing  5olbs.  of  dynamite.  This  weapon  is 
fifty  feet  long,  and  has  a  calibre  of  1 5-inches.    It  is  capable 


1894]  THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN    BRAZIL  4I 

of  training,  and  can  throw  its  shell  by  compressed  air  to  a 
distance  of  3000  yards,  but  the  time  occupied  by  the  shell  in 
its  flight,  projected  as  it  is  with  very  low  initial  velocity,  is  so 
considerable  that  it  must  be  difficult  with  it  to  hit  a  moving 
target.  It  was,  however,  an  interesting  experiment  to  mount 
it,  and  we  may  regret,  in  the  interests  of  naval  science,  that 
it  was  not  tested  in  action.  In  addition  there  were  one  47- 
inch  quick-firer,  two  10-centimetre  quick-firers,  eight  6-pounder 
quick-firers,  and  several  small  guns.  Besides  these  vessels 
there  were  the  armed  steamers  Advance,  Allianca,  Finance, 
and  Seguranga,  the  America*  with  a  Sims-Edison  controll- 
able torpedo,  the  small  steam-launch,  Feiseen,  re-named 
Inhandnay,  which  had  the  phenomenal  trial  speed  of  twenty- 
five  knots,  the  twenty-two-knot  launch  Xada,  five  Schichau 
torpedo-boats,  and  a  small  Yarrow  boat.  The  Nada  and 
Feiseen  were  carried  on  the  Nictheroy1  s  deck. 

Trouble  was  early  experienced  with  this  odd  assemblage  of 
ships.  Their  crews  were  untrustworthy 3  and  on  board  almost 
all  of  them  were  Alelloist  emissaries,  who  lost  no  opportunity 
of  damaging  their  machinery.  Breakdowns  were  constant ; 
there  were  neither  swords  nor  cutlasses  for  the  sailors  who 
were  to  fight  them,  and  trained  men  to  handle  the  new  engines 
of  war  were  lacking.  There  was  no  one  who  understood  the 
Sims-Edison  torpedo.  The  dynamite  gun  had  an  altogether 
insufficient  supply  of  ammunition.  Five  loaded  shells,  only  one 
of  which  contained  a  full  charge,  were  not  enough  to  sink  the 
Melloist  squadron.  In  addition,  there  were,  it  is  true,  five 
unloaded  shells,  but  the  few  fuses  on  board  were  untested  and 
untrustworthy.  The  torpedo-boats  had  been  very  carelessly 
placed  on  deck,  and  could  not  be  hoisted  out,  as  the  necessary 
tackle  was  wanting.  Parts  of  the  boats'  gear  were  missing, 
and  their  torpedo  tubes  were  in  bad  repair.  The  Destroyer's 
engines  had  broken  down,  and,  in  short,  the  improvised  fleet 
was  useless.  The  most  serviceable  part  of  it  was  the  squadron 
of  Schichau  boats,  which  had  safely  crossed  the  Atlantic  ;  but 

*  Re-named  Andrada. 


42  IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION.  [1894 

these  were  not  used  as  yet.  After  numerous  executions  of 
untrustworthy  Brazilians,  some  ships  were  at  last  ready  for 
action.  On  February  18th,  the  Nictheroy  appeared  off  Rio, 
and  landed  300  troops.  She  had  intended  to  try  her  dynamite 
gun  on  Villegagnon,  but  the  gunner  had  disappeared,  and  at 
the  critical  moment  the  weapon  would  not  work. 

On  February  23rd,  the  armed  Melloist  steamer  Venus  was 
struck  by  a  shell,  which  exploded  her  boilers  or  magazine, 
blowing  her  in  two,  and  killed  thirty  officers  and  men.  A 
fortnight  later  came  the  end  of  the  tedious  warfare  at  Rio. 
On  March  10th,  Peixoto's  squadron  appeared  off  the  harbour, 
and  next  day  notice  was  given  by  him  of  his  determination 
to  attack  the  insurgents.  On  the  12th,  Gama  proposed  terms 
of  submission,  which  were  rejected.  Despairing  of  his  cause, 
he  went  on  board  a  Portuguese  cruiser  which  lay  in  the 
harbour,  with  all  his  superior  officers,  and  landed  his  men  on 
one  of  the  islands.  The  warships  were  left  to  serve  as  a 
target  for  Peixoto's  fleet.  At  noon  on  the  13th,  the  Nictheroy, 
Andrada,  Tiradentes,  Paranahyba,  San  Salvador,  Gustavo 
Sampaio,  two  steamers  and  rive  torpedo-boats  began  the 
attack.  For  four  hours,  supported  by  the  forts,  they  played 
upon  the  squadron  in  harbour,  and  then  discovering  at  last 
that  there  was  no  reply  to  their  fire,  came  in  towards  Rio. 
Next  day,  they  seized  the  insurgent  vessels.  It  does  not 
appear  that  the  Nictheroy  used  her  dynamite  gun. 

Having  recaptured  the  rebel  ships,  Peixoto  demanded  the 
surrender  of  the  officers,  which  was  refused  him,  the  Portuguese 
vessel  steaming  away  and  landing  them  in  neutral  territory. 
Peixoto  on  this,  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Portugal, 
but  nothing  more  followed. 

The  insurrection,  or  one  of  the  insurrections,  still  smouldered 
on  in  the  south,  where  Admiral  Mello,  with  the  Aquidaban, 
was  at  large.  In  April,  Peixoto  decided  to  make  a  torpedo 
attack  upon  her,  and  in  consequence,  a  squadron  of  six  ships* 

*  The  ships  were  the  Andrada,  Nictheroy,  Tiradentes,  San  Salvador,  Itaipu, 
3nd  Santos. 


THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN  BRAZIL. 


43 


and  four  torpedo-craft  were  sent  against  her.  She  was 
lying,  short  of  men,  stores,  and  ammunition,  in  the  Bay 
of  Santa  Catherina,  close  to  Desterro.  Off  this  place,  the 
Peixotoist  flotilla  arrived  in  April,  and  from  Tijucas  Bay,  at  a 
distance  of  four  or  five  miles,  kept  a  watch  upon  her.  She 
lay  close  to  the  small  island  of  Santa  Cruz,  upon  which  stands 
a  fort,  whence  she  drew  her  supplies.  Between  this  small 
island  and  the  larger  one  of  Santa  Catherina  she  had  placed 
one  line  of  mines  in  the  fairway,  and  was  preparing  to  place 
a  second  to  the  rear  of  the  first.  The  islands  and  the  main- 
land were  in  the  possession  of  Melloist  sympathisers.  Four 
torpedo  vessels  were  selected  for  the  attack.  They  were  the 
Elswick  torpedo  gunboat,  Gustavo  Sampaio,  with  three  tubes, 
one  fixed  in  the  stem  and  the  other  two  training,  one  on 
each  beam,  and  the  Affonso  Pedro,  Pedro  Ivo,  and  Silvado, 
Schichau  boats,  of  130  tons  and  twenty-six  knots'  speed,  with 
complements  of  twenty-four  officers  and  men  each,  and  three 
16-inch  torpedo-tubes.  On  April  14th  the  Aquidaban  was 
reconnoitred  by  the  boats,  and  was  seen  to  be  lying  at  anchor 
about  two  miles  to  the  south  of  the  Santa  Catherina  light,  and 
under  the  lee  of  Santa  Cruz.  On  the  night  of  the  14th — 15th 
the  first  attack  was  attempted.  The  boats  ran  in  under  the 
northern  shore  of  the  bay  or  strait,  but,  before  they  had  got  far, 
saw  that  they  were  discovered.  Bengal  lights  were  burnt  by 
the  insurgents  on  shore,  and  signals  made  to  the  Aquidaban. 
In  consequence  the  boats  had  to  return  without  effecting  any- 
thing. 

On  the  next  evening  at  dusk  the  steamer  San  Salvador 
steamed  in  towards  the  bay,  and  on  the  Bengal  lights  being 
shown,  as  before,  opened  upon  them  with  machine-guns.  In 
this  way  she  must  have  destroyed  the  look-out  stations,  or 
driven  off  the  watchers,  as  there  were  no  more  signals  made 
during  the  night.  When  the  moon  set  the  torpedo-boats 
started  once  more.  The  sky  was  cloudy  and  the  night 
extremely  dark.  They  entered  the  bay,  keeping  in  the  centre 
of  the  fairway,  and  crossed  the  line  of  mines  without  misad- 


44 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1894 


venture.    The  plan  arranged  was  as  follows  :  They  were  to 
advance  in  line  abreast  till  well  within  the  bay,  and  then  to 
turn  in  succession  to  starboard,  thus  spreading  fan-wise,  and 
steaming  in  a  north-westerly  direction.*    By  this  disposition 
they  confidently  expected  to  find  the  Aquidaban,  although  the 
night  was  so  dark  that  they  could  not  see  her  at  any  distance. 
They  would,  too,  in  the  formation  adopted,  be  less  likely  to 
get  in  each  other's  way,  and  thus  impede  the  execution  of 
their  attack.    The  Aquidaban,  as  it  turned  out,  had  moved 
from  her  anchorage  of  the  14th,  further  to  the  north-west.  At 
2.30  the  Sampaio  was  in  the  bay,  and  almost  at  once  lost  sight 
of  the  other  boats.    On  drawing  near  the  place  where  she 
expected  to  find  the  ironclad,  her  speed  was  reduced  to  make 
as  little  noise  as  possible,  and  silently,  without  showing  any 
lights,  she  glided  through  the  still  water.    The  obscurity  was 
impenetrable  :  nothing  could  be  seen  or  heard.    After  passing 
the  Aquidaban' 's  anchorage  of  the  14th,  she  turned  in  a  north- 
westerly direction,  as  had  been  arranged,  but  could  still  see 
nothing,  and  began  to  suppose  that  in  the  darkness  the  Aqui- 
daban must  have  slipped  out  of  the  bay.  Her  captain  resolved, 
however,  to  make  the  full  circuit  of  the  waters  before  retiring, 
and  had  gone  one  mile  to  the  north-west,  when  he  made  out 
what  he  took  to  be  a  small  tug  upon  his  starboard  bow.  He 
was  passing  it,  not  thinking  it  worth  his  attention,  when  it  was 
suddenly  lighted  up,  a  sharp  fire  of  artillery  was  opened  upon 
him,  and  it  became  evident  that  here  at  last  was  the  Aqui- 
daban.    At  once  he  went  full-speed  towards  his  enemy, 
circling  so  as  to  bring  his  bow  tube  to  bear.    When  he 
thought  the  range  sufficiently  short,  he  shouted  down  the 
voice-pipe  of  the  bow  tube  to  fire,  but  the  officer  in  charge 
had  already  fired  the  tube,  fancying  that  he  heard  the  order 
given.    The  first  torpedo  consequently  missed  the  Aquidaban. 
The  captain  now  took  his  boat  round  the  ironclad's  stern, 
passing  very  close  indeed  to  her,  and  turning,  with  his  star- 


*  See  Plan. 


THE   AQUfDABAN . 


Map  XXIV. 


1894J  THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN  BRAZIL. 


45 


board  to  her  port,  stopped.  The  way  on  the  boat  took  her 
slowly  past  the  Aquidaban,  at  a  distance  of  only  400  feet. 
When  abreast  of  her  funnel  the  order  was  given  by  the  voice- 
pipe  to  fire  the  starboard  tube,  but  nothing  happened.  The 
second  officer,  who  was  standing  by  the  captain,  seeing  that 
there  was  danger  of  missing  the  Aquidaban  in  spite  of  all  the 
risk  that  had  been  run,  since  the  Sampaio  was  passing  her 
fast,  hurried  aft,  and  seizing  the  lanyard  of  the  tube,  pulled  it 
himself.  The  Sampaio  had  meanwhile  travelled  sixty  feet, 
as  three  seconds  had  elapsed  from  the  first  giving  of  the 
order  to  fire  the  starboard  tube.  The  torpedo  ran  straight, 
and  in  consequence  of  the  delay,  struck  the  Aquidaban  very 
far  forward  instead  of  amidships.*  The  explosion  was 
exceedingly  violent,  but  to  the  surprise  of  the  Sampaio }s  men, 
who  saw  a  great  uprush  of  water,  and  heard  a  terrific  crash, 
did  not  change  the  ship's  trim.  The  Sampaio  moved  ahead, 
and,  just  as  the  torpedo  struck,  the  ironclad  stopped  her  fire. 
The  Sampaio,  travelling  at  her  fullest  speed,  covered  1000 
yards  before  the  Melloist  gunners  re-opened.  Up  to  this 
point  they  had  not  used  their  search-lights,  but  these  were 
now  turned  on. 

Whilst  the  Sampaio  was  thus  making  her  attack,  the  other 
torpedo-boats  had  been  attracted  to  the  sound  of  firing.  The 
Pedro  Ivo,  indeed,  had  had  to  abandon  the  attempt,  as  the 
pressure  in  her  boilers  suddenly  fell  to  iolbs.,  and  she  could 
scarcely  keep  in  motion  ;  but  the  other  two  had  gone  forward. 
The  Silvado,  at  first  led,  but  when  she  got  near  the 
Aquidaban  found  the  Sampaio  between  herself  and  the 
ironclad,  and  was  forced  to  stop.  She  turned  to  starboard 
and  passed  the  Aquidaban 's  bows  at  a  distance  of  1000  yards, 
without  discharging  her  torpedoes,  or  taking  anv  part  in  the 
attack.  At  the  same  time,  a  launch  coming  from  Desterro, 
headed  towards  her,  endeavouring  to  ram  her,  and  to  avoid 
this  launch,  she  turned  once  more  and  retired.    The  Affonso 


*  It  was  of  Schwartzkopf  pattern,  carrying  125IDS.  of  guncotton. 


46  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

Pedro,  as  the  Aquidaban  opened,  put  on  full  speed  and 
steamed  past  the  ironclad's  starboard  side.  When  abreast  of 
her,  she  fired  two  torpedoes  from  her  training  tubes,  but  it 
is  uncertain  whether  either  hit.  According  to  the  lieutenant 
in  command  of  the  Affonso,  the  first  struck  the  Aquidaban. 
Having  passed  her  enemy,  the  Affonso  circled  and  retired, 
rejoining  the  other  boats  at  Tijucas  Bay.  They  were  not 
aware  of  the  success  of  their  exploit;  indeed,  they  seem  to 
have  supposed  that  the  explosions  had  not  harmed  the  ironclad, 
and  were  preparing  for  another  attack  on  the  night  of  the 
1 6th,  when  the  officers  of  the  German  cruiser,  Arcona,  in- 
formed them  that  the  Aquidaban  was  deserted.  The  Affonso 
Pedro,  though  she  went  within  200  yards  of  the  Aquidaban, 
was  not  touched.  The  Silvado  was  struck  by  one  Nordenfelt 
bullet.  The  sailors  of  both  boats  heard  the  enemy's  pro- 
jectiles whistle  over  their  heads.  The  Sampaio,  which  had 
stopped  for  a  minute-and-a-half  alongside,  at  a  distance  of 
150  yards,  was  hit  in  all  by  thirty-eight  Nordenfelt  i-inch 
bullets  ;  but  though  nearly  forty  men  were  on  board  her,  only 
one  was  very  slightly  wounded.  The  vessel  herself  was  not 
at  all  the  worse.  The  hits  were  distributed  along  her  whole 
length.  Two  bullets  struck  the  drum  of  the  search-light, 
and  the  guns  and  torpedo  tubes  were  scored. 

We  may  now  turn  to  the  account  of  the  Aquidaban' s 
officers.  That  vessel  had  been  expecting  a  boat  from 
Desterro,  probably  the  launch  which  engaged  the  Silvado, 
and  when  she  saw  the  Sampaio,  mistook  her  for  this  friend. 
In  consequence,  it  was  a  minute  or  more  before  it  became 
evident  that  the  approaching  torpedo  vessel  was  an  enemy, 
and  not  till  it  was  recognised  as  the  Sampaio,  was  fire  opened. 
The  Aquidaban  used  all  those  of  her  i-inch  Nordenfelts  and 
5* 7-inch  breech-loaders  which  would  bear,  but  not  her  heavy 
guns.  When  the  torpedo  exploded,  the  shock  felt  was 
terrific  ;  and  the  officer  of  the  watch  was  thrown  from  the 
bridge  into  the  sea.  No  one  was  killed  by  it,  as  there  was  no 
one  in  the  forward  compartments,  which  were  torn  open. 


THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN  BRAZIL. 


The  water-tight  doors  were  closed.  There  was  great  con- 
fusion after  the  ship  had  been  struck,  but  in  spite  of  this  the 
ship's  engines  were  started,  and  she  moved  a  short  distance  to 
the  north,  where  she  slowly  sank  till  she  took  the  ground,  in 
about  twenty-two  feet  of  water.  As  her  draught  was  eighteen 
feet  her  deck  and  upper  works  remained  above  the  water- 
level,  and  her  crew  were  easily  able  to  get  ashore.  On 
receiving  promise  of  pardon  one  third  of  her  men  returned 
and  surrendered. 

The  Brazilians  took  possession  of  her  on  the  16th.  Making 
a  careful  examination,  they  discovered  that  the  torpedo  had 
struck  close  to  the  bulkhead,  which  separated  compartments 
two  and  three,  about  thirty-five  feet  aft  from  the  ram.  It  had 
blown  a  hole  nineteen  or  twenty  feet  long,  and  six  feet  six 
inches  broad,  and  at  either  end  the  steel  skin  of  the  ship  had 
been  torn.*  The  tear  extended  aft  six  feet  longitudinally, 
past  the  bulkhead  dividing  the  third  and  fourth  compartments. 
The  water-tight  doors  in  this  bulkhead  had  been  loosened  by 
the  shock,  so  that  the  fourth  compartment,  which  was  a  very 
large  one,  had  filled  as  well  as  the  first  three.  Inside  every- 
thing was  smashed  beyond  recognition.  The  armoured  deck 
had  been  driven  out  a  little,  just  over  the  place  where  the 
explosion  occurred,  and  numerous  rivets  in  the  skin  had  been 
loosened.  In  all,  it  was  calculated,  she  had  taken  on  board 
500  tons  of  water,  and  only  the  shoals  saved  her  from 
foundering.  On  the  starboard  side  forward,  forty  feet  from 
the  ram,  was  another  hole,  but  much  smaller  than  that  to 
port,  as  it  was  only  three  feet  in  diameter.  This  may  have 
been  caused  by  the  head  of  the  first  torpedo  being  driven 
right  through  the  ship  by  the  force  of  the  explosion,  or  again 
it  may  have  been  made  by  the  Alfonso's  torpedo.  There  is 
some  doubt  whether  this  hit,  as  no  one  appears  to  have  heard 
or  seen  a  second  explosion  ;  it  is  possible  that  it  struck  the 
ground,  and,  if  it  exploded,  did  not  exert  its  full  force  on  the 


*  See  Diagram 


48  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

ship's  bottom.  This,  however,  is  only  a  guess.  The  torpedoes 
used  were  of  Schwarzkopf  make,  containing  57  kilogrammes 
(125IDS.)  of  gun  cotton. 

In  this  torpedo  action  there  are  one  or  two  points  of  interest. 
Firstly,  the  Aquidaban   betrayed   herself ;  had   her  watch 
been  a  little  less  smart  she  might  have  escaped  attack.  The 
difficulty  of  discovering  the  vessel  selected  for  destruction  must 
always  be  great  on  a  dark  night  when  there  is  a  wide  sheet  of 
water  to  be  searched.    A  fleet  of  course  would  be  easier  to 
find,  yet,    on   any  but  bright    nights,    even  considerable 
squadrons  should  be  safe  from  discovery  on  the  open  sea, 
provided  no  lights  are  carried.    Secondly,  having  discovered 
that  a  vessel  was  approaching  her,  and  knowing  that  hostile 
torpedo-craft   were   in   the  vicinity  from  the  unsuccessful 
attempt  of  the  previous  evening,  a  mistake  prevented  her 
from  opening  fire  till  the  enemy  was  too  close.  Thirdly, 
though  the  Sampaio  lay  almost  motionless,  not  four  hundred 
feet  off  her,  the  ironclad's  gunners  did  not  succeed  in  sinking 
the  small  torpedo  gunboat.     Probably  the  Sampaio  was  for 
nearly  half-a-minute  at  very  close  quarters.    The  Aquidaban* 
lacked  medium  quick-firers  ;  between  her  5'7-inch  70-pounder 
and   her  i-inch  Nordenfelts,    she   had  nothing.      All  the 
evidence  which  we  possess  points  to  the  utter  futility  of  the 
machine-gun  as  a  means   of  stopping  torpedo  craft  of  any 
size.     A  shell,  with  plenty  of  penetration,   and    a  good 
bursting  charge,  is  essential  so  that  it,  or  its  fragments,  may 
rake  the  boat  and  open  up  its  compartments.     In  fact,  the 
larger   the    quick-firer    the    better,   but    for  work  against 
torpedo-boats  the  size  of  the  gun  must  be    conditioned  by 

*  In  the  Table,  which  is  based  upon  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Rogers  (U.S.A.), 
in  the  U.S.  Naval  Intelligence  publication,  she  is  credited  with  six  47- 
inch  quick-firers.  There  is  no  mention  of  these  either  in  Mr.  Laird  Clowes' 
account  of  the  war  (Naval  Annual,  1894),  or  in  Lieutenant  Verlynde's 
(R.F.N.)  detailed  description  of  the  affair  in  the  "  Revue  Maritime,"  March, 
1895.  We  may,  then,  feel  doubtful  whether  she  mounted  them.  Of  course,  if 
she  did,  the  remarks  upon  the  necessity  of  heavy  quick-firers  lose  their  point, 
and  the  case  against  the  large  ship  becomes  very  black. 


THE    CIVIL    WAR    IN  BRAZIL. 


4Q 


the  rapidity  of  its  fire.  The  12-pounder  weapon  would  seem 
to  be  about  the  right  weight,  as  it  can  deliver  a  good  number 
of  rounds  in  the  minute,  and  its  shells  are  large  enough  to  do 
plenty  of  damage.  One-inch  Nordenfelts  and  Gatlings  are 
useless  for  this  special  purpose.  Fourthly,  the  Aquidaban  had 
no  nets  out  and  was  at  anchor.  No  vessel  has  as  yet  been 
destroyed  by  the  Whitehead,  when  in  motion  on  the  open  sea, 
and  it  looks  almost  as  if  the  conditions,  which  Mr.  Laird  Clowes 
has  shown  to  apply  to  the  use  of  the  ram,  apply  also  to  the 
torpedo."*  There  were  no  vedette  boats  patrolling  the  bay,  and 
there  was  no  attempt  to  protect  the  ship  by  a  boom.  The 
mines,  as  is  often  the  case,  were  a  very  delusory  protection. 
Some  of  them  were  fished  out  of  the  water  a  few  days  later. 
Lastly,  it  is  certain  that  her  full  complement  was  not  on  board, 
and  that  many  of  the  men  she  carried  were  comparatively 
untrained.  Admiral  Mello  is  known  to  have  suffered  from 
shorthandedness,  and  he  had  lost  some  of  his  sailors  in  the 
land  fighting. 

From  first  to  last  the  Aquidaban  was  the  mainstay  of  the 
insurrection.  She  was  able  to  take  a  certain  amount  of 
punishment  from  the  forts,  and  though  an  antiquated  vessel, 
secured  for  the  insurgents  the  command  of  the  sea,  till  the 
collapse  came  at  Rio.  It  is  not  likely  that  Peixoto  would 
have  moved  his  squadron  upon  the  harbour  had  she  been 
present.  The  efforts  made  to  effect  her  destruction  showed 
that  Peixoto  did  not  feel  himself  safe  whilst  she  was  afloat. 

The  war  cannot  be  said  to  have  added  greatly  to  our  know- 
ledge. It  showed  that  an  improvised  fleet,  without  trained 
seamen,  is  a  most  untrustworthy  instrument,  but  that  is  a  self- 
evident  fact.  It  showed  that  ships  can  pass  forts  with  impunity, 
or  something  approaching  impunity,  if  there  is  an  unobstructed 
channel,  but  a  long  series  of  actions  has  already  proved  this.f 

*  As  it  is  at  present.    See  page  160. 

f  It  is,  however,  possible  that  the  pneumatic  gun  will  modify  this  where  the 
channel  to  be  defended  is  narrow.  This  gun  can  be  absolutely  concealed,  and 
is  able  to  fire  a  shell  a  minute.  The  explosive  charge  of  the  shells  is  extremely 
heavy  and  one  hit  should  disable  any  man-of-war  afloat.    See  also  p.  150. 

Vol.  II.  E 


IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

Duckworth's  brilliant  run  up  the  Dardanelles,  Farragut's 
exploits  on  the  Mississippi  and,  above  all,  at  Mobile,  had 
left  no  doubt.  On  the  other  hand,  where  there  are  ob- 
structions in  the  channel,  where  there  are  mines  or  booms 
to  hold  the  ships  under  fire,  such  proceedings  become,  not 
risky,  but  well-nigh  impossible.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
Marshal  Peixoto's  forts  were  not  armed  with  heavy  quick-firers, 
and  that  the  powder  used  in  the  guns  was  very  bad.  The  insur- 
rection collapsed,  not  through  any  masterly  activity  on  the  part 
of  the  President,  but  rather  through  the  incapacity  of  the 
Melloist  leaders,  and  the  fact  that  they  could  not  collect  an 
army.  A  fleet  without  an  expeditionary  force  behind  it  is  only 
valuable  for  defence,  and  lacks  offensive  power.  Modern  war- 
ships do  not  carry  the  crews  of  three-deckers,  or  even  frigates, 
and  have  lost  the  power  of  landing  a  considerable  body  of  men. 
The  complements  are  barely  sufficient  to  work  the  ships,  and 
no  one  can  be  spared  without  risk. 

Two  months  after  she  had  been  torpedoed  the  Aquidaban 
was  patched  and  raised.  She  was  then  repaired  at  Rio,  and 
her  name  changed  to  the  Vinte-quatro  de  Maw. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


The  Struggle  in  the  East,  1894-5. 

Section  1. — The  Combatants  and  their  Ships. 

From  Brazil  to  the  Yellow  Sea  is  a  far  cry,  but  it  is  to  this 
quarter  that  we  must  next  turn  our  gaze.  Hardly  had  the 
naval  war  in  the  West,  a  struggle  so  feebly  and  fatuously  con- 
ducted that  it  seems  almost  absurd  to  call  it  a  war,  come  to  an 
abrupt  conclusion,  than  the  guns  began  to  shoot  in  the  East. 
Japan  and  China  have  been  old  enemies,  and  there  is  placed 
between  them  an  apple  of  discord  in  the  peninsula  of  Korea. 
In  the  spring  of  1894  an  insurrection  broke  out  in  the  south  of 
that  kingdom.  The  King  appealed  to  his  nominal  suzerain 
China  for  help,  and  help  was  granted.  Two  thousand  Chinese 
soldiers  were  landed  at  the  Korean  port  of  Asan.  Now  by 
the  treaty  of  April  18th,  1885,  China  was  bound  to  inform  the 
Japanese  Government  of  the  despatch  of  troops,  and,  as  this 
had  not  been  done,  Japan  promptly  embarked  a  force  of  about 
5000  men,  and  landed  them  at  Chemulpho  at  the  end  of  June. 
There  followed  the  affair  of  the  Kowshing  and  the  declaration 
of  war. 

It  seemed  a  most  perilous  adventure  for  Japan,  a  small  and 
poor  state  with  forty-one  million  inhabitants,  single-handed  to 
assail  the  colossal  Chinese  empire,  with  its  four  million  square 
miles  of  territory  and  its  three  hundred  millions  of  inhabitants. 
The  task  was  not  so  formidable  as  it  looked,  for  the  colossus 
had  feet  of  clay.  The  striking  peculiarity  of  Japan  is  that  there 
alone  in  Asia  we  find  Western  methods,  Western  organisation, 


52 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1894-5 


Western  strategy,  assimilated  by  an  Oriental  race.  An 
observant  eye  might  have  discerned  the  prognostics  of  this 
astonishing  phenomenon  a  generation  back.  At  the  close  of 
the  last  century  came  a  great  revival  of  learning,  bringing 
with  it  the  study  of  earlier  Japanese  history,  reminding  a 
receptive  and  patriotic  people  that  they  possessed  a  great 
past.  The  revival  of  interest  in  their  earlier  history  again 
contributed  to  the  re-establishment  of  the  Mikado's  rule,  in 
place  of  the  Shogun,  who  had  usurped  much  of  his  power.  In 
1853,  when  an  American  squadron  threatened  Yokohama,  a 
historic  debate  took  place  at  Yedo,  in  which  the  party  who 
advised  compliance  with  the  American  demands  pointed  out 
that,  as  they  were,  the  Japanese  must  be  beaten  with  no  gain. 
The  Kai-Koku,  for  so  this  party  was  called,  went  on  to  say, 
"  Rather  than  allow  this,  as  we  are  not  the  equals  of  foreigners 
in  the  mechanical  arts,  let  us  have  intercourse  with  foreign 
countries,  learn  their  drill  and  tactics,  and,  when  we  have 
made  the  nation  as  united  as  one  family,  we  shall  be  able  to 
go  abroad  and  give  lands  in  foreign  countries  to  those  who 
have  distinguished  themselves  in  battle."  Japan  was  opened 
to  the  United  States  and  later  to  England  and  Russia.  In 
1863  Japanese  officers  were  sent  to  Holland  to  study  naval 
war.  In  1867-8  came  the  civil  war,  which  ended  in  the 
triumph  of  the  Mikado  and  the  party  of  innovation.  Japan 
steadily  carried  out  the  policy  laid  down  by  the  Kai-Koku. 
Railways,  telegraphs,  roads  were  constructed.  Schools  were 
built  and  the  population  educated  in  a  European  fashion  ;  a 
university  at  Tokio,  as  it  was  now  called,  was  founded.  First 
a  deliberative  assembly,  and  then,  within  recent  years,  a 
constitution  was  granted.  The  calendar  was  Europeanised, 
postage  stamps,  and  an  imperial  post,  were  introduced  ;  the 
criminal  code  was  remodelled,  and  torture  abolished. 
Newspapers  were  permitted  to  be  published,  and,  in  spite  of 
a  somewhat  rigid  censorship,  there  were  113  as  early  as  1882. 
Western  manufactures  made  their  appearance ;  cotton  mills, 
paper  mills,  coal  mines,  and  ironworks  sprang  up.    At  a 


S>  WEIHAITVEI 


'r  PTvilip  Sc.  San, . 


Map  XXV 


i894-5_      THE    STRUGGLE    IN    THE    EAST,    1894-5.  53 

bound  the  country  passed  from  the  twilight  of  barbarism  into 
the  davlight  of  full  civilisation. 

Japan,  in  its  barbarous  days,  had  always  possessed  a 
singularly  high  code  of  honour;  its  nobles  had  shown  no 
want  of  self-sacrifice  or  devotion,  whilst  from  end  to  end  of 
the  kingdom  the  story  of  their  great  past  fired  the  Japanese, 
and  made  them  ready  to  sacrifice  their  personal  prepossessions 
for  the  welfare  of  Japan.  The  nation  progressed  eagerly 
upon  the  path  of  the  Kai-Koku  party.  The  army  first 
received  attention  and  was  organised  on  the  basis  of  universal 
service.  That  it  is  no  paper  force,  but  is  not  far  from  being 
the  equal  of  any  European  force,  is  attested  bv  its  bravery 
and  discipline  in  1S94-5,  and  by  the  unanimous  evidence  of 
observers.  The  Japanese  fleet  was  similarly  organised  on  the 
European  model,  England  being  chosen  as  the  pattern;  whilst 
English  instructors  were  brought  out  to  give  practical  and 
theoretical  instruction.  The  islanders  of  the  East  take  kindlv 
to  the  sea.  Captain  Ingles,  the  ex-naval  adviser  to  the  Mikado's 
Government,  states  that  they  are  just  like  Europeans — smart, 
constantly  on  the  alert,  cheerful,  and  patient.  Their  gunnery 
is  excellent,  though  thev  are  not  so  good  with  machine- 
worked  as  with  man-handled  weapons.  The  engineers  are 
very  good,  keep  the  engines  in  capital  order,  and  use  them 
well.  Thus  Captain  Ingles  saw  the  Naniwa  worked  during 
the  naval  manoeuvres  at  100  revolutions,  which  was  her 
maximum  natural  draught  rate  in  England  on  her  trial.* 
Boilers  and  machinery  are  as  efficient  on  the  Japanese  ships 
as  they  can  be  made.  The  discipline  is  comparable  to  that 
of  an  English  squadron.  The  officers  are  hard-working  and 
well  up  in  the  technical  literature  of  their  profession  ;  in 
intelligence,  capacity,  and  courage  they  are  Europeans. 
Admiral  Ito,  the  officer  in  command,  is  not  a  mere  paper 
sailor,  but  has  had  training  and  experience  in  the  annual 

*  On  the  other  hand  it  is  stated  that  the  Japanese  could  never  get  anything 
like  the  trial  speed  out  of  their  ships  ;  and  that  the  Yoshinn  in  the  action  off 
Asan  could  not  overtake  the  Tsi  Yuen.    See  f  .  71. 


54  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894-5 

manoeuvres.  In  short,  the  Japanese  fleet  is  a  war-force,  and 
does  not  merely  exist  for  show. 

Some  years  were  required  to  bring  it  to  this  pitch  of 
efficiency,  and  as  late  as  1890  the  Japanese  Parliament 
refused  to  sanction  a  programme  brought  forward  by  Count 
Kabayama,  which  would  have  greatly  increased  the  expendi- 
ture upon  the  navy,  on  the  ground  that  the  condition  of  the 
Japanese  personnel  was  not  satisfactory.  It  was  thought  that 
the  naval  officers  had  been  selected  by  favouritism  rather 
than  merit,  and  there  were  objections  to  the  pattern  of  the 
warships.  But  none  the  less  a  great  deal  was  done  between 
1884  and  1894  towards  providing  modern  and  powerful 
vessels,  and  care  was  taken  to  procure  the  most  modern  guns 
and  explosives.  The  naval  officers  in  the  war  of  1894  proved 
that  they  were  as  good  as  their  ships,  and  may  be  said  to 
have  surprised  Japan  no  less  than  Europe. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  China  Sea  is  perhaps  the  most 
effete  and  barbarous  state  in  the  world.  Whilst  the  national 
character  of  the  Japanese  stands  high ;  whilst  we  admire 
them  individually  for  their  determined  courage  upon  the  battle- 
field, and  for  the  intelligence  and  foresight  which  have  won 
them  victory,  we  can  feel  little  but  contempt  for  China.  There 
is  to  be  found  an  alien  despotism,  cruel  and  superstitious,  ruling 
a  vast  congeries  of  human  ants,  nourished  in  filth,  educated 
only  in  obsolete  formulas  and  catechisms,  taught  to  believe 
themselves  infinitely  superior  to  the  "foreign  devils"  whom 
they  so  despise,  and,  if  not  without  certain  noble  qualities,  a 
certain  passive  stoicism,  a  remarkable  faculty  of  application 
to  work,  yet  ignorant,  lethargic  and  bitterly  opposed  to 
Western  innovation.  The  Government  is  as  corrupt  and 
treacherous  as  it  is  incapable.  The  rulers  of  provinces,  the 
generals  of  armies,  the  admirals  of  fleets,  are  selected  by  an 
extraordinary  system  of  examination,  which  would  seem  ex- 
pressly adapted  to  choose  the  unfittest.  Peculation  is,  with  very 
rare  exceptions,  the  primary  object  of  everyone,  from  the  exalted 
members  of  the  Tsung-li-Yamen  to  the  meanest  mandarin. 


1394-5]     THE    STRUGGLE   IN    THE    EAST,    1894-5.  55 

Though  time  after  time  China  had  come  into  contact  with 
Europe,  and  smarted  sorely  on  each  occasion,  she  had  not 
learnt  Japan's  lesson.  Indeed,  we  may  doubt  if  she  could  have 
Europeanised  herself  so  thoroughly  and  effectually,  even  had 
she  followed  hard  in  the  footsteps  of  her  rival,  since  there 
must  have  been  a  deep  difference  of  character  between  the 
two  races.  China  had  no  Daimios,  no  Mikado,  no  Kai-Koku  ; 
there  was  no  one  to  hound  her  forward,  and  she  remained  true 
to  Asia,  true,  that  is  to  say.  to  hideous  cruelty,  to  dirt,  and  to 
extortion  ;  she  retained  an  imposing  exterior,  but  those  who 
looked  closely  saw  that  it  covered  internal  weakness  and  dis- 
organisation. She  deceived  Europe,  but  she  did  not  deceive 
Japan. 

Needless  to  say,  that  a  government  which  could  do  nothing 
but  prevaricate,  procrastinate,  and  peculate,  would  not  be 
likely  to  bring  into  existence  either  a  strong  army  or  a  strong 
fleet.  Both  might,  indeed,  exist  on  paper,  for  the  benefit  of 
the  mandarins'  private  purse  ;  neither  would  be  found  ready 
when  the  tugr  of  war  came.  The  armv  was  a  collection  of 
dirty  savages,  whose  tactics  were  grimaces  and  voluptuous 
music,  whose  arms  were  bows  and  arrows  and  unfamiliar  rifles, 
to  whom  discipline  was  a  word  unknown,  who  fought  to  avoid 
the  executioner's  knife,  not  to  defeat  the  enemy.  The  navy 
was  more  imposing.  For  a  time  China  appeared  to  be  follow- 
ing western  models.  Ironclads  were  bought  in  Germany, 
cruisers  in  England.  A  handful  of  naval  instructors  were 
enticed  to  China  from  Europe,  and  then  insulted  and  thwarted 
till  their  forbearance  was  exhausted.  Captain  Lang,  awhile  an 
admiral  of  the  Chinese  navy,  has,  indeed,  asserted  that  under 
Admiral  Ting  the  Chinese  navy  was  a  splendid  force.  Against 
that  we  may  put  the  evidence  of  the  "  Times  "  correspondent 
and  Mr.  Norman.  Ting,  it  appears,  was  an  ex-cavalry  general, 
and  is  said  to  have  been  devoid  of  tactical  and  strategical 
knowledge,  though  he  certainly  did  not  lack  courage.  The 
discipline  of  the  Chinese  fleet  may  be  judged  from  the  fact 
that  he  would  play  pitch  and  toss  with  the  sentry  at  his  cabin 


56  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION  [1894-5 

door,  and,  when  he  had  won  all  the  man's  money,  would  order 
the  paymaster  to  advance  his  subordinate  more,  that  his  game 
might  continue.  As  to  its  efficiency,  the  ships  were  filthily 
dirty,  which  is,  after  all,  only  what  we  should  expect ;  the 
water-tight  doors  were  seldom  closed  or  used,  a  fact  which  we 
must  remember  when  we  come  to  the  Yalu  ;  the  guns  were 
employed  by  the  sailors  as  receptacles  for  pickles,  rice,  and 
chop-sticks  ;  the  heavy  Krupps  were  kept  in  shocking  order, 
and  the  rings  on  them  were  beginning  to  open  out.  As  a 
foreign  instructor  said  to  Mr.  Norman,  so  far  from  the 
Chinese  squadrons  being  formidable,  it  was  only  a  question 
who  should  get  them  as  prizes.  The  officers  were  either  in- 
efficient nominees  of  the  authorities,  or  more  able  but  power- 
less. Quick-firers  were  not  bought  because  there  was  little 
money  to  be  "squeezed"  out  of  them.  One  Chinese  battle- 
ship is  stated  to  have  gone  to  the  Yalu  without  one  of  her 
heavy  guns,  which  her  captain  had  pawned.  There  were 
shells  loaded  with  charcoal;  charges  for  heavy  guns  of  stuff 
which  would  not  burn,  instead  of  cocoa  powder  ;  and  there 
were  docks  silted  up  from  neglect,  or  useless  owing  to  the 
bad  arrangement  of  their  pumping  machinery.  In  vain  did  the 
English  and  German  advisers  beseech  the  Government  to  add 
ships,  to  procure  sailors,  coal,  stores,  and  oil.  They  pointed 
oi^triaj:  the  Chinese  engineers  dared  not  use  forced  draught, 
and  that  the  Chinese  officers  were  so  nervous  when  handling 
torpedoes  that  they  fired  them  at  800  yards  instead  of  350. 
The  Chinese  seamen  on  occasions  displayed  both  coolness 
and  courage,  though  their  gunnery  left  much  to  be  desired  ; 
but  they  lacked  that  confidence  in  their  leaders,  which  is,  after 
all,  an  essential  of  success. 

All  this  is  of  great  importance  as  showing  us  what  kind  of 
a  task  the  Japanese  had  before  them,  and  how  few  deductions 
can  be  drawn  from  the  way  in  which  that  task  was  performed. 
The  Chinese  fleet  was  not  allowed  to  seek  the  Japanese.  It 
was  kept  by  orders  out  of  the  sight  of  Admiral  Ito  till  com- 
pelled to  fight.  The  strategy  of  the  Tsung-li-Yamen  may  or  may 


1894-5]      THE   STRUGGLE   IN    THE    EAST,    1894-5.  57 

not  have  been  sound,  but  it  could  have  contributed  to  neither 
efficiency,  discipline,  nor  morale.  The  officers  were  bad,  the 
sailors  certainly  lacked  training,  and  Ting,  whatever  his 
courage,  was  not  a  brilliant  commander.  Can  anv  very  serious 
tactical  conclusions  be  drawn  from  the  performances  of  such 
a  force  ?  We  may,  it  is  true,  observe  how  the  Chinese  ships 
behaved  under  the  Japanese  fire,  which  will  give  us  informa- 
tion as  to  construction.  But  can  we  get  much  more  than 
this?  Can  we  say  that  the  Yalu  proves  line  ahead  to  be  the 
ideal  formation,  and  not  line  abreast?  We  maybe  persuaded 
of  it,  but  we  shall  do  well  not  to  rely  overmuch  upon  this 
Eastern  engagement.  Had  the  Japanese  made  their  onset  in 
line  abreast,  it  is  quite  probable  that  they  would  have  won.  In 
fact,  the  gulf  between  the  two  forces  was  immense.  The  only 
question  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  was,  how  many  of  the 
Chinese  ships  would  have  to  be  sunk  before  the  others  could 
be  captured  and  added  to  the  Japanese  fleet.  The  issue  of  an 
engagement  with  the  Chinese  was  confidently  predicted  as  a 
success  for  Japan  by  Mr.  Norman,  writing  with  full  knowledge 
of  both  combatants,  a  month  before  the  Yalu. 

And  now  to  turn  to  the  Japanese  fleet  and  naval  resources. 
The  Japanese  sea-going  ships  fall  into  three  classes  :  the  first 
comprising  three  old  and  indifferent  armoured  vessels  ;  the 
second,  eight  large  protected  cruisers ;  the  third,  eighteen 
gunboats  and  smaller  vessels.  Taking  the  first  group,  its 
members  are  the  Fusoo,  Hiyei,  and  Kongo.  The  Fusoo  is  an 
old  central-battery  ship,  designed  by  Sir  Edward  Reed,  and 
launched  in  1877  at  the  Thames  Iron  Works.  On  her 
main  deck  in  a  citadel  she  carries  four  14^-ton  guns,  one  at 
each  corner  of  the  citadel.  On  her  upper  deck  are 
mounted  two  5i-ton  guns.  Her  armour  of  wrought  iron, 
7  inches  to  9  inches  thick,  is  of  very  inferior  quality  and 
resisting  power  to  the  steel  now  used.  Right  ahead  or  astern 
she  can  fire  two  i_i^-ton,  and  two  5i~ton  guns  ;  on  the  broad- 
side two  iz^-ton  and  one  5  J-ton.  Her  speed  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  did  not  probably  exceed  ten  knots.    She  is  very 


58  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894-5 

similar  in  type  to  the  English  Iron  Duke  class,  but  is  smaller 
The  Hiyei  and  Kongo  are  sister  ships  of  a  very  different  type, 
protected  by  a  4^-inch  iron  belt,  for  one  quarter  of  their  length, 
amidships;  they  were  both  built  in  England  in  1877-8,  and 
carry  on  their  main-deck  six  3-ton  guns  and  three  6-ton. 
Their  ahead-fire  is  from  two  6-ton  guns,  their  broadside  from 
two  6-ton  and  three  3-ton.  There  are  no  similar  vessels  in 
the  British  fleet.  The  R/oj'o,  like  the  last  two  ships,  has  a 
wooden  hull,  and  is  an  antiquated  ironclad,  built  in  England, 
carrying  4^-inch  armour.  She  took  no  part  in  the  fighting, 
and  need  not  therefore  be  further  considered. 

In  the  second  group,  the  Chiyoda  alone  has  a  chrome-steel 
armour-belt,  4^  inches  in  thickness,  for  two-thirds  of  her 
length.  In  addition,  she  has  an  inch  protective  deck  from 
stem  to  stern  with  coal  above  it,  and  round  her  machinery 
compartments,  coal  and  a  belt  of  cellulose.  She  is  divided 
into  eighty-four  water-tight  compartments,  and  has  a  double 
bottom  amidships.  Her  engines  develop  5600  horse-power 
and  give  her  a  speed  of  nineteen-and-a-half  knots  an  hour. 
She  was  built  by  Messrs.  Thomson  of  Clydebank,  and 
launched  in  1891.  Her  armament  includes  ten  47-inch  Arm- 
strong quick-firers,  and  fourteen  47-millimetre  Hotchkisses, 
with  three  Gatlings  and  three  torpedo-tubes.  Next  come 
three  larger  vessels  of  4240  tons,  the  Hashidate,  Itsukushima, 
and  Matsushima.  They  were  designed  by  M.  Bertin,  and 
the  last  two  were  built  at  La  Seyne  in  France,  the  first  at 
Yokosuka  in  Japan.  They  carry  an  end-to-end  steel  turtle- 
back  deck  2  inches  thick  amidships.  Forward  in  the  first  two, 
aft  in  the  last,  is  a  barbette  protected  by  12-inch  steel  plates, 
but  open  at  the  top  on  which  is  mounted  a  12'6-inch  Canet 
66-ton  gun,  the  most  powerful  weapon  of  its  size  in  the  world, 
built  to  fire  cordite,  and  loaded  and  manoeuvred  by  hydraulic- 
power.  The  loading  machinery  is  sheltered  by  the  thick 
armour,  but  the  barbette  is  open  underneath,  having  only  a 
small  armoured  ammunition  shaft  for  the  passage  of  projec- 
tiles and  charges  from  the  magazine  to  the  breech  of  the  gun. 


1894-5]      THE   STRUGGLE   IN    THE   EAST,  1894-5. 


59 


A  bullet-proof  shield  protects  the  gunner  sighting  the  weapon. 
Besides  this  immense  gun,  which  can  at  2000  yards  perforate 
any  armour  afloat,  each  vessel  carries  eleven  Armstrong 
4*  7-inch  quick-firers,  five  mounted  on  each  broadside,  behind 
bullet-proof  shields,  and  one  placed  at  the  opposite  end 
of  the  ship  to  the  heavy  gun*  The  Hashidate  further  has 
six  6-pounder  quick-firers,  and  six  machine-guns,  whilst  the 
other  two  have  each  five  6-pounders,  eleven  3-pounders,  and 
six  machine-guns.  Each  ship  has  four  torpedo-tubes.  Their 
speed  is  from  sixteen  to  seventeen-and-a-half  knots,  and  they 
were  launched  between  1889  and  1891.  Their  enormously 
heavy  gun  makes  them  something  more  than  mere  cruisers— 
indeed,  in  general  feature  they  approximate  most  closely,  on  a 
small  scale  of  course,  to  the  huge  Italian  cruiser-battleships. 
Even  more  powerful  than  these  is  the  Yoshino,  an  Armstrong- 
built  cruiser  of  4150  tons,  launched  at  Elswick  in  1892.  From 
stem  to  stern  she  has  an  armoured  deck  2  inches  thick,  but 
on  its  slopes  amidships  the  thickness  is  44  inches.  The  hull 
is  minutely  sub-divided,  and  there  is  a  double  bottom  amid- 
ships. On  the  measured  mile  her  speed  reached  the  very  high 
figure  of  23*03  knots,  and  at  the  date  of  her  trial  she  was  the 
fastest  cruiser  in  the  world.  Her  armament  is  extremely 
strong.  Forward  she  carries  three  6-inch  Armstrong  quick- 
firers,  mounted  separately  behind  stout  steel  shields,  whilst 
astern  is  a  fourth.  Two  of  the  four  are  on  the  keel-line,  the 
other  two  on  sponsons  forward.  Amidships,  on  her  upper 
deck,  are  eight  4/ 7-inch  quick-firers,  protected,  like  the  6-inch 
guns,  by  shields.  Two  fire  right  astern.  She  thus  brings  to 
bear,  ahead  three  6-inch,  astern  one  6-inch  and  two  4* 7-inch, 
and  on  either  broadside  three  6-inch  and  four  4* 7-inch  guns, 
all  quick-firers  of  the  latest  pattern.  Besides  this,  her  main 
battery,  she  carries  twenty-two  3-pounders  and  five  torpedo- 
tubes.  Her  supply  of  coal  is  1000  tons,  and  the  bunkers  are 
so  disposed  as  to  protect  the  engine-rooms,  boilers,  and  vitals. 

*  In  the  Matsushima  two  47  inch  quick-firers  are  placed  forward,  making  her 
total  of  these  guns  twelve. 


6o 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1894-5 


She  has  two  funnels  and  two  military  masts,  each  with  one 
top  ;  on  the  forecastle  is  an  armoured  conning-tower.  The 
Akitsnshima  is  a  Yokosuka-built  cruiser,  similar  in  design  to 
the  Voskino,  but  carries  two  less  47-inch  guns.  She  has  a 
deck  of  steel,  ih  inches  thick  on  the  flat,  2\  inches  on  the 
slopes.  Her  speed  is  nineteen  knots  ;  her  armament  consists 
of  four  6-inch  quick-firers,  placed  on  sponsons,  two  forward 
and  two  astern,  with  six  4* 7-inch  quick-firers  mounted  amid- 
ships. Her  bow  and  stern  fire  is  delivered  from  two  6-inch 
guns,  but  on  the  broadside  she  brings  to  bear  two  6-inch  and 
three  4*  7-inch  guns.  She  has  fourteen  3-pounders  and 
machine-guns,  and  carries  four  torpedo-tubes.  By  an  error 
she  is  described  in  the  older  "  Naval  Annuals"  as  armed 
with  a  66-ton  Canet  gun.  Last  come  the  Naniwa  and 
Takachiho,  two  Elswick-built  cruisers,  launched  in  1885. 
They  are  of  interest  as  being  practically  sister-ships  of  the 
celebrated  Esmeralda,  which,  designed  by  Mr.  Rendel  for  the 
Chilian  Government,  was  the  prototype  of  the  fast,  heavily- 
armed,  unarmoured  ship.  Their  tonnage  is  3600  to  3750. 
They  have  an  end-to-end  steel  deck  3  inches  thick  on  the 
slopes,  2  inches  on  the  flat  amidships  and  at  the  ends ;  above 
this  deck  are  coal-bunkers.  They  have  also  cork-packed 
compartments  running  nearly  round  the  ship  on  the  water-line. 
Forward  and  aft,  fifteen  feet  above  the  water,  are  placed  two 
28-ton,  1  o-inch  guns,  on  central-pivot  carriages,  with  hydraulic 
turning  and  loading  gear.  A  steel  screen  revolves  with  the 
gun  and  protects  the  gunners,  whilst  an  armoured  loading- 
station  is  provided  to  the  rear  of  each  gun.  Amidships  are 
six  6-inch  Armstrong  slow-fire  breech-loaders,  mounted  three 
on  each  beam,  on  sponsons.  Besides  these,  twelve  smaller 
weapons  and  four  torpedo-tubes  are  carried.  The  trial  speed 
was  1 8*7  knots,  and  there  is  bunker  space  for  800  tons  of 
coal.    Altogether,  these  are  fine  ships,  if  a  trifle  out  of  date. 

The  smaller  Japanese  ships  do  not  merit  any  detailed 
description,  as  none  of  them,  with  the  exception  of  the  Akagi, 
a  small  gunboat,  were  at  any  time  engaged.     The  torpedo- 


1894-5]      THE   STRUGGLE    IN    THE    EAST,    1894-5.  61 

boats  are  forty-one  in  number,  and  of  these,  one,  the  Kotaka, 
has  1 -inch  armour:  though  an  old  boat,  built  in  1886,  she  did 
good  service. 

Behind  her  war-fleet,  Japan  had  a  very  considerable 
mercantile  marine,  in  which  were  included  in  1894,  288 
steamers  of  174,000  tons.  The  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha  is  one 
of  the  important  shipowning  companies  of  the  world  ;  to 
it  belonged  fifty  steamers,  of  which  four  steamed  thirteen 
knots,  whilst  two,  the  Saikio  Maru  and  Kobe  Marn,  of 
2900  tons,  steamed  fourteen  knots.  The  government  sub- 
ventioned  this  company  to  the  extent  of  one-and-a-half  million 
dollars  yearly-  Just  before  the  war,  in  1894,  the  Japanese 
Government  purchased  a  large  number  of  steamers  at 
Shanghai  and  Hongkong,  so  that  it  wanted  neither  auxiliary 
cruisers  nor  transports.  With  the  exception  of  the  66-ton 
gun,  everything  required  by  the  Japanese  ships  is  produced 
in  Japan  ;  machinery,  castings,  armour,  guns,  projectiles, 
melinite,  powder,  all  are  manufactured  in  the  country."*  At 
Tokio  is  the  arsenal,  employing  in  peace  over  1000  men  ; 
whilst  the  dockyards  are  three  in  number.  Onohama  is  the 
least  important,  building  gunboats  and  torpedo-boats,  and 
employing  less  than  1000  men.  Yokosuka  is  more  important; 
it  builds  cruisers,  and  has  three  docks,  of  which  the  following 
are  the  dimensions  : 

Length.  Breadth.  Depth  on  Sill. 

No.  i      ...      392  feet      ...      82  feet      ...      22  feet 
No.  2      ...      502   ,,        ...      94   ,,        ...  28 
No.  3      ...      308   „        ...      45  ...      17  >. 

At  Tokio,  there  is  one  dock  300  feet  long,  fifty-two  feet 
broad,  and  fourteen  deep  ;  at  Nagasaki,  one  400  feet  long  ; 
and  at  Osaka,  where  there  are  important  ironworks,  a  dock 
250  long.  In  addition,  there  are  three  slipways,  one  capable 
of  lifting  a  2000-ton  ship  At  Kure,  on  the  Inland  sea,  is  a 
new  dockyard  recently  established.  The  Japanese  are  clever 
workmen,  and  were  able  to  effect  repairs  with  great  rapidity. 

*  Japan  has  not,  however,  as  yet  been  able  to  build  large  warships. 


62  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894-5 

Whilst  the  Japanese  fleet  thus  included  a  large  number  of 
thoroughly  modern  vessels,  equipped  with  quick-firers,  and 
capable  of  fast  steaming,  whilst  these  ships  were  manned  by 
well-trained  sailors,  and  officers  who  had  studied  strategy  and 
tactics,  the  Chinese  fleet  had  remained  almost  stationary  since 
the  close  of  the  war  with  France  in  1885.  To  begin  with,  it 
could  scarcely  be  described  as  a  fleet,  being  a  local  rather 
than  an  imperial  force.  In  peace,  it  was  organised,  so  far  as 
it  had  any  organisation  and  was  not  merely  a  jumble  of  badly 
kept  ships,  in  four  squadrons,  the  North  Coast,  the  Foochow, 
the  Shanghai,  and  the  Canton.  The  first-named  was  the 
largest  and  strongest,  though  the  Foochow  was  not  much 
inferior.  The  total  included  two  armoured  second-class 
battleships,  three  small  and  indifferent  armourclads,  eleven 
old  but  heavilv  armed  cruisers,  ranging  from  2200  to  2500 
tons,  nine  smaller  cruisers  of  over  1000  tons,  thirty  small 
vessels  and  gunboats,  and  forty-three  torpedo-boats.  In 
numbers,  China,  then,  had  a  very  decided  superiority ;  but 
whilst  the  two  large  armoured  ships  were  very  much  better 
than  anything  the  Japanese  possessed,  the  Chinese  cruisers  were 
old  or  in  bad  repair.  The  Chinese  artillery  was  of  a  much 
older  pattern  than  the  Japanese,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  very  few  quick-firers  were  included  in  it) 

The  two  largest  vessels  which  flew  the  Chinese  flag,  were 
the  sisters  Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen,  of  about  7500  tons 
displacement,  built  by  the  Vulcan  Company  at  Stettin  in 
1 88 1 -2.  They  carried  14  inches  of  compound  armour  upon  a 
citadel  which  occupied  about  half  their  length  ;  the  other  half 
was  unarmoured.  Thus  forward  and  aft  their  ends  were 
quite  unprotected  externally,  but  internally  there  was  a  3-inch 
horizontal  deck,  a  minute  cellular  sub-division,  and  a  large 
number  of  cork-packed  compartments.  The  extreme  speed 
at  their  trials  was  fourteen-and-a-half  knots,  but  their 
boilers  were  in  a  bad  condition  in  1894,  and  it  is  doubtful 
if  they  could  steam  much  over  ten  knots  in  the  hour. 
The  heavy    armament  was  placed  at  the  forward   end  of 


1894-5]      THE    STRUGGLE   IN    THE   EAST,    1894-5.  63 


the  citadel,  in  two  barbettes,  protected  by  12-inch  compound 
armour,  and  disposed  en  echelon.  The  barbettes  were  open 
at  the  top,  but  a  bullet-proof  shield  protected  the  gunners.* 
Hydraulic  power  was  used  to  work  the  four  12-inch  35-ton 
Krupps,  placed  two  in  each  barbette.  At  each  extremity  of 
the  ship,  one  6-inch  Krupp  breech-loader  was  mounted  in  a 
small,  lightly-armoured  turret.  In  addition,  there  were  twelve 
smaller  guns,  and  two  torpedo-tubes.  The  general  design 
was  similar  to  that  of  the  Ajax  and  Inflexible — developing 
bow-fire  at  the  expense  of  the  broadside.  As  this  feature  may 
have  exercised  some  tactical  influence  upon  the  battle  of  the 
Yalu,  we  may  be  permitted  to  dwell  upon  it. 

In  theory,  each  of  these  ships  could  fire  ahead  or  astern  the 
four  heavy  Krupps  and  one  6-inch  gun  ;  in  practice,  the  blast 
of  the  inner  gun  in  each  barbette,  when  both  were  trained 
right  ahead,  would  prevent  the  6-inch  gun  from  being  worked, 
and  might  even  demolish  its  turret  ;  the  same  would  be  the 
case  when  they  were  trained  aft.  With  an  antagonist  exactly 
abreast,  all  four  guns  would  bear  on  the  broadside,  but  yet  on 
either  beam  there  was  a  wide  angle  which  was  not  covered  by 
the  fire  of  more  than  two  heavy  guns,  since  the  barbettes, 
diagonally  placed,  obstructed  each  other.  The  funnels 
prevented  the  after  barbette  guns  from  bearing  upon  the  port 
quarter ;  on  the  starboard  quarter,  the  fore  barbette  guns 
could  not  fire,  because  of  the  after  barbette  ;  and  six 
points  before  the  beam  on  the  port  quarter,  the  after 
barbette  guns  could  not  bear  for  the  same  reason.  The 
best  fighting  positions  for  these  ships  would  then  be 
to  have  their  enemy  right  ahead  or  right  astern — exactly 
abreast  of  them  on  the  port  (left)  beam,  or  rather,  ahead 
of  them  on  the  starboard  (right)  beam.  In  those  positions, 
only  would  four  heavy  guns  bear ;  in  any  other  position,  half 
their  heavy  armament  would  be  useless.  These  vessels 
represented  a  tactical  theory  already  obsolete  in  1894,  as  they 


These  shields  were  removed  in  the  course  of  the  war 


64  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894-5 

were  built  to  attack  in  line  abreast.  At  the  date  of  their 
construction,  the  heavy  gun  was  the  dominant  factor  in  naval 
tactics,  coupled,  it  is  true,  with  the  ram.  Since,  1882, 
however,  had  come  the  large  calibre  quick-firer,  compelling  a 
return  to  the  fore  and  aft  disposition  of  the  guns,  through  the 
necessity  of  finding  room  for  such  useful  weapons  on  the 
broadside.  There  followed  in  consequence  a  general  return  to 
line  ahead  as  the  battle  formation,  since  the  greatest  weight 
of  metal,  with  ships  carrying  their  guns  fore  and  aft,  is 
discharged  on  the  broadside,  which  line  ahead  leaves  free. 

The  King  Yuen  and  Lai  Yuen  were,  again,  sister  barbette- 
ships  of  2,850  tons,  built  by  the  Vulcan  Company  of  Stettin, 
and  launched  in  1887.  They  had  a  very  short  armour-belt,  g\ 
to  5J-inches  thick,  over  their  engines  and  boilers,  but  the  top 
of  the  belt  lay  flush  with  the  water-line,  and  thus  it  was  not  of 
much  service  to  them.  Over  the  belt  was  a  deck  of  steel 
1  ^-inches  thick,  which  at  the  unprotected  ends  was  twice  as 
thick.  Like  the  larger  battleships,  they  had  minute  sub- 
division and  cork  packing  outside  their  armour.  Amidships 
only  had  they  a  double  bottom.  The  nominal  speed  was 
sixteen-and-a-half  knots  with  forced  draught,  but  in  1894  they 
could  not  do  much  more  than  twelve  or  thirteen.  A  conning- 
tower  protected  by  6-inch  armour  was  placed  forward ;  and 
the  armament  consisted  of  two  8J-inch  Krupps  mounted  in  a 
barbette  forward,  on  which  was  compound  armour  8  inches 
thick.  The  gunners  had  the  shelter  of  a  stout  steel  shield. 
Sponsoned  out  on  either  beam  was  one  5'9-inch  breechloader, 
and  thirteen  smaller  guns  were  also  carried.  The  Ping  Yuen 
of  the  same  displacement  was  built  at  Foochow,  and  had  a 
complete  water-line  belt  of  8-inch  armour,  a  deck  2  inches 
thick,  and  a  barbette  forward,  protected  by  5-inch  plating  and 
a  shield.  In  this  barbette  she  carried  one  22-ton  Krupp  instead 
of  the  two  8-inch  weapons  ;  otherwise  her  armament  was  the 
same.  Her  speed  was  only  ten  and  a  half  knots  on  trial,  as 
money  ran  short  when  she  was  on  the  stocks,  and  her  length  was 
cut  down,  ruining  her  lines.   The  Tsi  Yuen  was  a  Stettin-built 


1894-5]     THE    STRUGGLE    IN    THE   EAST,  1894-5 


65 


cruiser,  having  a  2  to  3-inch  deck  and  a  barbette  forward, 
armoured  with  10  inches  of  plating,  in  which  were  mounted 
two  8J-inch  Krupps.  Aft  she  carried  one  5'9-inch  Krupp  gun 
mounted  in  a  steel  turret.  Her  speed  was  nominally  fifteen 
knots.  The  Chih  Yuen  and  Chiug  Yuen  were  Armstrong 
cruisers,  launched  in  1886,  and,  like  all  that  firm's  ships, 
extremely  powerful  for  their  size  ;  their  armoured  deck  was 
4  inches  thick  on  the  slopes,  and  2  inches  on  the  ends  and 
centre;  two  8-inch  guns  were  mounted  forward  behind  a  shield 
and  one  aft,  whilst  one  6-inch  gun  was  sponsoned  out  on 
either  beam.  The  speed  was  at  their  trial  eighteen-and-a-half 
knots.  The  Tshao  Yong  and  Yang  Wei  again  were  of  Arm- 
strong construction,  but  older  and  smaller.  Their  speed  had 
been  sixteen  knots,  but  their  boilers  were  completely  worn 
out  and  good  for  very  little.  They  carried  fore  and  aft 
one  1  o-inch  Armstrong  gun,  on  a  central-pivot  mounting,  and 
amidships  four  5' 1 -inch  slow-firers  and  seven  machine  guns. 
The  1  o-inch  guns  were  not  in  good  condition,  as  fresh  copper 
rings  had  been  fitted  to  the  breech  by  Chinese  artificers,  and 
their  rings  jammed  in  action. 

All  these  vessels  took  part  in  the  Yalu,  with,  in  addition,  two 
small  cruisers  of  about  1000  tons,  whose  names  and  armaments 
are  uncertain  and  unimportant."*  Of  the  vessels  which  did  not 
take  part  in  that  action  the  most  important  were  the  Foo 
Ching,  Ye  Sing,  Foo  Sing,  Kai  Chi,  Nan  Shu  in,  Nan  Ting, 
and  Yang  Pao,  all  very  similar  to  the  Chih  Yuen)  carrying 
8-inch  or  SJ-inch,  and  47-inch  guns.  The  gunboats  were 
mostly  of  the  Rendel  type,  carrying  one  38-ton  or  35-ton 
muzzle-loader  forward. 

In  her  merchant  marine,  China  was  far  behind  Japan, 
having  only  thirty-five  steamers  of  44,000  tons.  In  docks  she 
was  better  off.    At  Foochow,  the  most  important  Government 

*  Huang  Chia  or  Hwang  Kai  and  Hwang  Ping.  The  first  is  described  by 
Captain  McGiffin  as  of  1030  tons,  armed  with  three  47-inch  quickfirers;  the  second 
as  of  1300  tons  armed  with  three  6-inch,  four  5-inch,  and  eight  small  guns. 
Details  of  the  ships  engaged  at  the  Yalu  are  given  in  Tables  XVIII. -XIX. 

Vol.  II.  F 


66 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1894-5 


yard,  was  one  dock  390  feet  long;  at  Amoy,  one  of  310  feet 
and  two  smaller  ;  at  Shanghai,  one  of  500  feet  and  four  of 
over  300  feet,  whilst  one  other  was  out  of  use.  At  Taku  was 
one  of  340  feet  and  another  of  smaller  dimensions;  at 
Whampoa,  two  of  over  400  feet ;  at  Port  Arthur,  one  400  feet 
long  and  one  smaller  dock.  On  the  Gulf  of  Pe-che-li  China 
possessed  two  excellent  harbours  in  Port  Arthur  and  Wei- 
hai-wei,  each  of  which  was  defended  on  the  seaward  face  by 
strong  works  mounting  very  heavy  guns,  Armstrongs  and 
Krupps.  But  the  management  of  the  dockyards  was  not 
good,  though  there  seems  to  have  been  little  fault  to  find  with 
the  Chinese  workmen. 

Serving  in  the  Chinese  fleet  were  eight  or  nine  Europeans, 
of  whom  Major  Von  Hanneken,  a  German,  acted  as 
strategical  adviser  to  Admiral  Ting.  Five  were  Englishmen 
with  some  knowledge  of  naval  matters,  one  or  two  having 
passed  through  the  British  Navy.  The  Japanese  depended 
entirely  upon  themselves,  and  had  no  Europeans. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


The  Action  off  Asan  and  the  Sinking  of  the 

KOWSHING,    July  25th,  1894. 

On  July  23rd  the  struggle  between  China  and  Japan  may 
be  said  to  have  begun  with  the  Japanese  attack  upon  the 
King  of  Korea's  palace  at  Seoul.  In  this  attack  only  troops 
were  engaged,  and  it  took  place  before  any  declaration  of 
war. 

Some  days  earlier,  on  or  about  the  20th,  a  Chinese  force 
was  despatched  from  Taku  in  ten  transports  to  the  Yalu 
River,  and  at  the  same  time  a  second  force  was  sent  to 
Asan,  a  port  in  Korea  at  the  head  of  Prince  Jerome  Gulf, 
some  distance  to  the  south  of  the  Yalu.  In  the  gulf  lay  a 
small  Chinese  squadron,  composed  of  the  Tsi  Yuen,  Captain 
Fong  Peh-kien  ;  the  Kwang  Yu,  Captain  Liu  Yiu-che  ;  and  the 
Wei  Yuen,  Captain  Hwang-Fu.  The  Kwang  Yu  or  Yi  was  a 
revenue  steamer  of  11 00  tons,  and  15  knots  speed,  armed  with 
one  4* 7-inch  quick-firer  and  one  6-inch  gun  ;  the  Wei  Yuen  an 
old  composite  cruiser  of  1200  tons,  built  in  1877,  and  very 
feebly  armed.  The  object  of  the  squadron  was  to  cover  the 
landing  of  the  Chinese  troops,  who  were  conveyed  in  three 
steamers  under  the  British  flag — the  Kowshing,  Fetching,  and 
Irene.  The  Irene  reached  her  destination  safely,  and  landed 
her  troops  on  the  night  of  the  23rd.  The  Feiching  arrived  on 
the  24th,  and  also  got  her  men  ashore. 

That  same  night  the  Wei  Yuen  received  intelligence  of  the 
fighting  at  Seoul  from  the  British  cruiser  Archer,  and  at  once 
informed  Captain  Fong.  He  was  anxious — for  such  were  his 
orders — to    avoid    any    collision    with    the    Japanese,  and, 

F  2 


68  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

therefore,  he  sent  the  Wei  Yuen,  his  worst  ship,  over  to  the 
north  of  the  gulf,  where  she  was  to  wait  for  the  other  ships  at 
a  rendezvous.  The  Tsi  Yuen  and  Kwang  Yi  were  instructed 
to  weigh  and  proceed  at  daybreak,  and  the  Chinese  officers 
were  kept  at  work  preparing  for  sea.  In  the  night  a  large 
man-of-war  was  noticed  without  lights,  cruising  off  Asan,  but 
she  did  not  molest  the  Chinese.  At  five  of  the  25th,  they 
weighed  and  steamed  slowly  down  the  gulf,  seawards. 
The  officers  had  now  turned  in  after  their  hard  night's 
work. 

At  six  o'clock  a  squadron  was  sighted  coming  up  towards 
Asan  from  the  sea.  It  was  composed  of  the  Yoshino,  Captain 
Kawara ;  Naniwa,  Captain  Togo;  and  A  kitsushima,  Captain 
Kamimura,  all  Japanese  cruisers  of  large  size.  Their 
appearance  seems  to  have  attracted  little  attention  ;  they 
came  on  in  single  line  ahead,  keeping  in  the  centre  of  the 
gulf,  the  waters  of  which  shoal  gradually  to  the  shore.  The 
Chinese  were  to  the  south  side  of  the  gulf,  some  distance 
away.  The  Japanese  were  passing  when  righting  began. 
There  are  two  stories,  as  for  almost  every  incident  in  this 
war,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  decide  which  is  true. 

According  to  the  Japanese  account  the  Chinese  failed  to 
salute  Admiral  Tsuboi's  flag,  as  international  etiquette  requires, 
but  were  cleared  for  battle  and  gave  various  indications  of  a 
hostile  purpose.  Seeing  this,  the  account  proceeds,  the  Japanese 
stood  out  to  sea  to  get  out  of  the  narrow  waters  in  which  they 
were  manoeuvring  ;  but  the  Naniwa  was  so  closely  followed  by 
the  Tsi  Yuen  that  she  turned  and  headed  for  the  Chinese  ship. 
The  Tsi  Yuen  being  now  in  turn  closely  pressed  by  the 
Naniwa,  though  no  shots  had  as  yet  been  fired  on  either  side, 
hoisted  the  white  flag  above  the  Chinese  naval  ensign.  Under 
cover  of  this  she  approached  the  Japanese  ship,  and,  at  a 
distance  of  only  300  yards  from  her  stern,  treacherously 
discharged  a  torpedo  at  her.  The  torpedo  missing,  the 
Naniwa  opened  at  once  on  the  three  Chinese  ships,  and 
was  supported  by  her  two  consorts. 


1 894]         THE    SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING; 


69 


The  Chinese  account,  which  is  the  more  probable,  is  this. 
As  the  Japanese  were  passing,  when  the  Chinese  were 
absolutely  unprepared  and  unsuspicious,  their  ships  fired  a 
broadside  at  the  Tsi  Yuen  and  Kwang  Yi,  and  attempted  to 
cross  the  shoals  and  close.  Immediately  the  Chinese  began 
to  clear  for  action.  The  Kwang  Yi  was  a  small  ship,  and  was 
ready  first;  she  opened  with  her  47-inch  gun.  She  behaved 
with  great  gallantry,  for  she  was  hopelessly  outmatched  by 
the  three  big  Japanese  cruisers.  The  Tsi  Yuen  was  longer  in 
clearing.  The  steam  turning-gear  for  the  guns  in  her 
barbette  had  to  be  got  to  work,  the  guns  cast  loose,  boats, 
chains,  screws,  awnings,  and  ventilators  stowed  away,  and 
ammunition  brought  up.  Even  in  a  British  ship  this  takes 
time ;  the  full  preparation  for  battle  is  a  matter  of  hours,  not 
minutes.  The  Tsi  Yuen  was,  therefore,  at  a  very  great 
disadvantage,  as  she  could  not  have  been  in  proper  order  for 
fighting  when  her  guns  opened. 

She  returned  the  enemy's  fire  with  her  two  big  8-inch  guns, 
and  the  6-inch  weapon  aft,  and  then  began  a  running  fight, 
the  Chinese  ships  in  the  shallower  water,  the  Tsi  Yuen 
gradually  forging  ahead,  and  the  Kwang  Yi,  which  could  only 
go  12  knots,  dropping  astern  ;  whilst  the  Japanese  followed 
in  the  deeper  water,  somewhat  on  the  Chinamen's  quarter, 
and  firing  the  wThile.  Fong  made  signals  to  the  smaller  ship 
to  keep  station,  but  these  were,  of  course,  useless.  The 
Naniwa  came  on  fast,  gaining  on  the  Tsi  Yuen.  The 
Kwang  Yi  had  already  turned  back  and  fled  to  the 
shallows. 

Fong,  the  captain,  had  disappeared  from  the  deck  of  the 
Tsi  Yuen.  In  her  conning-tower,  a  structure  of  i-inch  iron- 
plate,  were  two  lieutenants,  and  just  outside  it  a  midshipman 
taking  the  Naniwa }s  distance.  Before  the  lad  could  obtain  it 
he  was  hit,  but  with  splendid  courage  propped  himself  against 
the  tower,  and  made  a  fresh  attempt.  At  this  instant  the 
Japanese  let  go  a  terribly  destructive  broadside.  The  conning- 
tower  was  struck,  and  the  two  lieutenants  killed.    The  head 


7o  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

of  the  first  lieutenant  was  left  hanging  on  to  one  of  the 
voice-pipes,  whilst  steering-gear,  engine-room  telegraphs,  and 
voice-pipes  were  completely  wrecked.  The  midshipman 
outside  was  killed.  A  shell  pierced  the  shield  of  the  barbette, 
and  jammed,  but  did  not  totally  disable  the  ammunition 
crane.  It  was  bent  so  that  the  projectiles  and  charges  could 
not  be  swung  easily  to  the  gun  breeches,  and  in  consequence 
the  Chinese  made  no  more  use  of  the  two  heavy  guns. 

With  steering-gear  shattered,  Fong  attempted  to  manoeuvre 
his  ship  by  means  of  her  twin  screws  till  the  relieving-tackle 
was  got  ready.  Fresh  shots  meantime  struck  the  ship.  A. 
shell  perforated  the  turret,  and  bursting  inside  killed  the 
gunnery  officer  and  six  men*  but  did  no  damage  to  either  of 
the  two  guns.  Not  a  man  was  left  on  deck,  so  searching  and 
deadly  was  the  fire  ;  those  of  the  crew  who  were  not  killed  had 
fled  below  the  armour-deck,  nor  could  they  be  driven  to  the 
guns  till  the  officers  had  drawn  their  revolvers,  and  threatened 
to  use  them  with  effect.  A  large  number  of  shells  entered 
between  decks ;  one  wrecked  the  officers'  cabins  and  tore  a  huge 
hole  in  the  side  ;  another  struck  the  base  of  the  funnel  and 
burst  in  it,  killing  several  of  the  stokers.  The  boats  were  re- 
peatedly hit  and  set  on  fire,  whilst  the  military  mast  was 
struck  more  than  once.  Huge  holes  were  blown  in  the  side 
of  the  ship  by  the  Japanese  shells.  On  the  armour-deck  lay 
six  torpedoes,  which  had  not  been  sent  below  owing  to  the 
suddenness  of  the  attack.  One  of  these  was  discharged  by  the 
torpedo  lieutenant  without  purpose  or  without  aim,  anxious 
only  to  get  rid  of  a  petard  which  might  readily  hoist  his  own 
ship.  Strange  to  relate,  not  one  of  the  other  torpedoes 
was  hit,  though  shells  were  bursting  dangerously  near  them. 

In  this  dreadful  plight  Fong  had  recourse  to  a  most 
discreditable  stratagem.  He  struck  his  flag,  on  which  the 
Akitsushima  and  Naniwa  turned  and  headed  up  the  gulf  to 
look  for  the  Kwang  Yz,  whilst  the  Yoshino  remained  to  take 

*  This  shot  also  wounded  fourteen  men.  It  was  a  shell  with  base  fuse,  and 
struck  the  turret  to  the  rear, 


Conning  Tower  of  the  Tsi  Yuen. 

Plate  XXV. 


1894]         THE    SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING. 


71 


possession.  The  Japanese,  off  their  guard,  raised  the  shell 
gratings  on  board  the  Yoshino,  as  the  day  was  very  warm, 
and  the  heat  below  the  armour-deck  excessive.  They 
steamed  up  to  the  supposed  prize,  when  suddenly,  at 
a  distance  of  400  yards,  she  fired  a  torpedo  at  them, 
and  followed  this  up  with  a  shell  from  her  6-inch  gun. 
The  shell  passed  or  fell  below  the  gratings  over  the  engine- 
room  hatchway,  but  fortunately  for  the  Japanese  did  not  burst. 
It  did,  however,  temporarily  disable  one  engine,  and  in  the 
meantime  the  Tsi  Yuen  rushed  off  at  full  speed  to  sea,  chased 
by  the  Yoskino.  On  her  way  she  passed  the  old  dispatch 
boat  Tsao  Kiang  and  the  transport  Kowshing,  but  gave 
neither  the  slightest  warning.  Her  6-inch  gun  was  apparently 
firing  all  the  time,  though  the  gunners  were  much  incommoded 
by  the  fact  that  the  after  staunchions  and  awning  were  up.  It 
is  said  that  shots  from  this  weapon  struck  the  Yoshino's 
bridge  and  disabled  one  of  her  guns.  The  Japanese,  now 
reinforced  by  the  Naniwa  and  Akitsushima,  which  had 
returned  from  settling  the  Kwang  Yi's  account,  abandoned 
the  chase,  and  turned  on  the  Tsao  Kiang  and  the  Kowshing. 
The  Fetching,  whilst  they  were  thus  busy,  stole  by,  but  could 
not  warn  the  ill-fated  Kowshing. 

At  her  fastest  speed  the  Tsi  Yuen  proceeded  on  her  way, 
and  reached  Wei-hai-wei  without  further  adventure.  She  had 
been  terribly  knocked  about,  losing  sixteen  killed,  of  whom 
three  were  officers,  and  twenty-five  wounded.  She  had  been 
struck  a  great  number  of  times  by  6-inch,  47-inch,  and  smaller 
projectiles,  but  the  damage  was  not  quite  so  serious  as 
might  have  been  expected,  owing  to  the  fact  that  a  great 
many  of  the  Japanese  shells  failed  to  explode.  A  European 
officer  who  saw  her  on  her  arrival  thus  describes  her  appear- 
ance :  "  The  vessel  presented  the  appearance  of  an  old  wreck. 
The  mast  was  shot  through  half-way  up,  the  gear  was  torn  in 
pieces,  ropes  hung  loose  and  tattered.  On  deck  the  sight  was 
cruel,  and  beggars  description.  Woodwork,  cordage,  bits  of 
iron,  and  dead  bodies,  all  lay  in  confusion.    Between  decks 


72  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

matters  were  as  bad."  And  an  English  officer  adds*:  "The 
slaughter  has  been  awful,  blood  and  human  remains  being 
scattered  over  the  decks  and  guns.  Three  of  the  five  men 
working  the  4-ton  gun  in  the  after- turret  were  blown  to  pieces 
by  a  6-inch  shell  from  one  of  the  Naniwa?  s  (?)  quick-firing  (?) 
guns,  and  a  fourth  was  shot  down  while  attempting  to  leave 
the  turret.  The  remaining  gunner  stuck  to  his  post,  and 
managed  to  load  and  fire  three  rounds  at  the  Naniwa,  and, 
one  shell  entering  her  engine-room  and  another  blowing  her 
fore-bridge  away,  she  hauled  off.  The  Chinese  admiral 
awarded  the  plucky  gunner  1000  taels.  One  shell  struck  the 
Chen  Yuen's  [sic]  steel  deck,  and,  glancing,  passed  up  through 
the  conning-tower  and  exploded,  blowing  the  gunnery 
lieutenant  to  pieces,  and  leaving  his  head  hanging  on  to  one 
of  the  voice-pipes.  Huge  fragments  of  armour  and  backing 
had  been  torn  from  their  fastenings  and  carried  inboard, 
crushing  a  number  of  poor  wretches  into  shapeless  masses, 
even  the  upper  part  of  the  funnels  being  splashed  with  blood. 
An  engineer-officer  (European)  was  sent  for  to  repair  the 
steam-pipe  of  the  steering-engine,  and  tried  to  grope  his  way 
through  the  smoke  of  bursting  shells  and  heaps  of  killed  and 
wounded  lying  on  the  deck,  when  a  shot  struck  his  assistant 
and  disembowelled  him,  covering  the  engineer  with  blood. 
He  nevertheless  managed  to  reach  the  steering-engine,  and 
repaired  the  pipe,  for  which  he  received  a  rather  handsome 
reward  from  the  admiral.  The  engagement  lasted  about  one- 
and-a-quarter  hours,  when  the  Japanese  hauled  off,  and  the  Chen 
Yuen  made  the  best  of  her  way  back  to  Wei-hai-wei,  their  naval 
station,  where  she  arrived  the  next  day  in  just  the  same  con- 
dition as  she  left  the  scene  of  action,  no  attempt  having  been 
made  to  wash  away  the  blood  or  remove  the  dead  bodies." 

Meantime  the  cruiser  Kwang  Yi  had  fought  first  the 
Naniwa  and  then  both  the  Naniwa  and  Akttsushijna,  with 

*  In  the  earlier  accounts  the  vessel  inspected  was  described  as  the  Chen 
Yuen,  which,  as  now  appears,  was  not  engaged.  The  Tsi  Yuen  is  evidently  the 
ship  referred  to. 


1894]         THE    SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING. 


73 


gallantry,  though  only  a  small  vessel  and  lightly  armed.  She 
was  heavily  hulled,  and  lost  no  fewer  than  thirty-seven  men 
killed,  before  her  ammunition  ran  short.  In  a  leaking  and 
sinking  condition,  her  captain  ran  her  inshore,  beached  her, 
and  got  the  remnant  of  his  crew  away  in  safety.  The 
Japanese  left  her  for  the  time,  but,  returning  later,  fired 
thirteen  rounds  into  her,  one  of  which  exploded  a  torpedo  in 
her  after  torpedo-room,  and  blew  her  stern  clean  away.  The 
courage  of  her  captain  and  crew  is  evinced  by  the  fact  that 
only  eighteen  men,  most  of  them  badly  wounded,  escaped. 
The  despatch-boat  Tsao  Kiang  was  not  chased  till  after  the 
sinking  of  the  Kowshing,  when  she  was  quickly  overpowered 
and  taken.  Captain  Fong,  of  the  Tsi  Yuen,  was,  for  deserting 
these  two  vessels,  condemned  to  death  on  his  arrival  at 
Wei-hai-wei,  but  was  subsequently  given  a  chance  of  redeem- 
ing his  character  at  the  Yalu.  it  is  hard  to  see  what  good  he 
could  have  done  by  remaining  to  fight  the  Japanese  ;  the  odds 
were  heavily  against  him,  and  his  ship  could  only  have  fallen 
a  prize  to  Admiral  Tsuboi,  or  have  been  disabled.  Fong 
behaved  very  badly  at  the  Yalu,  and  for  this  was  executed 
after  that  battle." 

We  must  now  go  back  a  day  or  two  to  follow  the  fortunes 
of  the  Kowshing.  She  was  an  iron  screw  ship  of  1355  tons, 
built  in  England,  owned  by  Messrs.  Jardine  and  Matheson, 
sailing  under  the  British  flag,  and  carrying  a  British  captain 
and  officers.  On  July  23rd  she  left  Taku,  having  on  board 
1 100  Chinese  infantry,  two  Chinese  generals,  Major  von 
Hanneken,  and  twelve  field-guns,  besides  a  large  quantity  of 
ammunition.  Early  on  the  morning  of  July  25th  she  sighted 
the  islands  in  the  Gulf  of  Korea,  and  about  the  same  time 
noticed  a  large  warship,  which  resembled  the  Chen  Yuen, 
and  appeared  to  have  been  in  action,  steaming  westwards. 

*  Fault  has  been  found  with  the  Japanese,  and  with  good  reason,  for  their 
failure  to  capture  the  Tsi  Yuen.  They  had  three  good  cruisers,  all  much  faster 
than  the  Chinese  ship,  and  yet  they  let  her  get  away,  how  or  why,  it  is  difficult 
to  understand.  When  the  Yoshino  was  disabled  they  had  the  Naniwa  and 
Akitsnshima.    It  was  a  tactical  blunder  to  turn  on  the  Tsao  Kiang. 


74  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

This  vessel  was  upon  her  port  side,  and  must  have  been 
the  Tsi  Yuen  in  retreat  before  the  Japanese.  The  Tsi  Yue?i 
might  have  signalled  to  the  Kowshing  what  had  happened, 
and  so  have  prevented  the  catastrophe  which  was  to 
follow,  but  no  signals  were  made,  either  because  Fong 
was  not  aware  that  the  Kowshing  was  in  the  Chinese 
service,  or  more  probably  because  all  his  concern  was  for  the 
safety  of  his  own  ship.  Some  minutes  later  a  vessel  was  seen 
under  sail,  upon  a  course  which  would  cross  the  Kowshing s 
bows.  This  was  the  Tsao  Kiang.  An  hour  later  still,  at 
eight  o'clock,  a  large  warship  came  into  sight  from  behind  the 
island  of  Hsutan,  and  following  her  were  two  others.  All 
appeared  to  the  Koivshing1  s  officers  to  be  ironclads.  At  nine 
o'clock  it  could  be  seen  that  the  nearest  vessel  flew  the 
Japanese  flag  She  approached  rapidly,  saluted  the  Kowshing, 
and  passed  her.  The  three  Japanese  ships  were  now  in  line 
abreast  and  heading  west ;  they  appeared  to  be  chasing  the 
Tsao  Kiang,  and  to  intend  no  harm  to  the  Kowshing. 
Presently,  however,  the  ship  which  had  saluted  the  Kowshing 
signalled  to  the  English  vessel  to  anchor,  at  the  same  time 
firing  two  blank  shots.  The  order  was  obeyed,  and  was 
followed  by  a  second,  "  Remain  where  you  are  or  take  the 
consequences,"  after  which  the  Japanese  ship  was  seen  to 
circle  and  signal  to  her  consorts.  A  few  minutes  passed,  and 
the  warship  once  more  headed  towards  the  Kowshing ;  as 
she  drew  near  it  was  observed  that  her  crew  were  at  quarters 
and  her  guns  trained  on  the  Kowshing.  A  boat  was  lowered 
and  a  boarding  party  sent  off  to  the  English  vessel,  when 
Major  von  Hanneken  and  the  English  officers  learnt  that  the 
ship  observing  them  was  the  Elswick  cruiser  Naniwa,  Captain 
Togo.  The  Chinese  soldiers  and  generals  were  greatly 
excited,  and  when  Von  Hanneken  and  the  English  officers 
tried  to  persuade  them  to  surrender,  asserted  that  they  would 
die  rather  than  yield,  and  that  if  the  Englishmen  attempted  to 
leave  the  ship,  they  should  be  killed.  Between  the  Chinese 
and  the  Japanese  the  Europeans  were  in  no  enviable  plight. 


1894]         THE    SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING. 


75 


Meantime,  several  Japanese  officers  came  on  board  and 
inspected  the  ship's  papers.  They  were  told  by  Captain 
Galsworthy  that  the  Kowshing  was  a  British  ship,  with  the 
British  consul's  clearance,  and  flying  the  British  ensign,  and 
that  she  had  sailed  in  peace.  After  some  hesitation  and 
argument  she  was  ordered  by  the  Japanese  to  follow  the 
Naniwa.  Whilst  this  short  conference  was  proceeding  the 
excitement  on  deck  was  growing,  and  the  Chinese  had  set  a 
guard  upon  the  anchor.  When  the  Japanese  left,  the  Chinese 
absolutely  refused  to  allow  compliance  with  the  Naniwa }s 
demands.  As  argument  was  useless,  Yon  Hanneken  had  the 
Naniwa! s  boat  recalled.  He  explained  to  the  Japanese  that 
the  position  on  board  the  Kowshing  rendered  obedience  to 
their  orders  impossible,  and  asked  that,  as  the  ship  had  sailed 
in  peace,  she  should  be  allowed  to  return  to  Taku.  The 
Japanese  officers  understood,  and  promised  to  report  to  their 
captain. 

Once  more  the  boat  left  the  transport,  and  some  minutes  of 
suspense  followed.  It  reached  the  Naniwa,  and  the  next 
thing  was  an  imperious  signal  from  her,  "  Quit  ship  as  soon  as 
possible."  It  was  addressed  to  the  Europeans,  but  they  were 
helpless.  Finally  came  the  order,  ''  Weigh,  cut,  or  slip;  wait 
for  nothing."  To  attempt  obedience  in  the  face  of  a  thousand 
armed  Chinamen  was  hopeless.  Captain  Galsworthy  replied, 
"  We  cannot,"  and  his  signal  was  acknowledged.  Immediately 
the  Naniwa  beo-an  to  move  ;  she  blew  a  loud  blast  on  her 
steam  siren  and  hoisted  a  red  flag  ;  then  when  she  was  broad- 
side on  to  the  Kowshing,  abreast  with  her,  and  at  a  distance 
of  200  to  300  yards,  fired  a  torpedo.  At  that  moment,  all  the 
Europeans  on  board  the  doomed  vessel  mustered  on  deck,  in 
obedience  to  Captain  Galsworthy's  orders.  Whether  the 
torpedo  struck  or  not  is  doubtful,  since,  almost  at  the  same 
instant  as  the  torpedo  left  the  Naniwa,  that  vessel  fired 
with  a  terrific  crash  a  broadside  from  her  five  guns,  two  of 
28-tons,  and  three  6-inch.  According  to  Yon  Hanneken  the 
torpedo  struck  a  coal  bunker  amidships.     "  The  day  became 


76  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

night :  pieces  of  coal,  splinters,  and  water  filled  the  air,  and 
then  all  of  us  leapt  overboard  and  swam."  According  to 
the  other  survivors,  the  torpedo  missed,  and  the  damage  was 
done  by  a  5001b.  shell  from  one  of  the  28-ton  guns, 
which  exploded  the  boilers.  The  transport  listed  heavily 
to  starboard,  whilst  the  pitiless  Japanese  fire  searched  her 
vitals.  From  the  Naniwa' s  tops,  where  were  mounted 
Gatlings,  and  from  Nordenfelts  and  small  quick-firers  on 
her  upper  deck,  came  a  hail  of  small  projectiles,  tearing  through 
the  dense  mass  of  Chinamen  on  the  Kowshing' s  deck.  The 
Chinese  replied  in  a  futile,  though  gallant  manner,  by  dis- 
charging their  rifles  at  the  enemy.  The  result  could  not 
be  long  in  doubt.  The  heel  of  the  Kowshing  grew  greater, 
and  she  sank  lower  and  lower  in  the  water,  till  about  2  o'clock, 
an  hour  from  the  firing  of  the  first  shot,  her  deck  was  sub- 
merged. All  this  time  the  Europeans,  and  many  of  the 
Chinese  who  had  leapt  overboard,  were  in  the  water,  exposed 
to  stray  projectiles  from  the  Japanese,  and  deliberately  fired 
upon  by  the  Chinese  who  still  were  left  on  board  the  sinking 
ship.  "  Bullets  began  to  strike  the  water  on  all  sides  of  us," 
says  Mr.  Tamplin,  the  Kowshing }s  first  officer,  who  had 
jumped  overboard  after  the  explosion,  "  and,  turning  to  see 
whence  they  came,  I  saw  that  the  Chinese,  herding  round 
the  only  part  of  the  Kowshing  that  was  then  out  of  water, 
were  firing  at  us.  I  swam  straight  to  the  Naniwa.  I  had 
been  in  the  water  nearly  an  hour  when  I  was  picked  up  by 
one  of  the  Naniwa? s  boats."  On  telling  the  Japanese  officer 
in  charge  that  Captain  Galsworthy  was  swimming  for  his  life, 
Mr.  Tamplin  heard  that  he  was  already  being  looked  after. 
The  water  was  alive  with  Chinese  soldiers,  and  two  lifeboats 
had  put  off  from  the  transport,  crowded  with  Chinamen.  What 
followed  now  was  the  most  disgraceful  feature  of  the  day's 
proceedings.  The  Japanese  made  not  the  smallest  attempt  to 
rescue  their  drowning  enemies  ;  they  did,  indeed,  look  after  the 
Europeans,  but  they  left  the  Chinese  to  their  fate  or  worse. 
For,  when  Mr.  Tamplin  was  on  board  the  Naniwa ) s  boat,  the 


iSq4:  THE    SIXKIXG    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING."  77 

Japanese  officer  told  him  that  he  had  orders  to  sink  the 
Chinese  lifeboats,,  and  in  spite  of  remonstrances  proceeded  to 
do  so.  Two  volleys  were  fired,  and  the  Chinese  boats  were 
sunk.  This  atrocious  act  has  been  denied  by  the  Japanese, 
but  the  evidence  for  it  appears  incontrovertible.  Some  of 
the  Chinese  succeeded  in  swimming  to  the  island  of  Shopaul, 
whither  Yon  Hanneken  had  escaped,  after  being  hours  in  the 
water.  The  French  gunboat,  Lion,  and  the  German  warship, 
litis,  saved,  between  them,  three  hundred,  many  of  whom 
were  wounded.  Some  of  these  had  been  in  the  boats  and 
corroborated  Mr.  Tampiin's  assertion  that  the  Japanese  fired 
on  them.  In  one  boat  all  were  killed  or  wounded.  Having 
completed  her  bloody  work,  the  Naniwa  steamed  backwards 
and  forwards  till  eight  o'clock  that  evening.  The  Europeans 
were  shown  a  shell  in  one  of  the  officer's  cabins,  which  it  was 
stated,  had  been  treacherously  fired  into  the  Naniwa  by  the 
Tsi  Yuen.  Next  day  they  were  transferred  to  the  Yaeyama, 
which  conveyed  them  to  Japan,  where  they  were  set  at 
liberty. 

The  Japanese  had  thus  committed  three  questionable 
acts.  1.  They  had  attacked  the  Tsi  Yuen  in  peace  and 
before  a  declaration  of  war.  2.  They  had  followed  this  up 
by  destroying  a  neutral  ship,  which  had  sailed  before  the 
action  off  Asan,  and  could  not  therefore  know  that  a  state 
of  war  existed.  3.  They  had  tired  upon  the  Chinese  in  the 
water. 

As  regards  the  first  head,  if  we  follow  the  Chinese  account, 
the  Japanese  committed  an  act  of  violence — almost  of  unpro- 
voked aggression,  by  attacking  the  Tsi  Yuen  and  her  con- 
sorts. At  the  same  time,  there  was  on  the  25th  a  virtual 
state  of  war  between  China  and  Japan,  and  the  Tsi  Yuen  had 
no  business  to  be  taken  off  her  guard.  It  is  the  commonest 
thing  possible  for  states  to  go  to  war  without  any  declaration, 
or  for  acts  of  hostility  to  precede  a  declaration.  Indeed,  the 
vulgar  idea  that  formal  notice  is  necessary  is  probably  due  to 
the  fact  that  histories  use  the  phrase  "war  was  declared"  as 


78  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

a  convenient  expression  for  11  hostilities  commenced."  That 
body  of  precedents  which  goes  by  the  name  of  International 
Law,  gives  ample  justification  for  such  a  course.  Colonel 
Maurice  has  shown  that  between  1700  and  1870  there  were 
only  ten  instances  in  which  formal  notice  preceded  acts  of 
hostility.  We  cannot,  therefore,  condemn  the  Japanese  for 
acting  as  they  did :  they  were  only  once  more  copying  the 
West.  And  if  their  story  is  true,  which  it  does  not  appear  to 
be,  they  themselves  were  the  injured  and  the  Chinese  the 
aggressors. 

We  come  now  to  their  attack  on  the  Kowshing.  Here  things 
are  complicated  by  the  presence  of  the  neutral  flag.  Had  they 
any  right  to  treat  her  as  they  did,  accepting  their  own  version 
of  the  Tsi  Yuen  s  behaviour?  Before  a  declaration  of  war 
there  is  no  contraband,  and  there  are  no  neutrals,  since  all 
states  are  assumed  to  be  friends  in  peace.  There  is  then  no 
obligation  upon  the  neutral  to  avoid  the  conveyance  of  con- 
traband, or  the  performance  of  non-neutral  acts,  unless,  and  it 
is  an  important  proviso,  it  is  notorious  that  a  state  of  war 
exists.  There  is  no  right  of  search,  no  power  to  visit  neutral 
vessels  or  examine  their  papers,  resident  with  either  of  the 
two  parties  to  the  quarrel,  till  the  quarrel  has  become  war. 
The  whole  question,  then,  turns  upon  this :  Did  a  state  of  war 
notoriously  exist  on  July  23rd  ?  Apparently  the  English 
Government  was  satisfied  of  this,  since  we  do  not  know 
that  any  demand  for  reparation  has  been  made.  And  yet 
we  question  whether  it  could  be  said  with  truth  that  on  the 
23rd  war  was  inevitable,  or  a  state  of  war  a  notorious  fact. 
The  Kowshing  cleared  on  that  day  from  a  Chinese  port,  and 
could  not  very  well  have  received  later  intelligence.  There- 
fore, if  hostilities  had  commenced  on  the  24th  she  might  yet 
with  reason  have  been  spared.  She  was  carrying  Chinese 
troops  to  Korea,  it  is  true,  but  this  was  permitted  by  the  treaty 
of  1885  between  Japan  and  China.  The  neutral  may  carry 
whom  he  likes  and  carry  him  where  he  likes  till  war  has  been 
declared.    Whilst  the  Kowshing  was  at  sea  the  first  act  of 


1894]         THE   SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING. 


79 


hostility  was  committed — if  by  the  Chinese,  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  neutral  in  the  Chinese  service  should  be  injured, 
before  he  has  had  time  to  dissociate  himself  from  the  aggressor 
— if  by  the  Japanese,  still  less.  Nor  can  the  neutral  be  con- 
verted into  a  belligerent  by  an  attack  at  sea.  He  may,  indeed, 
be  requested  to  return  to  the  port  from  which  he  had  sailed, 
but  for  some  reason  or  other,  no  such  request  was  made  in 
the  case  of  the  Kowshing,  though  the  Chinese  generals  were 
ready  to  allow  the  English  vessel  to  go  back.  Obviously,  the 
English  captain  could  not  then  and  there  discharge  his  living 
cargo  into  the  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  captain 
saw  before  him  a  cargo  of  troops  in  a  neutral  ship,  and 
these  troops  might  be  used  against  his  country.  He  had,  by 
his  own  account,  received  considerable  provocation  from  the 
Chinese.  If  he  ordered  the  Kowshing  to  proceed  to  a  Chinese 
port,  she  might  double  when  out  of  his  sight,  and  return  ;  to 
place  a  prize-crew  on  board  her  in  the  midst  of  a  thousand  or 
more  armed  Chinamen,  was  impossible  ;  to  escort  her  with 
his  own  ship,  might  well  have  been  inconvenient.  He 
therefore  attacked  her,  but  his  attack  was  illegal,  and 
constitutes  a  dangerous  precedent.  For  it  cannot  be 
tolerated  that  neutrals  should  be  treated  with  severity  for 
breach  of  obligations  which  do  not  come  into  force  till  war 
begins. 

On  the  second  head,  the  Naniwa  took  the  extreme  course 
of  sinking  the  ship,  but  only  after  the  Japanese  captain  had 
requested  the  Kowshing  to  "  weigh,  cut,  or  slip/'  and  the 
Chinese  soldiers  had  refused  to  allow  her  to  do  this.  He  had 
further  done  his  best  to  save  the  European  officers.  Having 
once  decided  to  make  her  his  prize,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  else 
he  could  have  done.  As  has  been  said,  a  prize-crew  was  out 
of  the  question.  But  his  own  act,  which  was  illegal  in  the 
first  instance,  led  to  a  grievous  loss  of  human  life  in  the 
second. 

For  the  firing  on  the  men  in  the  water,  there  is  no  justifi- 
cation ;   it  was  an  act  at  once  barbarous  and  cruel.  The 


So  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

principle  which  governs  war  is  to  avoid  inflicting  unnecessary 
suffering,  and  very  few  commanders  have  ever  gone  so  far  as 
to  slaughter  their  enemies  when  they  were  helpless.  Even 
the  ancient  Egyptians  are  depicted  on  their  monuments  as 
rescuing  their  drowning  foes.  It  was  an  act  comparable  to 
the  slaughter  of  the  wounded  after  battle,  and  Japan  with  her 
fine  professions  should  have  shrunk  from  it.  The  Japanese 
commander  might,  indeed,  allege  that  if  he  had  rescued  his 
enemies,  they  would  have  been  an  element  of  great  danger  on 
board  his  ship,  for  the  Chinese  are  an  ignorant,  treacherous, 
and  cruel  race,  who  could  not  be  expected  to  obey  the  rules 
of  war.  But  when  once  in  the  water  they  were  helpless,  and 
care  might  have  been  taken  to  disarm  them  when  they  were 
got  on  board  the  Naniwa's  boats.  Again,  he  might  have 
urged  that  he  was  punishing  them  for  the  Tsi  Yuen's  act. 
But  one  act  of  barbarism  does  not  justify  another,  especially 
as  Japan  was  contending  with  a  barbarous  power,  herself 
a  civilised  state.  It  is  the  clear  duty  of  the  surviving 
combatant,  after  an  action,  to  do  his  utmost  to  rescue  his 
enemies. 

At  the  time  of  the  action  between  the  Tsi  Yuen  and  the 
Japanese,  the  heavy  Chinese  ironclads  were  at  sea,  under 
Admiral  Ting  Ju  Chang,  the  ex-cavalry  officer  who  had  been 
appointed  commander  of  the  Northern  Squadron  by  Li  Hung 
Chang.  Captain  Lang  and  numerous  European  officers  have 
spoken  well  of  him,  and  his  acts  testify  to  some  obstinacy 
and  no  lack  of  personal  courage.  Though  he  inspired 
confidence  in  his  foreign  subordinates,  he  was  great  neither 
as  a  tactician  nor  as  a  strategist.  "  He  knows  nothing  at  all 
about  naval  matters  ;  he  is  just  the  mandarin  put  on  board  by 
Li,"  said  a  foreign  instructor  in  the  Chinese  navy  to  Mr. 
Norman.  Perhaps  the  instructor  somewhat  exaggerated 
Ting's  incapacity,  as  the  admiral  had  held  command  in  1884 
during  the  war  between  France  and  China,  and  must  have 
picked  up  some  fragments  of  knowledge  from  the  various  very 
capable  foreigners  in  the  service  of  China.    He  was  not,  how- 


1894]         THE    SINKING    OF    THE    "  KOWSHING"  81 


ever,  a  Nelson  or  a  Tegetthoff,  if  he  never  sank  so  low  as  a 
Persano,  and  he  displayed  the  usual  Chinese  cruelty  in  orders 
that  no  quarter  was  to  be  given,  at  the  same  time  encouraging 
a  belief  amongst  his  sailors  that  the  Japanese  would  give  no 
quarter.  Of  the  Chinese  preparations  Captain  McGiffin,  who 
was  present  on  board  the  Chen  Yuen>  gives  us  some  details  in 
a  letter  :  "  We  are  reinforcing  our  turrets  on  all  the  ironclads 
by  bags  of  coal  piled  round  them  eight  feet  to  ten  feet  thick. 
That  is  my  own  idea.  Don't  believe  the  sneers  you  may  see  at 
the  Chinese  sailors.  They  are  plucky,  well-trained,  full  of 
zeal,  and  will  fight  better  against  the  Japs,  their  lifelong 
enemies,  than  anyone." 

On  the  arrival  of  the  Tsi  Yuen  at  Wei-hai-wei,  after  her 
action  with  the  Japanese  squadron,  six  Chinese  ships  went 
out  to  attack  the  Japanese.  Captain  McGiffin,  in  a  letter 
dated  August  2nd,  states  :  "We  are  now  on  our  way  . 
to  meet  the  enemy,  and  I  hope  we  will  sink  the  dogs.  We 
have  been  expecting  war  for  days,  but  China  has  kept  peace- 
able, and  therefore  Japan  deliberately  picked  the  fight.  Ad- 
miral Ting  and  I  wished  to  go  to  Chemulpho,  and  open  fire 
on  the  Jap  fleet,  but  at  the  last  moment  we  got  a  direct  cable 
from  [the]  Tsung-li-Yamen  not  to  do  so.  It  would  have  been 
splendid,  for  we  would  have  destroyed  their  navy  almost,  I 
think.  Our  crews  are  full  of  enthusiasm.  It  is  very  pleasing 
to  see  them.  We  have  had  several  alarms  at  night  and  by 
day  from  strange  vessels^  and  the  way  we  go  into  action  is 
splendid.  We  are  all  clear  for  action,  everything  that  could 
possibly  cause  splinters  left  ashore  or  thrown  overboard.  We 
have  left  all  our  boats  behind.  We  will  not  need  them,  for 
if  we  sink  the  Japs  will  give  no  quarter,  and  we  shall  give 
them  none  either.  The  admiral  is  on  the  ironclad  [the  Ting 
Yuen\.  .  .  .  He  made  two  signals  to-day  at  noon.  One, 
'  If  the  enemy  shows  the  white  flag,  or  hoists  the  Chinese 
ensign,  give  no  quarter,  but  continue  firing  at  her  until  she  is 
sunk.'  The  other,  '  Each  officer  and  man  do  his  best  for  his 
country  to-morrow.'  " 

Vol.  II.  G 


82 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


The  expected  battle  never  came  off.  For  three  days  Ting 
hunted  for  the  Japanese,  but  either  could  not  find  them  or  did 
not  want  to  find  them.*  The  Japanese  were  presumably 
engaged  in  convoying  transports,  and  were  quite  content  to 
be  let  alone  ;  possibly  some  of  their  vessels  had  received 
serious  injury  off  Asan,  and  were  undergoing  repair.  In  any 
case  they  do  not  seem  to  have  paid  much  attention  to  the 
Chinese,  who  returned  to  Wei-hai-wei  and  remained  strictly 
on  the  defensive,  in  obedience  to  orders  from  Li  Hung  Chang ; 
to  the  effect  that  they  were  not  to  cruise  to  the  east  of  a  line 
drawn  from  Wei-hai-wei  to  the  mouth  of  the  Yalu.  The 
Japanese  appear  to  have  known  of  this  order,  which 
practically  effaced  the  Chinese  fleet.  Meanwhile  from  time 
to  time,  they  reconnoitred  Wei-hai-wei,  and  even  on 
August  ioth  made  some  pretence  of  bombarding  it. 

*  Ting  was  anxious  to  fight,  but  was  dissuaded  by  his  flag-captain,  according 
to  "  Blackwood's  "  Correspondent  in  China. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


The  Yalu  *  and  its  Lessons. 

September  17th,  1894. 

The  Chinese  fleet,  though  on  the  whole  superior,  had  thus 
abdicated  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  lay,  through  no  fault 
of  its  gallant  commander,  inactive  at  Wei-hai-wei.  The 
Japanese  were  straining  every  nerve  to  convey  as  large  a 
force  as  possible  to  Korea,  and  merely  observed  Admiral 
Ting,  if,  indeed,  they  gave  themselves  this  trouble.  Such  was 
the  situation  through  the  last  weeks  of  August  and  the  first 
days  of  September.  But  early  in  September  the  Tsung-li- 
Yamen  awoke  from  its  lethargy,  finding  that  China  could  not 
move  men  with  sufficient  rapidity  into  Korea  by  land.  It 
decided  to  send  a  force  by  sea,  and  Admiral  Ting  was 
informed  of  the  decision. 

There  were  two  courses  open  to  Ting  and  his  foreign 
advisers.  They  might  collect  every  available  warship,  steam 
in  search  of  the  Japanese,  and,  having  found  them,  fight  a 
decisive  action.  If  the  Japanese  were  beaten  in  this  the 
mastery  of  the  sea  would  be  to  Ting.  If  the  Chinese  were 
beaten  they  would  at  least  be  unencumbered  by  transports, 
and  would  not  waste  men  unnecessarilv.  Or  Ting  might 
convoy  a  flotilla  of  transports,  holding  his  ships  ready  to 
protect  them.  His  own  inclinations  appear  to  have  been 
towards  the  former  alternative.  He  was  anxious  to  search 
for  the  Japanese  and  fight  before  he  took  the  transports 

*  I  have  retained  the  popular  name,  though  the  official  Japanese  accounts 
call  it  the  battle  of  Haiyang  from  the  island  of  Haiyang-tao,  near  which  it 
was  fought. 

G  2 


84  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

forward.  But  the  defeat  of  the  Chinese  land-forces  at  Phyong- 
Yang  forced  his  hand  and  compelled  him  to  use  all  possible 
expedition.  He  was  driven  to  convoy  the  transports  with  his 
fleet,  whilst  the  Japanese  were  still  at  sea  unbeaten,  and 
whilst  the  command  of  the  sea  was  in  dispute. 

The  transports,  five  in  number,  had  left  Taku  and  taken  on 
board  four  or  five  thousand  men  at  Talien  Bay.  Here  Ting 
joined  them.  He  flew  his  flag  on  board  the  battleship  Ting 
Yuen,  and  with  him  were  the  Chen  Yuen,  her  sister,  the  three 
small  ironclads,  King  Yuen,  Ping  Yuen,  and  Lai  Yuen  ;  five 
cruisers,  Ching  Yuen,  Chih  Yuen,  Tsi  Yuen,  Tshao  Yong, 
and  Yang  Wei ;  two  revenue  cruisers  of  the  Canton  flotilla, 
lightly  armed  and  ill-protected,  Kwang  Kai,  and  Kwang 
Ping ;  and  two  large  torpedo-boats.  At  Talien  Bay  with 
the  transports  were  also  four  Rendel  gunboats  and  four 
small  torpedo-boats.  The  Chinese  torpedo-boats  were  in 
bad  order,  having  been  used  for  scouting  and  despatch 
carrying.  Their  boilers  were  burnt  out,  and  their  machinery 
in  bad  condition.  Two,  however,  a  Yarrow  and  a  Schichau 
boat,  played  some  part  at  the  Yalu. 

Ting  might  with  wisdom  have  detached  his  fast  cruisers — 
the  Chih  Yuen  and  the  Ching  Yuen,  which  were  still  perhaps 
capable  of  making  fifteen  knots — to  scout,  as  obviously  he 
would  be  at  an  enormous  disadvantage  if  the  Japanese 
suddenly  came  down  upon  him.  He  did  not  do  this,  probably 
because  he  was  afraid  of  dissipating  his  strength,  and  preferred 
to  risk  a  surprise.  On  Sunday,  September  16th,  at  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  he  left  Talien  Bay,  the  convoy  keeping 
inshore,  whilst  the  fleet  steamed  a  parallel  course  in  the 
offing,  drawn  up  in  line  ahead.  That  same  day  he  reached 
the  mouth  of  the  Yalu,  and  the  transports,  with  the  Ping 
Yuen,  the  Kwang  Ping,  and  four  gunboats  and  the 
torpedo-boats,  entered  the  river.  Ting  anchored  his  squadron 
in  Tatung  Kow  Bay,  some  distance  off  the  coast,  which  is 
difficult,  owing  to  banks  and  shallows.  The  night  of 
September  16th — 17th  passed  without  event. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


In  the  Gulf  of  Korea  was  a  large  Japanese  fleet,  having  its 
headquarters  at  an  island  in  the  Gulf,  where  were  facilities 
for  coaling,  a  mine-field  protecting  the  anchorage,  a  soft 
bottom  in  shallow  water  for  running  disabled  ships  aground, 
and  a  torpedo  station.  In  command  was  Vice-Admiral  Ito, 
an  officer  who  had  distinguished  himself  at  various  times  in 
the  Japanese  naval  manoeuvres  with  the  cruisers  Matsushima, 
Itsukushima,  Hashidate,  and  Chiyoda,  all  modern  and  fast, 
the  old  ironclads  Fusoo  and  Htyei,  and  the  despatch  gunboat 
Akagi.  His  second-in-command,  Rear- Admiral  Tsuboi,  had 
under  him  the  Flying  Squadron,  which  had  already  been 
engaged  with  the  Tsi  Yuen,  and  which  comprised  the  splendid 
Elswick  cruisers  Yoshino,  Naniwa,  and  Takachiho  with  the 
Akttsusu  or  Akitsushima.  In  addition  the  Saikio,  an  impro- 
vised cruiser  taken  over  from  the  Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  was 
present,  having  on  board  Rear-Admiral  Kabayama,  chief  of 
the  naval  staff,  who  was  on  a  tour  of  inspection.  The  second 
Flying  Squadron,  including  the  old  vessels  Tsukushi,  Chokai, 
Maya,  and  Banjo,  and  the  third  Flying  Squadron  composed  of 
the  Kongo,  Takao,  Yamato,  Muzashi,  Katsuragi,  and  Tenrio, 
were  engaged  in  co-operating  with  the  land  forces,  and  took 
no  part  in  the  battle.  The  two  more  powerful  Japanese 
squadrons  had  been  convoying  troops  up  to  September  14th, 
and  had  not  paid  the  least  attention  to  the  Chinese,  unless, 
indeed,  a  telegram  which  reached  Ting  from  Wei-hai-wei  on 
September  14th,  to  the  effect  that  there  were  two  large 
Japanese  vessels  off  that  port,  was  correct.  In  that  case  these 
ships  must  have  been  detached  on  the  12th  or  13th.  Admiral 
Ito,  leaving  the  convoy,  anchored  off  Cape  Shoppek,  where  he 
remained  till  the  afternoon  of  the  16th.  Thence  he  proceeded 
to  the  island  of  Haiyang-tao,  off  which  some  Japanese 
torpedo-boats  were  cruising.  He  reached  the  island  at  half- 
past  six  on  the  morning  of  the  17th.  He  did  not  expect  to 
meet  the  Chinese  fleet,  and  had  therefore  left  his  torpedo- 
boats  behind,  and  brought  with  him  several  slow  and  weak 
vessels,  which  could  be  only  an  encumbrance  in  action. 


86  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

From  Haiyang-tao  he  steamed  east-north-east  to  Talu  Island, 
and  at  half-past  nine  saw  smoke  on  the  horizon.  From  its 
volume  he  judged  that  there  was  the  Chinese  fleet,  and 
steered  towards  it  at  a  low  speed. 

Whilst  the  Japanese,  as  yet  unseen,  were  heading  towards 
them,  the  Chinese  crews  were  exercising  at  the  guns.  Drill 
over,  dinner  was  being  made  ready,  when  the  look-out  men 
observed  smoke  far  away  to  the  south-west,  about  ten  o'clock. 
The  Chinese  had  their  fires  banked,  but  steam  was  at  once 
raised  and  anchor  weighed,  when  the  whole  fleet  proceeded 
in  a  south-westerly  direction  at  the  rate  of  seven  knots. 

Some  time  before  the  action,  according  to  Mr.  Laird  Clowes, 
Ting  had  issued  three  very  important  orders.  1.  In  action, 
sister  ships,  or  groups  of  pairs  of  ships,  were,  to  the  best  of 
their  power,  to  keep  together  and  support  each  other.  2.  All 
vessels  were,  if  possible,  to  fight  bows  on.  3.  All  ships  wTere, 
as  far  as  possible,  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  admiral. 
These  orders  were  issued  because  Ting's  squadron  was  not 
homogeneous,  being  composed  of  many  types  ;  because  the 
Chinese  signalling  staff  was  extremely  weak,  and  it  was 
apprehended  that  signals  could  neither  be  made  nor  received 
in  the  heat  of  action  ;  and  because  it  was  felt  that  the  course 
of  battle  could  not  be  foreseen,  but  must  be  left  to  individual 
judgment.*  The  heaviest  battleships  of  the  squadron — indeed, 
the  only  two  which  could  be  called  ironclads — were  built  for 
end-on  work,  and  possibly  Ting  had  thoughts  of  using  the 
ram.  None  the  less,  these  instructions  had  a  disastrous 
effect.  The  group  formation  is,  perhaps,  a  good  one  with 
perfectly  trained  officers  and  men,  but  it  destroys  the  unity  of 
a  fleet.  It  is  obvious  throughout  the  battle  which  followed, 
that  the  Chinese  were  little  better  than  an  incoherent  mass  of 
ships,  whilst  the  Japanese  were  an  organised  and  compact 
force,  striking  together  and  acting  together.    There  seems  to 

*  This  was  very  much  Persano's  defence  of  his  action  at  Lissa.  He  held 
that  the  details  of  the  battle  could  not  be  foreknown,  and  that  orders  were 
useless.    Von  Hanneken  was  perhaps  responsible  for  these  tactics. 


i 


1894]  THE    YALU   AXD    ITS    LESSOXS.  87 

have  been  no  definite  plan  on  the  Chinese  side  ;  but  every 
captain  instead  was  to  do  that  which  seemed  good  in  his  own 
eyes.  For  fighting  in  line  abreast  Ting  cannot  be  blamed  ; 
it  was  the  designers  of  his  ships  who  had  forced  him  to  this 
tactic.  But  his  dispositions  were  not  good  even  for  line 
abreast,  and  there  was  no  preparation  for  the  maintenance  of 
that  order  in  the  face  of  a  turning  movement.  The  Chinese 
left  their  anchorage  in  what  is  described  as  "  sectional  line 
abreast/"  or  columns  of  divisions  line  abreast  ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  ships  were  m  two  lines,  one  behind  the  other,  the  ships  of 
the  second  in  rear  of  the  gaps  between  the  ships  of  the  first. 
There  does  not  seem,  however,  to  have  been  overmuch  order, 
and  one  very  fatal  mistake  was  made.  The  heaviest  and 
most  powerful  ships  were  placed  in  the  centre  instead  of  on 
the  wings,  thus  violating  the  tactical  axiom  that  the  extremities 
of  a  line  should  be  strong.  Had  Ting  placed  the  Ting  Yuen 
on  one  flank,  and  the  Chen  Yuen  on  the  other,  some,  at  least, 
of  the  Chinese  disasters  might  have  been  averted.*  It  is, 
however,  unfair  to  blame  either  the  Chinese  admiral  or  his 
advisers  for  this  mistake,  as  Commander  Liu,  who  was  in 
charge,  did  not  signal  the  formation  ordered.  His  treachery 
was  discovered  when  it  was  too  late  to  make  changes.  In  the 
course  of  the  battle  Liu  repeatedly  interfered  with  and  altered 
the  admiral's  orders  to  the  engine-room. 

On  the  Chinese  ships,  what  were  the  preparations  for  action? 
The  Tsi  Yuen's  fight  off  Asan  had  given  Ting  and  his  advisers 
some  idea  of  the  precautions  necessary.  The  barbettes  of 
the  ships  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  protected  by  sacks  of 
coal.  Sandbags  were  used  to  shelter  the  lighter  guns,  and 
mantlets  of  rope  were  disposed  in  suitable  places  to  catch 
splinters.  The  tops  of  some  at  least  of  the  conning-towers 
had  been  removed  to  allow  the  gases  and  fragments  of 
bursting  shells  a  free  escape,  and  to  diminish  the  size  of  the 
target.    The  shields  on  the  barbettes  in  the  ironclads  had 

*  The  Tshao  Yong  and  Yang  Wei  were  slow  in  weighing  and  were  left  behind 
at  the  outset. 


88  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

also  been  left  on  shore,  and  thin  armour  had  been  generally 
dispensed  with,  on  the  principle  that  no  protection  is  better 
than  a  weak  one*  All  the  boats  had  been  left  behind  except 
one  gig  for  each  ship.  The  decks  of  the  Chen  Yuen  were 
well-drenched  with  water,  a  precaution  which  does  not  appear 
to  have  been  taken  on  board  other  ships.  And  there  was  one 
very  obvious  provision  which  was  neglected  by  the  Chinese — 
to  give  their  men  a  meal  before  action.  The  Japanese, 
with  greater  wisdom,  had  been  piped  to  dinner  on  sighting 
the  Chinese  fleet.  A  full  stomach  is  an  important  element  in 
the  battle. 

Both  sides  were  now  approaching  each  other,  cautiously, 
and  at  a  low  speed,  neither  wishing  to  run  the  risk  of  a 
violent  shock,  and  each,  perhaps,  desirous  to  see  what  his 
opponent  was  going  to  do.  It  was  the  first  time  that  fleets, 
equipped  with  the  modern  engines  of  destruction,  monster  guns, 
torpedoes,  quick-firers,  were  going  into  action.  With  no 
knowledge  of  personnel  it  would  have  been  hard  to  say  which 
of  the  two  was  the  stronger.  The  Chinese  were  infinitely  the 
worse  armed,  but  then  they  had  two  well-armoured  battle- 
ships, a  type  which  the  Japanese  did  not  possess,  and  the 
strength  of  their  defence  may  have  compensated  for  their 
offensive  weakness.  Ting  had  also  a  considerable  number 
of  Europeans  to  advise  him,  and  to  stiffen  the  resistance  of 
his  crews.  On  the  Ting  Yuen  was  Major  Von  Hanneken, 
Ting's  chief  of  the  staff,  with  Messrs.  Tyler,  Nichols,  and 
Albrecht.  On  the  Chen  Yuen  were  Captain  McGiffin  and 
Herr  Heckmann  ;  on  the  Chih  Yuen,  Mr.  Purvis,  and  on  the 
Tsi  Yuen,  Herr  Hoffman. 

At  about  five  minutes  past  twelve  the  Japanese  could 
clearly  make  out  their  opponents,  distinguish  the  types  of 
vessels,  and  see  what  lay  before  them.     Admiral  Ito  hoisted 

*  So  McGiffin.  The  accuracy  of  his  account  of  the  battle  is  doubtful. 
Photographs  of  the  two  ironclads  after  the  battle  show  the  hoods  still  on,  and 
Lieutenant  W.  White  (U.S.N.)  speaks  of  a  shot  hole  in  the  Ting  Yuen's 
starboard  hood.    Proceedings  United  States  Naval  Institute,  xxi.,  509. 


KWANO  ^TSOYIH 

*      X  at' 


^  YANG  WE* 


/ 


^TSKAOVONG 
*  ^CKiKGYUEN 

/  ^.CHENY. 
/  ^TINGY. 


4'' 


T5I  % 


HUANCCt-ilA 


A' 
4- 


<^SAIKIO 


4l«ATS15$HlMA 

^itsukusima 
^Jhashidate 


^AKAG! 


^Jrusoo 


THE  YALU 

i 

<J      Chinese  Shxpo 
<   „  Movements 

<]     Japanese  Ships 
<   „  Movements 


Gr.FhiUp  LSon, 


Map  XXVI. 


1 894]  THE    YALU    AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


89 


a,  large  ensign  and  ordered  his  ships  to  clear  for  action,  whilst 
the  Saikio  and  A kagi  were  directed  to  move  from  the  line  of 
battle  and  take  up  a  position  on  the  port  side  of  it.  The 
fleet  was  now  in  line  ahead,  ranged  thus  :  First,  Admiral 
Tsuboi  led  the  Flying  Squadron,  including  the  Yoshino,  which 
carried  his  flag,  Takachiho,  Akitsushima,  and  Naniwa,  a 
homogeneous  force,  steaming  over  seventeen  knots  and 
heavily  armed.  Then  followed  Admiral  Ito  with  the 
Main  Squadron,  comprising  the  flagship  Matsushima,  with  the 
Chiyoda,  Itsukushima,  Hashidate.  Fusoo,  and  Hiyei.  Last 
was  Admiral  Kabayama,  with  the  Saikio  and  A  kagi,  to  some 
extent  covered  by  the  rear  vessels  of  the  Main  Squadron.* 
When  the  two  fleets  were  separated  by  an  interval  of  about 
five  miles,  the  Japanese,  according  to  Captain  McGiffin, 
passed  into  line  abreast,  and  in  that  formation  advanced  for 
some  minutes  before  passing  back  again  into  line  ahead. f 
There  is  no  mention  of  this  in  Admiral  Ito's  account,  and 
if  it  took  place  it  is  difficult  to  understand  what  the  object 
was,  unless  to  puzzle  the  Chinese.  There  was  now  a  fresh 
east  wind  blowing,  the  sky  was  grey,  and  the  sea  rough 

Soon  after  twelve  Admiral  Ito  had  signalled  brief  instruc- 
tions to  his  captains.  The  Chinese  had  now  combined  their  two 
lines  into  a  single  line  abreast,  facing  almost  south-west,  but 
the  wing  ships  had  been  slow  in  getting  to  their  stations.  In 
consequence  the  Chinese  line  approximated  to  a  crescent,  the 
horns  of  which  were  away  from  the  Japanese.  From  right 
(starboard)  to  left  (port)  the  ships  were  placed  thus  :  Yang 
Wei,  Tshao  Yong,  Ching  Yuen,  Lai  Yuen,  Chen  Yuen,  Ting 
Yuen,  King  Yuen,  Chih  Yuen,  Kwang  Kai,  and  Tsi  Yuen.% 
The  Tsi  Yuen  was  some  distance  behind  the  other  vessels 
as  she  had  had  trouble  with  her  engines.  On  the  other  horn 
the  Yang  Wei  and  Tshao  Yong  were  also  to  the  rear,  whilst 

*  See  Plan  I, 

f  In  the  earlier  versions  which  appeared  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette.    In  the 
Century  he  states  that  they  kept  to  line  ahead. 
%See  Plan  I. 


9° 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


[1894 


the  Ping  Yuen,  Kwang  Ping,  and  the  two  torpedo-boats 
were  just  coming  out  of  the  harbour  of  Takushan,  and  were 
widely  separated  from  the  bulk  of  the  fleet.  The  other  gun 
and  torpedo  boats  remained  in  the  Yalu  River,  mere  spectators 
of  the  fight. 

Admiral  Ito's  intention  was  to  circle  round  the  enemy's 
flanks  and  crush  the  weak  ships  upon  them  by  a  concentrated 
fire,  as  his  cruisers  defiled  past.  The  Chinese  left,  which  was 
nearer  to  him,  was  stronger  than  the  right.  On  the  left  were 
the  lame  ducks,  Yang  Wei  and  Tshao  Yong ;  on  the  right  the 
formidable  Tsi  and  Chin  Yuen.  For  this  reason,  or  possibly 
through  a  mistake,  the  Japanese  attack  was  delivered  on  the 
Chinese  right,  and  to  deliver  the  attack  the  Japanese  had  to 
steam  along  the  Chinese  front,  taking  the  distant  fire  of  all 
the  enemy's  ships,  a  proceeding  which  Captain  Mahan  criticises 
severely.  The  range  was  to  be  long — 2000  to  5000  yards — 
which  would  give  the  Japanese  guns  with  their  flat  trajectories 
an  immense  advantage  over  the  older  and  less  powerful 
Chinese  pieces. 

The  Flying  Squadron  steadily  approached  the  enemy,  at 
first  heading  to  starboard,  and  then  keeping  away  to  port, 
when  Admiral  Tsuboi  had  got  within  range.  The  speed  was 
ten  knots  at  12.30,  but  at  12.45  was  raised  to  fourteen.  The 
first  shots  were  fired  from  the  Ting  Yuen's  12-inch  guns  some 
time  between  12.20  and  12.50.  The  concussion  of  the 
discharge  was  so  great  that  all  who  were  on  the  bridge, 
which  runs  just  above  the  barbettes,  were  thrown  down,  and 
Admiral  Ting  was  so  much  shaken,  that  he  was  taken 
below.  At  a  range  of  6000  yards,  the  Chinese  shots  fell 
short,  but  at  5000  yards  the  Chinese  drove  a  12-inch 
projectile  home.  The  Chinese  ships  were  painted  grey, 
and  the  Japanese  white,  so  that  mistakes  could  not  very 
well  occur.  As  the  Japanese  came  on,  the  east  wind  blew 
their  dense  coal-smoke  down,  hiding  them  for  minutes  from 
the  view  of  the  Chinese.  Their  masts,  however,  were  visible 
alwavs,  and  enabled  the  Chinese  gunners  to  lay  the  guns. 


IE 

1 

*SB.«  FIND  Y. 

^KWANG  P. 

  ==1 

j 

SAiKIO   ^^tf 

.<C^piSOO  j  YANG  W^^^f 
/A^*      .    ^  fan  fire]  >g 

\i«ya  Atshao  y.  <jo 

sfiS)  if-x _>,——"",. 

1 

is' 

KWArtG  C. 

I 

...... 

/WvVWI 

Track  of  Jap.  JS£d6tl  SqiuuZren,. 
«       x    *  Hying  » 
■-■>       ~  A  Tcafft,  JIta  ei,  ScaJcio. 
n       r,  Chinese  Ships. 

HI 


PINO  Y.. 


V/.  ft^X'W 


AKAG!  v. 


,'^YANG  UK 

^         LAI  Y.f  f  - '  '^S1  Y' ? 

CHINO  4  «  icHp  Y. 

/^TSHAOY.  f 
/  {sunk) 

V/FUSOO 

.CHEN  Y. 


^TINO  Y. 


*  / 


KWANG  U 


Map  XXVII. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


9i 


This  same  wind  carried  away  the  smoke  from  the  guns  of 
the  Chinese,  so  that  it  did  not  embarrass  them  much  at  this 
stage  of  the  proceedings. 

Ship  after  ship  of  the  Chinese  fleet  opened  fire,  and  the 
roll  of  heavy  guns  became  continuous.  The  Japanese  had  notyet 
replied,  but  stood  straight  on  till  they  were  within  3000  yards 
of  the  centre  of  the  Chinese  line,  when  they  turned  in 
succession  eight  points  to  port,  at  the  same  time  opening  with 
their  broadsides.  The  Main  Squadron  did  not  go  quite  so 
far  to  port  as  the  Flying  Squadron,  and  thus  fought  at  closer 
ranges.  But  all  the  Japanese  ships  gave  the  large  Chinese 
ironclads  a  wide  berth.  As  they  passed  along  the  line  their 
6  and  47-inch  quick-firers  poured  in  a  hail  of  steel,  which 
descended  upon  the  Chinese,  riddling  the  upper  portions  of 
the  ships'  superstructures,  and  filling  the  air  with  bursting 
shells.  The  water  was  lashed  into  foam  by  the  shells, 
which,  ricochetting,  inflicted  most  of  the  hits.  The  sand- 
bags piled  up  inside  the  vessels,  prevented  much  damage 
being  done  as  yet,  and  the  Chinese  gunners  were  kept  lying 
down  as  far  as  possible,  so  that  losses  were  small.  As  the 
Japanese  came  on,  the  two  large  Chinese  battleships  left  the 
line  and  steamed  forward  as  if  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
line,  or  ram.  The  Japanese  fired  three  or  four  times  as  fast 
as  their  enemies,  sweeping  their  decks,  and  riddling  super- 
structures and  funnels.  The  Chinese  appeared  to  fire  slowly 
and  at  random  ;  their  shots  went  wide  of  the  target.  Admiral 
Tsuboi  now  raised  the  pace  of  his  Flying  Squadron,  and 
rapidly  neared  the  Chinese  right  flank.  The  Chinese  had 
already  lost  what  little  order  they  possessed  at  the  start,  and 
were  becoming  a  mob  of  ships,  some  of  which  masked  the 
others.  The  left  was  practically  out  of  the  battle,  whilst  half- 
a-dozen  vessels  on  the  centre  and  right  were  bearing  the  brunt 
of  the  engagement.  So  much  was  this  the  case  that  the 
Chinese  ships  on  the  left  were  already  beginning  to  retire, 
the  Tsi  Yuen  and  Kwang  Kai  setting  the  disgraceful 
example. 


92  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

The  details  of  this  engagement  are  hard  to  follow.  No 
full  and  official  account  has  appeared  on  either  side,  and, 
therefore,  the  story  of  it  must  necessarily  be  pieced  together 
from  various  and  often  contradictory  statements.  The  general 
features  are,  however,  well  ascertained,  and  we  shall  put 
these  before  our  readers  concisely,  before  proceeding  to 
chronicle  the  fortunes  of  the  various  ships. 

The  Flying  Squadron  passed  rapidly  along  the  Chinese  front, 
and  when  it  reached  the  starboard  flank,  attacked  vigorously 
the  Yang  Wei  and  Tshao  Yong,  small  ill-protected  vessels, 
and  furnished  with  the  most  indifferent  ammunition.  Ap- 
proaching till  it  was  within  1700  yards  range,  it  directed  a 
tremendous  fire  upon  them.  In  a  few  minutes  the  projectiles 
began  to  tell  ;  the  Tshao  Yong  was  seen  ablaze,  and  listing 
heavily  to  starboard.  The  Yang  Wei  was  also  in  difficulties. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  angular  formation  of  the  Chinese 
ships  prevented  half  their  vessels  from  bringing  their  guns  to 
bear,  and  as  each  ship  in  the  line  turned,  facing  the  enemy, 
they  masked  one  another's  fire.  At  this  point,  however,  Rear- 
Admiral  Tsuboi  turned  off  to  chase  away  the  Ping  Yuen  and 
Kwang  Ping,  which  were  coming  up  from  Takushan.  He 
drove  them  back,  when  he  was  recalled  by  a  signal  from  his 
chief.  This  signal  directed  him  to  turn  to  starboard ;  he, 
however,  misunderstood  it  and  circled  to  port,  returning  to 
assist  the  slower  vessels  of  the  Main  Squadron.  Ito  had 
intended  to  go  to  port,  instead  of  which  he  now  turned  to 
starboard,  whilst  the  Flying  Squadron  described  a  fresh 
circle.    The  effect  was  to  take  the  Chinese  between  two  fires. 

We  have  seen  that  as  the  Main  Squadron  defiled  past  the 
Chinese  front,  the  heavy  Chinese  battleships  moved  forward, 
supported  by  the  Lai  Yuen,  King  Yuen,  and  Chih  Yuen. 
The  faster  Japanese  ships  drew  ahead  of  the  slower  vessels 
to  the  rear  of  their  line,  the  Fusoo,  Hiyei,  Saikio,  and  Akagi. 
On  them  fell  the  brunt  of  the  Chinese  attack.  The  Fusoo 
cleared  the  advancing  ironclads,  but  the  Hiyei  was  compelled 
to  turn  sharply  to  avoid  the  enemy's  rams.     With  extra- 


J5T 


PINO  Y. 


W  LA  I  V,  . 

on  fire) 


YANG  W. 
'(disabled) 


.  CH1NG  Y. 


(sunk)^       \  («u 


Track,  of  Jap  Mean.  SqxuxasrorL. 

n  Flying 

Chinese  Ships 


<^MATSUSHtMA 


AKAGI  ^HIYEl 


PING  Y. 


TINGY.  cheny.  laiy. 
 ^      ^  <sg 


CHINQY 


«g  '^u-  S3'  ™  "K  A5T  ^NAN 


Map  XXVIII. 


G.FkUip  &  Sort, 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS    LESSONS.  93 

ordinary  audacity,  she  headed  for  the  Ting  Yuen  and  passed 
between  the  flagship  and  the  Chen  Yuen  at  a  range  of  700 
yards.*  Fortunately  for  her,  the  Chinese  ships  could  not 
pour  in  their  fire  on  her  without  risk  of  injuring  one  another, 
but  none  the  less  she  was  hit  several  times.  At  point-blank 
range  showers  of  splinters  flew  from  her  as  the  Chinese 
12-inch  guns  did  their  work.  Dense  smoke  rolled  up  from 
her  stem  and  stern,  but,  owing  to  the  want  of  common  shell 
in  the  Chinese  ironclads,  she  escaped.  Two  torpedoes 
were  discharged  at  her,  but  missed  and  passed  astern.  The 
Akagi  was  near  her  and  suffered  more  severely.  Indeed,  it 
was  only  the  arrival  of  the  Flying  Squadron  which  saved  her 
from  destruction  at  the  hands  of  the  Lai  Yuen,  Chili  Yuen, 
and  King  Yuen.  The  Saikio  kept  further  away  to  port,  and 
passed  along  the  front  of  the  Chinese  line,  receiving  a  very 
heavy  fire.  On  rounding  the  Chinese  right,  she  found  herself 
confronted  by  the  Kwang  Ping,  whilst  the  Ching  Yuen  was 
coming  up  astern.  Her  steering  gear  was  disabled,  and  to 
add  to  her  perplexities,  the  Chinese  torpedo-boats  assailed 
her.  Three  torpedoes  were  fired  at  her,  and  as  usual  missed. 
She  was  compelled,  with  the  Akagi,  to  retire  from  the 
engagement,  and  was  only  saved  from  destruction  by  the 
approach  of  the  other  Japanese  ships. 

The  position  of  the  Chinese  was  now  as  follows:  The  line 
abreast  had  become  a  disorderly  conglomeration  of  ships  fight- 
ing anyhow.  On  one  side  of  them  was  the  Flying  Squadron, 
on  the  other  the  Main  Squadron  of  the  Japanese,!  which  had 
turned  the  right  flank  of  the  Chinese,  and  completed  the 
discomfiture  of  the  unfortunate  Yang  Wei,  which  ran  from 
the  scene  of  action  ablaze.  On  turning  the  Chinese  right, 
the  Main  Squadron  had  a  short  but  sharp  engagement  with 
the  Ping  Yuen  and  the  Chinese  torpedo-boats,  in  which  the 
latter  were  dm  en  off.    The  Chinese  ships  in  the  line  were 

*  See  Plan  II. 

f  It  is  said  that  this  was  due  to  a  mistake,  and  that  Admiral  Ito  had  intended 
to  keep  his  ships  together. 


94  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894 

thus  left  to  themselves,  and  had  an  enemy  in  front  and  an 
enemy  behind.  The  Flying  Squadron  engaged  the  cruiser 
Chih  Yuen,  which  broke  from  the  line,  and  endeavoured  to 
ram  the  Yoshino.  The  Yoshino' s  quick-firers,  using  cordite, 
covered  her  with  bursting  shells.  At  3.30  she  went  to  the 
bottom,  having  been  sunk  by  gun-fire  alone.  Since  the  two 
Japanese  squadrons  were  in  danger  of  hitting  each  other,  as 
they  steamed  backwards  and  forwards  to  the  front  and  rear  of 
the  Chinese,  they  went  further  apart,  always,  however, 
drawing  in  when  they  were  opposite  the  smaller  Chinese 
vessels.  The  hail  of  projectiles  upon  the  Ting  Yuen  and 
Chen  Yuen  Avas  extraordinarily  fierce,  but  there  was  no  sign 
of  their  yielding.  The  Tsi  Yuen  and  Kwang  Kai  were  now 
in  full  retreat,  when  in  her  flight  the  former  collided  with  the 
unhappy  Yang  Wei,  damaging  her  severely.  The  Ching 
Yuen  had  also  retired,  as  she  was  on  fire.  The  Lai  Yuen 
could  be  seen  ablaze.  To  her  and  her  sister,  the  King  Yuen, 
the  Japanese  Flying  Squadron  turned  its  attention.  At  3.52, 
the  Takachiho,  3300  yards  from  the  King  Yuen,  opened  upon 
her.  The  Yoshino,  with  her  6-inch  quick-firers,  joined  in  at 
2500  yards.  At  4.48,  the  Chinese  ship  had  a  list  to  port,  and 
could  be  seen  ablaze.  The  bottom  of  the  vessel  showed  ;  the 
rudder  was  useless  ;  she  veered  to  and  fro  in  the  smoke  and 
uproar.  The  hail  of  shells  tore  her  open  ;  her  stern  dipped  ; 
a  minute  she  rested  in  the  sight  of  all,  her  stem  standing 
perpendicularly  up  from  the  water ;  then,  amidst  the 
indescribable  enthusiasm  of  the  Japanese,  with  a  violent 
explosion  she  went  to  the  bottom.  On  their  side  the 
Japanese  lost  the  Matsushima,  which  at  3.30  or  3.40  was 
fearfully  injured  by  the  Chinese.  She  steamed  out  of  action 
and  Ito  transferred  his  flag  to  the  Hashidate. 

Whilst  the  Flying  Squadron  was  thus  busied  with  the 
smaller  Chinese  ships,  the  Main  Squadron  had  concentrated 
upon  the  two  ironclads,  which  it  assailed  at  ranges  varying 
from  1000  to  3000  yards.  These  great  ships  were  terribly 
pounded,  and  both  were  repeatedly  on  fire.    The  withdrawal 


1894]  THE    YALU   AXD    ITS    LESSOXS.  95 

of  the  Matsushima,  on  being  hit  by  a  heavy  shell  from  the 
Chen  Yuen,  ended  this  attack. 

The  loss  of  the  Chinese  so  far  had  been  heavy.  Sunk  were 
the  Chih  Yuen  and  King  Yuen;  disabled  and  sinking  the 
Tshao  Yong  and  Yang  Wei;  in  the  offing  the  Tsi  Yuen 
retiring  to  Port  Arthur,  and  the  Kwang  Kai ;  and  closer  at 
hand  the  Citing  Yuen  and  Lai  Yuen,  endeavouring  to  put 
out  fires.  The  Ping  Yuen  and  Kwang  Ping  were  holding 
discreetly  aloof.  In  line  there  remained  only  the  Chen  Yuen 
and  the  Ting  Yuen,  both  of  which  were  on  fire.  The 
Japanese  had  lost  the  Matsuskima}  Hiyei,  and  Saikio,  but 
the  Akagi  was  already  preparing  to  return  to  the  battle.  The 
Flying  Squadron  proceeded  to  chase  the  retiring  Chinese 
ships,  whilst  the  Main  Squadron  fell  back  to  the  S.E.  to 
transfer  the  flag.  In  this  movement  the  Chen  Yuen  and 
Ting  Yuen  followed,  but  slowly  and  at  a  distance.  The 
transfer  was  seemingly  made,  when  suddenly  the  Main 
Squadron  wheeled  and  delivered  a  peculiarly  fierce  fire  upon 
the  ironclads — as  one  witness  expresses  it  "  giving  them  hell.'' 
This  was  the  final  effort  of  the  Japanese  :  the  last  attempt  to 
beat  down  the  stubborn  and  determined  resistance  of  desperate 
men,  well  led,  fighting  behind  thick  armour,  and  it  very 
nearly  succeeded.  Could  the  Japanese  have  divined  the  real 
state  of  things  on  board  the  Chinese  ships  ;  could  their  crews, 
worn  and  wearied  bv  that  Long  and  exciting  dav  of  arduous 
conflict,  have  continued  their  exertions  another  hour  ;  had  the 
sun  in  the  heavens  stood  still,  perhaps  night  would  have  seen 
the  Chen  and  Ting  Yuen  flying  the  Japanese  flag.  For  in  the 
ironclads  ammunition  had  run  almost  out.  The  last  furious 
onset  died  away,  and  the  two  combatants  were  now  beginning 
to  draw  slowly  apart. 

The  dav  was  now  verging  upon  evening.  The  Flying- 
Squadron  was  recalled  from  its  pursuit  by  signal,  and  the 
Matsushima,  Hiyei,  and  Saikio,  were  sent  off  to  the  base  of 
operations  for  repairs.  Whilst  the  Japanese  concentrated,  the 
Chinese  did  the  same.,  and  the  two  heavy  battleships — still 


96  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1894. 

unsubdued  and  still  battle-worthy- — collected  round  them  the 
Lai  Yuen,  the  Ching  Yuen,  the  Ping  Yuen,  two  Ren  del 
gunboats  and  the  two  torpedo-boats.  The  Japanese,  with 
wearied  crews  and  exhausted  ammunition,  did  not  care  to  risk 
a  night  action,  in  which  the  torpedo-boats  would  have  had 
an  opportunity  to  show  their  efficacy.  They  followed,  at  a 
distance,  towards  Wei-hai-wei,  but  when  day  dawned  the 
Chinese  were  not  in  sight.  On  this,  they  returned  to  the 
scene  of  action.  The  Yang  Wei  was  destroyed  by  a  spar- 
torpedo,  used  against  her  by  the  Chiyoda 's  launch.  After 
coaling  and  taking  on  board  ammunition  at  their  base,  the 
Japanese  prepared  for  a  second  engagement.  The  Naniwa 
and  Akitsushima  examined  the  Chinese  ports,  whilst  the  rest 
of  the  squadron  cruised  in  the  gulf.  In  Talien  Bay  two 
Chinese  ships  were  sighted.  One,  perhaps  the  Tsi  Yuen,  ran 
on  seeing  the  Japanese,  and  succeeded  in  effecting  her 
escape.  The  second  turned  out  to  be  the  Kwang  Kai\  hard 
and  fast  aground.  She  was  destroyed,  either  by  the  Japanese 
or  by  her  crew. 

To  turn  now  to  the  individual  fortunes  of  the  ships  most 
hotly  engaged.  The  Matsushima  did  not  surfer  heavily  till 
she  fought  the  Ping  Yuen.  With  her  she  opened  fire  at 
3000  yards,  and  continued  firing  till  she  was  within  1300 
yards.  At  2.34  she  was  hulled  by  a  io*2-inch  shell  from  the 
Chinese  vessel,  which  killed  four  men  at  the  port  torpedo-tube 
aft,  and  striking  the  barbette  was  shattered  against  it.  This 
shell  passed  very  close  to  a  loaded  Whitehead  torpedo,  which 
would  assuredly  have  destroyed  the  ship  had  it  exploded,  It 
then  coursed  through  store-rooms  and  an  oil-tank,  but  proved, 
when  it  went  to  pieces  against  the  barbette,  to  have  been 
loaded  with  cement.  In  reply  the  Japanese  disabled  the  Ping 
Yuen's  big  gun.  Later  in  the  afternoon,  when  facing  the 
Chen  Yuen,  the  Matsushima  was  far  more  severely  handled. 
Two  shells  entered  her  coffer  dam  above  the  water-line,  but 
the  cellulose  swelled  and  prevented  leakage.  A  12-inch  shell, 
from  the  Chinese  ironclad,  entered  her  battery,  hurled  the 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


97 


fourth  4* 7-inch  gun  from  its  mount,  and  exploding,  fired  a 
great  heap  of  ammunition.  Two  4* 7-inch  guns  and  the  big 
Canet  weapon  were  disabled,  ninety  officers  and  men  killed  or 
wounded. 

The  gunnery  officer,  who  was  standing  close  to  the  ammuni- 
tion, was  blown  to  pieces,  only  his  cap  being  afterwards  found. 
The  ship  listed  and  a  fire  broke  out.  The  crew,  with  unabated 
gallantry  and  courage,  divided  their  attention  between  the 
fire  and  the  enemy.  The  bandsmen  went  to  the  guns,  and 
though  the  position  of  the  ship  was  critical,  and  her  loss 
appalling,  there  was  no  panic.  The  fire  was  on  the  lower 
deck,  just  above  the  magazine.  In  charge  of  the  magazine 
were  a  gunner's  mate  and  a  seaman.  The  shell  had,  apparently, 
dented  the  plating  over  the  powder,  and  the  red  glow  through 
the  crevices  showed  the  danger.  But  these  brave  men  did 
not  abandon  their  posts.  Stripping  off  their  clothes  they 
crammed  them  into  the  cracks  and  saved  the  Matsushima  ; 
though  nearly  a  third  of  the  men  above  the  water-line  had 
been  put  out  of  action,  the  remnant  got  the  fire  under. 
With  fifty-seven  officers  and  men  dead,  and  nearly  as  many 
wounded,  the  ship  steamed  out  of  action. 

The  Hiyei,on  escaping  the  torpedoes  fired  at  her,  had  with- 
stood the  attack  of  the  Chen  Yuen.  One  12-inch  shell  struck 
her  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  ward-room,  which  was  being 
used  as  a  temporary  hospital  ;  bursting,  it  killed  instantly  her 
chief  surgeon  and  paymaster,  with  a  large  number  of  wounded. 
The  mizzenmast  fell  and  the  ship  took  fire.  A  second  heavy 
shell,  bursting  on  her  upper  deck,  killed  many  of  her  gunners. 

The  Akagi  had  to  face  the  Chinese  ships  of  the  left 
unsupported.  At  850  yards  she  engaged  them  fiercely, 
clearing  the  Lai  Yuen's  deck  with  her  starboard  battery.  At 
1.20  a  shot  struck  her  bridge  and  killed  her  captain,  Com- 
mander Sakamoto,  with  two  gunners.  The  command  passed 
to  her  navigating  lieutenant,  and  a  few  minutes  later  she  was 
hulled  repeatedly  about  the  level  of  her  lower  deck,  losing 
four  firemen.  Her  steam-pipe  was  shattered,  and  the  scalding 
Vol,  11.  H 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION 


steam  by  its  escape  cut  off  the  supply  of  ammunition,  just 
when  it  was  most  wanted.  The  shot  and  powder  had  to  be 
sent  up  by  a  ventilating  shaft,  thus  incommoding  the  engine- 
room  complement.  Three  gunners  were  killed  at  this  time 
on  the  upper  deck.  The  Lai  Yuen,  Chih  Yuen,  and  King 
Yuen  were  coming  up  astern,  and  her  position  was  one  of 
extreme  danger.  Turning  to  port,  she  for  a  time  eluded  her 
enemies  whilst  repairs  were  made.  Once  more  the  Chinese 
neared  her,  and  once  more  she  fought  them,  now  heading 
west.  Her  mainmast  was  shot  away,  and  at  a  distance  of 
only  330  yards  from  the  Lai  Yuen,  her  bridge  was  struck,  and 
her  new  commander  wounded.  A  lieutenant  took  his  place, 
whilst  those  guns,  which  would  bear  astern,  fired  steadily  at 
the  Lai  Yuen.  At  2.20  a  shell  set  the  Lai  Yuen's  deck  on 
fire,  and  the  other  Chinese  vessels  slowed  down  to  give  her 
assistance.  The  Flying  Squadron,  too,  was  coming  up  astern 
of  them,  and  beginning  to  engross  their  attention.  Thus  the 
Akagi  was  enabled  to  steam  out  of  range,  when  her  steam- 
pipe  was  repaired  and  her  crew  given  a  much-needed  rest. 
At  5.50,  three  hours  after  her  withdrawal,  she  again  joined  the 
Main  Squadron.*" 

The  Saikio  had  an  even  more  wonderful  escape  than  these 
two  ships.  Passing  along  the  Chinese  line,  she  was  struck  in 
quick  succession  by  four  enormous  shells  from  the  Ting  Yuen. 
Two  went  clean  through  her,  doing  no  damage.  Two  common 
shells,  however,  burst  in  the  upper-deck  saloon,  shattered  the 
woodwork,  and  disabled  the  steering-gear.  Signalling  that 
she  could  not  steer,  and  manoeuvring  with  her  twin  screws,  she 
passed  through  the  Flying  Squadron,  between  the  Naniwa 
and  Akitsushima.  Relieving  tackle  was  fixed,  and  at  2.20  or 
thereabouts  she  was  again  under  control,  and  now  found  the 
Ping  Yuen  before  her.  With  this  ship,  the  Kwang  Ping, 
which  had  already  been  in  action  with  her,  and  the  two 
torpedo-boats,  she  began  an  engagement  about  2.50.  Opening 


*  Admiral  Ito  imagined  that  she  had  been  sunk 


THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


99 


at  3300  yards,  she  continued  till  she  was  only  500  yards  off 
the  Chinese.  One  torpedo-boat  was  driven  off  by  her  fire, 
but  the  second  discharged  three  torpedoes  at  her.  The  first 
crossed  her  bows,  the  second  ran  along  her  starboard  side, 
the  third  dived.  Though  she  kept  up  a  vigorous  fire  from 
her  machine-guns  upon  the  boat,  it  escaped  quite  unharmed. 
At  3.30  the  Saikio,  on  fire  astern,  abandoned  the  engagement. 
She  had  received  a  large  number  of  projectiles,  some  of  which 
narrowly  escaped  her  engine-room,  but  her  damage  was 
inconsiderable  and  her  loss  of  life  nil.  Nothing  so  surely 
demonstrates  the  incapacity  of  the  Chinese  gunners  as  their 
failure  to  sink  this  ship.  A  weak  merchant  steamer,  she  had 
faced  the  Chinese  line,  and  after  this  ordeal  had  engaged  two 
Chinese  warships,  one  of  which  had  considerable  armour  pro- 
tection. 

Next  let  us  pass  to  the  Chinese  ships.  The  Ting  Yuen 
fought  stoutly  all  through  the  day.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
battle  a  heavy  shell,  probably  a  ricochet,  struck  her  foremast, 
killing  seven  men  in  the  top,  but  failed  to  bring  it  down. 
As  we  have  seen,  Admiral  Ting  and  Major  von  Hanneken 
were  injured  by  the  concussion  of  the  guns  at  the  first  dis- 
charge. Later  in  the  day  a  very  serious  fire  broke  out  for- 
ward. The  smoke  from  it  completely  shrouded  the  barbettes, 
and  for  some  time  the  only  gun  which  could  fight  was  the 
6-inch  Krupp  aft.  The  fire  was  got  under  through  the  exer- 
tions of  Herr  Albrecht,  after  it  had  gravely  imperilled  the 
ship's  safety.  On  board  the  Ting  Yuen  was  killed  Mr. 
Nichols,  an  ex-petty  officer  of  the  British  Navy,  who  dis- 
played great  gallantry  throughout  the  battle.  The  Chinese 
on  board  showed  no  great  spirit  :  unlike  the  Matsuskima's 
men,  when  they  saw  the  ship  ablaze  they  bolted,  and  did  not 
even  think  of  fighting  the  ship.  Albrecht  it  was  who  saved 
her,  standing  to  his  hose  amidst  fire  and  exploding  shells. 
Yet  one  deed  of  heroism  on  the  part  of  a  Chinaman  must  be 
recorded.  During  the  fire  the  Ting  Yuen's  forward  torpedo 
room,  in  which  were  two  loaded  torpedoes,  was  threatened  bv 

H  2 


ioo  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

the  flames,  when  the  Chinese  gunner  went  forward  and 
removed  their  war-heads,  as  also  three  others,  lying  ready  for 
use.  It  was  found  impossible  to  signal  when  the  foremast 
had  gone. 

Like  the  Ting  Yuen  the  Chen  Yuen  suffered  much  from  fire, 
She  was  ablaze  no  less  than  eight  times,  but,  mainly  through 
the  Europeans,  each  time  the  fire  was  got  under.  A  European 
who  was  on  board  her  records  his  experiences  as  follows:* 
"In  helping  to  put  out  one  of  these  fires,  I  was  wounded. 
The  fire  was  forward,  on  the  forecastle,  and  there  was  such  a 
fierce  fire  sweeping  the  deck  between  it  and  the  fore-barbette, 
that  the  officer,  whom  I  ordered  to  go  and  put  it  out,  declared 
it  to  be  impossible  to  get  there  alive  ;  so  I  had  to  go  myself. 
I  called  for  volunteers,  and  got  several  splendid  fellows — some 
of  our  best  men,  unhappily,  for  nearly  all  were  killed,  but  we 
got  the  fire  under.  The  fire  was  on  the  port  side,  and  as  the 
starboard  fore-barbette  gun  was  firing  across  it,  I  sent  orders 
that  it  was  only  to  fire  on  the  starboard  side,  but,  as  bad  luck 
would  have  it,  the  man  who  received  the  order,  the  Number  One 
of  the  gun,  had  his  head  shot  off  just  after  I  had  gone  forward, 
and  his  successor  did  not  know  of  it.  As  I  stooped  to  pick  up 
the  hose,  a  shell,  or  a  fragment,  passed  between  my  wrists, 
grazing  each.  Shortly  afterwards,  I  heard  a  loud  explosion, 
and  saw  a  brilliant  light  behind  me,  was  knocked  down,  and 
lay  unconscious  for  a  while — how  long  I  do  not  know.  I 
believe  it  was  the  flame  from  the  gun  which  I  had  ordered  to 
fire  only  on  the  starboard  side,  but  it  may  have  been  a  shell 
exploding,  though,  if  so,  I  ought  to  have  been  blown  to  pieces. 
Anyhow,  I  was  pretty  badly  burnt,  and  when  I  came  to,  I  sat 
up  leaning  on  my  elbow,  and  found  myself  looking  almost 
down  the  tube  of  the  great  gun,  pointing  straight  at  me.  I 
saw  the  end  move  a  little  to  one  side,  then  to  the  other,  up  a 
little,  then  down  ;  and  I  waited  for  years — a  fraction  of  a 
second  no  doubt — for  the  gun  to  fire,  for  I  knew  that  the 


*  Captain  McGiffin  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette. 


Plate  XXIX. 


The  Chen  Yuen  in  Action. 

By  F.  T.  Jane. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AXD    ITS    LESSONS.  101 

gunner  had  taken  aim.  Then  it  suddenly  occurred  to  me  to 
make  an  effort.  I  rolled  over  on  my  side,  and  by  great  good 
fortune,  down  a  hatchway  some  eight  feet  or  so,  on  to  a  heap 
of  rubbish,  which  broke  my  fall  ;  as  I  fell  I  heard  the  roar  of 
the  big  gun."  Her  Chinese  crew  behaved  better  than  the  Tin& 
Yuen's  men.  The  discipline  was  excellent,  the  guns  were 
fairly  handled,  and  she  was  manoeuvred  with  some  skill.  With 
the  Ting  Yuen,  she  bore  the  brunt  of  the  Japanese  attack,  and 
with  the  Ting  Yuen,  circled  slowly  round,  attempting  to 
keep  end-on  to  the  two  hostile  squadrons.  She  was  much 
shattered  in  her  upper  works,  but  not  seriously  injured.  The 
spindle  of  the  port  gun's  hydraulic  gear  was  struck,  and  the 
port  gun  put  out  of  action  for  a  time.  The  bow  6-inch  gun 
was  disabled  by  an  accident.  The  foretop  was  hit  twice,  and 
six  officers  and  men  in  it  killed.  She  returned  to  port  3-ft. 
down  by  the  head,  and  almost  sinking. 

The  Chih  Yuen,  under  a  brave  and  determined  captain, 
Tang,  had  advanced  from  the  line  at  the  outset  of  the  battle, 
and  was  hotlv  engaged  with  the  Flying  Squadron  on  its 
return.  She  was  hit  repeatedlv,  amidst  loud  cheers  from  the 
Japanese,  and  began  to  list  to  starboard.  Her  captain  made  a 
futile  effort  to  ram,  but  the  Japanese  quick-firers  were  too 
strong  for  him.  As  he  closed  with  the  Yoshino,  the  list 
increased,  the  screws  showed  above  water,  racing  in  the  air, 
and  the  ship  went  down  with  all  hands.  As  she  sank,  a 
violent  explosion  was  observed.  She  is  said  to  have  been 
finished  off  bv  a  12-6-inch  shell  from  one  of  the  big  Canet 
guns.  As  in  the  case  of  the  King  Yuen,  the  appearance  of  an 
explosion  may  have  been  due  to  the  bursting  of  her  boilers, 
or  the  detonation  of  a  torpedo  in  one  of  her  above-water 
tubes.  Her  European  engineer,  Purvis,  went  down  with  her  : 
and  of  her  crew  only  seven  were  saved. 

The  King  Yuen  was  badly  on  fire  about  the  time  the  Chih 
Yuen  sank,  and  dense  volumes  of  smoke  were  seen  pouring 
from  her.  She  moved  forward  upon  the  Yoshino,  and  received 
a  tremendous  hail  of  shells.     She  was  seen   rolling  very 


102 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


heavily,  now  to  port,  now  to  starboard,  and  as  one  after 
another  the  Flying  Squadron  plied  her  with  their  projectiles, 
she  lost  all  power  of  steering  and  described  wild  circles.  Her 
end  is  veiled  in  mystery.  All  the  Chinese,  who  saw  her  go 
down,  attributed  her  loss  to  a  torpedo,  but  the  Japanese  fired 
none.  There  was  a  very  thick  cloud  of  smoke  and  an 
explosion  just  before  she  vanished,  like  the  Victoria  capsizing 
and  showing  her  bottom.  Of  a  crew  of  270  men  very  few 
escaped. 

The  Lai  Yuen  again  was  put  out  of  action  by  fire.  For 
an  hour-and-a-half  she  was  seen  ablaze.  A  shell  struck  her 
deck,  and  though  a  bucket  of  water  would,  at  the  start,  have 
put  out  the  flames,  with  Chinese  apathy  she  was  allowed  to 
burn,  till  the  fire,  having  consumed  almost  everything  above 
the  water-line,  burned  itself  out.  She  was  left  a  mere  shell, 
terribly  damaged  by  fire  and  shell,  yet,  strange  to  say,  her 
fighting  and  manoeuvring  qualities  were  little  affected.  She 
was  brought  safe  to  Port  Arthur.  Her  deck,  of  2-inch  teak, 
and  the  large  amount  of  paint  and  varnish  lavished  upon  her 
woodwork,  made  her  a  ready  prey  to  any  shell. 

The  Ching  Yuen  was  three  times  on  fire.  She  retired  to 
extinguish  one  of  these  fires,  and,  therefore,  took  little  part 
in  the  battle. 

The  Tshao  Yong  had  her  steering-gear  disabled  and  was 
seen  ablaze.  The  Yang  Wei  was  on  fire  when  she  was 
rammed  by  the  Tsi  Yuen ;  sinking,  she  ran  aground  in 
shoal  water.  The  Kwang  Kai,  Kwang  Ping,  and  Ping 
Yuen  took  little  part  in  the  fighting,  and  were  very  slightly 
damaged. 

The  Tsi  Yuen  was  commanded  by  Captain  Fong,  whose 
acquaintance  we  have  made  already.  He  is  said  to  have  run 
in  a  cowardly  manner  before  his  vessel  had  received  serious 
injury,  and  it  is  certain  that  he  managed  his  ship  very  badly, 
but,  in  justice  to  him,  we  must  record  the  statement  of  Herr 
Hoffman,  who  was  on  board,  and  who  gives  us  an  interest- 
ing picture  of  the  battle.    "  We  accomplished  the  journey  to 


1894]  THE    YALU    AND    ITS    LESSONS.  103 

Tatungkow  in  safety,  landed  the  troops,  and  about  1 1  o'clock, 
on  the  17th  ultimo,  the  whole  fleet  got  up  anchor,  and  prepared 
to  return  to  China.  A  short  distance  outside  the  mouth  of  the 
river  we  met  the  Japanese  fleet,  and  a  battle  followed,  which 
lasted  till  5.30  in  the  evening.  It  was  the  most  tremendous 
fight  I  had  ever  dreamt  about.  Captain  Fong  fought  the  Tsi 
Yuen  with  courage  and  ability.  We  had  seven  or  eight  men 
killed  on  board,  and  continued  firing  away  as  fast  as  we  could 
until  between  2  and  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  bv  which  time 
we  were  terribly  damaged,  and  had  to  leave  the  scene  of 
action.  Our  large  gun  aft.  16-centimetres,  [15-centimetre?] 
Krupp,  was  disabled,  and  the  two  forward  guns  had  their  gear 
destroyed,  so  that  they  could  not  be  used,  and  to  all  intents 
and  purposes  the  ship  was  useless,*  so  Captain  Fong  decided 
to  get  out  of  the  action  and  make  the  best  of  his  way  to 
Port  Arthur,  to  refit.  The  smoke  was  so  dense  that  no  one 
could  see  very  much  of  what  was  going  on  from  the  deck, 
but  from  time  to  time  we  heard  that  this,  that,  or  the  other 
ship  was  gone.  Having  left  the  fight  in  the  Tsi  Yuen,  I  know 
nothing  of  what  subsequently  happened.  We  arrived  at  Port 
Arthur  Ave  or  six  hours  before  the  remainder  of  the  fleet, 
which  came  in  about  8  o'clock.  On  the  way  in  we  had  a 
collision  with  another  vessel  [the  Yang  Wei]  which  sunk. 
From  the  injuries  to  the  Tsi  Yuen,  which  were  all  abaft  the 
stern,  I  should  say  the  other  ship  rammed  us.  The  water 
poured  into  the  Tsi  Yuen  in  a  regular  torrent,  but  we  closed 
the  water-tight  doors  forward,  and  went  on  safely.  I  don't 
think  that  the  charges  of  cowardice,  which  have  been  brought 
against  Captain  Fong,  can  be  supported  for  a  moment  ;  he 
fought  his  ship  until  it  was  no  longer  serviceable.  The  smoke 
was  so  thick  that  one  only  had  a  chance  of  knowing  what  was 
going  on  in  his  own  ship." 

*  Captain  McGiffin  states  that  on  examination  at  Port  Arthur  all  her  guns 
were  found  in  good  order,  except  the  15-centimetre  stern-chaser,  which  must  have 
been  disabled  during  her  retreat.  The  Tsi  Yuen's  movements  are  very  doubtful, 
and  his  account  of  her  is  inconsistent  in  various  particulars  with  the  above  and 
with  his  own  plan. 


io4  IRONCLADS   IN    ACTION.  [1894 

There  is  one  point  unexplained  in  the  battle.  The  Chinese 
assert  that  the  Chih  Yuen  was  successful  in  her  attempt  to 
ram  ;  the  Japanese  that  she  failed.  Some  foreign  observers 
on  the  Chinese  ships  saw  a  vessel  sinking  with  revolving 
screws,  and  thought  that  it  was  the  Chih  Yuen's  victim. 
More  probably  it  was  the  Chih  Yuen  herself,  or  the  King 
Yuen.  The  torpedo-boats  of  the  Chinese  found  it  difficult  to 
distinguish  the  combatants  in  the  smoke,  though  there  was 
the  wide  difference  of  colour,  between  white  and  grey. 
The  speed  of  the  torpedo-boats  was  found  to  be  only 
fourteen  or  fifteen  knots,  instead  of  the  trial  figure  of  twenty. 
The  boats  were  seen  at  once,  and  fired  at  by  the  Japanese, 
long  before  they  got  within  range. 

The  five  transports  up  the  Yalu  river  received  a  message 
from  Ting  at  the  close  of  the  engagement,  ordering  them  to 
join  him.  They  were  too  far  up  the  river  to  do  so  at  once, 
and  their  crews  were  prostrate  with  fear.  Not  till  four  days 
after  the  battle  did  they  leave,  and  then  they  had  the  good 
fortune  to  return  to  Taku  unmolested,  in  the  face  of  the 
victorious  Japanese  fleet. 

In  its  general  features,  there  is  a  singular  resemblance 
between  this  battle  and  Lissa,  with  this  broad  difference, 
that  the  Yalu  was  a  long  range  fight,  and  Lissa  a  melee*  The 
Chinese,  like  the  Italians,  fought  as  a  mob  of  ships,  without 
orders,  without  plans,  and  without  commander.  Each  vessel 
had  to  do  what  it  could,  as  there  were  no  signals  after  the 
Ting  Yuen's  foremast  had  been  shot  away.  The  Japanese, 
like  the  Austrians,  knew  what  they  meant  to  do,  but  they 
had  this  immense  further  advantage,  that  throughout  they 
manoeuvred  and  fought  by  signal.  A  signal  at  a  decisive 
moment  brought  back  Tsuboi  with  the  Flying  Squadron  to 
support  the  Hiyei  and  Akagi]  a  signal  recalled  him  a  second 
time  at  the  close  of  the  day,  when  pursuit  might  have  been 
dangerous.     Like  the  Austrians,  the  Japanese  had  won  a 

*  There  was,  of  course,  some  fighting  at  close  quarters  at  the  Yalu,  but 
generally  speaking  the  engagement  was  a  long  range  one. 


i894;]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS    LESSONS.  105 

distinct  advantage,  and  yet  failed  to  annihilate  their  enemy. 
Still  directly,  or  indirectly,  they  struck  off  his  list  of  ships  five 
vessels,  and  so  injured  one  that  it  was  henceforward  useless.* 
Tegetthoff,  on  his  part,  sent  two  Italian  ships  to  the  bottom,  and 
disabled  a  third.  And  like  Tegetthoff,  if  he  did  not  exactly 
wipe  out  the  Chinese,  Ito  left  them  with  little  stomach  for  future 
fighting.  At  the  Yalu,  China  lost  all  chance  of  commanding 
the  sea,  and  by  losing  it,  brought  on  herself  defeat  in  the  war. 

In  another  respect,  the  Yalu  resembled  Lissa.  In  each 
case  the  assailed  fleet  was  engaged  in  covering  a  landing 
force.  But  whereas  the  Italians  were  encumbered  with  troops 
and  transports,  and  whereas  they  were  caught  in  the  midst  of 
disembarkation,  after  they  had  unsuccessfully  cannonaded 
Lissa,  the  Chinese  were  taken  at  no  such  disadvantage.  The 
earlier  reports  of  the  battle  represented  it  as  having  taken 
place  close  inshore.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Chinese  had  no 
want  of  sea-room,  nor  were  their  movements  in  any  way 
hindered  by  their  convoy,  which  had  ascended  the  river,  and 
was  therefore  safe  from  attack,  since  the  Japanese  ships  of 
heavy  draught  could  not  follow  it.  There  seems  no  reason 
then  to  attribute  the  Chinese  defeat  to  the  presence  of  the 
convoy.  Except  that  it  brought  the  Chinese  fleet  to  sea,  it 
cannot  be  said  to  have  had  any  effect  upon  the  issue  of  the 
day.  Had  the  Chinese  warships  been  cruising  alone,  the 
result  must  have  been  the  same.  The  bearing  of  this,  and, 
indeed,  of  all  the  moves  of  both  Chinese  and  Japanese  during 
the  earlier  period  of  the  war,  upon  the  doctrine  of  "  the  fleet 
in  being  "  is  self-evident.  It  has  been  held  that  the  presence 
of  an  inferior  squadron  at  sea  will  prevent  even  a  superior 
squadron  from  attempting  to  convoy  or  disembark  troops.  Yet 
by  either  side,  up  to  the  battle  of  the  Yalu,  this  rule  was  disre- 
garded, though  the  two  squadrons  Avere  approximately  equal. + 

*  The  ships  sunk  were  the  Chih  Yuen,  King  Yuen,  Tshao  Yong,  Yang  Wei, 
and  Kwang  Kai.    The  Lai  Yuen  was  disabled. 

t  The  Japanese  may  have  known  of  the  orders  of  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
to  Ting.    Still  the  Japanese  fleet  was  hampered  by  no  such  orders.  Captain 


106  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

As  Tegetthoff  drew  off  at  Lissa  when  apparently  he  had  the 
Italian  fleet  in  his  grasp,  so  Ito  retired  at  the  Yalu.  In  either 
case  it  was  probably  the  want  of  ammunition  which  led  to  the 
withdrawal.*  With  heavy  guns  and  limited  displacement  the 
supply  carried  cannot  be  inexhaustible,  and  we  may  anticipate 
in  future  actions  a  similar  indecisiveness  at  the  finish,  if  from 
first  to  last  the  battle  should  be  fought  out  at  long  ranges. 
That  the  Japanese  did  not  close  may  seem  strange,  but  in  the 
first  place  they  probably  wished  to  capture  the  two  big 
ironclads  instead  of  destroying  them.  Captain  Ingles  in  a 
telegram  at  the  outbreak  of  war  had  recommended  this  course. 
Ulterior  motives  thus  supervened  to  protect  the  Chinese,  for 
if  the  Japanese  had  closed  they  must  have  employed  the  ram 
or  the  torpedo,  their  ammunition  being  exhausted,  and  either 
ram  or  torpedo  would  have  sunk  the  battleships.  Again,  the 
Japanese  with  their  unarmoured  ships  could  not  have  thus 
closed  without  heavy  loss.  A  cruiser  is  never  very  strong 
in  the  bows,  and,  disregarding  the  Chinese  fire,  the  injury 
inflicted  upon  the  "rammer"  must  have  been  very  con- 
siderable. A  hot  pursuit  would  also  have  exposed  these 
weak  cruisers  to  the  danger  of  being  raked  by  the  Chinese 
ironclads  heavy  guns.  The  Japanese,  too,  could  not  be 
certain  that  the  Chinese,  who  fired  very  much  more  slowly, 
had  used  almost  all  their  ammunition.  There  would  have 
been  risk  of  the  two  big  battleships,  protected  as  they 
were  by  armour,  sinking,  in  a  close  action,  the  Japanese 
unarmoured  cruisers. 

The  Chinese  are  stated  to  have  made  desperate  efforts  to 
come  to  close  quarters  with  the  Main  Squadron,  and  to  have 
been  foiled  by  the  superior  speed  of  the  Japanese.  If  the 
efforts  were  serious  they  should  have  succeeded.    The  Fusoo, 

Mahan's  pronouncement  on  the  "  fleet  in  being,"  that  such  a  fleet  would 
not  constitute  such  a  deterrent  force  upon  the  movements  of  a  resolute  man, 
as  had  been  supposed,  seems  to  be  fully  justified  by  facts. 

*  See  i.  240, 


1 894]  THE    YALU    AND    ITS    LESSONS.  107 

which  kept  her  station  in  the  Japanese  line,  was  slower  than 
one,  if  not  both,  of  the  Chinese  battleships.  The  "Times" 
correspondent,  however,  states  that  the  commanders  of  the 
ironclads  gave  orders  to  go  at  full  speed,  but  that  the  Chinese 
lieutenants  at  the  engine-room  telegraphs,  fearing  for  their 
own  skins  in  a  close  action,  did  not  transmit  the  orders 
correctly.  The  battleships  began  the  action  with  a  very 
limited  supply  of  common  shell.  Of  this  species  of  projectile 
they  had  but  four  rounds  per  gun  for  their  heavy  ordnance, 
and  all  these  of  indifferent  quality.  There  were  but  three  of 
the  steel  common  shells,  whose  efficacy  was  tested  on  the 
Matsushima*  The  rest  of  their  ammunition  was  armour- 
piercing  shot. 

On  their  return  to  Port  Arthur,  like  the  Italians,  the  Chinese 
claimed  the  victory.  They  represented  that  at  least  three 
Japanese  vessels  had  been  sunk,  and  probably  still  believe  it 
to  this  day. 

So  ended  the  most  important  and  decisive  naval  engage- 
ment fought  since  Trafalgar :  a  day  which  had  brought 
exceeding  honour  to  all  engaged.  The  Chinese  sailors, 
fighting  under  an  admiral  who  had  physical  and  moral 
courage,  led  and  inspired  by  Europeans  and  a  small  knot  of 
faithful  officers  of  their  own  race,  showed  a  surprising  power 
of  resistance.  Disorder  was  only  to  be  expected  in  a  semi- 
barbarous  fleet.  The  mismanagement  which  left  the  heavv 
Krupps  without  shell  cannot  perhaps  be  avoided,  except  by  a 
system  of  organisation  which  postulates  as  its  conditions 
civilised  intelligence  and  foresight :  corruption  and  peculation 
had  done  their  fatal  work  on  shore,  and  the  Chinese  were 
clearly  doomed  to  defeat  when  they  saw  the  Japanese  smoke 
rise  above  the  horizon.  Yet  the  greatness  of  the  catastrophe 
seems  to  have  dawned  neither  upon  them  nor   upon  the 

*  The  steel  common  shell  had  a  bursting  charge  of  1321b.  of  powder ;  all  the 
three  were  in  the  Chen  Yuen.  The  other  shells  carried  a  charge  of  281b.,  but 
had  been  made  at  Tientsin,  fitted  badly,  and  were  often  charged  with  non- 
explosive. 


108  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

Japanese.  On  that  evening  of  the  17th  the  engagement  may 
have  appeared  to  both  a  drawn  battle.  It  was  only  when 
each  figured  out  results,  when  the  great  reluctance  of  the 
Chinese  to  quit  their  harbour  was  noted,  and  when  the 
Japanese  were,  in  consequence  of  that  reluctance,  enabled  to 
dominate  the  Yellow  Sea,  that  the  West  understood  how 
decisive  the  action  had  been.  The  Japanese  Navy  might  well 
be  proud  of  its  performance.  It  had,  if  not  invented,  at  least 
adopted  a  system  of  steam  tactics  as  yet  untried  in  war.  Its 
ships  had  kept  perfect  station  under  a  heavy  fire.  Its  officers 
had  shown  a  coolness  and  resource  which  argued  that 
Western  knowledge  had  not  been  parodied  but  assimilated. 
Its  seamen  by  innumerable  deeds  of  courage  had  won  well- 
deserved  honour  for  a  new  Power.  And  its  fast  cruisers,  if 
not  severely  tried  by  shell  fire  or  by  the  hail  which  rains  from 
the  quick-firer,  had  encountered  well-protected  battleships 
and  come  off  none  the  worse. 

The  elaborate  contrivances  which  had  replaced  the  line-of- 
battleship  had  at  last  been  tested  at  sea  in  a  general  action. 
It  had  been  expected  that  the  losses  in  such  a  battle  would  be 
very  heavy,  yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  expectation  was 
altogether  justified.  The  Japanese  lost,  in  killed,  ten  officers 
and  eighty  men,  in  wounded,  sixteen  officers  and  188  men. 
This  gives  a  grand  total  of  294.  Their  total  force  of  sailors 
engaged  in  the  battle  could  not  have  been  much  less  than 
3750,  and  may  have  been  a  little  more.  They  lost  then  eight 
per  cent,  of  their  force.*  The  heaviest  loss  fell  upon  the 
Matsushima,  where  the  killed  numbered  fifty-seven  and  the 
wounded  fifty-four.  As  the  flagship  she  would  naturally  be 
singled  out  by  the  Chinese,  and  would  receive  a  heavy  fire. 
She  also  went  dangerously  near  the  two  large  Chinese  battle- 
ships. She  carried  no  vertical  armour,  except  on  her  heavy 
gun.  Second  came  the  Htyei,  with  nineteen  killed  and  thirty- 
seven  wounded.  She  had  no  armour  except  a  very  short  belt 
on  the  water-line,  and,  like  the  Matsushima,  she  was  at  very 

*  See  Table  XXI. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS   LESSONS.  109 

close  quarters  with  the  Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen.  The 
Itsukushima,  with  thirteen  killed  and  eighteen  wounded,  was 
third;  she,  too,  was  unarmoured.  The  Akagi  lost  eleven 
killed  and  seventeen  wounded,  but  the  Saikio,  wonderful  to 
relate,  only  eleven  wounded.  Bad  gunnery  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  can  alone  explain  this  strange  fact.  The  Akitsushima 
had  fifteen  killed  or  wounded,  the  Fusoo  fourteen,  the  Yoshino 
and  the  Hashidate  twelve  each,  the  Takachiho  three,  the 
Naniwa  one,  and  the  Chiyoda  none.  The  escape  of  the 
Chiyoda  is  extraordinary,  when  it  is  remembered  that  she 
fought  in  the  line  between  the  Matsushima  and  Itsukushima, 
both  of  which  suffered  severely. 

The  Chinese  loss  on  board  the  ships  which  survived  the 
encounter  was  not  so  heavy  as  that  of  the  Japanese,  but  a 
very  large  number  of  men  were  killed,  wounded,  or  drowned 
in  the  action  on  board  the  ships  which  went  down.  We  shall 
not,  perhaps,  be  exaggerating  when  we  place  the  number  of 
lives  thus  lost  at  from  600  to  800.  In  addition,  thirty-six  were 
killed  and  eighty-eight  wounded  on  board  the  seven  vessels 
which  survived.  The  Ting  Yuen  lost  fourteen  killed  and 
twenty-five  wounded;  the  Lai  Yuen,  ten  killed  and  twenty 
wounded ;  the  Chen  Yuen,  seven  killed  and  fifteen  wounded  ; 
the  Ching  Yuen,  two  killed  and  fourteen  wounded  ;  the  Tst 
Yuen,  three  killed  ;  the  Ping  Yuen,  twelve  wounded ;  and  the 
Kwang  Ping,  three  wounded.  The  Chinese  may  have  had 
2400  men  present  at  the  action  :  in  that  case,  they  lost  more 
than  twenty-two  per  cent,  of  their  force.  It  is  interesting  to 
notice  how  the  armour  of  the  Ting  Yuen  and  Chen  Yuen 
diminished  their  losses.  They  were  the  most  hotly  engaged 
of  the  Chinese  ships,  and  had  for  hours  to  serve  as  the  targets 
of  five  Japanese  vessels.  Yet  the  losses  of  these  two  ships, 
added  together,  are  just  half  of  those  incurred  on  the  Japanese 
flagship  alone.  And  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  practice 
on  the  Japanese  side  was  certainly  better  than  on  the  Chinese. 
If  it  did  nothing  else,  then,  armour  saved  a  very  large  number 
of  human  lives. 


no 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


Comparing  the  losses  at  the  Yalu  with  those  at  Lissa,  and 
earlier  battles,  in  the  days  of  wooden  ships,  we  get  these 
results  : 


Total  of 

Killed 

Total  Killed 

Percentage  of 

Battle. 

Nation. 

Men 

and 

Wounded. 

and 

Casualties 

Engaged. 

Drowned. 

Wounded. 

to  Force. 

Yalu   £ 

Chinese 

2400 

540? 

88 

Say  620 

22 \  \  Average 

Japanese  ... 

37So 

90 

204 

294 

8  )  of  both  1  S| 

Lissa   £ 

Italians 

10,880 

600  ? 

39 

639' 

Austrians  ... 

7871 

38 

138 

176. 

Trafalgar   ...  | 

Allies  

English 

21,580 
16,820 

3373* 
449 

"55* 
1241 

4528* 
1690 

Nile   j 

French 

9820 

Esti 

mated  at 

3000 

English 

7980 

218 

678 

896 

3}   -  *. 

Camperdown  ^ 

Dutch...  ... 

English 

7i5o 
8220 

540 
203 

620 
622 

1160 

825 

;<}  ..  - 

First  of  June  [ 

French 
English 

19,760 
17,240 

290 

858 

5000 
1 148 

Figures  for  earlier  battles  from  Hodge:  "Losses  in  Naval  War."— Journal  Statistical 
Society,  vol.  xviii.  Average  for  thirteen  battles  1782-1811,  11J  per  cent.  In  the  returns  for  the 
earlier  battles  the  slightly  wounded  are  not  usually  included.  Probably  an  addition  of  one- 
fourth  should  therefore  be  made  to  the  percentages,  to  give  an  accurate  comparison. 

*  French  only. 

It  would  thus  appear  that  the  loss  of  life  in  the  engagement 
we  are  considering  was  rather  heavier  in  proportion  than  it 
was  before  the  days  of  ironclads.  There  is  this  also  to  be 
taken  into  account :  on  board  the  old  line-of-battle  ship  very 
few  men  were  below  the  water-line,  whereas  on  modern  iron- 
clads and  cruisers,  quite  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  crew 
is  busy  in  the  engine-room  or  stokehold,  below  the  armoured 
deck,  and  therefore  out  of  the  reach  of  shot,  exposed  only  to 
death  by  drowning  if  the  ship  sinks.  When  this  is  remem- 
bered, the  proportion  of  men  killed  and  disabled  amongst 
those  exposed  mounts  considerably;  especially  on  the  Japanese 
side,  where  no  ships  were  sunk,  must  this  be  recollected  and 
the  percentage  adjusted.  At  least,  five  hundred  men  on  the 
twelve  Japanese  ships  must  have  been  engaged  in  tending 
boilers  or  machinery,  in  addition  to  those  at  work  at  the 
ammunition  hoists.  If  3200  men  only  were  exposed  to  fire, 
the  loss  would  amount  to  nine  not  eight  per  cent.  It  would 
not  then  seem  that,  with  the  modern  engines  of  destruction, 
war  has  become  less  bloody,  but,  rather,  that  the  risk  of  the 


Shot  Holes  in  the  Chen  Yuen  after  the  Yalu. 


Plate  XXX. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND   ITS   LESSONS.  11 1 

individual  serving  in  the  modern  fleet  has  been  slightly 
increased.  At  the  same  time,  the  loss  of  life  might  be  greatly 
diminished  if  special  vessels  were  at  hand  to  rescue  the 
drowning  in  the  water.  Both  at  Lissa  and  at  the  Yalu,  the 
greater  proportion  of  deaths  on  the  beaten  side  were  due 
to  drowning.  At  Lissa,  Tegetthoff,  as  we  have  seen, 
endeavoured  to  give  aid  to  the  Italians  in  the  water,  but 
was  prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  onset  of  the  Italians."* 
At  the  Yalu,  the  Japanese  saw  the  men  crowding  in  the  Tshao 
Yong's  tops,  after  she  had  collided  with  the  Tsi  Yuen  and 
sunk.  They  pitied,  but  as  in  Tegetthoff's  case,  the  stress  of 
the  battle  would  not  suffer  them  to  aid.  The  Chinese  torpedo- 
boats,  however,  took  off  a  large  number  of  men,  who  must 
otherwise  have  fallen  victims  in  the  struggle,  and  their  success 
in  this  mission  of  mercy  suggests  the  question,  whether  some 
international  agreement  not  to  fire  upon  ships  or  vessels, 
engaged  in  saving  the  drowning,  should  not  be  arrived  at. 
In  the  days  of  Nelson,  chivalry  and  self-interest  forbade  the 
line-of-battle  ship  to  fire  upon  frigates  thus  engaged.  It 
would  go  without  saying  that  these  special  vessels  would  not 
be  armed,  and  would  be  distinguished  in  some  way — by 
colour  or  build — from  the  combatants.  The  first  principle  of 
warfare  is  to  crush  the  enemy ;  the  second,  which  has  only 
been  recognised  in  modern  times,  is  to  inflict  no  unnecessary 
suffering  in  crushing  him.  When  the  enemy's  sailors  are  in 
the  water,  they  are  as  helpless  as  the  wounded,  and  as 
ambulances  are  not  fired  upon,  why  should  not  ambulance- 
ships  be  given  all  possible  immunity  ?  The  importance  of 
this  point  was  fully  understood  by  Tegetthoff,  who  was  anxious 
after  Lissa,  that  a  European  conference  should  be  convened 
to  deal  with  it.  Unfortunately,  this  step  has  never  been  taken. 

There  seems  little  doubt  that  the  stiffness  of  the  Chinese 
resistance  was  greatly  increased  by  their  belief  that  no  quarter 
would  be  given.     With  the  exception  of  the  Tsi  Yuen  and 


*  Vol.  i.  237-8. 


ii2  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

Kwang  Kai,  no  ships  in  the  Chinese  line  showed  cowardice. 
Incapacity  and  blundering  there  was  in  plenty,  but  having 
their  backs  to  the  wall,  as  they  supposed,  the  seamen  fought 
courageously.  On  land,  the  Chinese  invariably  fled  before 
their  better-trained,  and  better-armed,  opponents  ;  here  alone 
they  stood  up  to  them,  and  by  doing  so,  once  more  proved 
that  courage  alone,  without  skill,  will  not  win  battles.  The 
crews  of  the  ships  were  one  half  composed  of  raw  recruits, 
owing  to  the  peculation  of  admirals  and  captains,  who  had 
maintained  in  peace  a  shadow  of  the  nominal  effective. 
Corrupt  administration  is  a  most  fatal  failing  when  there  is 
fighting  toward. 

The  gunnery  of  the  Chinese  was  indifferent,  but  their  ships, 
guns,  and  ammunition  were  in  part  to  blame  for  this.  They 
had  eight  12-inch  Krupps  and  five  10-inch  weapons  by  various 
makers,  twelve  guns  of  8-inches,  fifteen  of  6-inches,  and 
twelve  of  47-inch,  besides  130  machine-guns  or  Nordenfelts. 
Their  heavy  guns  were  of  somewhat  antiquated  pattern,  and 
they  carried  no  large  quick-firers.  Thus  they  lacked  the  very 
weapons  which  would  have  been  most  effective  against 
unarmoured  ships.  They  were  further  very  ill-provided  with 
guns  of  moderate  size.  The  Japanese  had  of  weapons 
ranging  from  the  6'8-inch  Krupp  to  the  4* 7-inch  Armstrong, 
no  less  than  ninety-four,  and  of  these  sixty-six  were  quick- 
firers.  The  Chinese  had  of  corresponding  calibres  only 
twenty-seven,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  slow-firers.  In 
auxiliary  armament  the  Chinese  were  thus  immeasurably 
behind  their  enemy,  and  the  numerical  difference  is  increased 
by  the  fact  that,  as  a  quick-firer  will  discharge  in  a  given 
time  from  three  to  six  times  as  many  rounds  as  a  slow-firer, 
each  Japanese  quick-firer  was  worth  three  Chinese  guns.  As 
the  Japanese  fought  at  a  long  range,  and  moved  with  fair 
rapidity,  the  Chinese  gunners  did  little  but  miss  them  with  the 
heavy  guns,  which  have,  indeed,  a  very  long  range,  but  are 
slow  and  awkward  to  lay  upon  the  target.  We  find,  there- 
fore that,  as  we  should  have  expected,  the  great  guns  made 


i804]  THE    YALU    AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


II2A 


few  hits.  Five  of  their  shots  struck  the  Saih'o,  three  or  four  the 
Matsushima,  two  the  Hiyei,  one  the  Naniwa,  and  possibly 
some  the  other  ships.  This  would  give  a  total  of  twelve  to 
fifteen.  Now  the  Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen  alone  fired 
between  them  197  12-inch  projectiles,  to  say  nothing  of  268 
of  6-inch  calibre.  The  other  ships  must  have  discharged  fully 
as  many  10*2  and  8"2-inch  shells.  Thus  a  very  rough  esti- 
mate of  heavy  shots  fired  will  give  at  the  least  400,  of  which 
not  twenty,  or  four  per  cent.,  struck  the  target.  This  is 
curiously  in  accord  with  the  experience  of  the  Shah.  Of 
the  Chinese  heavy  projectiles  which  did  strike,  a  considerable 
proportion  again  appear  to  have  been  armour-piercing  shot, 
which  would  do  little  damage.  It  was  estimated  by  a  Japanese 
officer  that  ten  per  cent,  of  the  Chinese  shot,  and  fifteen  per 
cent,  of  the  Japanese  scored  hits.*  The  estimate  appears  a 
high  one,  when  we  consider  the  long  ranges  which  prevailed, 
and  if  it  is  correct  for  the  Chinese,  the  low  percentage  of  hits 
made  by  their  heavy  guns  must  have  been  compensated  by  the 
high  percentage  of  their  medium  and  light  guns.  Applying 
this  estimate  to  the  figures  given  for  purposes  of  comparison 
in  Table  XX.,  each  Chinese  ship  was  firing  32^8  shots  a  minute, 
with  3*28  hits,  each  Japanese  193*3  shots,  with  28*9  hits. 

The  slow  fire  of  the  Chinese  moderate-sized  guns  made 
strongly  against  good  shooting,  besides  placing  them  far 
behind  the  Japanese  in  the  weight  of  metal  thrown  in  a  given 
time.  With  a  moving  target,  the  shorter  the  period  that 
elapses  between  the  shots,  the  less  the  need  for  a  fresh 
adjustment  of  sights,  and  the  more  likely  the  shot  to  hit 
the  target.  Not  only  is  the  6-inch  quick-firer  a  longer,  a 
heavier,  and  a  more  powerful  gun  than  the  earlier  6-inch  or 
5*9-inch,  but  it  is  also  more  accurate.  One  man  does  the 
training  and  aiming,  having  the  weapon  completely  under 
his  control  ;  and  this,  of  course,  applies  with  still  more  force 

*  Captain  McGiffin  gives  the  Chinese  percentage  as  20,  and  the  Japanese 
as  12.    The  truth  lies  perhaps  rather  with  the  Japanese  estimate,  as  by  all 
accounts  the  upper  works  of  the  surviving  Chinese  ships  were  completely  riddled. 
Vol.  II.  H* 


U2B  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

to  the  47-inch  quick-firer.  The  rapidity  of  fire,  which  is  so 
startling  a  feature  in  these  weapons,  is  not,  perhaps,  of  so 
much  importance  as  the  excellent  mounting  of  the  gun. 
Yet,  of  course,  the  power  to  discharge  a  great  number  of  shells 
at  a  critical  moment  may  be  of  immense  value.  A  rough 
calculation  shows  that  the  whole  Chinese  fleet  could  fire  on  the 
broadside,  in  a  period  of  ten  minutes,  58,62olbs.  weight  of  pro- 
jectiles, whilst  the  ships  which  fought  in  the  line,  as  opposed 
to  the  inshore  squadron,  could  only  fire  53,ioolbs.  The 
weight  of  metal  discharged  in  the  same  period  by  the 
Japanese  was,  on  the  other  hand,  1 22, ozj-olbs.,  so  that  their 
artillery  preponderance  may  be  expressed  as  122  to  58,  or  as 
two  to  one."* 

The  structural  damage  inflicted  by  the  Chinese  fire  may  now 
be  considered.  Two  47-inch  guns  appear  to  have  been  the 
only  Japanese  weapons  hopelessly  disabled.  The  Matsushima, 
though  so  severely  hulled,  was  not  externally  much  the  worse. 
Indeed,  even  the  Hiyei  and  Akagi,  which  were  in  the  very 
hottest  of  the  fray,  carried  little  trace  of  the  Chinese  handi- 
work. The  Akagi  had  several  small  holes  in  her  starboard 
side,  and  her  funnel  was  riddled.  The  Hiyei  had  a  large  hole 
in  the  stern,  and  several  smaller  ones  in  her  sides.  The 
Naniwa  had  a  shell  in  her  coal  bunkers  on  the  level  of  the 
water-line.  The  Itsukushima  had  one  shell  in  her  torpedo- 
room,  another  in  her  engine-room,  and  a  third  some  way  up 
the  mast.  The  Hashidate'  sb&ibette  was  struck  by  a  5'0,-inch- 
shell.  The  Saikio  had  the  following  hits  distributed  about 
her  hull,  boats,  and  funnel:  12-inch  shell  four,  8-2-inch  one, 
5'9-inch  two,  47-inch  four,  6-pounder,  or  smaller,  ten.  It  is  an 
extraordinary  fact  that  such  a  vessel  could  take  so  much 
punishment.  The  8'2-inch  shell,  however,  was  within  ten  feet 
of  the  engine-room,  and,  had  it  struck,  it  must  have  disabled 
the  ship. 

Unlike  the  Chinese,  the  Japanese  had  obtained  the  very  best 
guns,  and  mounted  them  on  their  ships.    They  had  three  very 

*  Vide  Table  XX. 


THE    YALU    AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


1 1 2C 


heavy  Canets  of  12-inch  calibre,  but  these  guns  were 
unnecessarily  large  for  the  work  to  be  done.  On  the  proving 
ground  they  had  indicated  a  perforation  of  44-inches  of 
wrought  iron  ;  we  must,  therefore,  feel  exceedingly  doubtful 
whether  any  of  their  armour-piercing  projectiles  struck  the 
Chinese  battleships.*  Three  dents,  three  inches  deep,  are 
mentioned  in  the  Chinese  armour ;  these  must  have  been 
from  their  common  shell,  as  armour,  12  to  14-inches  thick, 
could  scarcely  resist  the  66-ton  armour-piercing  shot,  even  at 
2000  yards.  It  has  been  said  that  the  Japanese  were  bound 
to  mount  heavy  guns  in  their  fleet,  as  otherwise  the  Chinese 
ironclads  might,  early  in  the  action,  have  simulated  disable- 
ment, and  so  have  enticed  the  Japanese  unarmoured  cruisers 
to  close  quarters,  to  their  destruction. f  For  a  fleet,  which 
might  have  to  oppose  ironclads,  to  be  absolutely  destitute  of 
armour-piercing  guns,  could  not  be  expedient.  But,  whilst 
heavy  guns  were  a  necessity,  it  is  not  certain  that  the 
66-ton  gun  was  not  too  heavy,  and  that  a  pair  of  30-ton 
guns  would  not  have  been  as  efficient  a  deterrent  to  such 
tactics,  whilst  their  more  rapid  fire  would  have  rendered  them 
better  able  to  deal  with  unarmoured  ships.  A  shell  from  one  of 
the  66-ton  guns  is  said  to  have  struck  the  King  Yuen, 
perforating  her  armoured  deck,  and  wrecking  her  compart- 
ments so  hopelessly  that  she  foundered.  Another  may  have 
hit  the  Chih  Yuen,  and  produced  the  curious  explosion  noted 
by  on-lookers.  Yet,  there  seems  no  evidence  of  this.  The 
Ching  Yuen  is  stated  to  have  had  a  12-inch  shell  in  her 
bunkers  amidships,  but  not  to  have  been  injured. 

The  quick-firers  were  most  efficacious  and  deadly,  shattering 
the  structure  of  the  Chinese  ships  outside  their  armour,  and 

*  Captain  McGiffin  in  the  Century  states  that  the  Chen  Yuen  was  struck  by 
the  heavy  Japanese  projectiles.  But  on  examination,  after  her  capture,  no 
trace  of  hits  from  the  Canet  guns  could  be  found. 

f  This  would,  however,  have  exposed  the  Chinese  to  the  risk  of  being 
rammed  or  torpedoed  by  the  more  numerous  and  better  handled  Japanese 
ships. 


II2D 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


killing  or  wounding  all  on  their  decks.  The  Yang  Wei  was 
riddled  by  the  47-inch  shells  of  the  Japanese,  whilst  the  two 
heavy  battleships  had  each  about  200  shot  marks.  The  hail 
upon  them  is  described  as  most  terrible,  and  forward  and  aft 
they  were  full  of  holes,  whilst  their  superstructures  were 
reduced  to  a  tangle  of  ironwork  and  splinters.  Yet,  in  all,  on 
the  Chinese  ships,  which  survived,  only  three  guns  were 
dismounted.  The  Yoshino  fired  cordite,  which  performed 
admirably,  enabling  her  gunners  to  shoot  with  great  accuracy, 
owing  to  the  absence  of  smoke.  It  does  not  appear  that  this 
explosive  was  used  on  board  the  other  ships.  Even  if  the 
practice  of  the  Japanese  was  not  so  good  as  that  of  the 
Chinese,  when  we  remember  the  far  greater  number  of  shot 
and  shell  which  the  former  were  projecting,  we  get  at  once 
one  explanation  of  their  success.  The  empty  cartridge  cases, 
from  the  Japanese  quick-firers,  were  got  rid  of,  by  pitching 
them  down  the  hatchways. 

In  the  matter  of  size  and  speed  the  Japanese  had  the 
advantage.  The  Chinese  had,  indeed,  two  large  battleships, 
but  their  other  vessels  were  small  and  weak,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  Elswick  cruisers.  The  slowest  Chinese  ship  in  line 
was  the  Chen  Yuen,  whose  speed  from  the  state  of  her  boilers 
could  not  have  exceeded  twelve  knots.  The  average  tonnage 
of  their  twelve  larger  ships  in  company  was  2950  tons.  The 
Japanese  had  no  vessels  of  the  size  of  the  Chen  Yuen  or  Ting 
Yuen,  but  their  ships  were  more  nearly  even  in  displacement, 
and,  excluding  the  Saikio  and  the  gunboat,  had  an  average 
tonnage  of  3575.*  The  slowest  ship  with  their  fleet  was  the 
Akagi,  which  could  not  do  over  ten  knots,  and  the  Fusoo, 
Saikio,  and  Hiyei,  were  little  better.  The  rest  of  the  fleet 
was  both  fast  and  homogeneous,  with  an  effective  speed  of 
about  fifteen  knots.  It  is  doubtful  whether  anything  whatever 
was  gained  by  bringing  the  slow  vessels  into  line.  The 
Japanese  cruisers  could  have  manoeuvred  with  more  freedom, 


*  Vide  Table  XX. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS    LESSOXS.  113 

and  would  have  been  stronger  in  fact,  if  not  in  appearance, 
had  they  eliminated  their  obsolete  and  improvised  ships.  It  is 
interesting  to  notice  that  of  the  four  slow  ships,  three  were 
greatly  damaged,  and  two  lost  very  heavily.  On  the  other 
hand  the  Fusoo  kept  her  station  with  the  Alain  Squadron, 
though  at  her  best  she  was  only  a  thirteen  knot  ship. 

The  number  of  fires  which  occurred  on  board  the  ships  of 
both  combatants  is  a  striking  feature  of  the  battle.  The  Lai 
Yuen  was  so  severely  burnt  that  nothing  but  her  ironwork 
remained  above  the  waterline  ;  the  King  Yuen,  her  sister 
ship,  was  seen  to  be  blazing  before  she  was  sent  to  the  bottom  ; 
the  Ting  Yuen  was  on  fire  three  times,  and  it  was  only 
through  the  courage  of  her  foreign  officers  that  the  fires  were 
got  under ;  the  same  might  be  said  of  the  Chen  Yuen,  which 
had  eight  fires  ;  the  Ching  Yuen  was  on  fire  three  times,  but 
owing  to  her  powerful  pumps  and  the  discipline  of  her  crew 
got  the  flames  under ;  the  Yang  Wei,  Tshao  Yong,  and 
Kwang  Kai,  were  all  on  fire  at  least  once.  This  makes  a 
total  of  eight  ships,  and  nineteen  fires,  out  of  ten  ships  seriously 
engaged.  The  Japanese,  on  their  part,  suffered  somewhat 
from  fire,  though  not  so  seriously  as  the  Chinese.  Doubtless 
their  ships  were  in  better  order,  and  discipline  on  board  them 
was  more  thoroughly  maintained.  It  is  also  probable  that 
less  wood  was  used  in  the  construction  of  their  vessels.  It 
does  not  appear  that  any  high  explosive  was  employed  as  a 
"  burster "  on  either  side,  though  it  has  been  stated  by 
Japanese  officers  that  they  had  melinite,  and  used  it  in  some 
of  their  shells.  The  fires  seem  to  have  been  the  effect  of 
gunpowder  alone. 

It  had  been  widely  prophesied  that  machine-handled  guns 
would  break  down  under  the  stress  of  war.  This  forecast 
has  not  been  altogether  justified.  In  all,  there  were  nineteen 
such  guns  mounted  in  the  ships  which  were  seriously  engaged. 
One  Canet  gun  of  three  was  temporarily  put  out  of  action  ; 
one  of  the  eight  12-inch  Krupps  on  board  the  two  Chinese 
battleships  was  not  in  working  order  at  the  close  of  the  battle  ; 

Vol.  II  1 


H4  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

and  four  others  were  temporarily  disabled  through  causes 
which  we  do  not  know.  This,  if  not  a  good  record  in  itself  , 
is  by  no  means  so  bad  a  one  as  the  opponents  of  the  heavy 
gun  would  have  led  us  to  anticipate. 

From  the  tactical  point  of  view,  there  are  two  very 
astonishing  features  in  this  battle.  Neither  the  ram  nor  the 
torpedo  scored  a  single  success.  The  explanation  of  this,  is 
that  the  Japanese,  with  their  superior  speed,  and  the  mobility 
which  obedience  to  signals  conferred  upon  them,  deliberately 
decided  against  both  these  arms — arms  which  are  as  deadly  as 
they  are  uncertain.  To  use  the  ram,  ships  must  come  to  very 
close  quarters,  and,  as  during  the  battle,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
the  Japanese  kept  at  a  distance  of  over  2000  yards,  it  was 
obviously  impossible  for  the  Chinese  to  ram.  The  Chih  Yuen 
made  an  attempt,  and  was  thought  to  have  succeeded  ;  but  it 
was  the  King  Yuen  which  was  seen  sinking,  and  not  a 
Japanese  ship.  The  torpedo  was  still  more  useless.  The 
Chinese  ships  engaged  carried  forty-four  tubes  ;  the  Japanese, 
thirty-two.  These,  with  their  accompanying  supply  of 
torpedoes,  were  so  much  dead  weight,  conveyed  to  no  purpose, 
except  to  endanger  the  ships  which  conveyed  it.  It  would 
have  been  more  profitable  for  both  sides  to  have  devoted  the 
space  and  weight  thus  absorbed  to  guns  or  ammunition.  The 
Chinese  torpedoists  were  only  too  eager  to  get  rid  of  their 
above-water  torpedoes,  when  the  hail  of  projectiles  began  to 
descend  upon  their  ships.  They  had  gone  into  action  with 
torpedoes  in  the  tubes,  and  others  charged,  ready  on  deck  to 
reload.  On  the  Chen  Yuen,  all  these  were  hastily  discharged 
when  she  came  under  the  fire  of  the  Japanese,  and  hardly  had 
this  been  done,  when  the  stern  tube  was  struck  by  a  shell.* 
On  the  Ching  Yuen,  the  same  course  was  followed,  and  it  is 
probable  that  the  other  Chinese  ships  took  steps  to  get  rid  of 
these  truly  remarkable  weapons.    Some  were  set  to  sink  on 

*  Captain  McGiffin,  however,  denies  that  on  the  Chen  Yuen  the  torpedoes 
were  discharged  merely  to  get  rid  of  them,  and  asserts  that  they  were  used 
against  the  Japanese,  probably  against  the  Hiyei. 


1 894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS   LESSONS.  115 

being  discharged,  but  not  all ;  and  thus  there  must  have  been 
a  certain  number  of  live  torpedoes  floating  about  in  the  water. 
The  question  suggests  itself :  Did  the  Chih  Yuen  strike  one  of 
these,  or  was  a  torpedo  in  one  of  her  tubes  exploded  by  a 
Japanese  shell  ?  In  her  case,  it  will  be  remembered,  there  was 
an  explosion,  as  if  of  a  torpedo,  just  before  she  sank.  There  are 
no  means  of  answering  the  question,  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  in  future,  captains  will  be  very  careful  what  they  do 
with  their  torpedoes.  The  torpedo-boats  which  were  present 
with  the  Chinese,  effected  nothing  during  the  action.  They 
did  not  dash  into  the  battle  under  cover  of  the  smoke  and 
uproar,  and  fall  upon  their  enemies,  as  had  been  prophesied. 
The  engines  of  one  went  wrong,  and  a  second  missed  at  the 
closest  quarters,  three  times.  Yet  this  boat,  though  some 
minutes  under  fire,  received  from  the  Japanese  not  the  slightest 
damage.  At  the  close  of  the  day,  however,  the  torpedo- 
boat  did  exercise  some  influence  on  the  tactics  of  the  Japanese  ; 
since  the  mere  possibility  of  a  night  attack  upon  his  worn  and 
tired  crews,  decided  Ito  against  a  close  pursuit.  He  stood 
badly  in  need  of  destroyers,  or  fast  torpedo  gunboats,  to 
make  an  end  of  the  hostile  boats  before  dusk  came  on.  Thus, 
if  the  torpedo  proved  ineffective  in  the  battle,  the  influence  of 
the  torpedo  menace  after  the  engagement,  must  yet  be 
acknowledged. 

The  collision  of  the  Tsi  Yuen  and  Yang  Wei,  recalls  the 
fact  that  there  were  similar  accidents  at  Lissa  on  the  Italian 
side,  though  in  no  case  was  a  ship  sunk.  Whenever  the 
vessels  of  a  fleet  are  fighting  independently,  it  would  seem  that 
this  is  a  real  danger.  The  duration  of  the  battle  wras  four-and- 
a-half  hours,  from  12.30  to  5  p.m.,  but  towards  the  close  of 
the  action  the  fire  maintained  on  both  sides  was  very  desultory. 
Trafalgar  and  the  First  of  June  both  lasted  about  five  hours, 
and  St.  Vincent  five  hours-and-a-half.  Lissa  was  over  in 
less  than  three  hours. 

From  the  battle  the  most  varied  and  contradictory  deduc- 
tions have  been  drawn.     Indeed,  each  naval  expert  would 

I  2 


n6  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

seem  to  obtain  from  it  confirmation  of  his  own  particular 
fancies.  Let  us,  however,  pass  in  review  the  different  lessons 
and  consider  how  far  they  are  really  supported  by  the  evidence 
we  possess.  Full  and  accurate  details  of  the  injuries  inflicted 
on  the  Japanese  ships  are  not  at  present  accessible,  but  doubt- 
less when  the  official  history  of  the  war  is  published  by  the 
Imperial  Government,  much  new  light  will  be  thrown  upon 
the  battle.  And  before  we  proceed  to  consider  the  lessons, 
let  us  ask  how  far  any  of  them  would  be  applicable  to  a 
Western  engagement — a  battle,  say,  between  the  French  and 
English  Mediterranean  fleets.  The  first  point  to  emphasise 
is  that  no  large  battleship  of  modern  construction  fought  at 
the  Yalu.  Between  the  Royal  Sovereign,  of  14,150  tons,  or 
the  Brennus,  of  11,000,  and  the  Chen  Yuen,  of  7430,  the  gap 
is  immense,  both  in  defensive  and  offensive  power.  The 
Chen  Yuen  represented  obsolete  naval  theories — the  sacrifice 
of  broadside  to  end-on  fire,  and  the  enormous  preponderance 
of  the  heavy  over  the  auxiliary  armament.  She  was  at  least 
four  knots  slower  than  either  of  the  two  ships  named.  It 
is  not  fair,  then,  to  regard  her  as  the  type  of  the  modern  battle- 
ship, which  carries  heavy  guns  firing  with  twice  the  rapidity 
of  her  12-inch  Krupps,  and  a  large  complement  of  the  most 
powerful  quick-firers  into  the  bargain.  Secondly,  the  average 
size  of  ships  in  the  line-of-battle  in  a  Western  engagement 
would  be  much  greater  than  it  was  at  the  Yalu.  Taking  iron- 
clads and  large  cruisers,  as  opposed  to  scouts,  the  average  dis- 
placement of  the  British  Mediterranean  fleet  is  10,000  tons, 
the  average  of  the  French  Evolutionary  Squadron  9500.  The 
British  average  is  thus  nearly  three  times  that  of  the  Japanese 
fleet,  at  the  Yalu.  With  these  increased  displacements  come 
increased  sub-division,  increased  protection,  increased  arma- 
ments, increased  steadiness,  and  therefore  better  shooting, 
whilst  there  is  for  practical  purposes  no  difference  in  speed 
between  the  two  rival  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean,  England 
having,  perhaps,  a  very  slight  advantage  here  over  France. 
It  is  obvious  that  their  greater  size  would  render  these  ships 


1894]  THE    YALU    AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


117 


less  likely  to  be  sunk  by  gun-fire,  but  it  would  at  the  same 
time  conduce  to  a  desire  to  employ  the  torpedo-boat,  since  the 
blow  dealt  to  an  opponent  by  the  destruction  of  such  large 
vessels  would  be  a  very  serious  one.  Thirdly,  the  inequality 
in  training,  the  lack  of  a  courageous,  well-disciplined,  and 
thoroughly  efficient  personnel,  which  so  handicapped  the 
Chinese,  would  be  found  on  neither  side.  Both  England  and 
France  have  reduced  naval  training  to  a  fine  art,  and  it  is  im- 
possible to  say  to-day  which  has  the  better  men.  Probably 
both  are  equally  good.  Fourthly,  an  engagement  would  not 
be  likely  to  be  fought  at  long  ranges  with  the  gun  only,  with- 
out some  attempt,  and  perhaps  very  determined  attempts  on 
the  part  of  the  weaker  side  to  come  to  close  quarters,  and 
bring  on  a  general  melee,  in  which  the  weaker  cannot  lose. 
There  would  on  neither  side  be  any  motive  to  spare  the  enemy's 
battleships.  Each  would  endeavour  to  sink  and  spare  not. 
Fifthly,  without  doing  any  injustice  to  either  Japanese  or 
Chinese,  it  may  be  prophesied  that  the  gunnery  in  a  Western 
engagement  would  be  better,  and  that  more  hits  at  the  same 
ranges  and  with  the  same  number  of  projectiles  would  be 
inflicted.  Thus  the  damage  done  would  probably  be  far 
greater. 

We  will  now  review  the  deductions  which  have  been  made. 
In  the  first  place,  as  regards  strategy  and  tactics,  we  are  told 
with  varying  truth,  that,  since  the  value  of  line  ahead,  and  the 
weakness  of  line  abreast,  were  foretold,  naval  tactics  have 
been  demonstrated  to  be  an  exact  science  ;  that  steam  has 
not  vitally  affected  tactics  nor  strategy  ;  that  line  ahead  is  the 
one  formation  for  battle  ;  that  on  sea,  as  on  land,  increased 
rapidity  of  fire  has  necessitated  open  order ;  and  that  it  has 
been  proved  that  the  tumult  and  confusion  of  the  encounter 
do  not  prevent  fleets  from  acting  coherently  and  obeying 
signal.  First,  as  to  line  ahead ;  the  only  authority  who  has 
found  fault  with  the  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese, 
is  the  Italian  Admiral  di  Amezega.  His  opinion  is  that  the 
Japanese  ideas  of  strategy  and  tactics  were  based  on  the  days 


n8 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


[1894 


of  sailing  ships,  and  that  their  operations  have  taught  us 
little.  He  holds  that  the  group  system  is  the  ideal  one,  and 
that  the  Japanese  should  have  linked  their  vessels  in 
"  homogeneous  groups,  which  should  have  entered  action  in 
succession,  pouring  in  their  fire."  The  criticism  is  not  very 
clearly  expressed,  and  it  is  difficult  to  discover  any  particular 
point  in  it.  Yet  line  abreast  cannot  be  said  to  have  been 
fairly  tested  at  the  Yalu  ;  had  Ting  made  his  wings  strong, 
and  manoeuvred  his  fleet  together,  keeping  bows  on — a 
difficult,  but  not  impossible,  evolution — the  condemnation  of 
this  formation  might  not  have  been  so  vehement.  It  cannot 
be  maintained  that  it  lost  him  the  battle;  it  was  only  one, 
and  apparently  a  minor  one,  of  numerous  causes,  amongst 
which  were  bad  ships,  bad  guns,  bad  officers.  His  heavy 
ironclads  more  or  less  compelled  him,  by  their  structural 
peculiarities,  to  fight  in  line  abreast.  To  blame  them,  is 
only  to  find  fault  with  the  past.  And  when  line  ahead  is 
pronounced  the  only  battle  formation,  and  it  is  unhesitatingly 
laid  down  that  for  battle  in  line  ahead  alone  must  ships  be 
constructed,  we  may  be  allowed  a  protest.  For  how  do  we 
know  that  the  enemy  will  not  decide  to  fight  a  stern  battle, 
if  we  leave  our  bow-fire  weak  ?  In  that  case,  of  course,  a 
chase  formation,  or  line  abreast  becomes  necessary.  And  the 
peril  incurred  by  the  rearward  Japanese  ships  is  noticeable.* 
The  line  ahead  defiling  past  the  line  abreast,  runs  the  risk  of 
the  wing  of  the  line  abreast  being  projected,  so  as  to  cut  off 
the  rearward  ships.  The  Chinese  movement  was  not  well 
executed,  but  with  capable  gunners  and  good  captains  against 
them,  the  Japanese  would  indisputably  have  lost  the  Hiyei, 
Saikio,  and  Akagi.  On  the  whole,  however,  we  may 
endorse  the  value  of  line  ahead.  If  it  is  not  strong  at  all 
points,  what  formation  is  better  ?  Only  both  van  and  rear 
should  contain  very  powerful  ships,  a  truth  which  the  Japanese 
forgot. 

*  Admiral  Ito's  original  plan  is  said  to  have  been  an  attack  upon  the  Chinese 
left ;  the  attack  on  the  right  is  ascribed  to  a  mistake. 


1 894]  THE    YALU   AXD    ITS    LESSONS.  119 

The  Japanese  made  full  use  of  signals  under  fire.  It  is 
most  important  to  know  that  signalling  is  possible  in  battle, 
but  with  good  gunnery  on  both  sides,  we  may  be  permitted  to 
doubt  whether  much  could  remain  of  signalmen,  who  are 
generally  very  much  exposed,  or  of  signalling  gear,  after  a  very 
few  minutes.  The  Japanese  shot  away  halyards  and  masts, 
and  if  they  did  not  suffer  the  loss  of  their  own  gear,  this  was 
due  to  their  enemy's  indifferent  marksmanship.  We  should 
be  very  rash  to  conclude  that  it  will  be  possible  to  communi- 
cate orders  in  a  Western  engagement,  after  the  battle  is  fairly 
joined. 

The  strategy  of  both  sides  is  certainly  against  the  view  of 
the  Jeune  Ecole  that  steam  has  changed  conditions  and 
replaced  the  warfare  of  squadrons  by  such  old  substitutes, 
under  new-fangled  names,  as  the  guerre  des  cotes,  and  the 
guerre  de  course.  Neither  Chinese  nor  Japanese  fleet  attempted 
the  one  or  the  other.  Ting  might  have  given  us  a  great  deal 
of  information  had  he  been  obliging  enough  to  detach  his  only 
two  fast  ships,  the  Chih  Yuen  and  the  Ching  Yuen  to 
bombard  Japanese  ports,  and  interrupt  the  Japanese  lines  of 
communication.  The  Japanese,  during  this  part  of  the  war, 
obeyed  the  old  principles  of  strategy,  husbanded  their 
resources,  and  only  used  their  ships  against  ships. 

Turning  now  to  details  of  structure  and  tactics,  it  has  been 
in  one  and  the  same  breath  maintained,  that  the  Yalu  has 
proved  the  necessity  of  vertical  armour;  that  it  has  shown  that 
the  unarmoured  ship  can  face  and  defeat  the  ironclad.  The 
latter  is  the  deduction  of  the  Jeune  Ecole,  and  will  not  be  found 
to  bear  inspection.  Doubtless  the  Japanese  fleet  was,  for  all 
practical  purposes,  an  unarmoured  one,  whilst  the  Chinese 
included  two  well-armoured  ships.  But  the  real  test,  which 
enables  us  to  discriminate  between  the  resistance  of  armoured 
and  unarmoured  ships,  is  given  by  the  behaviour  of  these  two 
different  classes  in  the  Chinese  fleet,  where  both  cruiser 
and  ironclad  had  to  withstand  a  hail  of  6-inch  and 
4'7-inch  shells,    with  an    occasional    shot    from   a  heavier 


120  IRONCLADS    IN    ACTION.  [1894 

gun.  The  two  Chinese  ironclads  came  out  of  the 
encounter  much  battered,  but  still  battle-worthy.  Their  stout 
plating  stood  them  in  good  stead.  They  could  still  manoeuvre 
and  fight  their  guns,  whilst  the  loss  of  life  on  board  them  was 
small  considering  the  vehemence  of  the  attack  delivered  upon 
them.  Far  different  was  it  with  the  unarmoured  ships,  in 
which  class  virtually  fall  the  King  Yuen  and  her  sister,  the 
Lai  Yuen,  with  their  very  short  belts  below  the  water-line. 
Of  the  eight  in  line,  two  fled  before  they  had  been  punished ; 
one  withdrew  on  fire;  one  was  sunk  by  collision,  and  three 
were  sunk  or  hopelessly  damaged  by  the  Japanese  fire.  One 
only  fought  through  the  battle  and  survived  it  without  serious 
injury.  Both  the  Chih  Yuen  and  King  Yuen  had  end-to-end 
decks  which  did  not  save  them.  It  may  have  been  that  their 
hatches  and  water-tight  doors  below  were  not  closed,  or,  to 
give  yet  another  hypothesis  for  their  loss,  that  the  water  poured 
through  the  breaches  in  their  sides  and  collected  upon  their 
armour  decks  till  they  capsized,  because,  as  they  rolled,  the 
great  weight  of  water  rushed  to  one  side  and  destroyed  their 
righting  power.  We  know  the  sea  was  rough.  Yet,  though 
all  this  damage  was  done,  a  good  many  of  the  Japanese  shells 
failed  to  explode,  even  when  they  struck  armour.  With  high 
explosives  the  ravages  might  have  been  much  more  frightful. 
On  the  other  hand,  owing  to  the  Chinese  lack  of  common 
shell,  the  Japanese  ships  were  not  fairly  tested.  Armour- 
piercing  projectiles  would  only  pass  through  both  sides  of 
unarmoured  vessels  without  scattering  fragments  or  splinters, 
and  it  is  the  bursting  of  a  shell,  rather  than  the  perforation 
of  a  shot,  which  does  the  damage.  The  long  range,  at  which 
the  action  was  fought  must  also  be  taken  into  account,  and 
the  fact  that  at  five  in  the  evening,  after  four-and-a-half  hours 
incessant  fighting,  the  two  ironclads  were  as  formidable  as 
ever,  whereas  the  Matsushima  had  suffered  terribly  and  was 
out  of  action.  Three  of  the  Japanese  cruisers  carried  heavier 
guns  than  are  found  on  board  any  European  vessel  of  their 
type — approximating,  indeed,  to  the  great  Italian  battleships — 


THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSOXS. 


121 


and  they  had  armour  on  their  heavy  gun  positions.  They  would, 
as  we  have  seen,  have  done  better  with  smaller  guns,  or  perhaps 
with  one  smaller  gun,  and  plating  on  their  47-inch  battery. 

So  far  then  from  demonstrating  the  superiority  of  the 
unarmoured  ship,  the  Yalu  has  shown  that  armour  is  necessary 
for  ships  which  are  to  lie  in  the  line-of-battle.  As  at 
Alexandria,  it  was  proved  that  under  practical  conditions  the 
resistance  of  plating  is  far  greater  than  would  be  imagined 
after  experiments  on  the  proving  ground.  A  large  extent  of 
surface  protected  by  a  moderate  thickness  of  steel  will  be 
best — such  as  we  find  in  the  design  of  the  Majestic.  It  will 
save  human  life  and  it  will  make  the  ship  very  hard  to  sink. 
And  it  seems  a  matter  of  the  utmost  importance  to  protect 
the  powerful  guns  with  armour — whether  on  board  cruiser  or 
battleship.  Indeed,  one  gun  behind  six  inches  of  steel  is 
worth  two  without  any  protection.  Farragut's  maxim  that 
a  powerful  fire  is  the  best  protection  is  admirable,  but  can  be 
pushed  too  far.*  Of  the  weakly  protected  6-inch  guns  on  the 
Chen  Yuen  and  Ting  Yuen  one  was  hit,  and  all  the  crew 
would  have  been  killed,  had  not  a  previous  accident  led  to  the 
disablement  of  the  weapon  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  men. 
They  were,  too,  placed  at  the  extremities  of  the  ships,  so  that 
the  Japanese  gunners  could  not  be  likely  to  aim  at  them,  since 
the  range  was  great,  but  rather  at  the  centre  of  the  hull. 

The  heavy  guns  would  probably  have  been  disabled,  judging 
from  the  number  of  hits  on  the  armour  round  them,  had  they 
been  unprotected  as  on  our  cruisers.  Water-line  hits  appear 
to  have  been  very  few,  a  fact  which  has  an  important  bearing 
on  the  question  of  unarmoured  ends.  Both  the  Chinese 
ironclads  had  only  a  citadel  amidships,  which  did  not  extend 
over  half  the  ships'  length.  Forward  their  unprotected  ends 
were  exposed  to  the  tornado  of  projectiles,  and  were  hit 
without  the  ships  suffering  much.    This  may  be  held  to  point 

*  Farragut  himself  recognised  the  value  of  armour.  He  did  not  attack  at 
Mobile  till  ironclads  had  been  sent  to  him,  and  indeed  delayed  expressly  to  wait 
for  them.    i.  119-20. 


122  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

to  the  uselessness  of  armour,  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  vitals  were  strongly  protected,  and  that  shot  or  shell 
could  not  reach  the  engine-room  or  boilers.  Their  athwart- 
ship  bulkheads,  too,  prevented  shells  from  raking  them.. 
Whilst  the  armoured  citadel  thus  served  a  useful  purpose,  we 
cannot  doubt  that  the  complete  belt  is  the  best  and  most 
efficient  means  of  water-line  protection.  It  need  not  be 
broad  forward  and  aft,  but  should  just  cover  the  space 
between  wind  and  water  in  fine  weather.  Had  the  two  fleets 
come  to  close  quarters  the  damage  to  unarmoured  ends  might 
have  been  very  great.  There  is  no  record  of  hits  below  the 
water-line. 

The  experience  of  the  Ting  Yuen,  where  all  four  heavy  guns 
placed  close  together  were  temporarily  disabled,  is  strongly 
against  concentration  of  armaments.  The  more  the  guns 
are  dispersed  the  better,  and  perhaps  in  time  we  may  see 
introduced  on  English  battleships  the  lozenge-wise  disposition 
of  heavy  guns,  so  long  adhered  to  and  so  late  abandoned  by 
the  French.  We  have  fully  recognised  the  importance  of 
dispersing  the  auxiliary  armament,  placing,  as  we  now  do, 
each  gun  in  a  separate  casemate.  Though  the  heavy  guns 
on  our  ships  have  the  advantage  of  thick  armour,  it  might  be 
wise  to  reduce  the  thickness  on  the  barbettes,  whilst  increasing 
the  number  of  barbettes.  Another  important  point  to  note 
is  the  danger  of  placing  torpedo-tubes  above  the  water-line. 
With  quick-firers  the  risk  of  this  has  become  so  great  that 
henceforward  all  tubes  in  cruisers  and  battleships  must  be 
submerged.  The  sooner  the  above-water  tubes  on  our  com- 
pleted vessels  are  removed  the  better ;  they  are  mere  lumber, 
except  in  the  few  cases  where  they  are  protected  by  armour. 
No  wise  captain  would  employ  them  in  action.  Again,  wood 
should  never  be  employed  above  the  water-line,  owing  to  the 
risk  of  fire,  which  is  great  when  gunpowder  is  used  as  a 
burster,  and  perhaps  even  greater  with  melinite.  The  sub- 
stitutes are  metal,  papier-mache,  or  linoleum,  the  latter  being 
very  largely  employed  between  decks  on  modern  French  vessels. 


THE    YALU    AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


123 


It  is  somewhat  disquieting  to  notice  that  the  weight  of  wood  em- 
ployed on  board  the  Majestic  is  as  great  as  that  on  board  the 
earlier  and  older  Royal  Sovereign,  Further,  wooden  companion 
ladders,  and  perhaps  wooden  boats,  should  be  replaced  by  iron. 

Tactically  it  is  argued  that  the  gun  is  now  supreme  in  the 
contest  between  the  gun,  the  ram,  and  the  torpedo.  We  have 
already  seen  that  there  was  a  special  circumstance  which 
would  hinder  the  Japanese  from  using  either  ram  or  torpedo 
in  the  later  stage  of  the  battle,  this  circumstance  being  the 
wish  to  capture  the  heavy  battleships.  Hasty  deductions  must 
therefore  be  avoided.  The  newest  type  of  torpedo-boat  was 
present  with  neither  fleet,  though,  according  to  a  European 
officer  on  one  of  the  Chinese  ships,  there  were  whole  minutes 
when  he  could  see  nothing  owing  to  the  smoke,  and  when  a 
torpedo  attack  must  have  succeeded.  The  Japanese  were 
undoubtedly  in  the  same  case.  The  torpedo-boat,  from 
its  small  size,  can  steam  under  the  shelter  of  the  battle-ship, 
only  emerging  at  the  critical  moment,  and  is  particularly 
dangerous  in  battle.  The  gun  has  always  been  the  most 
important  weapon,  and  such  it  still  remains,  but  it  is  not 
everything.  There  is  the  fullest  evidence  that  very  great 
attention  to  gunnery  will  be  amply  repaid  on  the  scene  of 
action,  and  that,  with  the  possibility  of  an  engagement  fought 
at  high  speed,  the  gunner  should  be  trained  in  peace  by 
firing  at  targets  from  rapidly  moving  ships  at  sea.  He  must 
be  taught  to  husband  his  ammunition,  and  not  to  waste  a  shot, 
although  it  is  so  very  easy  to  load  and  fire  the  quick-firer. 
And  great  care  should  be  taken,  not  only  to  have  an  ample 
supply  of  ammunition  with  the  fleet,  but  also  to  see  that  every 
ship  is  well  provided  with  the  various  descriptions  of  ammuni- 
tion which  may  be  needed — common  shell,  armour-piercing 
shot,  and  shrapnel. 

As  to  speed,  it  has  been  concluded  that  the  Japanese  owed 
nothing  of  their  success  to  it,  and  also  that  they  entirely 
owed  their  success  to  it.  Which  view  is  right  ?  Speed,  we 
know,  is  a  strategical  factor  of  the  utmost  importance.    Is  it 


124  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1894 

also  a  tactical  factor  ?  We  may  recall  the  fact  that  the  slowest 
ship  of  Admiral  Ito's  squadron  was  slower  than  Admiral 
Ting's  slowest,  but  the  Flying  Squadron,  which  fought  and 
manoeuvred  quite  independently  of  these  slow  ships,  was  able 
to  use  its  speed.  This  speed  enabled  it  to  double,  and  arrive 
in  time  to  support  the  hard  pressed  rear  of  the  Main  Squadron, 
thereby  undoubtedly  contributing  to  the  Japanese  success.* 
The  Japanese  slow  ships,  with  the  exception  of  the  Fusoo, 
were  out  of  action  quite  early,  because  they  could  not  avoid 
coming  to  close  quarters  with  the  Chinese,  when,  being  feeble 
ships  at  the  best,  they  were  overpowered.  But  for  the  Chinese 
to  endeavour  to  ram  or  torpedo  the  Flying  Squadron  was 
hopeless,  and  in  the  Main  Squadron,  at  the  close  of  the  battle, 
there  was  only  one  vessel  which  they  could  catch.  And  if 
their  slow  ships,  without  a  round  of  shell,  had  endeavoured 
to  fall  upon  the  Fusoo,  the  speed  of  the  Japanese  would  have 
enabled  them  to  concentrate  round  these  assailants,  and, 
having  more  numerous  and  faster  vessels,  to  ram  or  use  the 
torpedo.  For  under  no  circumstances,  given  sea-room,  can  the 
fast  ship  be  rammed  by  the  slow,  whilst  the  slow  is  always 
exposed  to  the  ram  of  the  fast.  This  may  at  the  bottom  have 
been  the  circumstance  which  deterred  the  Chinese  from  closing 
in  the  final  phase  of  the  battle.  Therefore  speed  had  a  very  real 
influence  on  the  engagement,  giving  the  Japanese  an  advantage 
comparable  to  the  possession  of  the  weather  gauge. 

As  for  guns,  the  heavy  quick-firers  of  6-inch  and  4'7-inch 
calibre  were  irresistible  when  pitted  against  slow-firers  of 
their  own  size,  nor  was  any  difficulty  in  supplying  ammunition 
fast  enough  experienced.  It  has  been  concluded  that  an 
armament  of  numerous,  moderate-sized  guns  is  best,  and  that 
the  heavy  gun  is  played  out.  If  the  moderate-sized  gun  be  of 
about  8-inch  or  10-inch  calibre,  with  good  penetration,  we 

*  The  loss  of  life  on  board  the  ships  composing  the  Flying  Squadron  was  less 
than  on  those  of  the  Main  Squadron.  The  former  steamed  14  knots,  the  latter 
10.  Undoubtedly  the  high  speed  of  the  Flying  Squadron  rendered  it  hard  to 
hit,  and  acted  as  a  protection. 


1894]  THE    YALU   AND    ITS  LESSONS. 


125 


may  agree,  but  for  the  attack  upon  the  newer  type  of  battle- 
ships, which  carry  a  considerable  amount  of  armour  sufficiently 
thick  to  resist  the  shells  of  the  quick-firer,  heavy  guns  are  still 
necessary.  The  smaller  quick-firers  and  machine-guns  appear 
to  have  only  inflicted  trifling  damage,  though  firing  from  the 
tops  at  close  quarters  they  might  be  found  useful.  Rifle-fire 
is  not  mentioned  as  causing  any  loss,  and  we  may  conclude 
that  the  days  of  small-arms  at  sea  are  over. 

Lastly,  in  the  opinion  of  all,  training  and  discipline  are  shown 
to  be  indispensable  if  victory  is  to  be  secured.  However  good 
are  the  guns  and  the  ships,  they  will  be  well-nigh  useless  if  the 
officers  and  men  who  are  working  them  are  not  thoroughly  ac- 
quainted with  their  business,  if  gunners  cannot  shoot  straight, 
if  officers  do  not  handle  their  ships  with  skill.  A  well-trained 
personnel  \s  the  first  requisite,  if  an  efficient  navy  is  tobe  created. 
Constant  manoeuvring  and  target  practice  at  sea,  expensive 
though  they  may  be,  are  the  one  royal  road  to  success. 

Having  reviewed  the  various  deductions,  we  see  that,  with  the 
exception  of  the  danger  of  fire,  the  Yalu  has  done  nothing  but 
emphasise  principles  already  known  and  understood.  Its 
teaching  is  in  no  way  revolutionary,  but  tends  strongly  to 
confirm  the  argument  of  those  who  hold  that  naval  science  is 
an  exact  science,  and  that  its  issues  can  be  predicted.  On 
the  points  where  we  most  want  practical  information,  such  as 
the  true  place  of  torpedo-boats  in  a  fleet  action,  or  the 
possibilities  of  ramming,  it  yields  no  light. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


Naval  Operations  at  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-wei. 

October,  1894,  to  February,  1895. 

DEFEATED  at  the  Yalu,  the  Chinese  fleet  was  seen  no  more  at 
sea.  It  retired  to  Port  Arthur  much  crippled  and  battered, 
and  was  refitted  in  a  leisurely  manner.  The  Japanese  fleet  kept 
the  sea,  and  all  the  ships,  except  the  Matsushima,  Hiyei, 
Akagi,  and  Saikio,  effected  their  repairs  without  having 
recourse  to  port.  Admiral  Ito,  in  the  weeks  which  followed 
the  battle,  was  chiefly  engaged  in  convoying  transports,  paying 
no  attention  whatever  to  the  Chinese.  On  October  24th  a 
Japanese  army  disembarked  near  Port  Arthur,  and  the  attack 
on  that  place  began.  Admiral  Ting  had  before  this,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  withdrawn  to  Wei-hai-wei,  where  he 
remained  till  the  last  act  of  the  war  was  concluded.  As  soon 
as  Admiral  Ito  had  accomplished  his  transport  work,  he 
steamed  to  Wei-hai-wei,  and  offered  battle  to  the  Chinese. 
Their  fleet  included  the  Ting  Yuen,  Ching  Yuen,  Tsi 
Yuen,  Ping  Yuen,  and  the  Kwang  Ping,  a  small  revenue 
cruiser.  There  were  also  in  harbour :  the  Chen  Yuen, 
which  had  run  on  a  reef  whilst  entering  the  harbour,  and 
was  therefore  temporarily  disabled ;  the  belted  cruiser  Lai 
Yuen,  which  had  not  been  repaired  since  the  Yalu ;  the 
Kwang  Tsi,  which  was  unarmed ;  six  Rendel  gunboats,  and 
fourteen  torpedo-boats.  The  Chinese  showing  no  inclination 
to  come  out,  Admiral  Ito  returned  to  Port  Arthur,  where 
he  supported  the  land  attacks  of  the  army  on  November  20th 
and  2 1  st. 


1894J  PORT   ARTHUR    AND    WEI-HAI-WEL  127 

On  November  21st  the  Japanese  ships  shelled  the  forts  at 
long  range,  doing  very  little  damage,  and  the  Chinese  spas- 
modically replied,  without,  however,  securing  a  single  hit. 
At  four  in  the  afternoon  the  fleet  was  six  miles  from  the  forts 
on  which  the  troops  were  making  their  assault,  when  a  squall 
of  rain  came  down.  Under  cover  of  this,  ten  torpedo-boats, 
led  by  the  Yarrow-built  Kotaka^  which  has  i-inch  armour, 
dashed  into  the  harbour,  their  rush  being  supported  by  two 
cruisers.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  assisted  them  by  maintaining 
a  long-range  fire  upon  the  forts.  The  Chinese  soldiers  were 
crowding  down  to  the  water,  whilst  those  who  were  in  the 
forts  could  be  reached  with  ease  from  the  interior  of  the 
harbour,  as  the  works  faced  landward.  The  torpedo-boats 
opened  with  their  machine  guns,  doing  terrible  execution,  and 
completed  the  confusion  of  the  Chinese,  who,  seeing  them- 
selves taken  in  rear,  were  seized  with  panic.  Thanks  to  this 
audacious  rush,  the  place  was  within  half-an-hour  in  the  hands 
of  the  Japanese.  The  Chinese  had  laid  mines  in  the  entrance, 
but  these  failed  to  explode.  Altogether  this  was  a  brilliant 
performance  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  sailors,  and  inflicted 
no  loss  upon  them.  By  the  fall  of  Port  Arthur  they  obtained 
an  excellent  naval  base,  with  docks  and  workshops  in  the 
Gulf  of  Pe-che-li. 

There  still  remained  to  the  Celestials  Wei-hai-wei,  and  on 
this  place  fell  the  next  attack.  On  January  18th  and  19th  the 
fleet  bombarded  Teng-chow-foo,  which  lies  eighty  miles  west 
of  Wei-hai-wei,  and  on  the  20th  the  army  landed  to  the  east 
of  the  naval  port,  and  the  investment  began.  The  harbour  is 
formed  by  two  bays,  off  which  lies  the  island  of  Leu-kung-tau. 
There  are  thus  two  entrances :  one  to  the  east  of  considerable 
width,  with  the  island  of  Jih-tau  almost  in  the  very  centre 
of  the  fairway,  and  one  to  the  west,  which  is  not  half  the 
width  of  the  other,  and  is  rendered  difficult  by  reefs. 
The  entrances  to  the  harbour  were  protected  by  very 
strong  forts  and  batteries  mounting  heavy  breech-loaders 
and  quick-firers,  whilst  the  mountainous  islands  of  Leu-kung- 


128 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


tau  and  Jih-tau  were  also  well  fortified.  On  Leu-kung-tau 
were  the  naval  headquarters  with  a  gunnery  school,  a  naval 
school,  and  a  coaling  jetty.  There  was  no  dock,  but  only  an 
anchorage,  in  some  degree  sheltered  from  a  bombardment 
from  the  sea  by  the  Island.  Here  the  remnants  of  the  Chinese 
navy  had  gathered,  and  as  the  Chen  Yuen  had  now  been 
repaired,  they  constituted  a  formidable  force  on  paper,  and 
were  capable  of  giving  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  if  used  with 
vigour. 

Towards  the  end  of  January  the  Japanese  fleet  appeared 
off  the  place  and  watched  both  entrances.  Admiral  Ting 
was  now  caught  in  a  trap.  At  sea  were  the  victors  of  the 
Yalu,  on  land  the  conquerors  of  Port  Arthur.  He  could 
only  extricate  himself  by  sacrificing  his  slow  ships,  and  from 
making  this  sacrifice  he  shrank. 

On  January  30th  the  Japanese  ships  in  concert  with  the 
army,  opened  a  long  range  fire  upon  the  forts.  The  Naniwa, 
Akitsushima,  and  Katsuragi  assailed  the  works  at  Chao-pei- 
tsui,  on  the  eastern  entrance,  which,  after  the  explosion  of  a 
magazine,  they  silenced.  Meantime  the  rest  of  Ito's  squadron 
bombarded  Leu-kung-tau.  Most  of  the  land  forts  had  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Japanese,  when,  on  the  night  of  the  30th- 
31st,  a  torpedo  attack  upon  the  Chinese  fleet  was  decided 
upon.  Both  entrances  to  the  harbour  were  closed  by  booms 
constructed  of  three  steel  hawsers,  one  to  one-and-a-half  inches 
in  diameter,  supported  at  intervals  of  30  feet  by  wooden  floats. 
The  eastern  boom  was  about  3300  yards  long  between  Jih-tau 
and  the  shore.  There  were  two  openings  in  it,  a  small 
one  near  the  coast,  which  was  obstructed  by  numerous  rocks 
and  therefore  very  dangerous,  and  a  larger  one  300  feet 
wide  in  the  centre,  to  allow  the  Chinese  ships  to  go  in  and 
out.  Mines  were  plentifully  sown  but  did  not  prove  very 
effective. 

On  blockading  Wei-hai-wei  the  Japanese  had  attempted 
to  clear  the  central  passage  but  had  not  entirely  succeeded. 
Their  boats,  therefore,  moved  to  the  attack  by  the  landward 


1 895]  PORT   ARTHUR    AND    WEI-HAI-WEI.  129 

passage  where  they  would  be  covered  by  the  forts  which  were 
now  in  the  hands  of  their  army.  The  boats  were  sixteen  in 
number,  and  were  formed  in  three  divisions,  thus  constituted  : 

I.  Division. — No.  23  (Division  boat),  Kotaka,  Nos.  7,  11,  12,  13.    Total,  six  boats. 
II.  Division.— No.  21  (Division  boat),  Nos.  8,  9,  14,  18,  19.    Total,  six  boats. 
III.  Division. — No.  22  (Division  boat),  Nos.  5,  6,  10.    Total,  four  boats. 

The  Kotaka  had  been  built  by  Yarrow  in  1886,  and  her  trial 
speed  was  nineteen  knots  ;  Number  21  was  a  Normand  boat 
launched  in  1891,  when  she  steamed  twenty-three  knots  ; 
Numbers  22,  23  were  by  Schichau,  built  in  1891,  and  of  twenty- 
three  knots  extreme  speed.  These  were  all  first-class  boats. 
The  others  were  of  the  second-class,  built  at  Onahama,  and 
probably  did  not  steam  more  than  18-19  knots  at  their  trial. 

The  boats  proceeded  under  the  cover  of  darkness  towards 
the  passage,  and  were  nearing  it  when  the  land  forts  suddenly 
opened  upon  them  and  betrayed  their  approach.  The 
Japanese  gunners  had  taken  them  for  Chinese  boats,  and  there 
was  nothing  for  it  but  retreat.  They  retired  accordingly 
without  suffering  any  loss. 

Next  day  the  weather  was  extremely  bad,  a  violent  wind 
blowing,  and  snow  falling  heavily.  The  larger  ships  of 
Admiral  Ito's  squadron  retired  for  shelter  to  Teng-chow,  but 
left  a  cruiser  to  observe  the  Chinese.  On  February  2nd  they 
re-appeared.  The  sea  was  now  calm,  but  the  cold  was 
intense.  At  a  distance  of  2400  yards  they  steamed  rapidly 
past  the  forts  on  Leu-kung-tau,  which  now  alone  remained 
to  the  Chinese,  and  bombarded  them,  producing  very  little 
effect.  On  the  other  hand  the  Chinese  gunners  could  not  hit 
the  Japanese  moving  at  a  rapid  speed.  On  the  night  of 
February  2nd  a  second  torpedo  attack  was  attempted,  but 
failed,  as  the  Chinese  discovered  the  boats  and  opened  upon 
them.  On  the  3rd  and  4th  the  bombardment  of  the  island 
was  vigorously  carried  on  both  from  the  sea  and  from  the  land. 
The  Chinese  forts  and  ironclads  replied,  but  the  latter  were  in 
difficulties  as  they  had  not  much  room  for  manoeuvring. 
Attempts  were  made  by  the  Japanese  to  clear  a  passage 

Vol.  II.  .  K 


130  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1895 

through  the  eastern  boom,  and  dynamite  was  used,  but  the 
hawsers  were  too  strong  to  be  broken. 

On  the  8th  twelve  Chinese  torpedo-boats  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  escape  by  the  western  entrance.  The  Japanese  fleet 
opened  upon  them  as  they  came  out,  and  gave  chase,  capturing 
or  sinking  all  of  them.  With  engines  and  boilers  in  bad 
order  they  could  not  hope  to  elude  fast  cruisers  of  the  Yoshino 
and  Akitsushima  type. 

A  third  torpedo  attack  was  planned  for  the  night  of 
February  4th.  The  first  division  was  to  head  for  the  western 
passage  and  create  a  diversion  by  making  a  false  attack. 
The  real  assault  came  from  the  east,  and  was  delivered  by  the 
2nd  and  3rd  divisions.  About  3  a.m.,  when  the  moon  went 
down,  the  ten  boats  composing  these  divisions  steered  for  the 
central  opening  in  the  boom,  using  the  masts  of  the  Ting 
Yuen  as  their  guide. *  Numbers  8  and  14  were  unlucky  enough 
to  touch  rocks  on  their  way  in,  and  though  they  got  off,  could 
take  no  more  part  in  the  attack.  The  cold  was  intense — 
there  were  eighteen  degrees  of  frost — and  the  spray  froze  on 
the  boats,  clogging  their  torpedo-tubes,  as  they  travelled 
through  the  water.  At  four  o'clock  the  attack  was  opened  by 
Number  5  as  she  drew  close  to  the  Chinese,  but  firing  too 
soon  her  torpedoes  missed.  Number  22  followed  her ;  in 
silence  she  advanced,  in  silence  fired  three  torpedoes,  then 
turned  and  retired  without  anyone  on  board  being  able  to  say 
whether  the  Chinese  ships  had  been  hit.  The  orders  were 
strict,  forbidding  the  men  to  expose  themselves.  As  she  was 
backing  to  get  away  from  the  Chinese,  who  had  now  opened 
a  heavy  fire,  she  either  struck  a  Chinese  boat  which  had  come 
up  to  drive  her  off,  or,  more  probably,  grated  against  a  rock 
and  lost  her  rudder.  In  another  minute  she  ran  with  great 
violence  upon  the  rocks,  and  as  her  plight  was  hopeless  the 
crew  decided  to  abandon  her.  They  had  only  one  boat,  which 
would  hold  six  men,  whilst  there  were  sixteen  on  board.  The 

*  So  the  account  in  Le  Yacht,  April  22,  1895.  I  do  not  understand  how  they 
could  be  seen  in  the  darkness. 


1895]  PORT   ARTHUR   AXD    WEI-HAI-WEI.  131 

first  boat-load  got  to  the  shore  safely,  but  on  the  second  trip 
the  boat  foundered  close  in  shore,  leaving  on  board  one  sub- 
lieutenant and  six  sailors.  There  they  remained  till  daylight 
in  the  bitter  cold,  and  the  sub-lieutenant,  Suzuki,  and  one 
sailor,  half  frozen,  fell  overboard  into  the  water  and  were 
drowned.  With  daylight  the  Chinese  opened  a  sharp  fire 
upon  the  five  who  were  left,  but  being  seen  from  the  shore,  a 
boat  was  sent  to  them,  which  brought  the  survivors  off  in 

an  exhausted  condition.    Next  came  Number  10.  Steaming 

<_> 

at  the  rate  of  ten  knots,  she  passed  very  close  to  a  number  of 
small  vessels  and  Chinese  torpedo-boats,  moored  to  the  west 
of  Jih-tau.  As  she  drew  near  the  enemy's  large  ships,  she 
collided  with  another  torpedo-boat  engaged  in  the  attack,  but 
suffered  no  harm.  Approaching  through  a  hail  of  Gatling 
bullets  a  great  grey  mass  rose  suddenly  up  before  her.  It 
was  the  Ting  Yuen)  and  at  it  she  fired  her  bow-tube.  Owing 
to  the  ice,  the  torpedo  did  not  leave  the  tube  but  stuck  pro- 
jecting from  it,  half  in,  half  out.  Her  commander  turned 
gently  to  port  and  fired  his  broadside  tube.  In  spite,  however, 
of  the  fact  that  the  sights  were  most  carefully  laid,  and  the 
speed  corrections  accurately  applied,  the  torpedo  which  had 
been  pointed  at  the  centre  of  the  Ting  Yuen,  distant  about 
300  yards,  only  just  caught  her  stern.  A  man  looking  out 
from  the  boat  saw  it  explode.  Number  10  at  once  circled 
under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  Chinese,  and  turning,  touched, 
with  the  projecting  torpedo  in  her  bow-tube,  Number  6.  The 
two  boats  ran  a  terrible  risk,  for  the  trigger  of  the  torpedo 
was  actually  smashed,  without  exploding  the  detonator.  They 
separated,  and  Number  10  retired,  whilst  Number  6  went 
forward  to  continue  the  attack.  When  within  range  her  bow- 
tube  was  fired,  and  once  more  the  torpedo  stuck.  Circling, 
she  brought  her  broadside  tube  to  bear,  but  the  torpedo  broke 
in  two  on  leaving  the  tube.  A  hail  of  1 -pounder  shells  from 
the  ironclad's  Hotchkisses  was  falling  about  her,  and  yet 
strange  to  say  no  harm  was  done  her.  One  only  struck  her 
hull  abreast  of  her  engines,  and  stuck  in  her  side  without 

K  2 


13.2  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1895 

exploding.  The  screw  of  the  fuse  must  have  come  loose  in 
flight.  Number  9  fired  a  torpedo  at  a  despatch-boat,  when 
she  was  herself  pierced  by  a  projectile  which  burst  her  boilers, 
wounding  fatally  two  men  and  slightly  two,  whilst  four  were 
scalded  to  death.  The  boat,  however,  remained  afloat.  For 
some  minutes  she  lay  helpless  under  a  heavy  fire  till  Number  19 
came  to  her  aid  and  took  her  in  tow,  but  she  sank  before  she 
could  be  got  out  of  the  harbour.  The  attack  was  now  over, 
and  the  Japanese  boats  retired.  Numbers  8  and  18  had  their 
rudders  or  screws  injured  by  touching  rocks  or  by  contact 
with  the  boom.  They  were,  however,  towed  off.  Number  6 
had  been  hit  by  forty-six  rifle  shots,  and  one  Hotchkiss  shell ; 
Number  10  by  ten  rifle  shots.  The  loss  of  life  was  not 
at  all  heavy.  The  damaged  boats  were  either  repaired  on 
the  spot  or  sent  to  Port  Arthur. 

The  fourth  and  final  attack  was  made  on  the  night  of 
February  5th.  This  time  the  first  division  was  selected  to  do 
the  serious  work,  whilst  the  remnants  of  the  second  and  third 
watched  the  western  entrance.  The  Chinese  did  not  discover 
the  boats  till  they  were  right  in  amongst  them,  and  then  made 
only  a  feeble  resistance.  Seven  torpedoes  were  discharged  by 
the  Kotaka,  and  Numbers  1 1  and  23.  The  Ting  Yuen  seems 
to  have  received  another ;  the  Wei  Yuen  one,  and  the  Ching 
Yuen  one.  The  Lai  Yuen,  too,  was  hit  on  this  occasion,  and 
capsized,  her  bottom  showing  above  water.  Her  crew  were 
imprisoned  alive  in  an  iron  tomb,  and  were  heard  knocking 
and  shrieking  for  days.  It  was  a  work  of  great  difficulty  to 
cut  through  the  bottom,  and  when  at  last  this  had  been  done, 
all  were  found  dead.  The  Ting  Yuen  floated  in  spite  of 
the  torpedoes,  but  was  seen  to  be  slowly  settling  next 
day.  Her  water-tight  doors  were  either  closed  before  the 
explosion,  or  immediately  after,  and  thus  delayed  her  loss. 
The  Ching  Yuen  was  disabled,  but  not  destroyed,  and 
she  could  still  fire  her  guns.  Whilst  the  Japanese  suffered 
trivial  loss — twelve  killed,  and  two  torpedo-boats  sunk — 
they  had  thus,  in  one  way  or  another,  reduced  the  Chinese 


1895]  PORT   ARTHUR    A  ND    WEI-HAI-WEI.  133 

fleet  to  the  Chen  Yuen,  Tsi  Yuen,  Ping  Yuen,  and  Kwang 
Ting. 

On  the  7th,  the  Japanese  were  very  hotly  engaged  with  the 
Chinese  works,  and  suffered  considerably.  The  Matsushima 
was  struck  by  a  shell,  which  destroyed  her  bridge  and  wrecked 
her  funnel,  and  almost  immediately  after,  by  a  second,  which 
passed  through  the  engine-room  and  entered  the  torpedo 
magazine  *  but,  luckily,  glanced  up  and  exploded  harmlessly 
above  the  armour  deck.  The  Yoshino  and  Na?tiu'a  were  also 
hit.  On  the  other  hand,  a  Chinese  magazine  was  blown 
up.  On  the  8th,  the  island  forts  were  attacked  by  storm,  and 
all  but  one  captured.  The  Ching  Yuen  was  sunk  on  the  9th. 
just  after  she  had  delivered  her  broadside.  A  shell  from  a 
10-inch  gun  in  one  of  the  land  forts  in  the  possession  of  the 
Japanese,  struck  her  bow  a  little  above  the  water-line,  and 
sent  her  to  the  bottom. f  Yet  Admiral  Ting  still  held  out, 
though  his  enemies  were  closing  in  upon  him,  and  the 
western  mine-field  had  been  destroyed.  This  day  the 
Itsukushima  was  hit  on  the  water-line  by  a  shell  which  failed  to 
explode.  The  10th  and  nth,  the  bombardment  went  on,  and 
of  the  Japanese  ships,  the  Katsuraki  and  Tenrio  were  hit  and 
damaged.  On  the  12th,  Admiral  Ting  bowed  his  head  to  fate 
and  surrendered.  He  did  not  outlive  his  defeat,  choosing 
rather  to  die  by  his  own  hand. 

The  total  losses  of  the  Japanese  fleet  in  these  various 
actions,  were  two  officers  and  twenty-seven  sailors  killed, 
whilst  four  officers  and  thirty-two  sailors  were  wounded. 
Those  Chinese  ships  which  were  afloat,  including  the  Chen 
Yuen,  wrere  taken  to  Japan. 

Thus  ended,  with  the  fall  of  Wei-hai-wei,  the  career  of 
Admiral  Ting.     The  ex-cavalry  officer  had  shown  patriotism 

*  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  April  8th,  1895.  This  is  suspiciously  like  the  shot 
which  struck  her  at  the  Yalu  {vide  page  96).  It  is  possible  that  the  corre- 
spondent misunderstood  his  informant. 

f  This  shell  at  4000  yards  range  came  in  at  one  side,  perforated  her  2^-inch 
deck,  and  passed  out  through  the  other  side.  Her  water-tight  bulkheads  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  injury  were  damaged,  and  she  sank  in  half  an  hour. 


i34  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1895 

and  pluck,  but  perhaps  he  made  a  mistake  in  refusing  at  the 
beginning  of  the  siege  to  put  to  sea  and  risk  an  engagement. 
If  defeated,  the  result  could  not  have  been  worse  for  him  or 
his  country  than  it  was,  and  his  two  heavy  battleships  might 
have  got  safely  away  to  Foochow,  where  they  could  have 
been  reinforced  by  cruisers  from  the  southern  squadrons. 
The  Japanese  would  have  found  it  difficult  to  stop  them. 
His  slow  and  feeble  torpedo-boats,  his  battered  ships,  his 
treacherous  officers,  his  disheartened  seamen,  were  not  capable 
of  conducting  an  active  defence,  or  of  harrying  the  blockaders 
on  the  dark  nights,  and  his  fleet  played  a  purely  passive  role. 
It  degenerated  into  a  target  for  the  projectiles  of  the  land 
forts,  for  the  guns  which  the  Chinese  themselves  had  mounted. 

The  combats  of  the  Japanese  fleet  with  the  land  forts, 
teach  us  little,  yet  that  little  confirms  the  lessons  of  the  past. 
It  was  not  the  ships,  but  the  heavy  guns  on  land,  which 
silenced  the  forts,  and  Admiral  Ito  had  a  narrow  shave  of  losing 
his  flagship.  The  torpedo  attacks  were  well  conceived  and 
well  conducted,  but  the  demoralised  condition  of  the  Chinese 
must  be  taken  into  account.  We  see  clearly  that  booms  and 
mines  are  a  very  futile  defence,  if  they  are  not  covered  by 
heavy  guns,  and  if  the  openings  in  them  are  not  closely 
watched  by  launches  and  torpedo-boats.  It  is  increasingly 
evident  that  only  in  absolutely  enclosed  harbours  can  fleets 
rest  absolutely  secure.  The  fact  has  been  already  recognised 
in  France,  where,  at  great  expense,  sheets  of  water  have  been 
surrounded  with  breakwaters  both  at  Cherbourg  and  Brest. 
It  has  also  been  recognised  in  England — witness  the  new 
works  at  Portland,  Dover,  and  Gibraltar.  Not  that  British 
fleets  are  likely  to  copy  Chinese  strategy,  and  lie  in  port 
whilst  their  enemy  is  sweeping  the  sea.  But  it  is  necessary 
to  possess  havens  of  refuge,  where  isolated  battleships  and 
cruisers,  perhaps  harassed  by  weeks  of  blockading,  perhaps 
damaged  in  action,  will  be  able  to  lie  without  needing  even 
to  keep  a  watch.  The  mere  possibility  of  a  torpedo  attack, 
imposes  a  terrible  strain  upon  officers  and  men. 


1895]  PORT   ARTHUR    AXD    WEI-HAI-WEI .  135 

The  Japanese  boats,  when  once  they  got  in  amongst  the 
Chinese,  did  not  effect  such  wholesale  destruction  as  we  had 
been  led  to  expect.  They  did  not  sink  ships  right  and  left. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  losses  both  in  men  and  boats  were 
singularly  small  considering  the  results  achieved.  Five 
vessels  are  claimed  to  have  been  injured,  representing  a 
displacement  of 'at  least  14,000  tons,  considerably  larger  than 
the  displacement  of  the  ships  sunk  or  destroved  at  the  Yalu. 
Not  one  of  the  attacking  boats  was  directlv  sunk  bv  gun-fire, 
but  then  the  Chinese  ships  were  almost  entirely  devoid  of  the 
larger  quick-firers — 6-inch.  4-  7-inch,  20-pounder,  and  12- 
pounder,  which  would  probably  stop  these  small  and  delicate 
craft  with  a  single  hit ;  nor  were  they  over  well  provided  with 
6-pounders  and  3-pounders.  Certainly  the  attack  upon  a 
Royal  Sovereign  or  Brennus  at  anchor  would  be  quite  a 
different  matter.  The  boats,  too.  had  the  support  of  the  land 
works,  which  would  not  be  the  case  if  a  European  squadron  of 
these  vessels  went  to  look  for  its  enemy  in  harbour.  This  is 
the  first  occasion  on  which  the  torpedo-boat,  pure  and  simple, 
has  succeeded  in  sinking  larger  vessels  with  the  Whitehead. 
Both  the  Blanco  Encalada  and  the  Aquidaban  were  attacked 
bv  torpedo-gunboats.  The  torpedoes  used  were  of  the 
Schwartzkopf  type,  fired  by  electricity,  with  a  charge  of  200 
grammes  (less  than  \  lb.)  of  powder. 

Note. — ''Blackwood''  gives  the  following  account  of  the  torpedoing  of  the 
Ting  Yuen,  from  Commander  Tyler's  journal :  "  I  saw  a  torpedo  boat  approach- 
ing us  end  on.  When  about  300  yards  off  she  turned  hard-a-port.  Just  then  I 
saw  one  of  our  shot  take  effect,  a  cloud  of  steam  rising  from  the  boat.  A  few 
seconds  after  she  turned  her  torpedo  struck.  It  was  a  loud  dull  thud  and  a 
heavy  quivering  shock,  a  column  of  water  dashed  over  the  decks,  and  a  faint, 
sickly  smell  of  explosives.  .  .  .  Within  a  minute  of  being  hit  I  was  down 
below.  The  water  was  bubbling  up  from  one  of  the  water-tight  hatches, 
and  there  was  about  a  foot  of  water  in  my  cabin.  .  .  .  The  water-tight 
doors  .  .  .  were  in  working  order,  and  were  kept  clear.  They  were  all 
leaking  badly,  however.  The  ship  was  beached;  she  did  not  fill  and  sink  at 
once,  though  all  her  bulkheads  leaked  owing  to  the  shock."  Thus  it  appears  that 
the  1251b.  charge  of  gun  cotton  will  not  necessarily  inflict  a  fatal  wound. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


The  Naval  Battle  of  To-morrow. 

The  difficulty  of  forecasting  the  future  is  nowhere  greater 
than  where  the  mind  has  little  material  upon  which  to  base 
its  judgment,  where,  in  other  words,  the  instances  are  insuffi- 
cient for  an  induction.  On  land  there  have  been  two  great 
wars  within  the  memory  of  the  present  generation,  and  yet 
even  with  this  experience  it  is  difficult  to  predict  the  details 
of  a  future  land-battle  ;  so  considerable  have  been  the  changes 
of  materiel  in  recent  years.  At  sea,  changes  in  materiel 
have  been  far  greater,  and  have  exercised  an  influence  more 
profound  upon  the  science  of  war.  Monster  guns,  torpedoes, 
rams,  are  factors  which  no  soldier  has  to  consider.  So  rapid 
is  the  progress  of  invention,  so  swift  the  march  towards  per- 
fection, that  at  sea  what  was  yesterday  the  most  formidable 
of  fighting  machines  may  be  looked  upon  to-morrow  as  little 
better  than  lumber.  On  land  it  is  men  who  fight,  at  sea,  men 
and  machines.  And  though  we  have  no  warrant  for  thinking 
the  machines  all-important,  they  must  necessarily  affect  in 
some  degree  the  issue  of  any  war.  Naval  progress  is  a  race 
to  obtain  the  best  machines,  and  the  constant  structural 
changes,  made  to  obtain  that  best,  exhibit  a  state  of  flux 
unparalleled  in  the  past.  But  whilst  the  implements  of  war 
are  in  this  transitional  state  there  is  no  sign  of  a  similar  flux 
in  principles.  Strategy,  it  would  seem,  remains  the  same  as 
in  the  past,  and  tactics  have  only  altered  in  detail. 

We  may  now  sum  up  the  world's  experience  since  the  intro- 
duction of  the  ironclad.  There  have  been  two  pitched  battles  : 
Lissa,  in   1866,  and  the  Yalu,  or  Haiyang,  in  1894.  The 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


137 


former  is  not  of  much  value,  as  it  represents  an  action 
between  ships  as  different  from  those  of  to-day  as  they  them- 
selves were  different  from  the  ships  of  Xelson.  The  Yalu, 
as  the  more  recent,  is  also  the  more  valuable.  But  here 
really  modern  battleships  were  absent  on  either  side,  and 
there  were  certain  ulterior  motives  interfering  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  engagement.  Moreover,  both  at  Lissa  and  the 
Yalu  one  side  was  greatly  inferior  to  the  other  in  discipline 
and  morale.  We  may  say  that  there  is  no  instance  of  fleets 
approximately  equal  in  skill,  discipline,  and  numbers  encoun- 
tering one  another.  Some  such  encounter  is  necessary  to 
test  our  a  priori  conclusions  concerning  the  value  of  parti- 
cular classes  of  ships,  of  particular  types  of  construction  and 
armament,  and  of  particular  formations. 

Actions  of  single  ships  are  rather  more  numerous,  and 
fairly  numerous,  too,  are  actions  of  ships  with  forts.  The 
American  Civil  War  abounds  in  this  last  type  of  engagement, 
and  since  then  there  has  been  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria, 
when,  however,  the  Egyptians,  being  Orientals,  did  not  make  the 
resistance  which  we  should  have  to  expect  from  Westerners  ; 
and  the  various  actions  at  Rio.  Of  single-ship  actions  the 
most  important  are  the  fight  between  the  Merrimac  and 
Monitor ;  between  the  Tennessee  and  Farragut's  fleet;  between 
the  Alabama  and  Kearsarge ;  between  the  Shah  and  Huascar ; 
between  the  Vesta  and  Assar-i-Chevket ;  the  two  engagements 
in  which  the  Huascar  faced  the  Chilians  ;  and  the  encounter 
of  the  Tsi  Yuen  with  the  Japanese  Flying  Squadron.  Of 
torpedo  actions,  the  French  affairs  with  the  Chinese  on  the 
Min  and  at  Sheipoo,  are  of  little  value,  as  in  this  case  the 
torpedo-boat  encountered  enemies  who  were  careless  to  an 
extreme  degree.  The  Russian  attempts  upon  Turkish  iron- 
clads in  the  Black  Sea,  the  sinking  of  the  Blanco  Encalada 
and  the  Aqnidaban,  and  the  repeated  attacks  of  the  Japanese 
at  Wei-hai-wei  are  more  instructive,  but  cannot  be  said  to 
have  definitely  decided  the  powers  and  limitations  of  the 
torpedo-boat. 


138 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


The  remoter  past  is  of  importance  as  illustrating  certain 
questions,  such  as  the  influence  of  dimension,  the  general 
requirements  of  battleships,  the  methods  of  attack,  and  the 
formation  to  be  adopted.  Though  steam  has  changed  a 
great  deal  it  has  not  changed  everything,  and  though  French 
writers  of  the  Jeune  Ecole  often  tell  us  that  the  abyss  which 
separates  us  from  the  past  is  profound,  we  may  obtain  some 
profit  by  crossing  it.  Naval  warfare  is  as  much  a  matter  of  men 
as  of  ships,  and  even  if  ships  have  changed,  men  have  not. 

First  as  to  the  battle  dispositions  of  a  fleet.  What  ships 
are  to  be  placed  in  the  line,  if  line  there  is  ?  Is  the  protected 
cruiser  to  figure  in  it,  and  if  so,  what  class  of  protected  cruiser? 
Can  the  older  and  smaller  battleships  take  their  place  with 
the  newer  and  heavier  vessels  ?  Where  are  the  torpedo-boats 
to  be  stationed,  and  what  is  to  be  their  business  in  the 
conflict  ?  Is  there  to  be  a  reserve,  or  is  the  whole  of  the 
fleet  to  come  into  action  simultaneously  ? 

The  history  of  the  past  shows  that  ua  special  class  of  ships 
to  fight  in  the  line  of  battle"  was  necessary.  In  "  Naval 
Warfare,"*  Admiral  Colomb  has  pointed  out  how  at  first  a 
heterogeneous  medley  of  vessels,  with  scarcely  a  break  from 
the  largest  to  the  smallest  size,  lay  in  the  line ;  but  that  by 
slow  degrees,  experience  showed  it  was  inexpedient  to  place 
small  vessels  side  by  side  with  large  ones.  Gradually  the 
English  line  of  battle  tended  to  uniformity.  The  120-gun 
ship  was  found  too  large,  the  fifty-six-gun  and  forty-four- 
gun  ship  too  small.  It  was  the  mean  which  conquered  in 
the  shape  of  the  seventy-four.  The  frigate,  during  the 
revolutionary  war  with  France,  took  no  place  in  the  line. 
It  did  not  venture  to  encounter  the  crushing  broadside  of  the 
line-of-battle  ship,t  but  rather  acted  as  an  auxiliary  to  the 

*  Page  80. 

f  With  very  rare  exceptions,  e.g.,  Melpomene  (French),  engaged  Agamemnon 
(English),  and  Agamemnon  was  a  good  deal  injured.  Three  frigates,  Nelson 
thought,  had  an  advantage  over  one  ship  of  the  line  (64  guns).  Laughton. 
Nelson,  54,, 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  139 

combatants,  saving  men  and  towing  disabled  ships.  At 
Camperdown,  it  is  true,  it  played  some  part  in  a  fleet  action  ; 
but  Camperdown  was  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule. 
Still  less  do  we  find  sloops  or  corvettes  engaging  side  by  side 
with  heavier  ships.  The  frigate,  the  corvette,  and  the  sloop 
were  built  for  one  purpose,  the  battleship  for  another.  Each 
stuck  to  its  last. 

The  next  question  to  be  considered,  is  whether  the  protected 
cruiser  of  to-day  stands  to  the  battleship  as  did  the  frigate  to 
the  line  of  battle  vessel.  To  decide,  we  must  examine  the 
defensive  and  offensive  power  of  the  two  contrasted  classes  of 
ships  in  each  period.  As  type  of  the  frigate,  we  may  take  the 
thirty-eight-gun  ship  of  1805;  as  type  of  the  battleship,  the 
seventy-four-gun  ship  of  the  same  date.  The  armaments, 
broadsides,  and  complements  of  the  two  classes  are  given  by 
James  as  follows  : 

Battleship. 
f  28  32-pounders  "\  Broadside, 

89  ffuns*  \  28  l8-P°unders  I        .  78ilbs. 

"  &  I  18    9-pounders  C  With  carronades, 

V.  8  1 2 -pounder  carronades )  829lbs. 
Men  and  Boys,  594. 

Frigate. 

C  28  18-pounders  "\  Broadside, 

o  \    2  12-pounders  I  30olbs. 

4   guns  <    g   9-pounders  f  With  carronades, 

V.  10  18-pounder  carronades  J  39olbs. 
Men  and  Boys,  277. 

In  weight  of  metal  discharged,  and  in  the  number  of  men 
carried,  important  for  boarding,  the  seventy-four  was  to  the 
frigate  about  as  two  to  one.  But  in  reviewing  the  gun-power  of 
the  two  vessels,  there  is  this  to  be  considered,  that  in  James' 
words  "  the  destruction  caused  by  discharges  of  cannon  is  in 
a  great  degree  proportionate  to  the  diameter  and  weight  of 


*  Carronades  were  not  taken  into  consideration  in  the  official  classification  of 
ships,  by  the  numbers  of  their  guns.  Hence  the  seventy-four  was  really  an 
eighty-two. 


140 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


shot/'  *  Now  the  seventy-four  carried  the  32-pounder,  which 
was  nearly  twice  as  powerful  as  the  frigate's  heaviest  18- 
pounder,  when  we  look  at  the  weight  of  metal  thrown, 
and  far  more  efficacious  for  battering  the  sides  of  the  wooden 
ship.  In  defensive  strength,  the  seventy-four-gun  ship  had 
stronger  scantling  and  thicker  sides,  so  that  here  again 
there  was  another  point  of  superiority. 

And  now  to  pass  to  the  modern  cruiser  and  battleship.  As 
type  of  the  former  the  medium  vessels  of  the  Eclipse  class 
may  stand,  and  of  the  latter  the  medium  battleship  Renown, 
when  we  get  these  results  : 

Battleship. 


Offensive.    Guns  49 


I V  10-inch  29-ton  guns 
X    6-inch  quick-firers 
XIV  12-pounder 
XII  3-pounder 
IX  Machine,  &c. 
Torpedo  tubes,  five 
Ram. 


Broadside, 
26o2lbs. 
22  projectiles. 


Cannot  force  a  torpedo  action. 


Broadside, 

4861bs. 
1 1  projectiles. 


Defensive.    All  guns  over  12-pounder  behind  armour  6 — 10  inches 
thick. 

Water  line  and  side  8  to  6  inches  armour.  Coal. 
Deck  below  water,  3  inches  maximum  thickness. 
Bulkheads  to  prevent  raking-fire. 
Minute  sub-division. 

Crew.  674. 

Cruiser. 
f  V  6-inch  quick-firers 
I  VI  47-inch       „  ,, 
Offensive.    Guns  26  -i  IX  12-pounder,,  ,, 
j     I    3-pounder,,  ,, 
^  V  Machine,  &c. 
Torpedo  tubes,  &c,  three.    Can  force  a  torpedo  action. 

Defensive.    Guns  protected  only  by  shields. 
Coal  protection. 

Deck  below  water  line  2\  inches  thick. 
No  bulkheads. 
Minute  sub-division. 

Crew.  437. 

In  weight  of  metal  thrown,  the  battleship  is  to  the  cruiser 
as  five-and-a-half  to  one,  and  all  that  has  been  said  of  the 


*  James,  i.,  44, 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  141 

value  of  heavy  artillery  in  the  case  of  the  seventy-four  applies 
here  with  redoubled  force,  since  the  Renown's  largest  pro- 
jectile is  not  twice,  but  live  times  the  weight  of  the  Eclipse's 
largest.  The  side  of  the  Renown  is  impervious  amidships  to 
all  the  Eclipse 's  shells  ;  the  Eclipse  from  stem  to  stern  is 
open,  and  exposed  to  the  smallest  projectiles.  The  Eclipse 
can  be  raked  in  the  end-on  position,  the  Renown  cannot. 
The  Eclipse,  with  her  main  armament  ill -protected  on  deck, 
cannot  hope  to  silence  by  gun-fire  the  Renown  s  well-protected 
weapons.  Both  ships  are  of  the  same  date  and  designed  by 
the  same  hand,  yet  it  can  scarcely  be  denied  that  the  disparity 
between  them  is  enormous.  The  sole  advantage  which  the 
Eclipse  possesses  is  that  of  forcing  a  torpedo  action,  and  to 
do  this  she  has  to  approach  closely  to  the  battleship,  therebv 
giving  the  latter  the  opportunity  of  crushing  her  by  gun-fire. 
We  may  conclude  that  this  cruiser  could  not  lie  in  the  line  of 
battle  beside  the  battleship,  as  she  exhibits  a  comparative 
inferiority  very  much  greater  than  that  of  the  frigate.* 

It  may  be  said,  however,  that  whilst  the  medium  and  smaller 
cruisers  are  manifestly  unable  to  enter  the  line,  the  larger  and 
more  powerful  ships  of  the  class,  which  are  beginning  to 
abound  in  our  navy,  could  do  so.  To  test  the  statement  we 
will  make  one  more  comparison  between  the  most  powerful 
cruiser  afloat,  the  Terrible,  and  the  most  powerful  battleship, 
the  Majestic.    These  are  the  figures  : 

Battleship. 

f        IV  12-inch  46-ton  gruns        0      j  -j 
VTI    ,r  ■    l      -  1  c         )  Broadside, 
Xll    o-incn  quick-firers    !  .j^ij-, 

Offensive.    54  guns  j  XVI II  12-pounder  „    .,      [  254projectHes. 

I       Xll    3-pounder        .,      J    o  f  i 

I    VIII    Machine,  &c. 
Torpedo  tubes,  four.    Cannot  force  a  torpedo  action. 
Ram. 

*  It  is  a  common  argument  of  some  theorists,  that  the  large  battleship's 
equivalent  weight  in  moderate  cruisers'  would  be  more  than  a  match  for 
her.  Three  cruisers  of  the  English  Astrea  class  would  slightly  exceed  the 
displacement  of  the  Renown i  and  would  bring  to  bear  on  the  broadside  between 
them,  six  6-inch  and  twelve  47-inch  quick-firers,  with  a  broadside  of  1  i4olbs. 


142 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


Battleship — contd. 

Defensive.    All  guns  above  12-pounder  behind  armour  6 — 14  inches 
thick. 

Water  line  and  side  9  inches  armour.  Coal. 
Deck  below  water  line  4  inches  maximum. 
Bulkheads  against  raking  fire. 
Minute  sub-division. 

Crew.  757. 

Cruiser. 


f        II    0/2-inch  24-ton  guns^    „  , 

vn    r  •    u      -  \  a  I  Broadside, 

All    6-inch  quick-firers     f  q^,,  ' 

Offensive.    54  guns.  ^  XVII.  ,,-pounder  ,,    „       j  ^  ^es. 

L       XI    Machine,  &c. 
Torpedo  tubes,  four.    Can  force  a  torpedo  action. 

Defensive.    All    guns    above  12-pounder  behind  armour  6  inches 
thick. 
Coal. 

Deck  below  water  line  4  inches  maximum. 
No  bulkheads. 
Minute  sub-division. 

Crew.  About  840. 

The  inequality  between  these  two  is  far  less  than  that  existing 
between  the  Renown  and  Eclipse,  but  it  is  still  very  great. 
The  four  heavy  guns  of  the  Majestic  are  the  factors  which 
give  her  her  preponderance  in  broadside  fire.  Omitting  these, 
and  the  Terrible's  9/2-inch  guns,  the  two  ships  are  almost 
identical  in  armament.  But  whereas  the  Majesties  gunners 
can  fire  with  effect  at  every  square  yard  of  the  cruiser's  side, 
the  casemates  exposing  a  negligible  surface  of  armour,  the 
vitals  of  the  Majestic  are  proof  to  all  the  cruiser's  shot  below 
0/2-inch  in  calibre.  The  absence  of  bulkheads,  as  in  the 
Eclipse,  is  a  further  handicap  to  the  big  cruiser.  Still  she  is 
in  a  very  different  position  from  the  small  cruiser,  as  a  very 


against  the  Renown's  2500lbs.  (excluding  the  smaller  guns  on  either  side).  If 
the  old  seventy-four  was  considered  a  match  for  three  frigates  (Naval  Chronicle, 
xxxix.,  459),  though  these  fired  a  greater  weight  of  metal,  the  battleship  may  be 
considered  more  than  a  match  for  three  cruisers,  since,  in  addition  to  her 
advantage  of  concentrated  size  and  power,  she  fires  twice  their  weight  of  metal. 
The  torpedo  is  the  only  factor  which  can  affect  her  superiority. 


THE    XAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


considerable  amount  of  cover  is  given  to  her  guns,  and  her 
broadside  is  heavy.*    It  is  difficult,  then,  arguing  wholly  on 
a  priori  grounds,  to  suppose  that  she  cannot  lie  in  the  line 
but  if  she  does  lie  in  the  line  it  will  be  at  no  small  risk  to 
herself. 

Armoured  cruisers,  if  they  have  water-line  protection,  plated 
gun  positions,  and  bulkheads,  are  better  fitted  for  action  in 
the  line  of  battle.  The  Diipuy-de-Lo)ne}  for  instance,  at  long 
ranges,  under  service  conditions,  might  be  found  proof  to  the 
shot  of  the  6-inch  quick-firer,  and  could  not  be  perforated  by 
the  shell  of  that  gun.  The  Imperieuse  verges  very  closely 
upon  the  second-class  battleship  of  her  date.  The  belted 
cruisers  of  the  Aurora  class  are  of  an  older  epoch  in  design, 
and  could  not  face  battleships  of  their  own  date.  Their 
armament  is  unprotected,  their  gunners  exposed  to  every 
shell,  and  in  a  hot  or  close  action  their  batteries  could  not  be 
fought. 

Cruisers  thus  fall  into  three  classes,  (i)  The  medium  or 
small  cruiser,  unfit  for  the  line  of  battle.  (2)  The  very  large 
cruiser  which  may  fight  in  the  line  but  at  considerable  risk. 
(3)  The  armoured  cruiser  with  water-line  protection  as  well 
as  armour  on  her  guns,  fit  for  the  line.  The  belted  cruiser  of 
Aurora  type  will  fall  somewhere  between  the  first  and  second 
class,  and  is  unfit  for  the  line.  In  general  it  will  be  best  to 
keep  cruisers  to  their  own  proper  duties  as  far  as  possible, 
but  with  a  large  cruiser  squadron  present  on  either  side, 
the  temptation  to  place  them  in  line  will  necessarily  be 
great. 

Why  should  they  not  be  placed  in  line  ?  it  may  be  asked 
once  more.  There  will  be  vessels  of  the  same  class  present  on 
either  side,  perhaps  cruisers  in  the  opponent's  line,  and  surely, 
even  if  thev  &o  to  the  bottom,  it  will  not  be  till  thev  have 
done  very  considerable  mischief  by  their  fire  to  the  enemy's 

*  It  is  still,  however,  weaker  in  proportion  to  the  battleship's  than  was  that 
of  the  thirty-eight-gun  frigate  to  the  seventy-four's.  But  the  armour  in  the 
Terrible  protects  the  gun-crews  well. 


144 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


cruisers  and  the  unarmoured  surface  of  his  battleships'  sides. 
The  battle  will,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  be  fought  fleet  to  fleet 
in  its  earlier  stages,  and  there  will  not  be  a  number  of  actions 
between  individual  ships  in  which  the  cruiser  will  run  the  risk 
of  having  to  encounter  the  battleship.  In  answer,  we  may 
say  that  the  loss  of  ship  after  ship  will  be  very  discouraging 
to  the  crews  of  such  vessels  as  survive,  and  that  if  one  fleet  of 
ten  battleships  and  five  cruisers,  all  of  which  are  placed  in 
line,  assailing  another  of  similar  strength,  in  which  the 
cruisers  are  held  in  reserve,  succeeds  in  damaging  severely 
one  or  two  of  the  hostile  battleships  but  only  with  the  loss  of 
three  or  four  of  its  cruisers,  the  infliction  of  this  damage  will 
not  compensate  for  the  moral  effect  of  the  loss  of  the  ships.* 
It  is  very  evident  that  at  the  Yalu,  neither  Chinese  nor 
Japanese  gained  anything  by  bringing  the  weaker  ships  into 
battle,  whilst,  though  the  Saikio  and  Yang  Wei  were  poor  and 
feeble  vessels  when  contrasted  with  modern  cruisers,  they 
were  not  faced  by  any  ship  comparable  in  offensive  power  to 
the  Royal  Sovereign  or  Renown.  It  looks  as  though  fleet 
to  fleet  actions  made  uniform  battleships  as  necessary  as 
in  the  past.  Again,  cruisers,  being  longer  in  proportion 
to  their  beam,  are  not  generally  so  handy  at  a  moderate 
speed  as  the  shorter  and  broader  battleship.  Their  inclusion 
in  the  line  will  thus  reduce  the  manoeuvring  power  of  the 
battleship. 

The  best  solution  of  the  difficulty  would  seem  to  be  the 
sharp  separation  of  cruisers  and  battleships.  As  the  Japanese 
placed  their  fast  ships  in  one  squadron,  the  slow  in  another, 
which  each  acted  independently  of  the  other,  the  same  should 
be  done  with  cruisers  and  battleships.  The  cruiser  line  may 
attack  independently,  seeking  first  the  enemy's  cruiser  line, 

*  When  the  Tecumseh  sank  at  Mobile  (i.  124),  the  Confederate  gunners, 
imagining  that  their  fire  had  sent  her  to  the  bottom,  at  once  redoubled  their 
exertions,  whilst  the  Federal  fire  grew  perceptibly  less  vehement.  It  was  only 
Farragut's  dauntless  handling  of  the  Hartford  that  restored  the  Northern  elan. 
So  also  at  the  Yalu,  a  foreigner  on  the  Tsi  Yuen  states  that  the  news  "  Another 
ship  gone,"  greatly  depressed  the  Chinese,  as  well  it  might. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


or  may  face  the  hostile  battleships,  keeping  at  a  great  distance 
from  them  to  neutralise  the  cruisers'  want  of  armour,  and  to 
minimise  the  risk  of  hits  from  heavy  shells.  By  pouring  in  a 
hail  of  6  and  4- 7 -inch  shells,  the  enemy's  attention  may  be 
distracted  from  the  more  serious  assault  of  the  battleships, 
which  will  be  simultaneously  delivered.  The  ships  of  each 
class  will  then  be  together,  and  the  principle  of  like  with  like 
carried  out.  The  cruisers  will  be  able  to  use  their  high  speed 
if  it  is  found  desirable  ;  the  battleships  will  not  be^ hindered 
by  ships  with  large  turning  circles. 

The  line  of  battleships  will  be  composed,  naturally,  of  vessels 
similar  to  those  figuring  in  the  hostile  fleet.  At  the  outbreak 
of  war,  each  side  may  be  expected  to  employ  its  newest  and 
best  ships.  Provided  the  smaller  vessels  are  well  armoured 
and  armed,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  lie  in  the 
line.  The  French  Jemmapes,  the  Russian  Admiral  Ou- 
shakoff  are  of  the  battleship  type,  though  smaller  and  less 
powerful  than  armourclads  such  as  the  Renown  or  Royal 
Sovereign.  To  the  latter,  they  are  what  the  fifty-gun  ship 
was  to  the  seventy-four  or  120-gun  ship.  It  will  be  well  if 
older  vessels,  whose  speed  is  low,  armour  thin,  and  armament 
weak,  are  formed  in  yet  a  third  division,  should  they  be 
present."*  Such  vessels  would  be  well  adapted  to  act  as 
a  reserve  ;  if  they  fight,  it  must  be  at  long  ranges,  where 
their  moderate  armour  will  stand  them  in  good  stead. 
If  introduced  among  more  modern  or  first-class  battleships, 
they  will  lower  their  speed,  and  in  some  cases  reduce  their 
manoeuvring  qualities.  Let  us  by  way  of  illustration  take  the 
Mediterranean  squadrons  of  England  and  France  as  they 
stood  in  1896,  and  further  suppose  the  English  Mediterranean 
fleet  to  have  been  reinforced  by  the  Channel  Squadron.  The 

*  A  further  argument  for  this  is  that  more  than  eight  or  ten  ships  cannot,  at 
intervals  of  two  cables  (400  yards),  be  handled  in  one  line.  If  the  interval  is 
diminished,  there  will  be  the  risk  of  collision  between  friends.  In  the  grouping 
of  ships,  speed  is  especially  to  be  considered,  as  if  an  eighteen-knot  vessel  is 
with  a  fourteen-knot  ship,  an  element  of  tactical  superiority  is  wasted. 


146 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


following  would  be 
principle  : 


the  division  of  the  English  force  on  this 


Main 
Squadron.* 
16*7 

Royal  Sovereigti 

Empress  of  India 

Repulse 

Resolution 

Ramillies 

Hood^ 

Nile 

Barfleuv 

Revenge 

Royal  Oak 

Majestic 

Magnificent 


Second  or  Reserve 
Squadron* 
14 

Camperdown 

Howe 

Rodney 

Rupert 

Anson 

Polyphemus 


First  Cruiser 
Division. 


Hawke 

Blenheim 

Blake 


Second  Cruiser 
Division. 
17-8 

Sybille 

Barham 

Bellona 

Astrea 

Forte 


Torpedo 
Gun-boats. 
17-7 

Dryad 

Gleaner 

Hebe 

Skipjack 

Sandfly 

Sharpshooter 

Speedy 


Third  Cruiser 
Division. 
16*7 

Arethusa 
Scout 
Surprise 
Fearless 


The  French  fleet,  if  the  same  principle  were  followed,  would 
be  drawn  up  thus  : 


Main 

Reserve 

Cruiser 

Torpedo 

Squadron.* 

Squadron.  * 

Divisions* 

Gun-boats. 

14*2 

13 

16-8 

18 

Baud  in 

Caiman 

Labouche 

Treville  D' Iberville 

Courbet 

Indo?nptable 

Tage 

Bombe 

Devastation 

Terrible 

Sfax 

Leger 

Formidable 

Richelieu 

Sachet 

Couleuvrine 

Magenta 

Condor 

Fleche 

Marceau 

Cosmao 

Levrier 

Neptune 

Faucon 

Duperre 

Lalande 

*  Armoured  Ships 
squadron,  in  knots. 


Troude 

Forbin 

Milan 

Vautour 

Wattignies 

The  figures  give  the  trial  speed  of  the  slowest  ship  in  each 


Engaging  vessels  as  little  armoured  as  are  the  French  first- 
class  battleships  represented  in  this  list,  there  seems '  no 


THE   NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  147 

reason  why  the  first-class  cruisers  should  not  lie  in  the  line* 
The  "  Admirals  "  are  almost  too  good  for  a  reserve,  and  could 
perfectly  well  lie  in  line ;  though  lacking  quick-firers,  as  they 
do  at  present,  and  thin  armour  to  keep  out  high  explosives, 
they  would  be  distinctly  inferior  to  the  other  nine.  The 
Polyphemus  would  be  with  the  reserve  squadron,  as  her  time 
does  not  come  till  the  fleets  close. 

The  precise  position  of  the  torpedo  craft  is  also  a  matter  of 
dispute.  The  torpedo  gunboat  offers  too  large  a  target  in 
broad  daylight,  and  is  too  vulnerable  to  attack  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  engagement.  All  the  objections  which 
have  been  urged  against  the  cruiser  in  the  line  of  battle  apply 
with  additional  force  to  the  torpedo  gunboat.  Two  possibili- 
ties remain.  The  torpedo  gunboat  may  be  placed  to  leeward 
of  the  battleship  and  emerge  only  to  defend  its  larger  mate 
from  the  assault  of  the  enemy's  torpedo-boats. f  This  would 
appear  to  be  the  original  intention  of  the  designers  of  such 
craft.  When  the  assailing  flotilla  arrives  at  a  distance  of 
600  yards,  just  outside  torpedo  range,  it  will  find  itself  faced 
by  the  torpedo  gunboats.  The  assailants  would  be  under  fire 
from  about  3000  yards  up  to  600  yards,  for  a  distance  of 
2400  yards.  The  assailed  torpedo  gunboats  would  only  be 
under  the  enemy's  heavy  fire  for  the  time  occupied  in  steam- 
ing out  600  yards  from  the  battleship,  if  that  ;  for  the  battle- 
ships of  the  assailants  would  have  to  fire  over  their  own  boats, 
which  might  prove  a  dangerous  experiment.  The  torpedo 
gunboat,  thus  placed,  must  to  some  extent  hamper  the  move- 
ments of  the  battleship,  if  a  sudden  turn  becomes  necessary, 
but  it  will  be  fairly  sheltered  and  ready  at  hand  when  wanted. 
Should  it  be  formed  up  with  others  of  its  own  class,  upon 
it  will  fall  the  duty  of  watching  and  combating  the  enemy's 

*  The  Bandin  and  Formidable,  broadside  on,  expose  400  square  yards  of 
unprotected  target. 

f  In  such  a  position,  however,  unless  very  close  under  the  battleship,  it  will 
be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  hits  from  such  projectiles  as  pass  over  the  battleship, 
owing  to  too  great  elevation. 

L  2 


148 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


torpedo  craft,  whether  gunboats  or  boats  simply.  It  may  also 
have  to  make  a  rush  at  the  critical  moment,  when  the  enemy's 
quick-firers  have  been  dismounted  or  silenced,  and  only  the 
heavier  guns  have  to  be  faced. 

The  torpedo-boat,  whether  of  the  sea-going  or  the  still 
larger  "destroyer"  class,  is  nearly  certain  to  be  present  in 
some  force  with  either  fleet.  It  lacks  protection,  as  its  only 
defence  is  its  diminutive  size  and  very  high  speed,  and  it  is 
valueless  for  offence  outside  iooo  yards.  But  it  has  this  great 
advantage.  The  torpedo  which  it  carries  will,  if  it  gets  home, 
deal  a  crushing  blow,  and  almost  certainly  disable,  or  there 
and  then  send  to  the  bottom,  any  ship  which  it  strikes.  It 
is  not  likely  that  torpedo-boats  wrill  be  sent  against  intact 
battleships,  whose  quick-firers  are  in  good  order  and  whose 
gunners  are  unshaken.  The  boats'  time  will  come  towards 
the  close  of  the  battle,  when  the  fight  has  left  great  masses 
of  iron  wreckage  ;  when  the  targets  have  lost  their  power  of 
movement ;  when  their  crews  are  diminished  in  number  and 
wearied  by  the  intense  strain  of  action.  But  even  then  it 
will  not  be  as  easy  as  it  might  appear  to  destroy  the  damaged 
battleships,  since  they,  too,  will  have  auxiliaries,  who  will  be 
able  either  to  meet  the  assault  of  the  torpedo-boats  or  to 
destroy  the  opposing  battleships.  As  it  will  be  an  anoma- 
lous position  for  the  boats  of  each  side  to  deal  the  final  blow 
to  the  ships  of  the  other  side  simultaneously,  it  seems  probable 
that  at  the  close  of  the  action  between  the  larger  ships  there 
will  follow  a  fierce  contest  between  the  smaller  craft. 

The  immense  moral  effect  of  dealing  a  heavy  blow  at  the 
enemy  when  the  battle  begins,  may,  however,  in  defiance  of 
prudence,  lead  to  a  rush  of  the  boats  of  one  side  upon  the 
ships  of  the  other  early  in  the  engagement.  To  meet  such  a 
rush  the  assailed  must  have  boats  ready.  They  will  steam 
forward,  as  we  have  said,  to  the  limit  of  torpedo  range,  leaving 
the  hostile  boats  as  long  as  possible  under  the  big  ships'  fire. 
The  line  of  big  ships  will  probably  draw  off,  so  as  to  prolong 
the  duration  of  the  assailant  boats'  approach.    But  supposing 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


149 


that  the  hostile  boats  steam  straight  upon  the  battleships,  and 
the  latter  maintain  a  course  at  right  angles  to  their  approach, 
they  will  be  under  fire  for  the  time  taken  to  cover  2400  yards, 
which  at  a  speed  of  twenty  knots  would  be  about  three  and  a 
half  minutes,  during  which  time  a  6-inch  quick-firer  would 
discharge  from  ten  to  fifteen  shots,  or  a  12-pounder  twenty  to 
thirty.  Though  in  the  torpedo  attacks  of  the  Chilian  and 
Brazilian  civil  wars,  torpedo  gunboats  have  come  off  without 
much  more  than  a  scratch,  these  attacks  were  made  at  night 
and  upon  ships  which  had  not  a  powerful  quick-firing 
armament  or  well-disciplined-crews.  It  will  be  a  different 
matter  attacking  by  day  modern  battleships,  equipped  with 
quick-firers,  and  using  smokeless  powder,  though  the  torpedo- 
boat  is  never  a  target  easy  to  hit.  It  remains  possible  that 
one  or  more  boats  may  succeed  in  their  onset,  and  that  an  odd 
battleship  may  fall  victim,  but  the  price  paid  will  be  a  very 
heavy  one.*  The  best  plan  would  seem  to  be  to  hold  in  the 
boats  at  the  beginning  of  the  battle.  For  it  may  be  better 
to  throw  away  a  battleship,  than  to  abandon  the  chance  of 
following  up  a  victory,  or  striking  a  heavy  blow  later  in  the 
action,  which  intact  torpedo-boats  may  give 

Of  course,  if  there  is  anything  like  a  melee,  then  comes  the 
opportunity  of  the  boats,  but  even  then  there  may  be  danger 
to  friends  as  well  as  foes.  If  it  is  true  that  the  Chinese  boats 
could  not  distinguish  their  enemies  at  the  Yalu,  it  is  a  very 
noteworthy  fact,  for  in  that  battle  there  was  little  that  savoured 
of  the  melee,  though  there  was  more  smoke  than  would  be 
produced  with  cordite  or  amide  powder.  The  sphere  of 
action  of  the  torpedo-boat  upon  the  battlefield  very  closely 

*  To  lose  half-a-dozen  Cushings  would  be  disastrous  to  any  fleet.  The  ideal 
torpedo-officer  will  be  too  rare  and  valuable  a  being  to  be  risked  for  small  gain, 
and  if  the  torpedo-officer  is  not  ideal  in  courage,  coolness,  and  sagacity,  his 
attack  will  miscarry.  In  manoeuvres  there  is  no  ordeal  of  fire  to  sink  and  slay. 
Crews  of  boats  under  a  terrific  fire,  to  which  they  can  make  no  reply,  will  need 
extraordinary  steadiness  and  heroism.  A  torpedo  flotilla  once  beaten  off  with 
any  loss,  will  be  good  for  little,  owing  to  the  bad  moral  effect  of  such  a  '•epulse 
on  the  men.    cf.    Cipriani,  Journal  United  Service  Institution^  xxxvii.,  763. 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


resembles  that  of  cavalry  upon  land,  and  these  craft  should  be 
used  like  cavalry.  They  act  by  surprise ;  they  complete  the 
ruin  of  the  beaten. 

The  English  fleet  includes  one  vessel  which  is  specially 
built  for  ramming — the  Polyphemus ;  and  the  United  States 
have  in  the  Katahdin  a  similar  craft.  There  are  many  who 
are  in  love  with  "  the  small  swift  ram,"  but  it  is  doubtful 
how  far  such  a  ship  is  attainable,  and  how  far  she  would  be 
useful  if  the  ideal  could  be  obtained.  Ability  to  ram  depends 
upon  speed  and  handiness  in  the  assailant  and  the  want  of 
these  qualities  in  the  assailed.  To  obtain  a  high  speed,  not 
only  upon  the  measured  mile  but  in  a  sea-way,  the  boilers 
must  be  heavy  and  the  engines  powerful.  This  necessarily 
involves  a  high  displacement,  as  the  hull  must  be  strong  to 
withstand  the  jar  of  the  machinery  and  the  violent  concussion 
of  ramming.  If  the  ram  is  given  guns  and  armour,  she 
becomes  a  battleship  ;  if  she  is  left  without  them,  she  is  liable 
to  be  destroyed  by  gun-fire  long  before  she  can  use  her  sole 
weapon.  And  that  weapon  is  a  most  uncertain  and  two- 
edged  one,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

There  is  yet  another  species  of  ship  which  has  appeared 
within  the  last  decade — the  ship  armed  with  the  Zalinski  gun 
for  projecting  large  charges  of  dynamite  to  a  great  distance. 
The  Zalinski  gun  is  at  present  in  an  undeveloped  stage,  but 
there  is  good  reason  to  suppose,  like  many  other  inventions, 
it  will  be  perfected  in  time.  It  offers  a  very  large  target  to 
hostile  quick-firers,  and  it  is  not  strongly  constructed,  but  it  can 
project  shells  containing  20olbs.  of  the  highest  explosive,  to 
a  range  of  2000  yards  at  the  rate  of  one  a  minute.*  The  shell 
is  a  long  time  in  the  air,  in  some  cases  as  much  as  twelve 

*  The  projectile  is  practically  a  torpedo,  with  from  two  to  five  times  the 
range  of  the  Whitehead,  and,  it  is  probable,  at  least  as  great  accuracy.  The 
fuses  of  the  projectiles  and  the  valves  of  the  gun  have  been  vastly  improved  of 
late,  but  there  seems  to  be  some  scepticism  as  to  the  value  of  the  weapon, 
v.  Schrceder.  Proceedings,  U.S.A.  Naval  Institute,  xx.,  1.  ff.  A  similar 
weapon  is  Mr.  Hudson  Maxim's  torpedo  gun,  firing  huge  high  explosive  shells 
with  low  initial  velocity. 


THE   NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  151 

seconds.  Like  the  torpedo  it  could  not  be  used  with  much 
effect  against  a  single  ship,  which  could  turn,  or  stop,  or 
increase  her  speed,  and  thus  avoid  it ;  but  it  might  be  deadly 
against  a  squadron,  where  the  individual  ships  cannot  act  with 
entire  freedom,  but  are  dependent  upon  their  neighbours. 
Such  a  dynamite  vessel  might  lie  to  leeward  of  the  heavier 
ships,  and  throw  her  aerial  torpedoes  over  them  at  the  enemy. 
The  effect  of  her  projectiles  exploding  against  a  ship's 
unarmoured  side  would  probably  be  most  destructive.  At 
the  same  time,  the  American  Vesuvius,  which  has  been 
built  for  this  purpose,  does  not  give  entire  satisfaction,  and 
it  has  been  proposed  to  take  her  pneumatic  guns  out  of  her. 

The  perfecting  of  the  pneumatic  gun  would  be  the  death- 
knell  of  the  battleship  in  its  present  form,  and  it  is  hard  to 
see  what  protection  could  be  devised  against  its  bolts. 
As  the  jar  to  the  ship  is  very  slight  with  air-impulse, 
it  can  readily  be  fitted  upon  merchant  steamers,  and 
was  so  employed  upon  the  Nictheroy  in  the  Brazilian  Civil 
War* 

The  position  of  the  commander-in-chief  in  battle  has  been 
much  canvassed.  Persano  chose  to  leave  the  line  at  Lissa 
when  the  Austrian  attack  was  impending,  and  placed  himself 
outside  it,  to  be  the  better  able  to  communicate  his  orders. 
As  he  had  failed  to  acquaint  his  captains  of  the  purposed 
change,  the  effect  was  most  disastrous.  It  has  been  pointed 
out  that  for  the  admiraK  to  withdraw  to  a  light  ship,  or  to 
place  himself  with  the  reserve,  is  very  dangerous,  as  he  thereby 
becomes  a  simple  spectator,  and  cannot  be  at  hand  to  change 
the  formation  of  his  fleet  instantly,  if  this  should  be  required. t 
Farragut  at  Port  Hudson,  Tegetthoff  at  Lissa,  Nelson  at 
Trafalgar,  are  good  precedents  for  the  admiral's  ship  lead- 
ing. %    It  is  more  difficult  than  it  was  in  the  past,  when  ships 

*  Page  40-41.  f  Mahan,  Influence  of  Sea  Power,  353,  ff. 

X  Nelson  before  Trafalgar,  Farragut  at  Mobile  and  New  Orleans,  were  each 
entreated  by  their  captains  not  to  lead,  because  of  the  danger.  Nelson  complied 
with  the  request,  but  only  momentarily,  and  on  second  thoughts  took  his 


i52  IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 

were  closer  together,  and  when  it  was  comparatively  safe  to 
stand  on  deck,  for  the  leader,  by  his  personal  example,  to 
encourage  his  fleet.  But  if  his  personal  heroism  cannot  be 
witnessed,  the  behaviour  of  his  ship  can  be  seen  by  all. 
And  if  he  takes  his  place  at  the  head  of  the  line,  it  will  be 
possible  to  fight  the  battle  without  signals,  upon  the  "  follow- 
my-leader"  plan,  a  plan  which  was  constantly  practised  by 
the  Mediterranean  fleet  under  Admiral  Tryon.  In  most 
English  battleships  and  cruisers  the  signalmen  are  altogether 
unprotected.  The  masts  are  naturally  liable  to  be  shot  away, 
and  the  semaphores  are  placed  in  a  very  exposed  position 
upon  the  bridge,  where  the  hail  of  shells,  fired  direct,  or 
ricochetting  from  the  water,  would  exert  its  most  devastating 
effect.  If  a  really  simple  arrangement  can  be  devised  whereby 
the  signalmen  can  work  the  signals,  whether  at  the  mast- 
head, on  Prince  Louis  of  Battenberg's  plan,  or  otherwise, 
from  under  cover,  a  great  many  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
commander-in-chief  will  vanish.  It  will  still,  however,  be 
hard  to  communicate  with  those  divisions  of  the  fleet  which 
are  at  any  distance,  and  with  a  large  fleet  and  open  order 
the  distances  must  be  great.  It  is  therefore  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  subordinate  commanders  to  know  before- 
hand what  the  chief  is  going  to  do,  for  them  to  discuss  with 
him  the  various  possibilities,  and  to  be  saturated  with  his 
ideas.  Thus  it  was  that  Nelson's  captains  learnt  what  were 
their  admiral's  intentions,  and  were  prepared  at  the  moment 
of  action  to  execute  his  wishes.  The  want  of  such  knowledge 
amongst  the  Italian  commanders  was  one  of  the  chief  factors 
which  produced  the  disasters  of  Lissa. 

At  the  Yalu  Admiral  Ito  led  the  Main  Squadron,  and 
Admiral  Tsuboi  the  Flying  Squadron,  and  then  signalling  was 

position  in  the  van  (James,  iii.,  391).  Farragut  gave  way  on  both  occasions, 
but  never  ceased  to  regret  his  compliance  at  Mobile.  There  he  resumed  the 
lead  at  the  critical  moment  of  the  attack  (i.,  125).  TegetthofF s  captains  were 
instructed  to  follow  the  flagship's  movements,  even  if  he  fell.  The  French 
experiment  of  placing  the  fadmiral  in  a  frigate  was  most  disastrous  to  the 
Revolutionary  cause,  as  he  was  thereby  converted  into  a  mere  spectator. 


THE   NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  153 

comparatively  easy  on  board  the  Japanese  Fleet.  On  board 
French  ships,  with  their  strong  military  masts,  which  contain 
a  steel  core  inside  the  stairway,  signalling  would  probably  be 
easier  in  action  than  from  the  tops  of  English  ships.  It  is 
possible  that  in  one  or  other  of  the  tops  the  admiral  might 
find  it  advantageous  to  take  up  his  position  during  action,  as 
Farragut  found  it  necessary  to  climb  the  rigging  at  Mobile. 
But  special  protection  should  be  given  to  the  admiral's  battle- 
quarters,  as  his  life  is  a  valuable  one,  and  the  military  masts 
are  much  exposed.  It  was  a  saying  of  Admiral  Tryon  that 
the  captain  must  look  forward,  the  admiral  aft.  From  the 
forward  conning-tower  ships  astern  cannot  be  seen,  and  from 
the  after  conning-tower  the  same  is  the  case  with  ships 
forward.  From  the  upper  tops  a  good  all  round  view  can  be 
had,  and  there  is  not  much  to  obstruct  the  field  of  vision. 
Two  or  three  inches  of  Harveyed  steel  would,  however,  at 
that  great  height,  diminish  the  ship's  stability.  It  goes  with- 
out saying,  that  if  the  top  be  selected  by  the  commander  as 
his  battle  position,  communications  with  the  captain  must  be 
fully  assured. 

We  must  now  pass  to  the  general  formation  of  fleets  for 
battle.  There  are  five  possible  dispositions,  of  which  two  are 
practical :  line  ahead,  line  abreast,  one  or  other  of  these  two 
with  the  ships  en  echelo?i,  triangular  or  group  formation,  and 
naval  square.  The  tactics  to  be  adopted  and  the  structural 
peculiarities  of  the  ships  engaged,  must  to  some  extent  dictatr 
the  nature  of  the  formation  adopted.  What  is  suited  to  a 
melee,  or  to  the  use  of  the  ram  and  torpedo,  is  not  necessarily 
best  adapted  for  the  employment  of  the  gun. 

A  single  line,  whether  abreast  or  ahead,  has  these  dis- 
advantages :  its  extremities  are  weak ;  a  great  extent  of 
water  is  covered ;  the  force  is  not  concentrated ;  and  the 
attack  of  the  enemy  may  be  delivered  upon  a  section  of  the 
fleet.  In  addition  line  abreast  masks  the  broadside  fire  of 
the  ships  placed  in  it  and  compels  an  end-on  attack,  which  can 
only  result,  if  the  enemy  meet  it  by  a  similar  disposition,  in  a 


154  IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 

confused  melee,  in  which  the  fleets  will  break  up  into  a 
number  of  isolated  units  and  chance  will  decide  the  issue.** 
The  end-on  attack  was  favoured  by  our  constructors  between 
1875  and  1885,  when  most  of  our  "echeloned"  turret-ships 
were  designed.  Vessels  of  the  Inflexible  and  Colossus  class 
are  clearly  meant  to  fight  in  line  abreast,  since  the  disposition 
of  their  turrets  limits  the  arc  of  their  broadside  fire.  But  our 
more  modern  ships  are  marked  by  a  return  to  the  older  and 
sounder  conception  of  a  powerful  broadside, f  and  no  admiral 
would  be  likely,  of  his  own  choice,  to  place  such  ships  in  an 
order  which  would  reduce  their  efficiency,  and  prevent  them 
from  employing  their  numerous  and  formidable  quick-firers. 
Any  disposition  adopted,  however,  must  be  to  some  extent 
guided  by  the  action  of  the  enemy,  and  if  we  look  at  the 
French  battleships  we  shall  see,  between  1880  and  1890,  the 
tendency,  which  has  been  observed  in  England,  to  secure 
powerful  end-on  fire,  though  stern  fire  is  not  neglected,  as  it 
has  been  neglected  in  England  in  the  past.  This  looks  rather 
as  though  the  French  meant  to  fight  a  stern  battle  in  line 
abreast.  In  such  an  order  ironclads  like  the  Magenta  and 
Carnot  can  bring  to  bear  three  heavy  guns  to  our  two  in  our 
more  recent  designs.  But  since  France  has  followed  us  at 
last  in  the  fore  and  aft  disposition  of  the  heavy  guns,  in  her 
very  latest  ships — -the  St.  Louis  class — it  is  somewhat 
doubtful  what  she  intends  to  do. 

In  a  stern  battle  the  French  fleet  would  form  in  line  abreast, 
and  steam  away  from  our  ships.  As  we  hold  at  present  the 
weather  gauge  in  speed,  we  could  overtake  the  retreating 
fleet,  but  we  should  probably  have  to  chase  in  line  abreast. 
If  our  ships  were  in  line  ahead,  the  leaders  would  run  the  risk 

*  It  can  also  be  easily  doubled  upon,  or  turned  on  either  wing,  as  the 
broadside  fire  of  all  the  ships  in  it  except  one  is  masked. 

f  At  the  same  time  good  end-on  fire  is  a  necessity,  as  the  enemy  may  other- 
wise, with  equal  speed,  fight  a  stern  battle,  and  torpedo  attacks  are  generally 
best  delivered  from  ahead,  cf.  Sturdee.  Journal  United  Service  Institution, 
xxxviii.,  1244-5. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  155 

of  disablement  from  the  enemy's  concentrated  fire.  If  we 
attacked  in  two  columns  in  line  ahead,  one  coming  up  on  each 
quarter  of  the  French  line  abreast,  our  two  divisions  would  be 
widely  separated,  and  the  enemy  might  concentrate  upon  one  or 
other,  since  steam  lends  itself  to  sudden  and  rapid  movements. 
Our  cruiser  divisions,  or  at  least  our  powerful  first-class 
cruisers,  would  no  doubt  thus  move  on  the  French  flank, 
striving  to  disable  one  ship,  and  so  compel  the  others  to  delay 
in  order  to  support  it.  The  superior  speed  of  vessels,  such 
as  the  Edgar  and  Powerful,  would  enable  them  to  avoid  any 
sudden  concentration  by  the  enemy. 

Line  abreast  can  be  readily  converted  into  line  ahead  by  a 
quarter  turn.  But  for  ordinary  purposes  it  has  all  the 
disadvantages  of  line  ahead  and  none  of  the  advantages.  The 
strong  point  in  line  ahead  is  that  it  leaves  the  broadside  clear, 
and  allows  the  ships  to  follow  the  movements  of  their  leader. 
It  is  the  most  elastic  and  the  most  simple  formation,  and  the 
target  is  small.  For,  as  errors  in  shooting  more  generally 
arise  from  vertical  than  horizontal  misdirection,  and  as  more 
shots  fly  over  the  target  than  fly  wide  of  it  on  either  side, 
with  a  trifling  error  in  elevation,  projectiles  will  be  more  likely 
to  drop  on  the  deck  of  the  ship  end-on,  when  the  target  is 
300  feet  to  380  feet  long,  than  upon  her,  broadside-on,  when 
the  target  is  only  60  feet  to  80  feet.  The  armour  is  no  doubt 
presented  at  a  sharper  angle  end-on,  and  glances  will  be  more 
frequent,  but  the  gain  in  this  direction  does  not  compensate 
for  the  loss  in  other  ways.  The  object  in  battle  is  not  so 
much  to  elude  the  enemy's  projectiles  as  to  pour  projectiles 
upon  him. 

A  third  formation  is  the  double-quarter  line  adopted  by 
Tegetthoff  at  Lissa.  This  leaves  free  both  broadside  and  bow 
guns,  but  there  is  some  risk  of  gunners  in  the  uproar  and 
excitement  of  the  battle  hitting  friends.  It  is,  too,  a  formation 
which  lacks  elasticity.  A  better  disposition  is  a  slightly 
indented  line  ahead,  or  "  line  of  bearing,''  which  permits  the 
bow  chasers  to  fire  at  the  enemy,  but  does  not  avoid  the 


156 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


risk  of  accidental  injury  to  friends.  A  line  ahead,  reinforced 
at  both  of  its  extremities  is,  perhaps,  the  best  formation  of 
those  considered.  The  vessels  supporting  the  leaders  can  be 
ships  with  a  powerful  bow  fire,  when  the  most  will  be  made  of 
them.  In  the  same  way,  those  supporting  the  rear  should 
have  a  strong  stern  fire. 

Groups  of  ships  acting  together,  and  supporting  one  another 
in  a  series  of  triangles,  each  composed  of  three  ships,  were  in 
great  favour  as  a  battle  formation  some  years  ago,  but  now 
receive  less  enthusiastic  support.  The  group-commander  is 
a  fresh  intermediary  between  the  admiral  and  his  captains,  and 
an  unnecessary  intermediary.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted 
that  whatever  order  is  adopted,  each  vessel  in  the  line  will 
support  her  neighbour,  so  that  there  is  little  gained  by 
detailing  B  and  C  to  cover  A.  Nor  does  there  seem  any 
reason  why  the  group  should  consist  of  three  ships  and  not 
of  two  or  four,  since,  as  has  been  said,  there  is  no  transcen- 
dental power  in  the  number  three.  For  the  group  it  may  be 
argued  that,  with  such  a  formation,  ships  of  similar  type  can 
best  act  together,  and  that  often  there  are  not  more  than  two 
or  three  ships  of  identical  type.  But  it  will  always  be  the 
case  that  ships  in  line  will  be  similar,  and  small  differences  of 
construction  do  not  necessitate  a  total  change  of  formation. 
Where  the  differences  are  important,  the  ships  of  the  different 
types  will  not  be  jumbled  together,  but  placed  apart.  The 
group  as  a  sub-division  of  the  division  is  hardly  necessary- 
Most  group  formations,  too,  offer  a  good  target  to  hostile  fire. 

Naval  squares,  or  the  arrangement  of  ships  in  quincunces, 
again,  are  complicated  and  impossible.  They  offer  too  good 
a  target  to  the  quick-firer.  Such  dispositions  lack  elasticity, 
and  inevitably  mask  the  fire  of  the  ships  in  more  than  one 
direction  ;  and,  as  in  all  complicated  formations,  there  is  risk 
of  gunners  hitting  their  friends.  The  formation  of  six  ships 
in  a  triangle,  recommended  by  MM.  Montechant  and  Z.,*  is 
open  to  all  these  objections. 

*  Guerres  Navales  de  Demain,  p.  185, 


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•  J?. 

7.  Ztow&te  Carter  l/aes.    2.  Line  Abreast.    3,  5.  Line  of  Bearin*  Abreast  and  Ahead. 
4.  Line  Ahead.         6.  Line  of  Groups  Ahead.        7.  Line  Ahead  Re-inforced. 
8.  Quincunx.  9.  Line  of  Groups  Abreast. 

Naval  Formations. 

Map  XXIX. 


i 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


157 


There  is  little  doubt  that  line  ahead  is  the  best  formation 
when  the  enemy  does  not  run  away.  It  is  the  normal  forma- 
tion for  cruising,  and  thus  its  adoption  for  battle  does  not 
necessitate  a  sudden  alteration  at  the  last  minute  ;  it  is  easy 
to  make  changes  of  direction  or  formation  with  it ;  the  broad- 
side is  left  clear,  and  there  is  no  r1  mger  of  firing  into  friends  : 
station  can  readily  be  kept ;  signals  are  almost  unnecessary, 
or  reduced  to  a  minimum  ;  ar  d  bow  lire  can  be  obtained  by 
reinforcing  the  head  with  ships  powerful  in  this  direction,  or 
by  indenting  the  leading  vessels.  There  is  no  other  dispo- 
sition which  offers  so  many  advantages  and  which  has  so  few 
defects  ;  moreover,  there  is  this  additional  argument  in  its 
favour,  that  it  was  the  formation  adopted  by  the  deliberate 
experience  of  the  past.  Though  details  may  have  changed 
principles  have  not,  and  if  our  ancestors  feared  to  allow  their 
ships  to  be  raked,  we  shall  be  wise  if  we  refuse  to  expose 
ours  to  such  a  risk. 

Line  ahead,  then,  will  probably  be  the  formation  adopted 
by  a  judicious  commander-in-chief,  and  the  various  classes  of 
ships  will  be  in  separate  divisions  or  lines.  The  main  battle- 
ship squadron  will  engage  closely  with  the  enemy,  at  ranges 
not  exceeding  3000  yards  and  not  less  than  1000.  To  lee- 
ward of  it  will  lie  the  reserve  battleship  squadron  and  the 
torpedo  divisions,  whilst  the  first-class  cruisers  will  attack 
at  long  range,  not  going  inside  2000  yards,  and  the  second- 
class  cruisers  will  lie  yet  farther  out.  The  cruisers  will 
endeavour  to  divert  the  enemy's  attention.  They  may  steam 
round  and  round  him  if  they  are  fast  and  he  is  slow,  or  they 
may  steam  alongside  on  the  same  course.  It  is  certain  that 
the  battle  will  be  a  running  battle,  that  both  sides  will  be 
in  motion,  and  perhaps  in  rapid  motion.  For  either  side  to 
lie  to  whilst  the  other  cannonades  him  would  be  suicidal. 
At  the  outset,  ships  will  probably  use  their  highest  trust- 
worthy speed,  leaving  a  reserve  of  one  or  two  knots  for 
contingencies.  As  the  action  progresses  the  speed  will 
diminish,  when  ships  are  more  or  less  disabled.    Vessels  very 


158 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


severely  injured  will  leave  the  line,  and  their  place  will  be 
taken  from  the  reserve.  Should  both  fleets  steam  fast  upon 
a  parallel  course  in  one  direction,  injured  ships  will  be  left 
behind,  a  prey  to  torpedo-boats.  Over  these  there  may  be 
fierce  engagements,  as  the  one  side  will  detach  torpedo- 
boats  to  attack,  and  the  other,  boats  to  protect  ;  or  the  two 
fleets  may,  like  the  Alabama  and  Kearsarge,  circle  on  a 
common  centre.  Generally  speaking,  the  battle  will,  in  its 
earlier  stage,  be  fought  fleet  to  fleet,  and  individual  ships 
will  not  fight  isolated  actions.  The  effort  of  each  commander 
will  be  to  concentrate  upon  a  portion  of  his  enemy's  force 
his  whole  strength.  This  will  be  a  vastly  harder  proceeding 
with  alert  opponents,  whose  ships  are  propelled  by  steam, 
and  can  move  rapidly  to  any  point,  than  it  was  when  the 
line  had  only  to  be  broken  to  secure  the  advantage,  and 
when  our  enemies  were  hardly  our  match  in  skill,  however 
fiery  their  courage  may  have  been.  The  victory  in  war  goes 
to  the  side  which  makes  fewest  mistakes,  and  no  doubt  mis- 
takes will  be  made,  otherwise  it  looks  as  though,  with  even 
forces,  battles  would  be  a  matter  of  hard  pounding,  and  there- 
fore indecisive.  The  certainty  and  rapidity  of  movements 
with  steam,  however,  render  great  combinations,  sudden 
changes,  rapid  developments,  possible.  The  fleet  which  is 
skilled  and  practised  in  steam  tactics  will  threaten  attack  in 
one  direction  and  in  one  formation,  and  then,  perhaps,  change 
to  quite  another  with  great  speed.  If  the  opponent  is  less 
skilled  in  station  keeping  or  manoeuvring,  he  will  fall  into 
disorder,  his  ships  will  mask  one  another's  fire,  and  he  will 
lose  from  the  start. 

A  period  of  manoeuvring  may  thus  precede  the  opening  of 
fire,  as  well  as  succeed  it.  Unless  the  ships  are  well  handled 
and  the  formation  simple,  there  may  in  this  be  some  risk  of 
collision  between  friends,  as  the  fleet  will  be  possibly  under 
fire,  and  the  tension  and  excitement  tremendous.  To  get  the 
weather  gauge,  so  that  the  smoke  from  funnels  and  guns 
blows  down  upon  the  enemy,  may  be  very  advantageous  ; 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


159 


advantageous,  too,  it  may  be  to  place  the  sun  in  the  hostile 
gunners'  eyes.  If  neither  side  forces  a  melee*  there  will  be  a 
long  range  cannonade,  during  which  considerable  damage  may 
be  done  on  either  side,  but  such  a  long  range  encounter  cannot, 
it  seems,  be  decisive. t  Careful  gunnery,  strict  fire  discipline 
will  be  essential  to  prevent  the  waste  of  precious  ammunition. 
The  quick-firers  and  heavy  guns  will  be  alone  employed,  as 
small  projectiles  cannot  do  much  harm  at  these  considerable 
ranges,  and  their  turn  will  come  later. %  The  preliminary 
cannonade  will  continue  till  one  side  is  getting  decidedly  the 
worst,  or  till  both  have  expended  a  good  proportion  of  their 
ammunition.  In  the  former  case,  tire  weaker  side  may  be 
desirous  to  close,  to  redeem  if  possible  what  has  been  lost  in 
the  chances  of  the  melee.  In  the  latter  case,  each  side  will  be 
anxious  to  end  the  battle  by  bringing  it  to  a  decision.  It  is 
possible  that  the  weaker  may  attempt  to  steam  off ;  but  if  he 
does,  he  will  abandon  his  disabled  ships  to  destruction  or 
capture 

So  far,  there  is  mention  of  neither  ram  nor  torpedo  as  being 
employed  by  ships.  The  ram  has  been  shown  by  repeated 
analyses  to  be  a  most  difficult  weapon  to  use.§  It  involves 
actual  contact  with  the  enemy,  and  if  the  enemy  has  engines 
unimpaired,  and  sea  room,  the  past  proves  that  such  actual 
contact  is  difficult  to  effect.    The  ram  has  hardly  ever  scored 

*  It  will  require  great  self-restraint  and  strict  discipline  to  prevent  a  dash 
upon  the  enemy,  when  he  comes  into  sight.  There  may  be  disobedient  captains, 
like  Tang  of  the  Chili  Yuen,  who  will  be  anxious  to  use  the  ram,  and  may  for 
that  object,  leave  the  line.  The  strain  upon  the  crews  is,  perhaps,  less  at  close 
quarters,  as  the  duration  of  the  action  must  then  be  shorter. 

f  The  Yalu  was  a  striking  demonstration  of  the  resistance  of  ironclads  to 
long  range  fire. 

%  As  it  will  be  useless  to  attempt  to  pierce  armour  at  long  ranges,  common 
shell  will  be  used.  When  the  fleets  close,  it  might  be  advantageous  to  use 
common-shell  and  armour-piercing  shot  alternately. 

§  Mr.  Laird  Clowes  shows  that  of  seventy-four  attempts  to  ram,  in  twenty 
cases  the  rammed  ship  was  much  damaged,  disabled,  or  sunk.  There  is  only 
one  case  in  which  serious  damage  was  inflicted  upon  a  ship  under  steam  with 
sea  room.    Journal  United  Service  Institution,  xxxviii.,  223. 


i6o 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


against  ships  in  motion.  When  the  Merrimac  rammed  the 
Cumberland,  the  latter  was  at  anchor  ;  when  the  Ferdinand 
Max  charged  the  Re  d'  Italia,  the  Italian  was  motionless.  In 
the  American  Civil  War,  few  attempts  to  ram  were  successful 
out  of  the  great  total.  The  use  of  the  ram  involves  a  melee, 
which  tacticians  agree  in  regarding  as  detestable.  And  if 
vessels  are  charged  whilst  running  at  a  high  speed,  the 
damage  to  the  "rammer"  may  be  great.  The  Camperdown 
was  badly  injured,  though  the  Victoria's  speed  was  only  five 
knots  ;  the  Konig  Wilhelm  had  her  stem  badly  twisted  by  the 
Grosser  Kurfurst,  which  was  steaming  at  ten  knots.  The 
Iron  Duke  alone  charged  a  vessel  under  way  without  being 
much  the  worse  for  it.  The  utmost  skill  will  be  necessary  to 
deal  a  blow  with  a  ram.  At  very  close  quarters  a  furious  hail 
of  projectiles  will  crash  upon  the  conning-tower,  and  render 
the  direction  of  the  ship  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty.  And 
there  is  the  great  risk  of  being  rammed  by  the  enemy  if  there 
is  any  miscalculation,  or  without  miscalculation,  of.  being 
torpedoed.  Indeed,  the  torpedo  may  be  said  to  have  relegated 
the  ram  to  the  background.  Yet,  if  the  fleets  charge  one 
another  end-on,  there  may  be  cases  when  the  ram  will  be 
used,  but  there  will  be  great  danger  then  of  end-to-end 
collisions  should  the  commanders  on  either  side  be  determined, 
and  these  will  almost  certainly  result  in  the  loss  of  both  ships, 
unless,  indeed,  the  bows  of  the  ships  on  one  side  are  so  weak 
as  to  take  the  full  force  of  the  collision  and  to  break  it. 
More  probably  the  less  determined  man  will  swerve  at  the 
last  minute  and  expose  his  side,  as  did  Buchanan  at  Mobile. 

The  torpedo  has  a  limited  range,  though  not  so  limited  as 
the  ram."*  As  long  as  the  fleets  fight  at  a  distance  it  cannot 
be  used,  whilst  even  at  close  quarters  it  is  somewhat  uncertain. 

*  In  Table  XXV.  will  be  found  all  the  instances  of  the  employment  of  the 
torpedo  in  war  up  to  this  time.  So  far  as  any  result  can  be  deduced  it  is  that 
the  torpedo  is  not  successful  against  ships  in  motion.  But,  unlike  the  ram,  it 
has  not  been  often  enough  employed  to  give  grounds  for  any  induction,  and  it  is 
moreover  an  essentially  progressive  weapon,  improving  every  year. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  161 


It  is  a  most  deadly  projectile  when  it  strikes,  but  the  difficulty 
is  to  ensure  its  striking.  If  the  submerged  tubes  on  ship- 
board are  used  whilst  the  ship  is  in  rapid  motion  there  is 
always  some  danger  of  the  torpedo  being  deflected  in  quite  a 
different  direction  to  that  intended."*  Instances  have  occurred 
in  which  it  has  fouled  the  screw  of  the  vessel  from  which  it 
was  discharged  ;  improved  submerged  tubes  have,  however, 
got  over  this  difficulty,  and  every  day  the  range  of  the  torpedo 
and  the  accuracy  of  its  aim  are  increasing. 

The  old  above  water  tubes,  when  they  are  not  protected 
by  armour,  could  hardly  be  used  in  action, t  and  even  from 
them  the  deflection  is  considerable.  Moreover,  when  the 
torpedo  has  safely  left  the  discharger  and  is  running  straight, 
its  course  can  be  followed,  and  the  ship  at  which  it  is  aimed 
may  elude  it  by  a  quick  movement.  Doubtless  the  Whitehead 
is  becoming  day  by  day  more  deadly,  and  may  ultimately  be 
brought  to  the  comparative  perfection  of  the  gun.  Even  as 
it  stands  now,  it  has  vast  possibilities.  The  chief  argument 
against  it  is  its  "  flukiness."  Though  useful  as  a  protection 
against  the  ram,  its  employment  in  battle  is  best  left  to  its 
special  craft,  the  torpedo-boat. 

There  is  one  other  kind  of  torpedo  that  might  conceivably 
play  some  part  in  a  fleet  action,  the  dirigible  torpedo  of 
pattern  similar  to  the  Brennan  and  Nordenfelt.  At  present  it 
is  in  an  undeveloped  stage,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  a 
torpedo  which  could  be  steered  and  directed  from  a  distance, 
would  be  a  most  formidable  weapon.    Still  the  difficulties 

*  Some  of  these  difficulties  are  now  overcome,  or  are  in  a  fair  way  to  be  so. 
The  chief  causes  of  deflection  must  be  (i)  The  speed  of  the  ship,  which  can  be 
ascertained  and  allowed  for.  (2)  The  inclination  of  the  ship,  which  cannot  be 
ascertained,  as  it  varies  with  the  helm  used,  and  the  state  of  the  sea.  Torpedoes 
are  fitted  with  an  arrangement  which  prevents  their  explosion  till  they  have  run 
a  safe  distance.  The  chief  arguments  against  the  torpedo  are  these:  (1)  Its 
complication.  (2)  Its  limited  range.  (3)  The  terrible  effects  of  an  accidental 
explosion.  (4)  Its  many  failures  in  peace  when  uncharged.  Lloyd  and 
Hadcock.    Artillery,  261. 

f  At  the  Yalu  the  Chinese  are  said  to  have  emptied  their  above-water  tubes, 
though  this  is  denied  by  Commander  McGiffin. 

Vol.  II.  M 


l62 


» 

IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


are  great.  It  is  one  thing  to  direct  such  an  engine  of 
destruction  from  a  stationary  ship  at  a  stationary  ship,  and 
quite  another  to  manage  it  when  both  ships  are  travelling 
at  a  high  rate  of  speed  through  the  water.  One  or  two 
French  cruisers  have  been  fitted  with  such  a  dirigible  torpedo, 
but  its  employment  in  battle  would  probably  necessitate 
special  craft. 

At  the  close  of  the  long  range  cannonade  will  come  the 
close  action.  The  range  will  be  diminished  to  goo  yards  or 
iooo^yards,  and  the  stronger  side  will  steam  in  to  assure  its 
victory.  This  will  be  the  most  terrible  period  of  the  action. 
Up  to  that  time,  indeed,  the  damage  done  to  the  vitals  of  the 
battleships  will  not  have  been  serious,  but  no  doubt  the 
internal  economy  of  these  vessels  will  have  been  impaired. 
The  heavy  quick-firers,  judging  from  the  Yalu,  will  not,  at  long 
range,  inflict  much  injury  on  the  water-line.  It  will  be  upon 
the  upper  works,  superstructures,  military  masts,  funnels, 
ventilators,  chart-houses,  bridges,  and  stacks  of  boats  and 
top-hamper,  that  the  hail  of  projectiles  whether  fired  direct 
or  ricochetting  from  the  water,  will  descend.  The  battleship 
has  to  carry  about  with  her  all  sorts  of  odds  and  ends  which 
are  essential  to  her  in  peace,  but  useless  in  war.  It  is  difficult 
to  know  what  should  be  done  with  the  top-hamper.'54'  When 
the  ship  clears  for  action  the  boats  cannot  be  taken  below, 
and  must  remain  above  to  be  shot  to  splinters  and  to  cause 
fires.  Equally  dangerous  and  difficult  to  dispose  of  are 
wooden  companion  ladders,  mess-tables,  benches,  and  the 
various  impedimenta  usually  found  between  decks ;  if  of  wood 
they  will  add  to  the  risk  of  fire,  which  is  very  great.  They 
can  hardly  be  thrown  overboard,  though  it  is  a  point  to  be 

*  The  presence  of  such  top-hamper  adds  greatly  to  the  difficulty  of  clearing 
for  action.  It  is  said  by  Lieutenant-Commander  Wainwright  (U.S.N.)  that 
some  of  the  ships  of  the  English  Mediterranean  fleet  took  twenty-four  hours  to 
clear.  The  amount  of  time  available  may  determine  the  tactics  of  a  battle. 
The  French  instructions  order  boats  to  be  filled  with  water  and  surrounded  with 
splinter-proof,  material.  The  torpedo  launches  carried  would  most  likely  be 
lowered  if  time  allowed. 


THE   NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  163 


noted  that  the  Japanese  crews  did  without  them,  and  so  kept 
their  decks  clear.  It  would  seem  best  to  leave  all  but  the  very 
barest  minimum  of  boats  on  shore.  It  is  stated  that  this 
course  will  be  adopted  by  the  French  in'  war,  and  it  is  a 
proceeding  which  commends  itself  to  common  sense.  No 
boats  will  be  of  much  use  for  saving  life  after  a  battle.  This 
is  a  duty  which,  as  we  have  urged,  should  fall  upon  special 
vessels,  protected  by  the  white  flag  or  the  red  cross.*  There 
should,  however,  be  some  provision  of  life-preservers  for  the 
crew  of  the  big  ship,  and  as  far  as  possible  the  preservers 
should  be  non-inflammable.  With  the  ship's  upper  deck 
thoroughly  cleared  of  wood  there  will  be  no  wreckage  to 
float  and  save  the  drowning.  India-rubber  distendable  air- 
bags  would  seem,  on  the  whole,  the  best  suited,  and  there 
is  no  reason  why  one  should  not  be  supplied"  to  each  man. 
ready  to  be  inflated.  It  would  support  him  in  the  water  till 
the  special  craft  could  pick  him  up. 

Upon  the  upper  works  of  the  ships,  then,  will  fall  most  of 
the  damage  inflicted  during  the  preliminary  cannonade.  They 
will  have  been  prepared  for  the  strain  in  every  conceivable 
way.  Round  the  funnels  sacks  of  coal  will  be  placed,  and 
near  the  quick-firers  mantlets  to  catch  splinters.  The  conning- 
tower  and  the  positions  from  which  the  ship  will  be  fought, 
will  also,  doubtless,  receive  attention.  In  this  way  the  injury 
done  may  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  but  it  will  still  be 
extensive.  The  effect  of  even  small  shells  charged  with  high 
explosives  upon  unarmoured  structures  is  very  deadly.  Great 
holes  will  be  torn  in  the  outer  plating;  splinters  and  frag- 
ments of  side  and  shell  sent  flying  through  the  confined  space 
within  ;  and  any  wood  that  may  be  about,  which  has  not  been 
thoroughly  drenched  with  water,  will  be  set  on  fire.  The 
funnels  and  ventilators  may  be  riddled  till  they  come  down, 
and  inside  them,  on  the  splinter-gratings,  which  commonly 
cross  them  at  the  level  of  the  armour-deck,  fragments  of  iron 


*  Page  1 1 1 


M  2 


64 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


and  wood  will  collect  and  obstruct  the  draught.  If  the  venti- 
lators are  blocked,  and  flow  of  air  to  the  stokehold  checked, 
the  stokers  and  engine-room  men  will  be  exposed  to  terrible 
hardships—gasping  in  a  hot  and  vitiated  atmosphere  for  the 
air  which  cannot  reach  them.  The  boiler-fires  will  fail  and 
the  steam-pressure  sink.  It  is  true  that  nothing  of  this  kind 
appears  to  have  happened  at  the  Yalu,  but  the  fire  main- 
tained there  was  not  so  accurate  as  it  would  probably  be  with 
highly-skilled  and  cool  Western  gunners.  The  danger  to  the 
funnels  and  ventilators  is,  indeed,  so  great,  that  it  is  strange 
that  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  protect  them  by  an 
armoured  shaft  rising  at  least  as  high  as  the  upper  deck. 
The  American  monitors  had,  one  and  all,  armoured 
funnels.  If  the  funnel  is  injured  between  decks  there  will  be 
some  risk  of  fire,  and  there  is  certain  to  be  great  inconveni- 
ence from  smoke.  The  more  improvised  protection — provided 
the  material  used  is  non-inflammable — the  better.  Other 
points  which  will  require  protection,  if  any  can  be  given 
them,  will  be  the  supports  of  the  barbettes  in  ships  such  as 
the  Amiral  Duperre  or  the  Benbow,  where  the  bases  of  the 
heavy  gun  positions  are  left  unarmoured."*  If  the  iron-work 
under  them  is  much  damaged,  there  will  be  the  risk  of  the 
barbette,  with  its  ponderous  weight,  coming  down  and  sink- 
ing the  ship.  In  such  ships,  too,  the  auxiliary  6-inch  battery 
must  receive  attention.  We  have  seen  the  free  use  made  of 
sand-bags  on  board  the  Northern  ships  in  their  attacks  upon 
the  New  Orleans  forts  and  Mobile.  It  is  to  be  feared  that 
with  a  full  weight  of  coal,  stores,  and  ammunition  on  board, 
modern  ships  could  not  load  themselves  with  sand.  Coal 
would  be  the  only  substance  available.  And  here  again  it 
is  impossible  to  overlook  the  fact  that  a  fleet  fresh  out  of 
port,  with  full  bunkers,  has  a  great  advantage  over  one  which 
has  been  cruising  some  time  at  sea,  from  the  mere  fact  that  in 
the  former  coal  protection  will  be  at  its  maximum,  and  plenty 


*  In  the  "  Admirals,"  coal  can  be  stowed  under  the  barbettes. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  165 

of  coal  at  hand  for  extemporised  defences,  whilst  in  the  latter 
many  of  the  bunkers  will  be  empty.  In  theory,  of  course,  a 
warship  will  always  burn  first  the  coal  in  those  bunkers, 
which  are  least  valuable  for  defensive  purpose  ;  she  will  avoid 
using  the  fuel  from  the  water-line  bunkers.  But  in  practice, 
regard  for  stability  will  prevent  the  emptying  of  the  lowest 
bunkers,  whilst  the  upper  ones  are  left  full.  Doubtless,  if 
there  is  time,  the  ship  can  use  water-ballast,  and  transfer  as 
much  of  her  fuel  as  is  convenient  to  the  positions  where  it 
will  be  most  useful ;  but  she  may  not  always  have  the  time 
required.  And  thus,  in  considering  the  relative  value  of 
coal  and  armour  protection,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that, 
however  efficacious  the  former  may  be  when  in  its  place,  it  is 
as  likely  as  not,  not  to  be  in  that  place,  whilst  armour  cannot 
be  burnt  in  the  furnaces,  and  is  always  there. 

During  the  preliminary  attack  fires  are  certain  to  be 
frequent,  unless  the  ships  engaging  are  of  the  very  latest 
pattern.  At  the  Yalu  and  at  Lissa,  as  we  have  seen,  they 
were  numerous,  and  it  is  possible,  though  not  certain,  that 
they  will  be  even  more  frequently  produced  by  high  explosive 
bursters.  Such  fires  will  greatly  add  to  the  difficulty  of 
working  the  ship.  The  temperature  in  the  Lai  Yuen's 
engine-room  is  reported  to  have  risen  to  2000  Fahrenheit,  and 
the  engineers  to  have  been  seared  and  blinded  by  the  heat. 
Fires  will  certainly  render  yet  harder  the  position  of  the 
stokers  and  engine-room  complement,  and  may  seriously 
interfere  with  the  supply  of  ammunition  at  a  critical  moment. 
Though  the  hoists  to  the  heavier  guns  are  well  protected  on 
all  ships,  there  are  many  cases  when  projectiles  and  charges 
have  to  go  up  to  the  smaller  guns  with  very  scanty  armour  to 
protect  them  against  heat  or  the  enemy's  shells.  The  con- 
tingency of  a  shell  on  its  way  up  dropping  down  the  hoist 
through  some  damage  to  the  apparatus  or  through  accident, 
is  guarded  against  in  some  ships  by  automatic  brakes  on  the 
hoists,  but  there  are  other  ships  which  are  defective  in  this 
respect.    To  extinguish  fires,  good  pumps  placed  out  of  reach 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


of  shells,  and  good  discipline  are  necessary ;  but  since  pre- 
vention is  better  than  cure,  it  will  be  better  to  use  as  little 
wood  in  the  construction  of  the  ship  as  is  possible. 

The  number  of  hits  which  will  be  effected  in  this  preliminary 
period,  demands  some  attention.  An  English  admiral  has 
estimated  it,  throughout  the  battle,  at  two  per  cent ;  other 
writers  place  it  as  high  as  fifteen.  The  average  of  the 
Chinese  and  Japanese  fleets  at  the  Yalu,  works  out  to  twelve 
and  a  half,  if  we  accept  the  estimate  given  by  an  eye-witness, 
but  this  is  probably  too  high.  At  the  same  time,  there  seems 
little  doubt  that  the  shooting  with  quick-firers  will  be  more 
accurate  than  it  was  in  the  past  with  the  slow-fire  muzzle  or 
breech-loader.  In  practice,  great  feats  have  been  performed. 
Thus,  the  Royal  Arthur,  at  ranges  varying  between  1600  and 
2200  yards,  hit  a  target  fourteen  times  out  of  sixteen  shots, 
and  this  whilst  steaming  at  eight  knots.  The  French  fleet  has 
demolished  targets  at  4000  metres  range.  There  is,  however, 
a  great  difference  between  firing  at  a  motionless  target,  and  firing 
at  a  moving  enemy  who  is  returning  your  fire.  In  the  old  days, 
misses  were  frequent  when  the  ships  fought  at  very  close  quarters 
and  it  would  be  thought  impossible  for  a  shot  to  go  astray. 
But  generally  speaking,  the  state  of  the  sea  will  exercise  most 
influence  upon  the  quality  of  the  marksmanship.  If  the  water 
is  calm,  good  shooting  may  be  expected,  and  the  percentage 
of  hits  will  rise  above  ten  or  fifteen  :  if  rough,  it  will  fall  very 
rapidly,  perhaps  below  two  per  cent.  The  steadiness  of  the 
combatant  vessels  will  in  any  sea-way  become  a  factor  of 
great  importance,  as  two  guns  upon  a  stable  and  steady  ship 
will  beyond  doubt  effect  more  hits  than  as  many  weapons  upon 
an  unsteady  and  unstable  one.  In  the  days  of  top-heavy  ships, 
it  is  well  to  bear  this  in  mind. 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  huge  military  masts  carried 
by  most  French  battleships.*    They  would  be  of  immense 

*  In  a  recent  American  design,  the  Iowa,  the  military  mast  has  vanished,  and 
there  is  not  even  the  light  mast  of  English  pattern,  but  only  signal-poles.  So 
also  in  the  Brooklyn.    The  French  are  removing  the  after  military  mast  from 


THE   NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  167 

value  in  close  action,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  will  sur- 
vive the  long-range  cannonade.  They  tend  to  make  the  ship 
which  carries  them  unsteady  ;  they  are  very  heavy,  and  their 
fall  might  do  serious  damage.  The  English  military  masts  are 
much  lighter  and  smaller.  French  officers  are  of  opinion  that 
their  masts  would  stand  a  good  deal  of  knocking  about,  and 
that  a  single  6-inch  or  47-inch  shell  would  not  bring  them 
down.  At  the  Yalu  the  Japanese  military  masts  on  board 
the  three  great  cruisers,  Matsiishima,  Itsukushima)  and 
Hashidate,  apparently  survived  the  conflict  without  receiving 
damage.  On  the  other  hand  the  Akagi  lost  one  of  her  masts, 
which  was  not,  however,  of  the  military  pattern,  and  the 
Chinese  ships  lost  all  the  men  who  were  stationed  at  the  guns 
in  the  tops. 

The  maintenance  of  communications  within  the  ship 
during  action  is  even  more  important  than  the  maintenance 
of  her  communications  with  the  admiral.  How  far  is  it 
possible  to  use  voice-pipes  in  the  turmoil  of  battle  ?  We 
read  how  at  the  Yalu  officers  fought  with  their  ears  plugged 
and  yet  remained  deaf  for  weeks.  There  will  be,  not  only 
the  tremendous  din  and  concussion  of  the  ship's  own  guns, 
but  the  not  less  disquieting  crash  of  the  enemy's  shells,  and 
the  crunch  and  jar  of  the  iron  under  the  blows.  In  the 
ship's  interior  will  be  smoke  from  high  explosive  shells, 
smoke,  perhaps,  from  the  funnels,  and  smoke  from  hre.  Voice- 
pipes  may  be  severed  by  heavy  projectiles  impinging  upon 
the  tubes  which  carry  them  down,  or  perforating  the  armour. 
A  trustworthy  system  of  signalling  from  one  part  of  the  ship 
to  another  is  most  urgently  required.  It  should  be  operated 
by  electricity,  have  a  reply-indicator,  and  should  supplement 
the  existing  voice-pipes*     Mischances  with  the  present  form 

many  of  their  ships.  On  the  one  hand,  military  masts  are  valuable  for  signalling 
and  top-fire  at  close  quarters :  on  the  other  hand  it  is  doubtful  whether  they 
would  survive  the  preliminary  encounter. 

*  The  telephone  has  been  suggested,  but  in  the  uproar  of  battle  might  be 
difficult  to  use. 


i68 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


of  engine-room  telegraph,  which  is  purely  mechanical,  are 
constantly  occurring,  and  in  the  Victoria  disaster  the  catas- 
trophe may  have  been  aggravated  by  its  failure  on  the 
Camperdown  to  convey  an  order  correctly  at  a  very  critical 
moment.  There  may  be  many  critical  moments  in  battle  when 
such  a  failure  would  mean  destruction.  A  string  of  men  to 
pass  orders  is  found  not  only  on  board  the  Monitor  in  1862, 
but  on  board  the  Huascar  many  years  later.  Yet  here  again 
there  is  room  for  mistakes  in  the  turmoil  and  excitement  of 
the  fray.  These  vast  machines,  with  all  their  complex 
mechanism,  where  the  want  of  simplicity  is  so  painfully 
manifest,  have,  as  in  the  past,  to  be  handled  by  men  who 
are  human  and  liable  to  error,  but  a  new  danger  has  been 
created  by  our  Frankensteins  in  the  risk  of  the  machinery's 
error. 

It  has  been  doubted  whether  it  is  advantageous  to  indicate 
to  the  enemy  the  precise  position  of  the  captain — the  brain 
of  the  ship — by  the  conning-tower.  Forward  in  most  British 
battleships  is  a  tower  protected  by  15-inch  to  10-inch  plating; 
aft,  a  second  one,  with  3-inch  or  4-inch  armour.  The  conning- 
tower  is  the  centre  of  the  ship's  nervous  system  ;  all  the  com- 
munications are  collected  there;  it  is  crammed  with  voice-pipes, 
steering  gear,  and  firing  keys  ;  from  it  the  outlook  is  very  cir- 
cumscribed in  many  cases,  and  too  often  there  is  a  cumber  of 
chart-houses  and  bridges  above  it,  which  do  indeed  screen  it 
from  view,  but  may  yet  be  wrecked  by  a  well-placed  shell, 
and  set  on  fire  or  brought  down  upon  it,  thus  rendering  it 
useless.  Beyond  all  doubt  a  heavy  fire  will  be  concentrated 
upon  it ;  experience  shows  us  in  the  past  a  heavy  roll  of 
casualties  in  the  conning-tower.  In  it  Worden  was  blinded 
fighting  the  Merrimac ;  in  it  Rodgers  was  killed  before 
Charleston  ;  in  it  pilot  after  pilot  was  killed  or  wounded  on 
the  Mississippi ;  in  it  Grau  was  blown  to  pieces ;  in  it 
another  commander  of  the  Huascar  died ;  in  it  two  of  the 
Tsi  Yuen's  officers  perished.  The  rain  of  splinters  will  make 
it  very  hard  to  see  what  is  happening  from  the  narrow  open- 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  169 


ing,  and  any  shutters  which  are  left  closed  may  be  jammed 
The  concussion  of  a  heavy  shell  upon  the  structure,  though, 
no  doubt,  it  would  not  necessarily  demolish  it,  might  kill  or 
injure  those  inside  it,  and  would  very  probably  destroy 
the  communications.  It  would  almost  appear  as  if  the  best 
method  of  ensuring  communication  would  be  to  have  at  least 
three  or  four  stations,*  protected  by  4-inch  or  5 -inch  Harvey ed 
steel,  with,  as  Admiral  Colomb  has  suggested,  a  large  voice- 
pipe  leading  straight  down  to  a  station  below  the  armoured 
deck,  the  simplest  telegraphic  instruments,  and  the  least 
possible  number  of  gun  and  torpedo  directors.  The  multipli- 
cation of  positions  whence  the  ship  can  be  fought,  gives  a 
better  guarantee  against  the  destruction  of  its  brain,  than  the 
provision  of  a  single  heavily  plated  shelter,  as  the  enemy  will 
be  at  a  loss  to  know  where  to  concentrate  their  fire.  More- 
over, if  the  captain  delegates  his  authority,  if  the  gunnery 
officer  is  given  the  control  of  the  ship's  guns,  the  torpedo 
officer  of  its  torpedoes,  and  the  conning-towers  are  four  in 
number,  dispersed  lozenge-wise,  three  will  always  face  the 
enemy ;  when  captain,  gunnery  officer,  and  torpedo  officer 
will  each  have  a  separate  position,  each  commanding  a  good 
view  of  the  enemy,  and  all  three  will  not  fall  at  one  blow,  as 
they  would,  if  present  together  in  one  conning-tower.  In  case 
of  injury  to  those  in  the  captain's  tower,  the  command  can 
instantly  devolve.  For  the  ship  to  be  straying  masterless  in  a 
great  fleet  action — like  the  King  Yuen  or  Huascar — describing 
erratic  curves,  would  be  fraught  with  the  utmost  danger  not 
only  to  herself  but  to  her  fellows.  She  might,  at  such  a  time, 
ram  or  be  rammed  by  her  friends,  and  veering  to  and  fro, 
though  only  for  a  moment,  would  throw  any  line  into 
confusion. 

*  The  more  recent  French  ships  have  three  such  positions.  Croneau,  ii.,  425. 
The  Germans  station  the  second  in  command  on  the  lower  deck,  in  a  position 
of  safety.  But  even  so,  if  the  captain  is  killed,  his  successor  will  take  seconds 
or  minutes  to  reach  the  tower,  during  which  much  may  happen.  With  three 
towers,  the  command  can  pass  at  once,  and  only  a  message  from  one  to  the 
others  is  needed.    The  obvious  objection  is  the  additional  weight. 


170 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


The  paramount  importance  of  preventing  such  an  evil  is 
evident.  It  may  be  that  in  the  earlier  stage  it  would  not  be 
likely  to  occur,  though  no  one  could  say,  for  after  all  the 
conning-tower  is  a  small  target  to  hit.  But  should  there  be  a 
close  action  hits  must  be  more  numerous,  and  in  a  close 
action  a  brainless  ship  will  be  most  perilous.  Many  captains 
may,  till  the  fleets  close,  decide  to  keep  outside  their  shelters 
and  choose  a  point  of  vantage  on  bridge  or  deck,  where  they 
can  be  seen,  and  whence  they  can  encourage  their  men*  The 
hail  from  the  quick-firers,  however,  killed  or  wounded  all  at 
the  Yalu  who  showed  themselves  on  the  Chinese  decks.  A 
suggestion  which  has  been  made  in  "  Le  Yacht"  is  worth  con- 
sideration if  such  a  course  is  adopted.  Cloth  or  canvas,  of 
the  same  colour  as  the  ship's  upper  works,  should  be  hung 
round  the  captain's  position,  hiding  all  but  his  head.  Where 
practicable  the  same  protection  should  be  given  to  the  crews 
of  the  machine-guns  and  small  exposed  weapons.  It  is  a 
protection,  as  it  in  some  measure  conceals  from  the  enemy 
the  exact  position  of  men  and  guns  ;  moreover,  a  screen 
between  the  gunners  and  the  enemy  makes  them  cooler.  The 
only  risk  is  that  of  its  being  fired  by  the  enemy's  projectiles. 
To  prevent  this,  it  can  be  drenched  in  alum  or  any  other  anti- 
combustion  solution. 

How  far  armour  will  be  penetrated  in  a  long  range  engage- 
ment is  an  open  question.  If  we  can  judge  from  the  Yalu,  it 
will  not  be  penetrated  at  all  when  it  is  of  moderate  thickness 
— twelve  inches  or  thereabouts. f  But  guns  are  so  rapidly 
increasing  in  power,  that  it  is  dangerous  to  dogmatise.  A 
weapon  such  as  the  wire  Elswick  8-inch  quick-firer,  with  a 
nominal  perforation  of  twenty  inches  of  steel  at  the  muzzle, 

*  Or  like  some  of  the  American  monitor  captains,  stand  to  leeward  of  the 
conning-tower. 

f  The  experience  of  the  Yalu  shows  that  thin  armour  is  worse  than  useless. 
By  thin  armour,  is  meant  plating  less  than  4  inches  thick,  which  is  the  least 
thickness  that,  under  service  conditions,  at  long  ranges,  could  be  trusted  to  keep 
out  the  4/7-inch  and,  possibly,  the  6-inch  shell. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  171 

should,  under  service  conditions,  in  action,  send  its  bolt 
through  ten  inches  of  compound,  or  eight  inches  of  Han-eyed, 
armour  at  2000  yards,  if  it  hits  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the 
target.  The  thickness  of  metal  perforated  by  guns  on  the 
proving  ground,  is,  of  course,  only  useful  to  indicate  their 
power  under  the  most  favourable  circumstances,  and  to  give 
some  standard  of  comparison.  And  when  the  claims  of 
moderate  sized  guns  are  urged,  and  it  is  said  that  the  present 
English  29-ton  gun,  for  instance,  is  quite  heavy  enough  for 
work  at  sea,  because  it  can  pierce  the  thickest  plate  afloat,  it 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  whilst  it  can  do  it,  it  is  never 
likely  to  do  it,  and  that  to  decide  a  battle  it  may  be  necessary 
to  be  able  to  pierce  the  enemy's  thick  armour,  and  to  possess 
guns  which  not  only  can,  but  are  likely  to  do  it.*  The  rapid 
progress  of  artillery  is,  however,  giving  us.  guns  which  will  be 
able  to  do  all  that  is  required  on  a  moderate  weight.  Such 
weapons  must  necessarily  be  long,  but  it  is  better  to  submit 
to  some  inconvenience  than  to  sacrifice  ballistics. t 

*  The  endurance  of  a  battleship  must  ultimately  depend  upon  the  endurance 
of  her  men,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  if  the  ship  does  not  capsize  through 
injury  on  her  water-line,  all  guns  which  are  not  protected  by  armour,  may  be 
put  out  of  action  in  a  close  encounter.  The  thickly-armoured  positions  may 
hold  out,  and  inflict  much  damage  if  they  cannot  be  silenced,  and  the  victor, 
without  heavy  guns,  will  be  driven  to  torpedo  or  ram  the  ship.  With  heavy 
guns  he  can  overpower  the  enemy.  The  recoil  from  the  big  guns  seems  to  have 
reached  its  limit,  and  it  does  not  appear  that  any  nation  will  go  much  lower 
than  12  inches  for  the  heavy  armament.  The  United  States  are  returning  to 
the  13-inch  gun  for  their  new  battleships.  There  are  many  advantages  in  the 
big  gun  ;  like  the  big  ship,  it  can  deal  a  crushing  blow,  and  can  fire  a  shell 
containing  a  large  burster;  its  shell,  too,  is  more  likely  to  perforate.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  larger  the  gun,  the  slower  its  fire,  and  the  shorter  its  life. 
Fewer  weapons  can  be  carried,  and  the  chance  of  a  breakdown,  where  much 
machinery  is  carried,  increases.  The  battle  of  the  guns  is  no  new  one.  In  the 
past,  there  was  the  struggle  between  the  18-pounder  and  the  24-pounder, 
between  the  long  42-pounder  and  the  short  32-pounder. 

f  The  howitzer  has  received  much  support  in  France  of  late.  Short,  large- 
calibre  guns  might,  perhaps,  be  combined  with  the  longer  weapons,  for  use,  like 
the  old  carronades,  at  close  quarters.  But  they  would  be  of  little  value  till  the 
fleets  closed.  With  long  guns,  the  trajectory  is  flat,  and  there  is  less  chance  of 
missing  the  target  through  a  trifling  error  in  judging  the  distance.  On  the 
other  hand  short,  large-calibre  guns  can  fire  a  very  heavy  shell. 


12 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


When  the  now  battered  hulls  draw  nearer,  and  hits,  though 
from  a  diminished  number  of  guns,  become  more  frequent,  the 
last  phase  of  the  battle  begins.  Probably  the  auxiliary  arma- 
ment of  all  the  ships,  where  it  is  not  thoroughly  protected  as 
in  modern  English  and  American  types,  will  have  been  put  out 
of  action  by  the  awful  carnage  wrought  by  the  high-explosive 
shells  in  batteries  which  are  not  armoured,  where  the  guns  are 
massed  together.  This  is  the  hour  for  the  torpedo-boat,  and 
it  will  dash  to  the  attack,  no  longer  to  be  pelted  with  light 
projectiles,  for  the  ship  it  is  assailing  has  reverted  under  fire 
to  the  conditions  of  1870,  when  heavy  guns  behind  thick 
armour  were  the  only  armament.  The  torpedo  attack  must  be 
met  by  a  corresponding  defence  of  torpedo-boats,  and  a  fresh 
struggle  will  begin,  to  be  decided  by  a  superiority  upon  the 
one  side  or  the  other,  followed,  perhaps,  by  a  cruiser  action, 
as  these  craft  draw  in  to  support  their  various  boats.  Mutual 
destruction  or  disablement  may  be  expected  to  be  the  issue, 
when  the  battleships  on  each  side  will  meet  in  the  final  colli- 
sion, and  reserves  of  uninjured  ships  will  decide  the  day. 
The  ram  will  now  be  used  upon  ships  with  engines  disabled, 
if  they  will  not  surrender  ;  the  torpedo  will  also  come  into 
play.  A  duel  between  the  heavy  guns  on  either  side  will  con- 
clude the  battle.  We  have  some  idea,  from  the  effect  of  the 
Chinese  12-inch  and  10-inch  shells  upon  the  Matsushima, 
what  will  be  the  effect  of  projectiles  weighing  850  lbs.  and 
1200  lbs.  crashing  through  thick  steel,  carrying  inboard  splin- 
ters and  fragments  of  plating,  and  exploding  with  delayed- 
action  fuses  in  the  interior."*  These  deadly  and  stunning  blows 
dealt  on  either  side  will  rend  and  tear  the  ships  perhaps  past 
recognition.  So  in  the  uproar  and  confusion,  the  smoke  and 
the  fire,  the  long  agony  of  the  battle  will  draw  to  its  close 

*  A  fifty  pound  charge  of  melinite  exploding  against  a  steel  armour-deck 
shatters  it  over  a  surface  of  one  square  yard,  driving  down  fragments  weighing 
400  lbs.  with  a  velocity  of  210  to  200  foot  seconds  upon  engines  or  boilers.  A 
12-inch  shell  might  thus  disable  any  ship.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether 
the  fuse  has  yet  been  devised  which  will  take  a  high-explosive  through  even 
thin  armour.    Croneau,  ii.,  71. 


The  End  of  a  Battleship. 

Plate  XXXIII. 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


173 


on  board  the  mastodons,  which  are  now  settling  in  the  water, 
rolling  terribly,  and  threatening  to  engulf  their  crews.  The 
picture  that  rises  before  us  is  one  of  horror  almost  transcend- 
ing imagination,  a  scene  of  bloodshed  and  destruction  so 
fearful,  that  man's  high  purpose  and  devotion  can  alone  re- 
deem it  from  the  ghastliness  of  the  shambles.  But  it  is  neither 
profitable  nor  elevating  to  batten  upon  horrors. 

But  will  the  slaughter  be  great,  it  may  be  asked  ?  Will  the 
damage  be  so  tremendous  ?  And  it  is  certainly  the  case  that 
a  ship  can  only  take  a  certain  number  of  hits  without  surren- 
dering or  sinking.  The  temper  of  the  crews  will  largely 
determine  the  percentage  of  loss.  Courageous,  resolute,  and 
devoted  men  will  stand  firm  through  slaughter  from  which 
weaker  men  will  quail,  and  thus  the  braver  the  combatants 
the  heavier  the  loss.  The  sailors  on  either  side  will  be  dis- 
ciplined men,  not  as  very  often  on  both  sides  in  the  last 
French  war,  a  conglomeration  of  merchant  seamen,  prisoners, 
landsmen,  and  genuine  naval  sailors.  In  the  British  Navy, 
they  are  now  picked  men — they  may  be  said  to  be  the  flower 
of  the  nation.  They  are  taken  in  youth,  taught  and  trained 
to  instinctive  obedience,  and  high  courage.  They  are  not 
swept  on  board  against  their  will  by  the  arbitrary  injustice  of 
the  press.  They  are  regarded  by  the  nation  with  the  most 
absolute  confidence.  They  are  animated  by  the  national 
spirit  bred  in  men  who  know  what  England  really  is,  and 
who  day  by  day  behold  her  power  and  the  splendour  of  her 
Empire.    They  know  that  the  race  is  for  an  object — 

.  .  .  6vk  leprjLOV  ofSe  fioe'iriv 

that  the  result  of  the  battle  will  be  life  or  death  to  that 
England.  They  have  behind  them  a  past  of  uniform  success, 
and  they  will  not  be  ready  tamely  to  surrender  it.  We  may 
expect  from  them  a  most  obstinate  resistance  if  the  battle 
goes  against  them,  and  with  an  obstinate  resistance  the  loss 
must  be  heavy.  So,  too,  with  our  opponents  there  will  be 
every  probability  of  a  determined  resistance.    The  French 


74 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


sailor  is  a  picked  man  ;  he  does  not  want  courage,  discipline, 
or  training,  and  he  has  a  burning  desire  to  revenge  the  defeats 
of  the  past.  It  is,  of  course,  often  asserted  that  war  grows 
less  bloody  with  time,  and  history  does  show  it  is  so  on  land, 
but  at  sea  there  is  small  evidence  to  prove  it.  We  have 
already  reviewed  the  losses  at  the  Yalu  and  Lissa,  and  have 
compared  them  with  earlier  battles.  All  the  sea  engagements 
of  the  period  1860-6,  in  which  ironclads  fought,  show  slight 
loss  of  life,  because  armour  had  then  conquered  the  gun.  It 
is  now  beaten  by  it,*  and  there  is  also  the  torpedo  to  be 
reckoned  with.  The  slaughter  on  board  the  Maisushima 
drove  her  out  of  battle,  but  it  amounted  to  more  than  one- 
third  of  her  crew.  So  in  the  desperate  actions  of  the  war 
of  1 8 1 2  British  ships  more  than  once  held  out  till  they  had 
suffered  similar  loss.f  The  casualties  may  then  reach  as  high 
a  figure  as  thirty  or  forty  per  cent,  including  killed,  wounded, 
and  drowned.  And  as  it  is  with  loss  of  life,  so  it  is  with  the 
loss  of  ships.  Though  the  vitals  are  well  protected  in 
battleships,  the  deck  may  at  close  quarters  be  perforated  by 
plunging  shot,  the  hull  below  the  water-line  pierced  as  the 
ship  rolls.  Heavy  losses  in  armoured  ships  may  not  be 
anticipated  till  the  fleets  draw  near  to  each  other,J  but  when 

*  The  thickest  armour  is  still  impenetrable  to  the  guns,  under  service 
conditions,  or  only  barely  penetrable.  But  only  a  small  portion  of  the  ship 
can  be  thus  protected.  The  increasing  power  of  the  gun  has  compelled  designers 
to  leave  many  important  parts  of  the  ship  unprotected. 

f  The  following  is  the  percentage  of  British  loss  in  some  of  the  hottest  actions 
of  this  war.  Guerriere  and  Constitution,  32  ;  Frolic  and  Wasp,  67  ;  Macedonian 
and  United  States,  37 ;  Java  and  Constitution,  38  ;  Peacock  and  Hornet,  33  ; 
Reindeer  and  Wasp,  67.  In  two  of  the  bloodiest  single-ship  actions  of  the 
French  war,  the  English  losses  reached  32  and  34  per  cent. 

%  A  few  hits  on  the  water-line  may,  however,  lead  to  the  loss  of  any  ship. 
The  catastrophe  to  the  Victoria,  as  battleships  go,  a  stable  vessel,  has  shown 
how  slight  injuries  on  the  water-line  may  impair  any  ship's  flotatory  qualities. 
Professor  Elgar,  writing  in  Nature,  xlix.,  153,  suggests  that  it  would  be  well 
before  action  to  fill  unarmoured  ends  with  water.  There  would  then  at  least  be 
no  changes  in  the  ship's  trim.  But  if  in  the  Sanspareil  and  probably  in  the 
"  Admirals  "  the  ends  were  thus  filled,  the  top  of  the  belt  would  be  on  or  below 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  175 

they  do  so  approach,  some  are  almost  bound  to  go  to  the  bottom. 
The  torpedo  and  the  ram  will  claim  their  victims  ;  wrecked 
water-lines  in  a  sea-way  will  lead  others  to  capsize,  perhaps 
with  little  notice.  The  losses  in  craft  so  ill  protected,  as  most 
cruisers  are,  will  probably  be  very  severe.  The  old  wooden 
ship  of  war,  attacked  by  feeble  smooth-bores,  could  stand  a 
prodigious  amount  of  battering,  without  very  often  being  much 
the  worse  for  it.  Far  otherwise  is  it  with  our  delicate  boxes 
of  machinery,  attacked  by  guns  which  can  easily  send  a  shell 
through  them  at  two  miles.  Though  the  Saikio  came  off  so 
cheaply  at  the  Yalu,  it  was  to  chance  she  owed  her  escape,  as 
the  fate  of  better  built  Chinese  cruisers  showed.  Again  the 
wooden  ship,  when  she  did  sink,  sank  slowly,  giving  her  men 
plenty  of  time  to  escape.  These  iron  hulls  capsize,  or  founder 
in  a  minute. 

It  is  difficult  then  to  suppose  that  the  loss,  whether  of  men 
or  materiel  will  be  small.  Nor  will  it,  in  all  probability,  be 
spread  over  a  long  period  of  time.  On  the  contrary,  the 
battle  cannot  last  very  long.  The  fleet  actions  of  the  past 
occupy  a  time  which  seldom  exceeds  five  hours.  Lissa  was 
over  in  considerably  less,  and  the  Yalu  in  a  trifle  less.  At 
the  Yalu,  however,  there  was  no  effort  to  come  to  close 
quarters,  but  merely  a  prolonged  and  distant  cannonade.  The 
increasing  rapidity  of  gun-fire,  the  relatively  small  supply  of 
ammunition  carried,  the  potency  of  the  implements  of  des- 
truction, all  point  to  a  short  and  sharp  struggle.  Neither  side 
has  much  to  gain  by  prolonging  the  unendurable  tension  of 
the  battle.  There  will  be  on  either  side  an  anxiety  to  bring 
the  affair  to  an  issue,  and  as  soon  as  either  sees  a  favourable 
chance,  he  will  dash  in. 

Not  that  such  a  struggle  need  necessarily  be  decisive.  If 
no  mistakes  are  made,  if  men  and  ships  on  either  side  are 
equal,  there  cannot  be  great  results  to  either.    But  so  many 

the  water-line.  Luckily  the  present  form  of  projectile  ricochets  over  the  ship 
or  goes  to  the  bottom  when  it  hits  the  water  short  of  it,  so  that  long  range 
hits  between  wind  and  water  will  be  rare. 


176  IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 

ifs  are  not  likely  to  be  combined.  One  side  may  have  more 
ships,  better  men,  greater  manoeuvring  skill,  and  abler 
commanders.  War  is  more  largely  a  personal  matter  than  is 
often  supposed.  Not  the  best  ships,  but  the  best  men  will 
win.  Only  we  must  insist  upon  good  ships  and  not  in  peace,  at 
least,  profess  to  regard  ourselves  as  better  than  our  neigh- 
bours. If  at  the  close  of  the  day  one  side  has  ships  intact, 
and  the  other  ships  damaged,  no  power  on  earth  can  save 
the  latter.  There  is  no  wind  to  suddenly  blow  him  away  from 
his  foe,  or  to  compel  his  enemy's  retreat.  Ruin  for  the 
beaten  side  is  the  prospect  in  a  great  battle  where  the 
result  is  not  wholly  indecisive  and  where  the  enemy's 
ammunition  does  not  fail,  Lissa  and  the  Yala  notwithstanding. 

The  losses  of  ships  on  the  beaten  side  in  the  more  important 
naval  engagements  of  the  last  hundred  years  may  be  sum- 
marised as  follows  : — 


No.  of  ships 
engaged  on 
beaten  side. 

c 

0  6 

in 

Year. 

Name  of 
Battle. 

Nationality  of 
Defeated. 

Burnt  or 
sunk  in 
Battle. 

Captured  i 
Battle. 

Destroyed  < 
captured 
after  Battl 

Total  Los 

Captured 
ships  sun 
or  destroy* 
after  Battl 

1782 

April  1 2th 

French   

3° 

i 

6 

1794 

June  1st 

St.  Vincent  ... 

French   

26 

1 

1 

1797 

Spaniards  

25 

4 

4 

1797 

Camperdown  . 

Dutch  

16 

9 

9 

1798 

.Nile  

French   

13 

1 

8 

2 

11 

1805 

Trafalgar 

P'rench  &  Span. 

33 

1 

i8t 

1827 

Navarino 

Turks  &  Egypt. 

3 

3 

3 

1866 

Lissa   

Italians   

23 

2 

~i* 

3 

1894 

Yalu   

Chinese   

4 

1 

$ 

*  Sank  at  Ancona  after  Battle, 
t  Of  these  three  were  recaptured  and  ten  wrecked,  scuttled  or  burnt.    Five  other  ships 
were  captured,  October  24th,  and  November  4th. 


The  disappearance  of  capture  may  be  due  to  chance  and  an 
insufficiency  of  modern  instances,  or  may  be  a  feature  of 
naval  warfare  under  the  new  conditions.  It  seems  to  have 
been  replaced  by  the  total  destruction  of  the  beaten  ship. 

All  that  has  been  said  hitherto  applies  to  day  actions,  in 
which  neither  fleet  is  surprised.  If  a  fleet  should  be  caught 
unawares,  either  by  day  or  by  night,  it  will  be  lost.  But  this 
is  not  at  all  likely  if  both  sides  have,  as  they  probably  will, 


THE  NAVAL 


BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


*77 


plenty  of  scouts.  A  night  action,  in  which  both  sides  would 
be  willing  combatants,  is  hard  to  conceive.  It  might  be 
preceded  by  a  torpedo  attack,  in  which  one  or  more  large 
ships  having  been  damaged,  the  assailant's  heavy  ships  come 
up  and  endeavour  to  capture  or  destroy  them.  The  use  of 
the  search-light  would  be  necessary  upon  either  side,  and 
very  strict  control  over  it  would  have  to  be  maintained  to 
prevent  it  from  being  flashed  in  the  eyes  of  friends.  But  a 
night  attack  would  leave  so  much  to  chance — if  conducted  by 
heavy  ships — that  admirals  are  not  likely  to  run  the  hazard. 

Boarding,  as  a  feature  of  naval  warfare,  has  vanished.  It 
is  only  when  the  motive  power  of  a  ship  is  disabled  that  it 
becomes  practicable,  and  a  disabled  ship  is  entirely  at  the 
mercy  of  an  assailant  who  is  free  to  move.  Perhaps  the 
action  between  the  Covadonga  and  Independencia  illustrates 
this  most  clearly.  It  is  needless  to  waste  life  by  boarding 
when  the  crew  can  be  reduced  to  submission  by  the  threat  of 
a  torpedo  or  the  ram. 

If  the  battle  be  as  we  have  represented  it,  what  type  of 
ship  will  be  best  adapted  for  action  in  it  ?  By  comparing 
such  an  ideal  vessel  with  the  battleships  now  under  construc- 
tion, we  may  be  able  to  verify  the  probability  of  our  guesses 
at  truth,  since  the  acutest  minds  are  everywhere  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  problems  of  naval  construction.  Taking 
protection  first,  the  parts  most  essential  to  the  ship,  and 
therefore  requiring  most  attention,  may  be  placed  as  follows : 
First,  the  lower-works,  on  the  safety  of  which  depends  the 
safety  of  the  ship,  as,  if  they  are  shattered  and  torn  open, 
in  spite  of  compartments  and  water-tight  doors,  she  must 
founder.  Next  come  the  engines,  boilers,  and  motive  power 
generally.  As  the  lower  portion  of  the  hull  cannot  be  hit 
directly,  unless  the  ship  rolls  very  much,  it  is  left  unarmoured 
on  the  exterior,  but  to  protect  the  interior  from  harm  a 
horizontal  deck  of  armour  will  be  necessary.  The  lower  this 
is  kept  below  the  water-line  the  better,  though  to  give  space 
for  engines  and  to  assure  flotation  there  are  obvious  limits. 

Vol.  II.  N 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


On  the  side  upwards  from  the  water  line,  to  as  great  a 
height  as  the  weight  at  the  disposal  of  the  architect  will  allow, 
should  be  disposed  plating,  proof  against  the  largest  quick- 
firer  under  service  conditions,  to  protect  the  ship's  upper 
works  from  the  ravages  of  all  but  the  largest  shells.  The 
captain's  position,  as  the  brain  of  the  ship,  and  the  commu- 
nications as  its  vital  nerves,  should  be  assured  by  duplication 
and  moderate  armour.  The  heavy  guns  should  be  mounted 
in  separate  and  well-armoured  positions.  The  quick-firers 
should,  wherever  possible,  be  in  turrets,  when  awkward 
arrangements  for  housing  them  become  unnecessary.  It  is 
well  to  allow  for  a  possible  growth  in  length  in  the  near 
future,  and  it  is  manifest  that  a  gun  much  over  20  feet  long 
could  not  be  stowed  as  on  the  Royal  Sovereign.  The  thick- 
ness of  armour  will  range  from  6  inches  or  8  inches  of 
Harveyed  steel  on  the  quick-firer  turrets,  to  double  that 
amount  on  the  heavy  guns.  On  the  side,  8  inches  or  9  inches 
of  steel  will,  at  long  ranges,  exclude  even  the  8-inch  pro- 
jectile when  it  does  not  strike  perpendicularly.  Such  a  ship 
will  have  three  or  four  positions  whence  she  can  be  fought  in 
action.  As  far  as  stability  will  permit  the  guns  should  be 
mounted  high,  when  the  command  will  be  greater,  and  the 
difficulty  of  using  the  weapons  to  advantage  in  a  sea-way 
less.  The  funnels  and  ventilators  will  be  carried  up  a  large, 
thinly  armoured  shaft,  to  some  feet  above  the  upper  deck. 
The  freeboard  will  be  high,  but  the  superstructure  will  be 
reduced  to  a  minimum.  Such  a  vessel  will  be  very  far  from 
invulnerable — an  impossible  aim  unless  all  fighting  qualities 
are  sacrificed. 

Though  water  line  hits  may  not  be  numerous,  chance  pro- 
jectiles are  nearly  certain  to  strike  the  ship  betwixt  wind  and 
water.  It  is  to  guard  against  such  hits,  which  in  so  vulnerable 
a  quarter  might  do  immense  damage,  that  a  belt  is  carried 
by  every  battleship  except  the  great  Italian  vessels.  No 
amount  of  subdivision  without  armour  can  ensure  the  ship's 
flotation.     A  single  heavy  shell  bursting  in  a  mass  of  cells 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF  TO-MORROW. 


179 


such  as  are  found  above  the  armour-deck  of  the  Italian  ships, 
would  tear  them  open  and  shatter  them  severely,  perhaps 
setting  their  cork  packing  on  fire.  Again,  grave  injuries  can 
easily  be  inflicted  upon  the  armour-deck,  where  it  is  placed 
low,  and  has  no  barrier  of  side-plating  to  explode  shells 
outside  the  ship.  It  does  not  seem  absolutely  essential  to 
carry  the  belt  round  the  ends  of  the  ship,  as  shell  wounds 
there  are  not  so  serious  as  amidships,  but  it  is  undoubtedly 
better  to  have  a  complete  belt.  If  the  bows  are  much 
wounded,  the  rush  of  the  ship  through  the  water  will  tend 
to  force  the  sea  in,  and  impair  the  manoeuvring  qualities  by 
depressing  the  forward  portion.  The  screws  will  come 
nearer  to  the  surface,  and  in  a  sea-way  there  will  be  risk 
to  the  engines  and  propellers  from  racing,  and  from  the 
enemy's  projectiles.  Injuries  astern  are  not  so  much  to  be 
feared. 

The  guns  carried  should  be  numerous,  manageable,  and 
powerful.  Four  heavy  weapons  is  the  number  which  ex- 
perience accords  to  large  battleships,  though  in  some  recent 
German  examples  there  are  six.  Ability  to  pierce  the  thickest 
plating  at  short  ranges  must  be  demanded  of  such  weapons, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  weight  of  the  gun  must  not  be 
extreme.  The  9/45-inch  gun*  of  fifty  or  fifty-five  calibres  can 
perforate  two  feet  of  wrought  iron  at  2000  yards,  and  weighs 
from  thirty  tons  upwards.  Such  a  gun  would  exhibit  a 
perforation  greater  than  that  of  the  67-ton  weapons  of  the 
Royal  Sovereign,  with  less  than  half  their  weight.  Whilst  it 
should  be  loaded  and  trained  by  electricity  or  hydraulics  to 
ensure  rapidity  of  fire,  alternative  hand-gear  can  be  fitted. 
Each  of  the  heavy  guns,  if  weight  allows,  should  have  a 
separate  armoured  position,  as  in  the  French  Magenta  class, 
for  why  separate  widely  the  secondary  armament  whilst 
concentrating  the  primary?  The  auxiliary  armament  should 
include  as  many  8-inch  or  6-inch  quick-firers  as  can  be  given, 

*  The  Canet  9"45-inch  gun,  as  long  ago  as  1890,  could  perforate  23*5  inches 
of  wrought  iron  at  2000  metres.    This  gun  was  fifty  calibres  long.    See  p.  250. 

N  2 


i8o 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


whilst  to  stop  hostile  torpedo-boats  and  riddle  the  enemy's 
unarmoured  works  at  close  quarters,  the  12-pounder  and 
1 -pounder  are  necessary.  A  certain  differentiation  of 
armament  is  as  needful  to-day  as  it  was  in  Nelson's  time. 
To  give  the  battleship  an  armament  composed  of  one  single 
size  of  gun,  would  be  sacrificing  to  an  ideal  simplicity  the 
efficiency  of  the  ship.  The  principle  of  dispersing  the 
armament  and  concentrating  its  fire,  should  be  carried  as  far 
as  is  possible.  Torpedo  attacks  will  be  generally  delivered 
from  ahead,  and  demand  a  strong  bow-fire. 

The  ship  which  we  have  sketched  corresponds  generally  to 
the  English  Majestic  class,  though  in  certain  features,  such 
as  the  four  gun-positions,  it  approximates  to  the  earlier 
French  type.  The  arguments  against  four  gun-positions  are 
strong,*  but  still  stronger,  it  appears  to  us,  is  the  argument 
that,  with  the  heavy  weapons  mounted  in  pairs,  a  single  hit 
might  disable  half  the  ship's  primary  armament. 

In  action  at  long  ranges,  the  heavy  guns  would  fire  only 
an  occasional  shot,  and  the  quick-firers  would  maintain  a 
rapid  and  steady  fire  upon  the  enemy.  When  the  time  came 
for  closing,  the  guns  would  attack,  according  to  their  size, 
the  thick  armour,  the  thin  armour,  or  the  unprotected  portions 
of  the  opponent's  side.t  This,  of  course,  involves  familiarity 
on  the  part  of  the  officers  and  gunners  with  the  enemy's 
designs,  but  it  is  always  easy  now  to  obtain  fairly  accurate 
information  on  such  matters.  At  this  period  the  fire  will  be 
as  rapid  %  as  possible,  and  efforts  will  be  made  to  concentrate 

*  See  page  269. 

t  At  long  ranges  the  diminutive  size  of  the  target  prevents  such  dis- 
crimination. 

%  Rapidity  of  fire  in  practice  will  depend  not  only  on  the  mount  and  breech 
action  of  the  gun,  and  training  of  the  gunners,  but  also  upon  the  supply  of 
ammunition,  Power-hoists  to  the  quick-firers  are  of  great  importance,  as  they 
reduce  the  number  of  men  that  will  be  required  below,  and  they  abolish  the 
need  for  large  emergency  magazines  on  deck,  which  must  prove  a  source  of 
danger,  especially  where  there  are  many  guns  close  together.  The  accidents 
on  board  the  Palestro  and  Matsushima  warn  us  of  the  danger  of  such  exposed 


THE    NAVAL    BATTLE    OF    TO-MORROW.  181 


the  fleet's  weight  of  metal  upon  ship  after  ship  in  succession. 
But  as  each  side  will  try  the  same  game  this  need  not  lead 
to  decisive  results. 

It  is  more  than  possible  that  the  command  within  the  ship 
may  devolve  with  great  rapidity.  In  her  engagement  with 
the  Chilian  ironclads  the  Huascar  had  in  quick  succession 
four  commanders ;  on  the  Akagi,  at  the  Yalu,  commander- 
after  commander  was  injured,  and  any  ship  which  comes  to 
anything  like  close  quarters  may  fare  as  badly.  It  seems, 
then,  a  matter  of  great  importance  that  every  commissioned 
officer  on  board  should  have  practice  in  handling  the  ship 
at  fleet  manoeuvres.  So,  too,  the  methods  of  fighting  the 
ship,  when  she  has  lost  heavily  in  men,  must  be  studied. 
No  modern  battleship  carries  any  spare  men,  yet  to  supply 
the  place  of  those  who  have  fallen  at  the  guns,  or  in  exposed 
positions,  men  will  have  to  be  drawn  from  somewhere  at 
whatever  sacrifice.  If  they  come  from  the  stokehold  it  will 
be  at  the  expense  of  the  ship's  speed  ;  if  from  the  maga- 
zines, at  the  expense  of  her  rapidity  of  fire.  The  import- 
ance of  giving  engine-room  hands  and  stokers  a  training  in 
gunnery,  where  practicable,  is  manifest.  It  is  when  the  ship 
is  in  extremis  that  its  value  will  be  felt. 

A  small  matter,  but  a  very  important  one,  is  the  adoption 
of  some  distinctive  mark  or  colour  for  the  ships  of  each  side. 
Neither  side  is  likely  to  gain  much  by  a  disguise.  A  dis- 
tinctive colour,  which  is  varied  from  week  to  week,  with  a 
broad  stripe  running  right  round  the  ship,  will  serve  to  show 
friends  to  friends.  Individual  ships  can  be  marked  on  the 
Austrian  plan,  by  belts  of  colour  on  the  funnels.  In  spite  of 
all  precaution,  in  a  melee  there  might  be  great  risk  of 
accidental  injury  to  friends.  The  ships  would  be  much 
injured,  perhaps  veiled  in  a  wreath  of  smoke,  and  if  the 

magazines.  On  the  Tamandare,  in  the  Paraguayan  war,  there  were  three 
explosions  arising  from  this  cause.  Still,  as  Captain  Mahan  has  pointed  out  in  the 
Century  (August,  1895),  it  is  better  to  risk  an  explosion  than  to  concede  to  the 
enemy  superior  rapidity  of  fire. 


182 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


morale  of  the  gunners  has  been  much  shaken,  they  may  not 
be  too  careful.  The  view  from  casemate  or  turret  is  not 
extensive,  and  the  temptation  to  fire  at  an  object  crossing  the 
field  of  vision  must  be  strong.  For  to  be  active  in  battle  is 
less  trying  to  the  nerves  than  to  stand  and  look  on.  In  such 
a  matter  as  this,  discipline  and  training  will  tell  strongly. 

This  then  is  a  forecast  of  the  battle  of  to-morrow.  Two 
great  lines  of  monster  ships  steaming  side  by  side,  but  far 
apart,  whilst  the  uproar  of  the  cannonade,  the  hail  of  shells, 
fills  the  air.  As  the  minutes  pass,  funnels  and  superstructures 
fly  in  splinters,  the  draught  sinks,  the  speed  decreases,  ships 
drop  to  the  rear.  The  moment  for  close  action  has  come, 
and  the  victor  steams  in  on  the  vanquished.  The  ram  and 
the  torpedo,  amidst  an  inferno  of  sinking  ships  and  exploding 
shells,  claim  their  victims.  The  torpedo-boats  of  the  weaker 
side  in  vain  essay  to  cover  the  beaten  battleships.  Beneath 
a  pall  of  smoke,  upon  a  sea  of  blood,  the  mastery  of  the 
waters  is  decided  for  a  generation.  Such  an  encounter  will 
not  lack  sensation.  To  live  through  it  will  be  a  life's 
experience  ;  to  fall  in  it  a  glorious  end.  And  that  Heaven 
may  send  our  fleet  success,  when  the  great  day  comes,  is  the 
ardent  prayer  of  every  Englishman.  For  though  men  can  do 
much  by  the  stoutness  and  constancy  of  their  hearts,  there  are 
chances  which  lie  evermore  on  the  knees  of  the  gods. 

Note. — Weight  of  metal  and  its  influence  on  the  result  of  the  engagement 
have  not  been  discussed,  but,  judging  from  the  lessons  of  the  wars  of  1778- 1783 
and  1812 — the  wars  in  which  the  personnel  on  either  side  was  of  good  quality — 
it  will  have  a  decisive  influence.  Ten  guns  with  5°°  rounds  of  ammunition 
can  obviously  do  more  damage  than  five  with  1000  rounds  in  a  given  time,  if 
that  time  is  not  long.  Modern  cruisers  will  not  stand  much  hammering,  and 
where  they  have  no  vertical  armour  seem  to  stand  in  need  of  heavy  batteries. 
Of  course,  it  will  be  said  that  every  ship  is  a  compromise  ;  but  in  the  compro- 
mise guns,  the  fighting  element,  are  of  the  most  vital  importance. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


Ironclad  Catastrophes. 

The  first  of  the  three  great  disasters  which  have  made 
Englishmen  look  with  some  apprehension  upon  the  ironclad, 
did  not  occur  till  1870.  For  ten  years  our  experience  of  the 
new  type  of  warship  was  untried  by  any  serious  misadven- 
ture. And  strangely  enough  this  first  great  catastrophe  had 
been  all  but  foretold  at  the  Admiralty,*  and  was  the  fault,  not 
of  Whitehall,  but  of  the  British  public  and  press,  which  had 
persistently  urged  the  construction  of  a  certain  demonstrably 
unsound  type  of  vessel. 

The  ill-fated  Captain  was  an  iron  armoured,  turret-ship,  of 
6,900  tons,  designed  by  Captain  Cowper  Coles,  the  English 
inventor  of  the  turret.  He  had  converted  the  three-decker 
Royal  Sovereign  into  the  first  English  turret-ship,  but  she  was 
not  a  sea-going  vessel,  and  was  fit  for  little  more  than  harbour 
defence.  For  the  latter  she  was  excellent :  her  turrets  were 
ingenious  and  gave  complete  satisfaction.  Captain  Coles, 
however,  dreamed  of  yet  greater  triumphs.  He  had  set  his 
heart  upon  a  sea-going,  masted  turret-ship,  with  low  free- 
board, and,  much  against  the  will  of  the  technical  advisers  of 
the  First  Lord,t  chiefly  through  the  influence  of  the  press,  he 
was  at  last  permitted  to  build  such  a  ship.  Messrs.  Laird  were 
the  contractors,  and  needless  to  say  their  work  was  well  done. 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1871,  xlii.  ;  677,  "utterly  unsafe;"  678,  "cannot 
possibly  prove  a  satisfactory  sea-going  ship;  "  892,  "the  danger  to  be  appre- 
hended from  these  [fully  rigged]  monitors  is  very  great.1' 

f  Parliamentary  Papers,  1870,  xlii.,  668,  673. 


1 84  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1870 

When  completed  in  1870,  she  was  considered  by  all  except  a 
few  experts,  who  had  misgivings,  the  finest  fighting  ship  in  the 
fleet,  and  was  to  be  the  type  of  future  battleships. 

Her  length  was  320  feet,  her  beam  53  feet,  and  her  draught 
25  feet  g\  inches.  As  designed  by  Captain  Coles  she  was  to 
have  had  a  freeboard  of  a  little  more  than  8  feet  6  inches.*  A 
curious  error  of  her  designer  had  reduced  this  to  6  feet 
8  inches,  so  that,  if  unsafe  in  embryo,  she  was  still  more  unsafe 
in  her  completed  state.  Indeed,  Messrs.  Laird  would  seem  to 
have  been  by  no  means  easy  about  her,  as,  when  they  handed 
her  over,  they  requested  the  Admiralty  authorities  to  test  her 
stability  by  inclining  her.  This  was  done  with  fairly  satisfac- 
tory results .f  The  ship  carried  four  25-ton  guns  in  two  turrets, 
placed  fore  and  aft  in  the  keel-line.  She  had  a  high  forecastle 
and  poop,  which  were  connected  by  a  hurricane-deck  running 
above  the  turrets.  The  armour  on  the  turrets  was  13  to  8 
inches  thick,  and  on  the  water-line  6  to  8  inches.  There  were 
three  tripod  masts,  with  full  sail-power,  a  sail-power  which  was 
greater  than  that  given  to  her  safer  competitor,  the  Monarch, 
in  proportion  to  her  size.  There  was  one  funnel.  The  com- 
plement consisted  of  500  officers  and  men,  and  the  supply  of 
fuel  was  500  tons,  though  Captain  Coles  had  undertaken  to 
give  her  1000  tons. 

As  the  finest  ship  in  the  fleet  she  was  commanded  by  a  most 
able  and  promising  officer,  Captain  Burgoyne,  whilst  on  board 
her,  in  various  capacities,  were  sons  of  Mr.  Childers,  Lord 
Northbrook,  and  Sir  Baldwin  Walker.  Everyone  had  absolute 
faith  in  her,  and  she  was  in  due  course  sent  to  sea  with  the 
Channel  squadron.  In  May  she  faced  a  heavy  gale  in  the 
Bay  of  Biscay.  On  this  cruise  her  fighting  capacities  were 
well  tested.  In  a  heavy  sea  she  fired  her  great  guns  without 
any  difficulty,  making  good  practice.  Under  sail  she  stayed 
and  wore  beautifully,  beating  the  Monarch  with  great  ease. 

*  The  Monarch's  freeboard  was  14  feet.    The  Captain,  in  spite  of  Coles' 
criticisms  of  the  Monarch,  was  only  an  indifferent  replica  of  that  ship, 
f  Her  metacentric  height  was  2*6  feet. 


1870]  IRONCLAD  CATASTROPHES.  185 

Admiral  Symonds,  after  noting  her  behaviour  and  inspecting 
her,  reported  :  "  She  is  a  most  formidable  vessel,  and  could,  I 
believe,  by  her  superior  armament,  destroy  all  the  broadside 
ships  of  the  squadron  in  detail."  A  second  successful  cruise 
across  the  Bay  of  Biscay  confirmed  this  good  opinion  of  her, 
and  even  her  detractors  were  forced  to  confess  themselves 
mistaken. 

A  third  time  she  went  to  sea  with  the  Channel  squadron 
under  Admiral  Milne  ;  and  Captain  Coles,  her  designer,  sailed  in 
her,  to  observe  her  behaviour.  The  vessels  cruising  with  her 
were  the  Lord  Warden,  the  flagship,  the  Minotaur,  Agin- 
court,  Northumberland,  Monarch,  Hercules,  Bellerophon, 
and  the  unarmoured  ships  Inconstant  and  Bristol.  To  test  the 
turret-ship  thoroughly  they  crossed  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  on 
September  6th,  1870,  were  near  Cape  Finisterre.  That  day  a 
heavy  sea  was  running,  and,  on  Admiral  Milne  visiting  her,  he 
pointed  out  to  Captain  Coles  that  the  lee  side  of  the  deck 
was  under  water  when  she  rolled,  and  said  that  it  looked 
ugly.  Captain  Coles  assured  him  that  it  made  no  difference, 
and  mattered  nothing.  Both  Coles  and  Burgoyne  were 
anxious  that  the  admiral  should  spend  the  night  on  board, 
but,  fortunately  for  him,  he  declined.  The  Captain  was  under 
sail,  but  with  steam  up,  ready  to  be  used  if  required.  She  was 
rolling  heavily,  the  angles  averaging  twelve-and-a-half  degrees 
and  sometimes  reaching  fourteen  degrees. 

At  8  p.m.  that  evening  the  sea  was  high,  and  it  was  cloudy 
to  the  west,  but  there  was  as  yet  no  indication  of  a  gale. 
The  ships  were  in  station,  the  Captain  astern  of  the  Lord 
Warden.  At  11  o'clock  there  was  a  fresh  breeze  and  some 
rain.  At  midnight  the  barometer  dropped,  the  wind  rose,  and, 
as  it  became  evident  that  dirty  weather  was  at  hand,  sails 
were  reefed.  A  little  before  1  p.m.  a  furious  gale  set  in  from 
the  south-west  and  sails  were  furled.  The  rest  may  be  told 
in  Admiral  Milne's  words  :  "  At  this  moment  the  Captain  was 
astern  of  this  ship,  apparently  closing  under  steam.  The 
signal,  '  Open  order,'  was  made,  and  at  once  answered;  and 


1 86  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1870 

at  1. 1 5  a.m.  she  was  on  the  Lord  Warden's  lee  quarter, 
about  six  points  abaft  the  ship :  her  topsails  were  either 
close  reefed  or  on  the  lap ;  her  foresail  was  close  up,  the 
mainsail  having  been  furled  at  5.30  p.m. ;  but  I  could  not 
see  any  fore-and-aft  set.  She  was  heeling  over  a  good  deal 
to  starboard,*  with  the  wind  on  her  port  side.  Her  red  bow 
light  was  at  this  time  clearly  seen.  Some  minutes  after  I 
again  looked  for  her,  but  it  was  thick  with  rain,  and  the  light 
was  no  longer  visible.  The  squalls  of  wind  and  rain  were 
very  heavy,  and  the  Lord  Warden  was  kept  by  the  aid  of 
the  screw  and  after-trysails  with  her  bow  to  a  heavy  cross  sea, 
and  at  times  it  was  thought  that  the  sea  would  have  broken 
over  her  gangways.  At  2.15  a.m.  (of  the  7th)  the  gale  had 
somewhat  subsided,  and  the  wind  went  round  to  the  north- 
west, but  without  any  squall  ;  in  fact,  the  wind  moderated,  the 
heavy  bank  of  cloud  had  passed  off  to  the  eastward,  and  the 
stars  came  out  clear  and  bright  ;  the  moon,  which  had  given 
considerable  light,  was  setting :  no  large  ship  was  seen  near 
us  where  the  Captain  had  been  last  observed,  although 
the  lights  of  some  were  visible  at  a  distance.  When  the 
day  broke  the  squadron  was  somewhat  scattered,  and  only 
ten  ships,  instead  of  eleven,  could  be  discerned,  the  Captain 
being  the  missing  one." 

The  dreadful  truth  dawned  upon  the  admiral.  The  splendid, 
the  trusted  ship,  was  gone,  and  how  no  man  knew  as  yet. 
The  vessels  of  the  squadron  scattered  and  searched  in 
every  direction,  but  it  was  not  till  the  afternoon  that  the  fore- 
boding became  a  certainty.  Some  portions  of  her  hurricane- 
deck,  a  spar  with  a  handkerchief  tied  to  it,  the  body  of  a 
seamen,  told  the  tale.  The  Captain  had  foundered  in  one 
of  the  heavy  squalls  soon  after  twelve  o'clock,  when  a  heavy 
cross  sea  was  running,  and  had  taken  to  the  depths  her  crew. 
The  Inconstant,  the  fastest  ship  of  the  squadron,  was  ordered 
to  steam  at  her  fullest  speed  for  Plymouth  and  carry  home  the 
terrible  news. 

*  Eye  witnesses  placed  her  heel  at  fifteen  degrees. 


1870].  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  187 

And  what  had  been  her  end  ?  The  survivors,  who  in  evil 
plight  struggled  ashore  to  the  sullen  coast  of  Finisterre,  could 
alone  tell  the  story.  About  midnight  the  wind  was  very  strong, 
and  the  ship  was  then  under  her  three  topsails,  in  each  of 
which  double  reefs  had  been  taken.  Steam  was  up,  but,  appa- 
rently, the  screw  was  not  working,  and  she  was  making  little 
way,  rolling  very  heavily.  The  starboard  watch  had  been 
called  a  few  minutes  after  midnight,  and  had  just  mustered  on 
deck.  As  they  were  called  there  was  a  very  heavy  lurch, 
but  the  ship  righted  herself  again.  When  the  men  came  on 
deck*  they  heard  Captain  Burgoyne  give  the  orders,  "  Let  go 
topsail  halyards,"  and  then  "  Let  go  fore  and  main  topsail 
sheets."  Before  they  got  to  the  sheets  a  second  and  more 
terrible  lurch  began.  In  quick  succession  the  angle  of  the 
heel  was  called,  in  answer  to  a  question  of  Captain  Burgoyne, 
"  Eighteen  degrees  !  Twenty-three  degrees  !  Twenty-eight 
degrees  !  "  At  the  sheets  the  heel  to  starboard  was  so  great 
that  some  of  the  men  were  washed  off  the  deck.  The  ship 
was  now  on  her  beam-ends,  lying  down  on  her  side,  slowly 
capsizing,  and  "  trembling  with  every  blow  which  the  short, 
jumping  seas,  white  with  foam,  struck  her."  It  was  a  dread- 
ful moment.  The  steam,  escaping  with  a  tremendous  roar 
from  the  funnel,  did  not  drown  the  cries  of  the  stokers,  which 
came  up  from  the  bowels  of  the  ship.  The  boilers  were  fired 
athwartship,  and  when  the  Captain  was  on  her  beam-ends  the 
furnace  doors  in  the  port  row  of  boilers  would  no  longer  be 
able  to  resist  the  pressure  of  the  glowing  coal  inside,  but 
would  be  forced  open,  and  thus  would  discharge  their  contents 
upon  the  hapless  men,  flung  in  a  heap  upon  the  fronts  of  the 
starboard  boilers.  And,  as  the  draught  failed,  and  the  water 
descended  by  the  funnel  to  the  furnaces,  upon  the  torment  of 
fire  would  come  a  rush  of  flame  and  steam,  till  death  by  drown- 
ing ended  the  tortures  of  that  inferno.    It  is  sometimes  said 

*  Court  Martial,  H.M.S.  Captain,  p.  124.  This  fixes  the  time  and  shows 
that  Admiral  Milne  must  have  been  mistaken  when  he  thought  he  saw  the 
Captain  at  1.15, 


1 88  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1870 

that  the  men  in  engine-room  and  stokehold  are  safe  in  war. 
But,  when  they  die  unseen  and  unsung,  at  moments  such  as 
this,  without  a  chance  of  escape,  we  must  own  that  they  con- 
front a  danger  more  unnerving  than  is  faced  by  the  sailor 
fighting  on  deck,  and  that  they  deserve  special  honour. 

As  the  ship  heeled,  and  it  became  evident  that  she  was 
capsizing,  many  of  the  men  ran  forward  to  the  weather- 
forecastle  netting  and  leapt  overboard,  still  hearing  the  roar 
of  the  steam,  even  when  the  funnel  was  below  the  water. 
Others  climbed  up  the  tilting  deck  with  the  help  of  ropes,  and 
got  out  on  the  port  side,  and  then  as  the  Captain  slowly  turned 
over,  walked  up  her  bottom.  One  man  caught  his  foot  in  a 
Kingston  valve,  and  finally  reached  the  place  where  the  keel 
would  have  been,  had  there  been  one,  when  the  ship  fell 
suddenly  away  from  under  him.  The  gunner  had  a  very 
narrow  escape.  He  had  been  asleep  in  his  cabin,  when  some 
marines  awakened  him  by  the  noise  they  made.  Noticing 
that  the  ship  was  rolling  heavily,  he  got  up  and  went  to  the 
turrets  to  see  that  the  guns  were  properly  secured.  He 
visited  the  fore-turret,  and  was  in  the  after-turret  when  the 
fatal  lurch  began.  As  the  heel  grew  greater,  he  climbed  out 
of  one  of  the  sighting  holes,  and  was  just  clear  when  the  ship 
went  down.  '  The  last  seen  of  her  was  the  prow.  The  few 
survivors,  all,  except  the  captain  and  the  gunner,  of  the  star- 
board watch,  climbed  on  to  the  launch  and  the  pinnace,  which 
were  floating  about.  The  second  launch  was  cleared,  and  the 
men  set  to  work  to  row  her  to  the  help  of  the  pinnace,  upon 
which,  as  it  swam  bottom  upwards,  were  Captain  Burgoyne 
and  several  men.  Many  of  the  men  jumped  to  the  launch, 
but  Burgoyne  would  not,  and  as  the  heavy  sea  prevented  close 
approach,  and  all  but  swamped  the  launch,  he  had  to  be  aban- 
doned. He  refused  an  oar,  telling  the  men  they  would  want 
all  those  they  had.  Eighteen  survivors  reached  dry  land,  after 
in  vain  hailing  the  Inconstant,  which  passed  close  to  them, 
without  hearing  or  seeing  them  in  the  uproar  and  darkness  of 
the  squall. 


1875]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  1S9 

The  news  was  at  first  received  with  incredulity  in  England, 
and  then  with  grief  and  indignation.  The  loss  of  so  fine  a 
ship,  with  so  many  promising  officers  and  nearly  500  men, 
was  a  national  disaster.  At  the  court  martial  which  sat  to 
try  the  survivors  the  verdict  was  a  vindication  of  the  Ad- 
miralty. "The  Captain"  it  ran,  "was  built  in  deference  to 
public  opinion,  and  in  opposition  to  the  views  and  opinions  of 
the  Controller  of  the  Navy  and  his  department. "  Her  heavy 
masting,  her  sails,  her  low  freeboard,  far  lower  than  her 
designer  had  intended,  and  her  great  top- weights,  in  the  shape 
of  her  hurricane  deck  and  turrets,  were  the  causes  of  the 
disaster.  She  might  have  been  a  safe  ship  without  her  masts, 
or  with  them  she  might  have  been  a  satisfactory  coast-sendee 
vessel.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  she  was  too  unstable  for 
work  at  sea.  Her  loss  has  not  been  without  effect.  In  the 
first  place,  it  has  led  our  constructors  to  pay  great  attention 
to  stability,  a  virtue  the  value  of  which  would  be  felt  in  war, 
though  it  does  not  necessarily  make  a  great  show  in  peace. 
In  the  second,  it  has  for  ever  warned  off  amateur  designers. 
The  art  of  designing  a  ship  is  so  intricate,  and  needs  such  a 
deep  technical  knowledge,  if  the  product  is  to  be  satisfactory, 
that  in  this  there  is  only  cause  for  satisfaction. 

The  second  disaster  was  happily  unattended  with  loss  of 
life.  The  Channel  Squadron,  consisting  of  the  five  ironclads, 
Warrior,  Achilles,  Hector,  Iron  Duke,  and  Vanguard,  left 
Kingstown  for  Queenstown  on  September  1st,  1875,  at 
10.30  a.m.  On  reaching  the  Kish  lightship  the  Achilles  left 
the  squadron  to  steer  for  Liverpool,  whilst  the  other  four  pro- 
ceeded on  their  course,  formed  in  line  ahead.  At  about  12.30 
a  very  thick  fog  came  on,  and  it  was  not  possible  to  see  more 
than  fifty  yards  ahead.  The  positions  of  the  ships  were  now 
as  follows  :  First  came  the  Warrior  and  Hector ;  then,  a  mile 
or  two  astern  of  them,  the  Vanguard  and  Iron  Duke,  the 
former  ship  leading.*    The  speed,  which  had  been  ten  or 

*  The  Vanguard  and  Iron  Duke  were  three  cables  instead  of  two  cables,  the 
right  distance,  apart  just  before  the  collision. 


I  go  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1875 

twelve  knots  before  the  fog  came  down,  was  reduced  to  seven 
or  eight* 

Soon  after  half-past  twelve  a  large  sailing  vessel  crossed 
the  Vanguard 's  bows,  and  compelled  her  to  sheer  from  her 
place  in  the  line.  Her  helm  had  been  put  hard-a-port,  and 
her  way  thus  checked,  when  suddenly  the  Iron  Duke,  which 
had  first  sheered,  for  no  adequate  reason,  and  then  had  come 
back  to  her  course,  loomed  up  through  the  fog,  not  one 
cable  distant,  with  her  ram  pointed  at  the  Vanguard's  broad- 
side. Simultaneously  the  Vanguard  was  seen  by  the  Iron 
Duke,  and  Captain  Hickley,  the  commander  of  the  latter,  who 
was  on  deck,  at  once  ordered  his  engines  to  go  astern,  but 
too  late  to  avert  a  collision.  Steaming  at  a  rate  of  something 
less  than  seven  knots,  the  Iron  Duke  struck  the  Vanguard, 
which  was  steaming  about  six  knots,  four  feet  below  her 
armour,  just  abaft  the  mainmast  on  the  port  quarter,  abreast  of 
the  engine-room.  Avery  large  rent,  twenty-five  feet  square,  was 
made  in  her,  and  the  water  came  through  in  a  torrent.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  ram  had  damaged  the  ship  at  her  most  vulner- 
able point,  tearing  a  hole  in  the  athwartship  bulkhead,  which 
parted  the  engine  and  boiler  compartments — the  two  largest 
compartments  in  the  ship.  The  shock  was  very  violent.  The 
armour-belt  of  the  Vanguard,  here  8  inches  thick,  was 
driven  in  more  than  a  foot,  but  the  inner  skin  was  not  actually 
pierced  by  the  ram.f  Other  bulkheads  in  the  ship  were  so 
much  damaged  that  they  leaked  badly,  and  on  deck  spars 
and  blocks  fell  from  her  masts.  Immediately  the  collision 
occurred  the  water-tight  doors  were  closed.  There  was  no 
panic,  and  the  discipline  maintained  was  excellent.  The 
engine-room,  stokehold,  and  alleys  were  quickly  filled,  the 

*  The  "  Fog  Signal  Instructions,"  however,  laid  down  the  rule  that  in  fogs 
the  speed  should  not  exceed  three  or  four  knots. 

f  The  inner  skin  of  the  double  bottom  only  went  as  high  as  the  lower  edge 
of  the  armour  belt.  Thus  for  some  feet  below  the  water-line  there  was  nothing 
behind  the  side-plating  and  its  supports.  Had  the  Vanguard  been  built  with  a 
wing-bulkhead  as  are  all  modern  ironclads  she  would  certainly  have  floated, 
notwithstanding  her  severe  injuries. 


1875]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  191 

boiler  drowned  out,  and  the  steam-pumps  left  without  steam. 
An  artificer,  with  great  presence  of  mind,  opened  the  boiler 
valves,  and  allowed  the  steam  to  escape,  thereby  averting 
an  explosion.  The  men  were  mustered  on  deck  in  order,  and 
no  attempt  was  made  to  save  the  ship,  all  the  energy  of 
Captain  Dawkins,  her  commander,  being  devoted  to  the 
saving  of  life.  A  certain  want  of  promptitude,  resolution, 
and  resource  was  perhaps  visible  amongst  the  officers,  but 
looking  at  the  case  of  the  Vanguard  in  the  light  of  later 
catastrophes,  it  is  doubtful  whether  much  could  have  been 
done.  The  Iron  Duke,  which  had  disappeared  in  the  fog, 
came  up  as  close  as  she  could  with  safety,  and  as  quickly  as 
possible,  but,  with  perfect  order,  the  men  were  transferred  to 
her.  Within  twenty  minutes  they  had  all  been  taken  off, 
the  captain,  as  usual,  being  the  last  to  leave  the  sinking 
ironclad.  One  hour  after  the  collision,  at  2.15  p.m.,  the 
Vanguard,  which  was  heavily  down  by  the  stern,  whirled 
round  two  or  three  times  and  went  to  the  bottom  in  nineteen 
fathoms. 

The  Vanguard  was  a  second-class  battleship  of  5899  tons 
and  3500  horse-power.*  She  was  one  of  a  class  of  six  ships 
designed  to  meet  the  French  Alma  class,  and  was  primarily 
meant  for  service  on  distant  stations.  She  carried  ten 
12^-ton  muzzle-loaders  and  two  64-pounders.  She  had  a 
complete  armour-belt,  6  to  8  inches  thick  on  the  water-line, 
and  a  central  battery  protected  by  6-inch  plating.  She  had  a 
speed  of  14*9  knots  at  her  trial,  and  carried  a  crew  of  450 
men.  On  her  steam  trials  she  was  found  to  be  defective  in 
stability,  and  her  double-bottom  had  been  filled  with  bricks 
and  cement.  There  were  seven  athwartship  bulkheads  dividing 
the  hold  into  eight  compartments,  and  it  was  calculated  that 
any  one  of  these  might  be  breached  without  disaster  to  the 
ship.  Unfortunately,  the  possibility  of  a  blow  being  struck 
over  one  of  the  bulkheads,  and  thus  laying  open  two 
compartments  to  the  sea,  had  been  overlooked. 

*  See  Plate  xxxvii.  p.  220  for  elevation  of  her  sister-ship  Audacious. 


i92  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1875 

The  court,  which  tried  the  officers  of  the  Vanguard,  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  disaster  was  due,  firstly  to  the  high 
speed  which  the  squadron  was  maintaining  in  spite  of  the 
fog ;  secondly  to  the  fact  that  Captain  Dawkins,  of  the 
Vanguard,  though  leader  of  his  division,  and  though  the 
weather  was  foggy,  had  left  the  deck  ;  thirdly  to  a  reduction 
of  speed  by  the  Vanguard  without  any  signal  to  the  Iron 
Duke  astern;  fourthly  to  an  increase  of  speed  by  the  Iron 
Duke  in  spite  of  the  fog,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
speed  was  already  high ;  fifthly  to  the  Iron  Duke's  improperly 
sheering  out  of  line;  and  sixthly  to  the  absence  of  any  fog- 
signals  on  her  part.  Captain  Dawkins  was  censured  and 
dismissed  his  ship  for  neglecting  to  get  the  pumps  to  work, 
and  instead  hoisting  out  the  boats.  The  court  held  that  he 
should  have  tried  to  cover  the  rent  in  the  side  with  sails. 
The  navigating  lieutenant  was  censured  for  not  endeavouring 
to  run  the  ship  into  shoal  water,  when  she  might  have  been 
recovered,  even  if  she  had  sunk.  It  was  held  that  the  Iron 
Duke  should  have  made  some  effort  to  tow  her  into  shallow 
water.  The  commander  of  the  Vanguard  was  reprimanded 
with  the  chief-engineer  and  carpenter.  The  Iron  Duke's 
watch-officer  was  dismissed  his  ship. 

The  Iron  Duke,  which  was  precisely  similar  to  the 
Vanguard,  suffered  no  injury  of  any  moment.  Her  ram 
projected  but  very  slightly  below  her  armour-belt,  and  could 
have  repeated  the  blow  without  danger.  The  accident 
produced  in  England  a  tendency  to  favour  the  ram,  whilst, 
seeing  how  easily  the  largest  ship  could  be  destroyed  by  it, 
various  impracticable  suggestions  for  an  unsinkable  ship  were 
put  forward. 

Three  years  later  a  similar  disaster  occurred  to  the  German 
fleet,  but  this  time  there  was  grievous  loss  of  life.  On  May 
6th,  1878,  a  squadron  of  three  ironclads — the  Konig  Wilhelm, 
carrying  the  flag  of  Admiral  von  Batsch,  the  Grosser  Kurfurst, 
and  the  Preussen — went  into  commission  at  Wilhelm  shaven. 
After  completing  their  crews  and  fitting  out,  on  May  29th  they 


1878] 


IRONCLAD    CA  TASTROPHES. 


193 


left  the  port  on  their  way  to  Plymouth.  On  May  31st,  they 
were  in  the  Channel  off  Folkestone.  The  formation  adopted 
was  a  triangular  one,  the  Kcnig  Wilhelm  leading,  and  the 
Preussen  following  astern,  in  line  with  her.  To  starboard  of 
the  flagship,  slightly  abaft  her  beam,  was  the  Kurfilrst.  Her 
distance  from  the  Konig  Wilhelm,  had  originally  been  440 
yards,  but  an  hour  before  the  collision,  she  had  been  ordered 
to  draw  closer,  till  only  no  yards  parted  the  two  vessels, 
and  from  the  shore  it  was  noticed  that  they  were  in  dangerous 
proximity.  Whilst  steaming  thus,  two  sailing  vessels,  hauled 
to  the  wind  on  the  port  tack,  crossed  the  bows  of  the  squadron. 
In  obedience  to  the  rule  of  the  road,  the  Kurfilrst  ported  her 
helm,  and  turned  to  starboard  to  clear  them.  Having  done 
this,  she  turned  sharply  to  port  to  recover  her  original 
direction.  The  K'dnig  Wilhelm  at  first  tried  to  pass  ahead  of 
the  sailing  vessels,  but  finding  this  impossible,  turned  to 
starboard,  and  found  the  Kurfilrst  lying  across  her  bows, 
at  right  angles  to  her  course.*  To  avoid  the  collision  now 
imminent,  the  Kurfursfs  captain  went  full  steam  ahead,  and 
tried  to  cross  the  bows  of  the  oncoming  ironclad  in  time 
to  clear  her.  Seeing  that  this  was  impossible,  he  essayed  to 
turn  to  starboard,  hoping  to  come  round  on  a  course  parallel 
to  the  K'dnig  Wilhelm,  or  at  least  to  receive  only  a  glancing 
blow.  On  board  the  Konig  Wilhelm,  both  admiral  and 
captain  were  below,  and  in  these  few  critical  instants  there 
was  not  time  to  summon  them  on  deck,  or  for  them  to  do 
anything  if  they  had  been  summoned.  The  helm  was  in 
charge  of  a  petty  officer,  a  one-year  volunteer  of  no  ex- 
perience, and  six  raw  recruits.  When  the  watch-officer  gave 
orders  for  the  helm  to  be  starboarded,  to  bring  the  ship  round 
to  port,  the  men  got  confused,  and  instead  of  obeying  the 
order,  did  the  exact  opposite,  and  ported  the  helm,  thus 
swinging  the  ram  more  round  to  starboard,  whilst  the 
Kurfilrst 's  stern  swung  round  to  port  to  meet  it.    As  the 


Vol.  II. 


*  See  Plan,  p.  194. 


O 


194  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1878 

collision  was  now  inevitable,  the  order  on  board  the  Konig 
Wilhelm  was  given  to  reverse  the  engines,  and  they  were 
actually  going  astern  at  the  moment  of  impact. 

With  a  speed  which,  in  spite  of  the  reversal  of  the  engines, 
reached  six  or  seven  knots,  the  Konig  Wilhelm  crashed  into 
the  Grosser  Kurfurst,  which  was  steaming  at  nine  or  ten 
knots,  between  the  main  and  mizzenmasts.  The  ram  ploughed 
up  the  armour  as  if  it  had  been  orange-peel,  whilst  a  sound  of 
crunching  and  rending  filled  the  air.  The  angle  of  impact 
was  more  than  forty-five  degrees  and  less  than  ninety.  On 
board  the  Konig  Wilhelm  there  was  no  shock,  but  a  gentle 
trembling.  Glasses  of  water  on  her  tables  were  not  upset, 
nor  was  the  water  spilled.  On  the  Kurfurst  there  was  a 
violent  shock.  The  ship  lurched  to  starboard,  away  from  the 
Konig  Wilhelm,  but  kept  her  way,  and  twisting  and  breaking 
the  ram  cleared  it,  and  grated  alongside.  The  bowsprit  of 
the  Konig  Wilhelm  caught  the  Kurfurst'' \s  rigging  and  brought 
down  her  mizzen  topgallantmast,  before  it  was  broken  off. 
The  boats  on  the  rammed  ship's  quarterdeck  were  shattered 
or  swept  away.  The  water  poured  through  the  great  breach 
in  the  side  and  down  the  stokehold,  flooding  the  furnaces,  and 
driving  the  stokers  up  the  hatchways  and  steps  inside  the 
ventilators,  whilst  the  steam  escaped  violently.  A  heavy  list 
to  port  laid  the  doomed  vessel  on  her  beam  end,  and  prevented 
the  crew  from  getting  out  the  boats,  which  were  smashed  on 
the  port  side,  and  lying  on  the  side  to  starboard.  There  was 
little  time  to  do  anything,  but  an  effort  was  made  by  the 
captain,  Count  von  Montz,  to  run  her  into  shallow  water. 
Before  she  had  moved  any  distance,  five  minutes  from  the  time 
of  the  collision,  she  sank  in  fifteen  fathoms  of  water,  sucking 
down  many  of  the  crew.  Her  hammocks  had  been  stowed 
away  in  an  unusual  position — between  the  boom-boats — so 
that  they  could  not  float  away  and  act  as  buoys.  Of  the  men 
on  board,  most  jumped  into  the  water  when  the  end  was  at 
hand.  Thirty  sailors  met  a  dreadful  fate.  In  spite  of  the 
entreaties  of  the  boatswain,  they  leaped  over  the  bows,  and 


li 


■ 


1878]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  195 

were  caught  in  the  netting  under  the  jib-boom,  entangled,  and 
carried  down.  The  first  lieutenant  felt  himself  sucked  in  when 
the  Kurfurst  foundered.  There  was  a  sensation  of  a 
tremendous  pressure  upon  his  ribs,  as  if  the  water 
was  forcing  him  down.  Then  a  minute  later  the  pressure 
was  reversed,  and  drove  him  to  the  surface,  where  he  caught 
a  spar  and  saved  his  life.  The  captain  was  similarly  carried 
down,  but  came  again  to  the  top,  and  was  saved.  Fishing 
vessels,  and  boats  from  the  Konig  Wilhelm,  were  quickly  on 
the  spot,  though  the  Preussen  was  very  slow  in  getting  her 
boats  out.  Of  a  crew,  which  numbered  497,  216  were  picked 
up,  of  whom  three  afterwards  died  from  exhaustion.  Twenty- 
three  officers  were  saved,  and  six  drowned,  amongst  whom 
were  an  engineer  and  a  paymaster. 

The  ram  of  the  Konig  Wilhelm  was  greatly  damaged.  The 
stem  was  broken  in  two  places,  and  twisted  over  to  port  at  an 
angle  of  forty-five  degrees.*  All  the  rivets  near  it  were 
sheared,  or  broken  away.  The  sea  rushed  into  her  fore 
compartment  and  filled  it,  heavily  depressing  the  bows.  There 
was  great  excitement  on  board,  as  it  was  at  first  thought  that 
she  too  was  going  to  founder,  and  her  captain  prepared  to 
beach  her,  but,  finding  that  the  pumps  could  keep  the  water 
down,  abandoned  the  idea,  and  returned  to  succour  the 
Kurfurst.  A  sail  was  placed  over  the  bows,  whilst  the  four 
side  boats,  the  cutters,  gigs,  and  one  steam-launch,  were 
lowered  to  save  the  drowning  men.  When  the  Kurfurst 
sank,  a  cloud  of  steam,  caused  probably  by  the  bursting  of  her 
boilers,  was  seen  to  rise  from  the  water.  The  Konig  Wilhelm 
and  her  consort,  after  cruising  about  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  sunken  ship  till  the  afternoon,  went  to  Portsmouth,  where 
the  damage  was  repaired. 

This  accident,  whilst  it  showed  the  dreadful  efficacy  of  the 
ram,  showed  also  that  its  use  was  attended  with  much  danger 
to  the  assailant.    In  a  heavy  sea,  the  injuries  to  the  Konig 
Wilhelm  might  have  caused  her  loss.    Her  bows,  however, 
*  The  stem  was  a  solid  forging  4  inches  thick. 

O  2 


196  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1893 

were  not  particularly  strong,  as  she  was  a  comparatively  old 
ship,  and  built  before  the  value  of  a  ram  was  fully  understood. 
Though  armour-belted,  her  plating  did  not  descend  to  the 
extremity  of  the  ram,  and  there  was  no  support  against  a 
transverse  strain.  The  Grosser  Kurfurst  was  a  turret-ship  of 
6600  tons,  resembling  the  English  Monarch.  In  her  two 
turrets  she  carried  four  24-centimetre  Krupps,  and  on  her 
upper  deck  two  17-centimetre  guns.  Her  armour  was  from 
7  to  10  inches  thick. 

The  last  and  most  tragic  of  all  these  misadventures,  was  the 
loss  of  the  Victoria.  She  was  a  single-turret  battleship  of  the 
first  class,  and  the  most  recent  construction."*  Completed  in  1890 
at  a  cost  of  £724,800,  exclusive  of  guns  and  gun-mountings,  she 
had  a  speed  of  167  knots  on  the  measured  mile,  and  a 
tremendous  armament,  included  in  which  were  two  110-ton 
guns,  one  of  29  tons,  and  twelve  of  6  inches.  She  carried  a 
belt  of  armour  from  16  to  18  inches  thick,  extending  for  about 
half  her  length  on  the  water-line  ;  and  forward,  was  her  single 
turret,  with  its  two  huge  guns.  Her  original  name  had  been 
the  Renown,  but  on  the  stocks  it  had  been  changed  to  Victoria, 
in  honour  of  the  Queen.  The  total  strength  of  the  crew 
including  officers  was  659.  On  board  her,  as  the  finest  ship 
of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  George  Tryon, 
the  commander-in-chief  on  the  Mediterranean  station,  had 
hoisted  his  flag. 

At  10  a.m.,  on  the  morning  of  June  22nd,  1893,  the  fleet 
left  Beyrout  for  Tripoli.  The  vessels  present  were  the 
armoured  battleships  Victoria,  Camperdown,  carrying  the 
flag  of  Rear-Admiral  Markham,  the  second  in  command, 
Collingwood,  Sanspareil,  Nile,  Edinburgh,  Inflexible,  and 
Dreadnought ,  with  the  cruisers  Edgar,  Amphion,  Phaeton, 
Barhani,  and  Fearless.  The  order  was  line  abreast,  and  the 
speed  eight  knots  Five  miles  off  the  intended  destination, 
at  2.20  p.m.,  the  order  was  changed  to  columns  of  divisions 
line  ahead,  disposed  abeam  to  port,  the  two  columns  being 

*  See  page  232. 


1 893]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  197 

six  cables*  apart.  This  brought  the  fleet  into  two  parallel 
columns,  the  starboard  one  headed  by  the  Victoria,  containing 
six  ships,  and  the  port  column  headed  by  the  Camperdown, 
containing  five.  The  Barham  and  Fearless  were  not  formed 
up  with  the  heavier  ships.  A  few  minutes  earlier,  Admiral 
Tryon  had  sent  for  the  Victorians  commander,  Captain 
Bourke,  and  her  navigating  officer.  To  them  he  explained 
the  manoeuvre,  by  which  he  proposed  that  the  fleet  should 
take  up  its  position  preparatory  to  anchoring.  The  two 
columns,  only  six  cables  apart,  were  to  turn  inwards  sixteen 
points, t  towards  each  other.  This  half-turn  would  exactly 
reverse  their  direction  and  leave  the  ships  still  in  a  double 
column,  but  extremely  close  together. 

The  danger  of  the  proposed  manoeuvre  was  at  once  realised 
by  both  Captain  Bourke  and  the  staff-commander.  ;f  The 
space  between  the  two  columns  was  wholly  insufficient,  for  in 
manoeuvring  with  other  ships  the  tactical  diameter§  of  the 
least  handy  ship  must  govern  the  movements  of  the  handiest. 
With  twenty-eight  degrees  of  helm,  which  was  for  manoeuvring 
purposes  the  limit  of  the  Victoria,  and  without  "jockeying" 
with  the  screws,  driving  one  ahead  and  the  other  astern,  a 
practice  which  Admiral  Tryon  discountenanced,  the  diameter 
of  the  Victories  circle  was  800  yards,  or  four  cables.  The 
Camperdown  with  about  the  same  turning  circle  was  therefore 
demonstrably  bound,  if  both  ships  started  turning  inwards  at 
once  with  a  distance  of  only  six  cables  between  them,  to  ram 
or  to  be  rammed  by  the  Victoria.  They  must  collide  unless 
quite  exceptional  measures  were  taken.  The  staff-com- 
mander suggested  eight  cables  as  a  better  distance,  and  the 
admiral  accepted  the  suggestion,  remarking,  "  Yes,  it  should 
be  eight  cables."  The  surprise  of  the  commander  was  there- 
fore great,  when  at  2.20  the  admiral  sent  orders  to  signal  the 

*  A  cable  is  200  yards. 

f  There  are  thirty-two  points  in  the  whole  circle  of  the  compass.  One  point 
is  eleven  degrees  fifteen  minutes.  J  Comm.  Hawkins-Smith,  R.N. 

§  Tactical  diameter  is  the  diameter  of  the  circle  which  a  ship  describes  in 
making  a  complete  turn. 


i98  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1893 

distance  between  the  columns  as  six  cables,  and  as  he 
apprehended  that  there  must  be  some  mistake,  the  admiral's 
flag-lieutenant,  who  had  carried  the  order  forward,  went 
below,  and  asked  once  more  whether  the  distance  was  to  be 
only  six  cables.  Once  more  he  was  told  by  Admiral  Tryon 
to  "  leave  it  at  six  cables."  Captain  Bourke,  who  was  with 
the  admiral,  reminded  him  that  the  turning  circle  of  the 
Victoria  was  "800  yards  in  diameter,  but  to  no  purpose. 

Admiral  Tryon  was  a  masterful,  as  well  as  an  able  officer. 
He  was,  says  Captain  Bourke,  "  always  ready  and  glad  to 
discuss  any  manoeuvre  after  it  had  been  performed,  but  I 
never  knew  him  to  consult  anyone  before.  He  loved  argu- 
ment, but  he  was  a  strict  disciplinarian.  He  always  used  to 
say  that  he  hated  people  who  agreed  with  him,  but  that  again 
was  different  from  arguing  against  a  direct  order."  Captain 
Bourke  left  the  admiral  with  an  uneasy  confidence  in  him  ;  he 
was  uneasy  because  the  manoeuvre  was  manifestly  dangerous, 
confident  because  he  was  serving  under  a  commander  of  vast 
knowledge,  immense  experience,  and  great  caution.  The 
discipline  of  the  service,  which  to  obtain  great  results  must 
necessarily  be  strict  and  exacting,  forbade  further  action  on 
his  part.  He  had  done  his  best  to  point  out  the  extreme  peril 
of  the  evolution,  and  Sir  George  Tryon  would  not  understand. 
Therefore,  he  probably  thought,  the  admiral  must  have  some 
other  intention  than  that  to  which  the  signal  appeared  to  point. 

An  interval  of  an  hour  passed,  during  which  a  remonstrance 
might  have  averted  the  terrible  disaster  which  was  impending. 
But  no  further  remonstrance  was  possible  on  Captain  Bourke's 
part  without  something  verging  upon  insubordination.  At 
3.28  the  fatal  signal  was  made  in  the  following  terms  : — 

Second  division  alter  course  in  succession  sixteen  points  to  starboard, 
preserving  the  order  of  the  fleet. 

First  division  alter  course  in  succession  sixteen  points  to  port,  preserving 
the  order  of  the  fleet. 

The  signal  was  received  on  board  the  Camper  down  and  other 
ships.    Admiral  Markham  was  at  once  seized  with  the  same 


1893]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  199 

misgivings  as  Captain  Bourke.  "  It  is  impossible  as  it  is  an 
impracticable  manoeuvre,"  was  his  remark  to  his  flag-lieutenant. 
He  ordered  him  to  keep  the  signal,  which  he  was  repeating, 
at  the  dip,  to  show  that  it  was  not  understood.  On  this  the 
Victoria  signalled  to  him  to  know  why  he  was  waiting.  He 
answered :  u  Because  I  do  not  quite  understand  the  signal." 
Unhappily  his  reply,  which  might  even  now  have  saved  the 
Victoria,  was  not  received  on  board  her,  and,  as  there  was  no 
answer,  Admiral  Markham  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
commander-in-chief  must  intend  the  second  division  to  turn 
first,  whilst  he  with  the  first  division  circled  round  outside  it. 
It  was  a  most  unfortunate  error,  but  there  is  only  one  law  at 
sea,  for  the  junior  officer  to  obey.  There  was  hardly  one  of 
the  captains  of  the  other  ships  who  did  not  think  the  manoeuvre 
fraught  with  the  utmost  danger,  yet  all  complied  with  the 
signal.* 

The  signal  was  passed  down  the  two  lines,  and  the  fatal 
turn  began.  The  Victoria  and  the  Camperdown  at  the  head 
of  the  two  columns  led  the  way.  On  board  the  Victoria  the 
helm  used  was  thirty-five  degrees,  the  extreme  limit  possible, 
and  when  the  ship  had  swung  but  a  very  little  distance  to  port, 
it  became  evident  that  a  collision  was  at  hand.  Captain 
Bourke,  the  staff-commander,  and  Midshipman  Lanyon  were 
close  to  the  admiral  on  the  Victoria! s  flying-bridge  above  the 
chart-house.  The  first  remark  of  the  captain  was :  "  We 
shall  be  very  close  to  that  ship  (the  Camper  down)  ^  and, 
turning  to  Lanyon,  he  ordered  him  to  take  the  distance.  This 
occupied  some  seconds,  during  which  the  two  great  ships 
were  swinging  rapidly  towards  each  other.  Meanwhile, 
Captain  Bourke  asked  the  admiral  to  permit  him  to  go  astern 
with  his  port  screw,  and  so  help  the  turn.  Three  times  he 
asked  in  quick  succession  before  the  admiral,  after  a  glance 
at  the  Nile,  the  next  astern,  consented.  A  very  short  time 
afterwards  both  screws  were  put  astern  full  speed,  but  it  was 

*  Dangerous  manoeuvres,  it  must  be  remembered,  may  be  necessary  as  a 
training. 


200 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


now  too  late.  No  power  could  avert  the  collision,  and  the 
two  ships  drew  closer  and  closer.  A  minute  before  the  actual 
crash  came,  the  orders  "  close  water-tight  doors  "  and  "  out 
collision-mat  "  were  given.  At  the  former  order  the  crew 
would  go  at  once  to  their  collision-stations  and  fasten  every 
door  and  hatchway,  thus  isolating  every  compartment  and  flat. 
The  order  for  collision-stations  is  given  by  a  "  G  "  on  the 
bugle  or  by  the  ship's  foghorn. 

The  Victoria's  crew  was  a  new  one,  and  therefore  had  not 
had  time  to  become  fully  acquainted  with  the  ship.  The  time  in 
previous  drills,  occupied  in  closing  water-tight  doors,  was  three 
minutes,  therefore  at  the  moment  of  the  collision  they  could 
not  have  been  secured.  The  discipline  was  admirable  ;  there 
was  everywhere  steadiness  and  obedience,  no  hurry  and  no 
confusion,  but  the  time  given  was  not  sufficient.  At  "  out 
collision-mat "  a  large  mat  is  brought  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  leak  by  a  party  on  deck,  ready  to  be  placed  over  it,  if 
possible.  Thus  the  last  seconds  passed  on  board  the  Victoria 
in  preparing  for  the  now  imminent  disaster. 

Four  minutes  at  the  most  after  the  signal,  the  Camperdown 
struck  the  Victoria  very  nearly  at  right  angles,  just  before  the 
armoured  breastwork  which  encompasses  the  base  of  the 
turret.  The  ram  ploughed  its  way  in  about  nine  feet,  shatter- 
ing a  coal  bunker  and  breaking  a  man's  leg.  A  petty  officer, 
standing  in  his  mess,  looked  up  and  saw  the  nose  of  the  huge 
ship  come  right  in  amidst  a  cloud  of  coal  dust.  The  water 
could  be  heard  pouring  into  the  ship  below.  The  deck  and 
ironwork  buckled  up  before  the  ram,  and  there  was  a  dreadful 
crunching  sound.*  The  shock  was  tremendous,  if  indeed  it 
could  be  called  a  shock,  for  the  Victoria  was  forced  bodily, 
sideways,  a  distance  of  70  feet.  No  one  was  thrown  down, 
but  the  wrench  was  violently  felt  throughout  the  ship.  For 
an  appreciable  time  the  two  vessels  remained  in  contact,  and 
the  way  on  them  gradually  swung  their  sterns  together  whilst 

#  The  blow  was  struck  just  over  a  water-tight  bulkhead,  which  was  probably- 
destroyed. 


1893]  IRONCLAD  CATASTROPHES. 


201 


the  Camper  down?  s  ram,  still  in  the  breach,  worked  round  and 
perhaps  enlarged  the  hole.  Then  as  Admiral  Tryon  hailed 
the  Camper  down  and  ordered  her  to  go  astern,  that  ship 
cleared  the  Victoria.  The  Camperdown 's  engines  had  for 
some  seconds  been  moving  astern,  and  since  her  speed,  which 
was  only  five  knots  at  the  moment  of  the  collision,  had  been 
further  checked  by  the  collision,  it  would  not  be  long  before 
they  began  to  drive  her  backwards.  The  water  at  once  began 
to  pour  into  the  Victoria  by  the  breach,  which  measured  about 
125  square  feet. 

On  board  the  Camperdown  the  turn  had  been  executed  with 
twenty-eight  degrees  helm,  instead  of  thirty-five  degrees,  the 
extreme  angle  possible.  Though  both  Admiral  Markham  and 
Captain  Johnstone  had  expressed,  as  we  have  seen,  their 
opinion  that  the  manoeuvre  was  a  dangerous  one,  the  fullest 
helm  was  not  used,  nor  were  the  screws  "jockeyed"  to 
diminish  the  turning  circle.  Both  watched  the  Victoria 
attentively  till,  when  it  was  seen  that  she  was  end-on  to  the 
Camperdown,  approaching  her  and  not  circling  outside  her  as 
had  been  expected,  the  orders  were  at  last  given  to  close 
water-tight  doors  and  go  astern  with  the  starboard  screw.  An 
instant  later  both  screws  were  ordered  to  go  astern  at  full 
speed,  but,  through  some  defect  of  the  engine-room  telegraph, 
the  order  when  it  reached  the  engine-room  was  only  for 
three-quarter  speed  astern.  This  could  not  have  made  much 
difference,  as  the  time  was  too  short  for  the  reversal  of  the 
engines  to  have  much  effect  upon  the  speed.  At  3.34  the 
Camperdown  delivered  the  blow,  and  about  two  minutes  after- 
wards cleared  the  Victoria,  when  the  flagship  steamed  ahead. 
The  collision-mat  was  placed  over  the  Camperdown1  s  bows, 
whilst  she  too  filled  forward,  and  was  heavily  down  by  the 
bows.  The  crew  had  been  prevented  by  the  inrush  of  water 
from  closing  all  the  water-tight  doors  forward. 

Meantime  on  board  the  Victoria  the  men,  closing  the  doors 
forward,  were  driven  up  by  the  water  and  gathered  on  the 
upper  deck,  above  the  auxiliary  battery.     The  party  with 


202  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1893 

the  collision-mat  could  do  nothing ;  the  water  rose  steadily 
forward,  and  when  the  mat  was  taken  to  the  forecastle  the 
upper  deck  was  so  far  below  the  surface  that  the  men  at  the 
foremost  stations  were  wet  to  the  waist.  As  the  bow  was 
depressed  the  stern  rose  out  of  water,  and  the  port  screw 
could  be  seen  from  the  other  ships  racing  in  the  air.  The 
effort  had  to  be  abandoned,  and,  as  the  men  of  the  forecastle 
party  reached  the  upper  deck,  the  water  was  up  to  the  turret- 
ports  and  was  beginning  to  wash  in  at  the  door  in  the  screen, 
at  the  forward  end  of  the  auxiliary  battery."*  There  was  a 
steadily  growing  heel  to  starboard,  the  side  on  which  were  the 
injuries.  The  engines,  which  had  been  stopped  at  the  moment 
of  the  collision,  were  going  ahead,  in  the  vain  endeavour  to 
run  the  ship  into  shoal  water,  and  this,  in  no  small  degree, 
tended  to  force  the  water  into  the  breach,  and  also  to  depress 
the  ship's  bows  by  the  leverage  of  the  water  acting  upon  the 
inclined  plane  of  the  deck.  The  steering  engine  would  not 
work,  as  the  hydraulic  machinery  had  been  disabled,  and  the 
same  was  the  case  with  the  hydraulic  boat-hoists,  when  they 
were  tried. 

Admiral  Tryon,  the  staff-commander,  and  Midshipman 
Lanyon  were  on  the  top  of  the  chart-house  ;  whilst  Captain 
Bourke  had  gone  below,  at  the  time  of  the  collision,  to  see 
that  the  water-tight  doors  were  closed.  The  first  recorded 
remark  of  the  admiral  was  "  It  is  all  my  fault."  He  then 
asked  whether  the  ship  would  float,  and  the  commander 
assured  him  that  in  his  opinion  it  would.  No  one  appears  to 
have  expected  the  sudden  disaster  which  followed.  The 
Dreadnought  having  prepared  to  send  boats,  a  signal  was 
made  directing  that  they  should  not  be  despatched,  but  kept 
ready.  Below,  as  Capiain  Bourke  passed  through  the  passages 
and  flats  of  the  huge  ship,  where  the  electric  light  was  now 
burning  faint  and  dim,  the  men  were  coming  on  deck  without 
haste  or  hurry.  Looking  down  into  the  starboard  engine-room, 


*  This  is  the  condition  represented  in  the  diagram. 


Plate  XXXV. 


Diagram  of  the  Victoria  on  the  point  of  Capsizing. 


1893]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  203 

he  spoke  to  the  engineer  in  charge,  and  heard  that  there  was 
no  water  in  the  engine-room.  He  heard,  also,  the  gongs  of 
the  telegraphs,  and  could  see  that  the  engine-room  men  were 
steady  at  their  posts.  Meeting,  in  the  main  passage,  the  fleet- 
engineer,  he  was  told  by  him  that  the  boiler-rooms  were  water- 
tight. The  trend  to  starboard  was  great  when  he  reached  the 
upper  deck.  There,  on  the  port  side,  with  their  faces  away 
from  the  ship's  side,  were  drawn  up,  four  deep  in  line,  the 
whole  of  the  Victoria's  crew,  except  the  doomed  men  below 
in  the  engine-room  and  stokehold.  It  was  a  memorable  sight. 
Steadiness  the  most  perfect,  obedience  the  most  unwavering, 
discipline  the  most  admirable,  held  the  company.  Though  it 
must  have  been  evident  to  all  that  the  ship's  end  was  at  hand, 
there  was  still  no  panic.  Not  a  man  moved  to  the  side,  not  a 
sailor  stirred.  All  in  the  presence  of  this  overmastering 
catastrophe  demeaned  themselves  like  men,  as  if  to  prove  to 
this  nation  what  their  bearing  would  be  before  the  enemy. 
For  many  there  these  were  the  last  few  minutes  of  life.  And 
deep  and  tender  though  our  sorrow  must  be  for  noble  lives  thus 
lost  in  peace,  we  can  yet  feel  something  akin  to  exultation  at 
the  thought  that  at  this  supreme  moment  another  imperishable 
tradition  was  being  added  to  the  glories  of  our  sea  service,  and 
that  the  children  of  Nelscn  met  death  in  a  manner  not  un- 
worthy of  their  past. 

The  tilt  of  the  great  ship  grew.  The  deck  heeled  towards 
the  perpendicular,  and  the  order  "Jump,"  was  given.  The 
line  of  men  broke  and  made  for  the  side,  but  with  difficulty, 
owing  to  the  growing  angle  of  the  list.  Some  threw  them- 
selves over,  others  were  thrown  through  the  air  by  the  ship. 
Those  astern  had  to  leap  past  the  whirling  screw,  which  is 
said  to  have  killed  or  injured  no  few.  There  was  no  want  of 
gallant  deeds  in  the  awful  instants  which  succeeded.  On  the 
chart-house  Midshipman  Lanyon  remained  by  Admiral  Tryon, 
and  the  staff-commander,  to  the  last,  though  ordered  by  the 
admiral  to  the  boats.  The  final  lurch  came  at  344I,  just 
ten  minutes  after  the  collision.    There  was  a  tremendous  roll 


204  IRONCLADS   IN   ACTION.  [1893 

to  starboard,  the  stem  of  the  Victoria  dived,  a  crash  of  boats 
and  top-hamper  falling  into  the  water  filled  the  air,  and  then 
the  flagship  went  to  the  bottom  amidst  a  cloud  of  smoke  and 
steam.  The  last  seen  of  her  was  the  stern,  with  the  screws 
still  revolving.  A  great  uprush  of  air,  a  violent  upheaval  of 
the  surface  followed,  and  spars  and  fragments  of  wreckage 
carried  up  by  it  injured  many  of  the  men  in  the  water,  whilst 
others  were  sucked  down  in  the  whirling  vortex.  The  men 
were  so  close  together  that  it  was  hard  to  strike  out,  and  as 
there  were  many  who  could  not  swim,  or  who  had  been  injured, 
in  the  water,  these  clutched  hold  of  the  others  and  carried 
them  down  with  them.  The  officers  and  crews  of  the  other 
ships  were  horror-struck  witnesses  of  the  scene,  and,  as  quickly 
as  they  could,  sent  their  boats  to  the  help  of  the  drowning  men. 
In  from  five  to  ten  minutes  they  were  near  the  place  where  the 
Victoria  had  foundered,  and  rescued  between  them  338  lives. 
Admiral  Tryon  was  never  seen  again  after  the  final  lurch. 

Nothing  was  wanting  to  complete  the  tragedy.  There  was 
amongst  the  spectators  of  that  scene  the  same  foreboding  of 
evil  which  was  present  in  the  mind  of  the  Greek  in  his  theatre. 
The  play  must  inevitably  end  in  tragedy.  They  saw  evil 
coming  and  could  not  avert  it ;  they  saw  their  chief  seized 
with  "  God-sent  madness "  and  stood  powerless.  The  com- 
mander-in-chief was  guilty  of  a  grave  error,  and  by  that 
error  he  doomed  321  officers  and  men.  He  refused  to  listen 
to  a  suggestion  or  remonstrance,  and  his  order  was  obeyed. 
He  expiated  his  fault  by  death,  and  with  a  noble  magnanimity 
acknowledged  his  fault.  The  second  in  command  was  guilty 
of  an  error  of  judgment  in  obeying,  without  a  question  as  to 
the  real  meaning  of  the  signal.  There  is  little  doubt  that  on 
board  the  Victoria  the  officers  had  a  presentiment  of  the 
collision  which  would  follow.  They  may  be  blamed  for  doing 
nothing  which  might  have  averted  it,  for  not  making  their 
remonstrance  felt.  But  in  justice  we  must  own  that  it  was 
discipline  which  was  to  blame,  not  the  officers.  Without 
discipline,  without  prompt  and  unquestioning  obedience,  a 


1 893]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  205 

navy  would  be  worthless.  And  so,  as  it  has  been  well 
said,  by  one  of  those  antinomies  which  occur  more  often 
in  fiction  or  the  drama  than  in  real  life,  the  collision  was 
precipitated.  The  finest  ironclad,  or  all  but  the  finest,  in  the 
squadron,  before  the  eyes  of  all,  on  a  clear  summer  day,  went 
to  the  bottom  as  the  result  of  a  touch  of  the  ram.  All  the 
skill  and  ingenuity  which  had  been  lavished  upon  her 
proved  of  no  avail  to  keep  her  afloat ;  perhaps  they  were  even 
a  snare,  as  they  led  to  excessive  confidence  in  her  stability. 

The  Camper  down  was  very  severely  damaged  in  her  bows. 
A  great  hole,  ten  feet  by  six  feet,  was  torn  by  the  sharp  edge 
of  the  Victoria }s  armour-deck,  and  the  stem  was  broken  above 
the  ram  and  twisted  to  port.  The  water  shipped  brought  up 
her  draught  forward  from  27  feet  9  inches  to  32  feet,  an 
increase  of  over  four  feet.  She  could  not,  therefore,  have 
repeated  the  blow,  and  must  have  been  in  great  danger  if 
a  storm  had  arisen. 

The  great  loss  of  life  on  board  the  Victoria  was  due  in  the 
first  instance  to  the  number  of  men  who  could  not  swim,  and 
would  go  down  at  once ;  in  the  second,  to  the  violent  swirl  and 
subsequent  agitation  of  the  water  ;  and  in  the  third,  to  the 
number  of  men  below  in  the  engine-room  and  stokehold.  No 
order  was  given  to  them  to  come  on  deck,  and  they  died  like 
Englishmen,  with  a  poetic  splendour,  doing  their  duty,  how- 
ever useless  and  hopeless  a  one.  Upon  their  fate  we  scarcely 
can  dare  to  speculate.  The  rush  of  water  down  the  funnels 
would  be  followed  by  a  burst  of  steam  from  the  boilers. 
Probably,  as  the  ship  touched  the  bottom,  the  pressure,  in 
eighty  fathoms  of  water,  drove  in  the  sides,  and  so  killed  any 
who  had  survived  the  scalding  steam.  The  water  above  the 
ship  was  greatly  agitated  by  escaping  air  for  some  consider- 
able time  after  she  had  gone  down.  There  was  no  explosion 
as  she  sank,  but  only  steam,  probably  from  the  funnels. 

The  court  martial  which  met  at  Malta  found  that  Sir 
George  Tryon  was  to  blame  for  the  collision,  acquitted 
Captain  Bourke  and  the  Victoria's  officers,  and  praised  the 


2o6  IRONCLADS    IN   ACTION.  [1893 

order  and  discipline  maintained  on  board.  It  regretted  that 
Admiral  Markham  had  not  signalled  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  his  doubts  as  to  the  evolution.  An  Admiralty  minute 
blamed  Captain  Johnstone  for  not  making  preparations  in 
view  of  the  collision  which  he  expected.  The  same  minute 
pointed  out  that  the  foundering  of  the  Victoria  was  due,  not 
to  defective  construction,  or  instability,  but  to  the  fact  that 
many  of  the  water-tight  doors  and  scuttles  forward  had  not 
been  closed,  and  thus  the  water,  instead  of  being  confined  to 
two  compartments  at  the  most,  filled  the  forward  part  of  the 
ship.  This  weight  of  water  depressed  the  bow,  and  brought 
the  ventilators  on  the  upper  deck,  some  of  which  could  not 
be  secured,  below  the  water-line,  and  admitted  the  sea  to  the 
mess  deck.  Next  the  turret-ports,  the  door  in  the  screen,  and 
the  forward  portholes  of  the  6-inch  battery,  all  of  which  were 
open,  became  awash.  Flowing  through  them  into  the  angle 
formed  by  the  side,  and  the  now  sharply  sloping  deck,  the 
water  lodged  there,  and  capsized  the  vessel,  as  all  her  stability 
was  gone.  Had  all  watertight  doors  been  closed,  had  the 
ports  and  ventilators  been  secured,  the  Victoria  would  beyond 
a  doubt  have  floated,  though  with  a  heavy  list.  But  we  have 
seen  that  the  men  at  collision-stations  had  only  one  minute 
instead  of  three  to  do  the  work.*"  It  may  be  said  again  that 
Captain  Bourke  should  have  caused  the  doors  to  be  closed 
earlier.  To  have  done  so,  however,  would  have  been  almost 
insubordination,  a  direct  reflection  upon  the  admiral.  It  may, 
perhaps,  be  said  that  they  should  not  have  been  open  at  all. 
But  if  the  doors  are  there  they  are  meant  to  be  used,  and  it 
is  extremely  difficult,  indeed  impossible,  to  work  a  ship 
minutely  subdivided,  with  every  door  closed.  Even  in  battle 
it  would  not  in  practice  be  found  feasible  thus  to  isolate  every 
compartment.    Human  foresight  and  ingenuity  can  do  much, 

*  There  were  a  great  many  doors  in  the  forward  bulkheads,  and  there  were 
numerous  openings  in  the  decks  fitted  with  water-tight  hatches,  all  of  which  had 
to  be  closed.  Some  of  the  doors  could  only  be  secured  by  entering  the  flooded 
compartments,  a  manifest  impossibility. 


1895]  IRONCLAD    CATASTROPHES.  207 

but  cannot  do  everything.  The  ship  which  no  injury  of  the 
ram  shall  be  able  to  sink  has  yet  to  be  designed. 

One  point  of  some  importance  is  dwelt  upon  by  the  minute. 
The  presence  of  an  armour-belt  would  not  have  saved  the  ship, 
as  it  could  not  have  resisted  the  terrific  force  of  the  Ca?nper- 
down's  blow,  and  must  have  been  crushed  in.  This  has  been 
questioned  both  in  England  and  in  France,  and  does,  indeed, 
seem  doubtful.  The  force  of  the  blow  struck  by  the 
C amp er down' s  ram  was  about  that  of  the  45-ton  gun  pro- 
jectile at  the  muzzle.  If  16-inch  armour  will  keep  out  such 
a  projectile  where  all  the  energy  is  concentrated  upon  an 
extremely  small  space,  it  should  have  been  able  to  keep  out 
the  ram,  or  at  all  events  to  limit  the  damage  done.  The  loss 
of  the  Victoria  has  not  increased  the  confidence  in  the 
English  type  of  battle-ship  with  its  large  unarmoured  ends."* 

"  The  order  and  discipline  maintained  upon  the  Victoria 
.  .  .  was  in  the  highest  degree  honourable  to  all  concerned, 
and  will  ever  remain  a  noble  example  to  the  service,"  con- 
cludes the  minute.  It  is  a  noble  epitaph,  and  that  order  and 
discipline  converted  a  great  disaster  into  a  greater  triumph. 

Last  of  all,  and  still  unexplained,  is  the  loss  of  the  Spanish 
cruiser  Reina  Regente,  with  all  hands,  during  March,  1895. 
She  was  conveying  the  members  of  the  Moorish  mission  from 
Spain  to  Tangiers.  She  had  thus  no  great  distance  to  cover, 
and  she  was  not,  like  the  Captain,  exposed  to  the  fury  of  the 
Bay  of  Biscay.  A  violent  storm,  however,  arose,  and  in  it 
she  must  have  foundered.  No  trace  of  her,  whether  wreckage 
or  bodies  of  her  crew,  has  as  yet  been  discovered.  She  was 
a  very  heavily  armed  vessel  for  her  size,  and  it  is  therefore 
conjectured  that  her  stability  was  deficient,  and  that  she  cap- 
sized. She  carried  a  crew  of  over  400  officers  and  men, 
besides  the  members  of  the  mission.  In  general  outline  and 
size  she  was  similar  to  the  English  belted  cruisers  of  the 

*  If  the  compartments  above  the  armour-deck  were  riddled  the  Victoria  and 
similar  ships  would  sink  5  feet  by  the  head.  They  should,  says  Professor  Elgar, 
be  classed  as  protected  ships,  not  as  armour-clads.    See  also  pages  233,  174. 


208 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


Australia  type.  She  carried  four  y8-inch  guns,  two  forward 
and  two  aft,  with  six  47-inch  guns  in  the  waist  of  the  ship. 
She  was  a  comparatively  new  ship,  having  been  launched  in 
1887  at  Messrs.  Thomson's  yard  at  Clydebank.  Her  displace- 
ment was  5000  tons. 

Catastrophes  of  less  importance  were  the  loss  of  the 
Japanese  cruiser  Unebi  in  some  unexplained  way  at  sea,  the 
foundering  of  the  French  floating  battery  Arrogante  off 
Hyeres,  the  loss  of  the  British  gunboats  Wasp  and  Serpent, 
the  boiler  and  gun  explosions  on  board  the  Thunderer,  in  all 
of  which  there  was  heavy  loss  of  lifer  and  the  terrible 
explosion  in  the  Sissoi  Veliki's  turret,  when  a  charge  of 
powder  in  a  12-inch  gun  blew  out  the  unsecured  breech-block, 
and  killed  or  mortally  wounded  every  officer  and  man  in  the 
turret.  This  occurred  in  the  spring  of  1897.  As  the  result 
of  the  accident  the  turret  was  disabled  by  jamming. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


The  Development  of  the  English  Battleship. 

There  is,  perhaps,  no  period  in  the  history  of  the  human 
race  which  has  seen  changes  so  numerous,  so  startling,  so  far- 
reaching,  as  the  present  century,  or  we  might  almost  say  the 
half-century  in  which  we  live.  Fifty  years  ago  ships,  guns, 
and  the  art  of  war  were  much  as  they  were  left  at  the  close 
of  the  Dutch  wars  of  the  seventeenth  century.  All  was 
clear  and  all  was  certain,  for  the  implements  of  battle  had 
been  constantly  tested,  not  only  in  peace  but  in  war.  What 
was  found  by  practical  experience  to  be  useless  was  quickly 
eliminated,  because  there  was  practical  experience.  Structural 
modifications  of  ships  were  numerous  between  1690  and  1840, 
but  at  the  same  time  they  involved  no  radical  changes.  There 
was  a  slow  and  steady  progress,  not  an  advance  of  lightning 
speed.  Warships  were  divided  into  distinct  classes  with 
distinct  objects  :  line-of-battle  ships,  frigates,  corvettes,  sloops. 
For  the  one  class  to  engage  the  other  was,  if  the  assailant  was 
of  superior  class,  almost  a  breach  of  the  conventions  of  war,  if 
of  the  inferior,  an  act  of  foolish  temerity.  The  line-of-battle 
ship  of  1840  was  an  implement  in  which  practical  efficiency 
and  beauty  of  form  were  combined  in  the  highest  degree. 
Yet,  propelled  by  the  force  of  the  winds,  in  a  day  when  men 
had  not  mastered  and  applied  the  forces  of  nature  to  their 
own  use,  the  Victory  or  the  Agamemnon  was  helpless  and 
motionless  in  a  calm.  Her  movements  had,  to  a  certain 
extent,  to  be  governed  by  the  direction  of  the  wind,  which 
cannot  be  foretold  or  foreknown.    Whilst  there  was  certainty 

Vol.  II.  P 


2IO 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


as  to  the  value  of  ships  and  the  methods  of  tactics,  there 
was  yet  uncertainty  in  regard  to  strategical  combinations. 
It  was  often  impossible  for  fleets  to  effect  a  junction,  starting 
from  different  points,  on  a  pre-determined  day.  The  first 
requirement  of  the  sailor  was  ability  to  sail  a  ship.  He  had 
to  be  a  good  seaman,  to  be  a  smart  topman  or  yardsman,  alert, 
agile,  and  courageous.  The  merchant-sailor  and  war-sailor 
were  of  one  and  the  same  trade ;  and  each  could  learn  his 
vocation  in  either  service.  The  only  weapon  carried  by 
ships  was  the  gun,  and  the  gun  was  of  a  rudeness  and  sim- 
plicity which  rendered  naval  gunnery  a  science  easily  acquired 
by  any  man  who  had  sea-legs.  There  was  no  breech  action 
with  its  elaborate  mechanism,  to  be  understood  ;*  there 
were  no  sights  to  be  mastered  ;  there  were  no  complicated 
gun-carriages  and  mountings  ;  no  hydraulic  or  electric  motors. 
The  torpedo  existed  only  in  the  imagination  of  sanguine 
inventors  ;  the  ram  was  an  impossibility  with  sails.  Battles 
were  fought  and  won  by  concentrating  a  superior  force  upon 
a  detail  of  the  enemy — a  task  rendered  moderately  easy 
where  the  only  motive  agent  was  sail-power.  The  ships  then 
drew  as  close  as  possible  and  battered  each  other,  till  the 
critical  eye  of  the  captain  told  him  that  the  time  had  come 
for  boarding,  when  a  rush  of  seamen  and  marines  carried  the 
enemy's  deck. 

The  steam  engine  has  changed  all  this,  and  changed  it  in 
two  ways.  First,  by  rendering  the  ship,  when  it  is  placed  on 
board  her,  capable  of  defying  the  winds  and  following  her  own 
course  ;  and,  secondly,  by  enabling  men  to  employ  mechanical 
implements  of  extraordinary  power.  Till  machinery  was 
introduced  it  was  impossible  to  forge  or  handle  large  masses 
of  iron.  It  was  impossible  to  obtain  accuracy  and  exactness 
in  matters  like  the  rifling  of  a  cannon  or  the  fit  of  a  breech- 
plug.  The  machine  is  unaffected  by  external  causation  to  a 
degree  unattainable  in  a  human  being.    That  is  to  say,  a 

*  The  return  of  simplicity  is  a  gratifying  feature  in  our  new  quick-firers. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  211 


lathe  can  be  set  with  accuracy  to  plane  a  shaft  to  a  certain 
dimension,  and  it  will  continue  to  do  this  till  it  wears  out  or 
the  power  is  exhausted.  A  man  with  a  file  varies  from  day 
to  day.  He  will  approximate  to  the  required  standard,  but 
will  never  attain  to  it,  and  his  personal  equation,  profoundly 
affected  by  a  vast  train  of  causes  ceaselessly  in  operation, 
must  be  taken  into  account.  This  is  the  real  explanation  of 
the  failure  of  early  ideas  on  subjects  such  as  the  use  of 
turrets,  or  the  employment  of  the  breechloader.  They  were 
sound  enough  in  themselves  but  the  means  necessary  for 
their  manufacture  were  wanting.*  So  iron  ships  could  not  be 
cheaply  constructed  before  the  days  of  rolling-mills  and 
steam-hammers,  if,  indeed,  they  could  be  constructed  at  all. 
And  when  we  plume  ourselves  upon  our  enormous  advance, 
let  us  remember  that  our  ancestors  were,  after  all,  step  by 
step  building  up  the  means  which  should  take  us  forward. 

Steam  was  at  first  applied  to  the  propulsion  of  ships  by 
means  of  paddles,  which  were  clumsy  and  exposed.  It  was 
impossible  to  mount  a  heavy  battery  on  the  broadside  with 
such  interruptions  amidships,  and  thus  the  new  motor  could 
not  well  be  employed  on  board  anything  larger  than  a  frigate. 
Accordingly,  sailing  line-of-battle  ships  were  to  be  towed  into 
action  by  tugs  when  the  wind  was  against  them.  But  the 
advent  of  the  screw  changed  everything,  as,  from  the  date  of 
its  application  to  the  steamer  Stockton,  in  1838,  by  Ericsson, 
it  steadily  made  its  way.  It  lay  below  the  water-line  and 
was  not  exposed  to  hostile  shot,  whilst  it  could  be  readily 
fitted  to  ships  of  the  accepted  pattern.  By  the  date  of  the 
Crimean  war  the  fighting  ships  of  the  world  were  screw- 
propelled. 

The  adoption  of  steam  had  numerous  effects  on  the  con- 
struction of  the  ship.  Whereas  with  the  warships  of  the  past 
speed  had  been  obtained  by  diminishing  size,  thus  making  the 
frigate  faster  than  the  line-of-battle  ship,  it  could  now  only  be 

*  Lord  Armstrong,  even  as  late  as  1854,  could  not  obtain  satisfactory  steel 
forgings  for  a  gun-barrel  only  i'88  inches  in  diameter. 

P  2 


212 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


secured  by  giving  increased  weight  and  space  to  machinery, 
engines,  and  boilers  on  board  the  fast  ship.  Moreover,  the 
discovery  that  the  larger  the  ship  the  more  economically  is 
the  power  exerted,  also  tended  to  increased  size.  The 
principle  would  not  apply  to  sailing  ships  whose  motor  was 
the  wind,  where  not  economy  of  power,  but  the  direction 
to  the  required  end  of  what  power  existed,  was  sought. 
Extreme  fineness  of  lines  again  was  dangerous  where  a  vessel 
had  the  leverage  of  masts  upon  the  hull,  tending,  if  the  latter 
was  not  broad  and  steady,  to  capsize  her.  The  incompatibility 
of  steam  and  sails,  which  lies  in  the  different  form  of  hull 
required  with  each  to  give  the  best  results,  has  led  to  the 
gradual  supersession  of  the  latter  by  the  former,  though  at 
first  both  were  applied  conjointly,  and  though  there  are  great 
advantages  in  the  possession  of  sails  as  an  auxiliary.  Thus 
steam,  at  first  a  mere  auxiliary,  becomes  next  the  main,  and 
finally,  the  sole  motive  force.  The  growth  of  displacements 
begins  forthwith.  From  the  days  of  the  Henri  Grace  a  Dieu, 
of  1488,  to  the  Queen,  of  1839,  the  increase  had  been  only 
threefold,  from  1 500  tons  to  4500  tons.  From  the  Queen  to 
the  Italia  or  Majestic  is  a  two-fold  increase  in  the  half- 
century,  a  growth  not  of  3000  tons,  but  of  6000  tons.*  Steam 
and  machinery  have  made  the  advance  possible  and  necessary. 
A  15,000  ton  sailing  ship  would  require  enormous  anchors, 
huge  cables,  a  vast  sail  area,  with  gigantic  masts  and  steering 
apparatus  to  match.  Without  steam,  and  machinery  to  apply 
the  force  of  steam,  the  management  of  such  a  vessel  would  be 
a  business  of  extraordinary  difficulty. 

Steam  having  thus  vastly  enlarged  displacements,  began  to 
increase  the  speed  of  ships.  The  Warrior  achieved  a  great 
feat  when  she  covered  a  little  over  fourteen  knots  in  an  hour. 
The  United  States'  Government,  in  the  Civil  War,  projected 
cruisers  of  seventeen  knots,  the  famous  Wampanoag  class. 
In  our  own  day  most  of  the  advance  has  been  made,  since  we 

*  Allowance  being  made  for  the  different  systems  of  measuring  tonnage. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  213 

are  building  for  our  sendee  vessels  of  thirty-three  knots,  a  gain 
of  nineteen  knots  upon  the  Warrior,  and  an  enormous  advance 
upon  the  mean  rate  of  progression  between  two  points  in  the 
case  of  the  sailing  ship.  The  steamer  goes  in  a  straight  line 
where  it  lists ;  the  sailing  ship  must  humour  the  winds,  and 
zigzag  for  days,  or  for  days  lie  motionless.  Hence,  though  at 
times,  with  a  favourable  breeze,  the  vessels  of  oak  and  hemp 
could  obtain  fourteen  or  even  fifteen  knots,  they  cannot  be 
matched  with  even  the  "  tramp  "  for  continuous  speed. 
Nelson,  in  his  three  months'  chase  of  Villeneuve  only 
averaged  ninety-three  miles  a  day. 

Another  effect  of  the  introduction  of  steam  has  been  the 
growing  tendency  to  fill  our  warships  with  machinery  of  kinds 
other  than  those  necessary  for  their  propulsion.  The  charac- 
teristic of  the  nineteenth  century  is  to  employ  mechanical 
agencies  to  do  the  work  of  man,  and  it  has  run  riot  on  our 
ships.  The  motive  force  was  present  in  the  boilers  which 
supplied  the  main  engines  with  steam.  It  was  certain  then 
that  secondary  or  auxiliary  engines  would  be  introduced,  and 
all  the  more,  because  the  increasing  size  of  the  weights  to  be 
handled,  the  increasing  amount  of  work  to  be  done,  as  the 
ship  grew  larger,  rendered  it  inconvenient  to  use  hand-power. 

As  a  consequence  of  this  the  crews  carried  are  smaller  on 
the  modern  ship  than  they  were,  ton  for  ton,  in  the  old  days. 
In  1793  a  120-gun  ship  of  2508  tons  (old  measurement) 
carried  841  officers,  men  and  boys;  a  thirty-eight-gun  frigate 
of  the  largest  class,  1063  tons  in  displacement,  277  men  ;  and 
a  twenty-gun  ship  of  432  tons,  138  men,  whilst  the  French 
ships  of  like  size  carried,  as  a  rule,  one  fourth  more.  In  1895 
the  Royal  Sovereign  of  14,150  tons  carries  720  officers  and 
men  ;  the  Devastation,  of  9300  tons,  400  ;  the  Cambrian,  a 
cruiser  of  4360  tons,  265  ;  and  the  Dryad,  a  torpedo-gun- 
boat of  1070  tons,  about  ninety  men.  It  is  possible  that  these 
crews  are  not  large  enough  for  battle  purposes,  but  the 
economy  in  human  labour  is  enormous.  To  gain  some  idea 
of  the  work  done  on  board  ship  by  mechanical  power,  we  may 


214 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


observe  that  the  Royal  Sovereign  class  carry  eighty-six 
engines,  the  French  Magenta  over  100,  whilst  there  are  at 
least  as  many  on  our  largest  cruisers.  Taking  the  Terrible, 
for  instance,  we  find  her  equipped  as  follows  : 

Sets  of  Engines. 

2  working  the  screws  (main  engines). 

2  reversing  the  main  engines. 

2  turning  the  main  engines. 

4  driving  main  circulating  pumps. 


2  auxiliary  circulating  pumps  and  air  pumps. 

6  ,,       main  feed  pumps. 

8  „  auxiliary  ,, 
4  fire  and  bilge ,, 

2  distilling 

1  .,  drain-tank 

8  ,,      air  compressors  for  air  jets  in  Belleville  boilers, 

j 2  ,.      fan  compressors  for  stokeholds. 

2  engine  rooms. 
4  ,,                    ,,           ,,  ventilation. 

3  ,,       electric  light  dynamos. 

4  ,,      air  compressors  for  torpedoes. 
2  steering  apparatus. 


2  for  boat-hoisting. 
2  coal 
12  ,,  ash 

1  workshop  engine. 

2  capstan  engines. 

The  engines  are  in  most  cases  duplicated  to  prevent  dis- 
ablement by  accident,  but  even  so,  dividing  by  two,  forty-three 
odd  sets  of  engines  are  necessary  to  the  economy  of  a  large 
cruiser.  The  warship,  then,  approximates  to  a  floating 
factory,  her  decks  and  hull  crammed  with  machines  and 
guns.  The  Terrible  further  carries  forty-eight  boilers, 
occupying,  with  the  engine  rooms,  252  feet  of  her  total 
length,  and  that  amidships,  where  the  breadth  of  the  vessel 
is  greatest. 

Growth  in  size,  advance  in  speed,  development  of  machinery, 
are  all  directly  traceable  to  the  influence  of  steam.  Due  in 
part  to  this  cause,  in  part  to  the  influence  of  the  past,  is  a 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  215 

growing  tendency  to  specialisation  in  the  various  types  of 
ship.  Our  ancestors,  after  long  experience,  found  that  a  cer- 
tain differentiation  was  necessary.  They  had  the  line-of-battle 
ship,  the  frigate,  the  corvette,  the  sloop,  the  bomb-ketch,  the 
fire-ship.  But  all,  except  the  last,  were  constructed  to  use 
guns,  though  the  armament  varied  in  power  according  to  the 
ship's  sphere  of  action.  The  appearance  of  armour  for  a 
time  destroyed  this  specialisation.  For  the  first  few  years 
after  the  introduction  of  the  ironclad,  we  built  little  but  large 
ironclads  and  small  ironclads.  The  latter  were  intended  for 
coast-defence,  or  for  service  upon  distant  stations.  They  were 
to  the  typical  battleship  of  the  day  much  as  the  frigate  was 
to  the  line-of-battle  ship.  The  difference  between  the  two 
was  in  degree,  not  kind.  Our  ancestors,  however,  did  not 
build  vessels  for  the  express  purpose  of  coast-defence,  since 
their  strategical  wisdom  led  them  to  aim  at  the  command 
of  the  sea  and  the  blockade  of  the  enemy's  ports,  for  which 
coast-defence  ships,  or  ships,  to  call  them  by  their  true  name, 
of  indifferent  sea-keeping  quality,  were  quite  unsuited.  When 
new  weapons,  in  the  shape  of  the  ram  and  torpedo,  came  into 
favour,  and  when  it  grew  increasingly  evident  that  slow,  small 
ironclads  would  be  eaten  up  by  fast,  large  ones,  a  new  era 
began.  Though  all  three  weapons,  the  gun,  ram  and  torpedo 
could  be  combined  on  board  one  ship,  there  were  yet  advan- 
tages to  be  gained  from  the  use  of  a  particular  type  of  ship 
for  each.  As  a  high  speed  demanded  heavy  engines,  and 
without  it  the  small  ship  would  be  left  a  prey  to  the  large, 
the  required  weight  was  provided  by  denuding  her  of  armour. 
The  cruiser  began  to  differ  in  kind  from  the  battleship  :  she 
had  no  longer  thinner  armour,  but  no  armour  at  all.*  On  the 
other  hand,  she  could  decline  battle  and  run.  The  torpedo 
could  be  employed  by  a  small  boat,  and  it  was  fondly  imagined 
by  enthusiasts  that  with  its  advent  the  day  of  great  ships  had 

*  The  frigate,  at  any  but  the  very  closest  range,  was  impervious  to  even  the 
line-of-battle  ship's  guns.  Now  the  cruiser  is  vulnerable,  at  the  extremest 
ranges,  to  the  guns  of  even  her  own  class  of  ship. 


216 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


passed  away.  Special  craft  were  constructed  to  use  it,  in 
which  diminutive  size  and  high  speed  were  combined.  These, 
again,  led  up  to  special  craft  constructed  to  combat  them. 
The  cruiser,  with  the  lapse  of  time,  has  differentiated  within 
itself  to  a  degree  unknown  in  the  frigate.  The  gap  between 
the  Powerful,  of  14,250  tons,  and  the  For  bin,  of  1850,  is 
immeasurably  greater  than  that  which  parted  the  forty-four- 
gun  and  twenty-gun  frigate.  We  have  this  cruiser  for  ocean 
work  ;  that  for  work  on  the  narrow  seas ;  a  third  for  scouting ; 
a  fourth,  though  this  type  does  not  appear  in  our  fleet,  for 
commerce-destruction.  Our  specialisation  may  be  excessive, 
as  we  can  never  be  certain  that  our  special  ship  will  meet  the 
enemy's  special  ship,  and  the  observance  of  the  uniform  mean, 
whilst  adopting  a  certain  number  of  types,  might  be  best.  A 
Nelson  might  look  aghast  at  the  motley  array  of  battleships, 
rams,  large  cruisers,  small  cruisers,  dynamite  ships,  torpedo 
gunboats,  destroyers,  torpedo-boats,  coast-defence  craft,  and 
torpedo-boat  carriers  which  this  decade  has  produced. 

A  point  also  to  be  noticed  is  the  difficulty  with  modern  ships 
of  estimating  a  vessel's  fighting  force,  when  she  is  seen  at  a 
distance.  With  the  old  sailing  ship  it  could  be  told  at  once. 
Now  a  change  in  the  armament  in  the  case  of  a  vessel  well 
known,  the  substitution  of  long  for  short  guns,  of  quick  for 
slow-firers,  may  have  doubled  her  power,  and  may  enable  her 
to  crush  an  unwary  adversary.  War  may  bring  many  sur- 
prises of  this  kind. 

The  last  point  to  be  considered  before  we  pass  to  a  general 
view  of  the  changes  in  our  period,  is  the  increased  attention 
which  is  everywhere  being  given  to  naval  matters.  Fifty 
years  ago  there  were  only  two  fleets  in  the  world,  the  English 
and  French.  Russia  was  quite  a  minor  power,  though  making 
great  exertions,  and  whilst  the  United  States  built  very  fine 
ships,  they  had  very  few  of  them.  England  and  France  are 
still  first  to-day,  but  in  the  intervening  years,  strong  navies, 
some  of  which  aspire  to  the  front  rank,  have  sprung  up  in 
other  quarters.     Germany,  Italy,  Japan  are  well  to  the  fore 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  217 

in  the  second  class,  and  the  United  States  shows  signs  of 
embarking  upon  a  great  naval  programme.  The  minor 
states  of  the  world  are  just  as  active.  This  phase  is  probably 
due  in  part  to  the  increasing  fierceness  of  competition  between 
nations  as  between  individuals,  in  part  to  the  clearer  appre- 
hension of  the  value  of  sea  power. 

The  application  of  armour  to  ships  was  an  idea  of  consider- 
able antiquity.  In  the  history  of  human  progress,  frequent 
instances  will  be  found  where  suggestions  are  made,  to  be 
regarded  at  the  time  as  wild  chimeras,  and  adopted  with 
enthusiasm  by  posterity.  All  the  old  line-of-battle  ships  were 
in  a  certain  sense  armoured,  since  their  sides  and  timbers 
were  made  very  heavy  and  solid  on  the  water-line  with  the 
express  object  of  keeping  out  shot.  Thus,  a  ninety-gun  ship 
had  16-inch  oak  timbers  spaced  at  intervals  of  five 
inches,  with  planking  inside  seven  inches  thick  and 
outside  eight  inches.  Even  at  close  quarters,  the  projectiles 
from  the  old  pattern  smooth-bores  would  not  always  go 
through,  especially  when  fired  with  reduced  charges,  as  was 
the  custom  on  the  guns  growing  hot.  The  Spanish  floating 
batteries  at  the  sie^e  of  Gibraltar  were  in  like  manner 
protected  by  an  enormous  thickness  of  timber  and  hide, 
with  bars  of  iron  interspersed.  Still,  earlier  lead  plating  had 
been  employed  by  the  knights  of  St.  John,  though  of  all 
metals  this  would  seem  most  unsuitable.  But  it  was  not  till 
General  Paixhans  had  produced  a  gun  which  could  fire  shells, 
that  governments  began  seriously  to  dream  of  iron-plated 
ships.  General  Paixhans  himself  suggested  the  efficacy  of 
armour  as  a  protection  against  these  new  and  terrible  pro- 
jectiles. Admiral  Page  assures  us  that  the  French  govern- 
ment knew  its  value,  and  that  Admiral  de  Mackau,  Louis 
Philippe's  minister  of  marine,  had  actually  tested  its  resistance, 
but  kept  his  knowledge  a  dark  secret,  wishing  to  employ  it 
as  a  trump  card  in  the  event  of  war  with  England,  and  so  to 
get  the  upper  hand.  In  1842,  the  British  Admiralty  fired  at 
a  shield  of  iron  plates,  joined  together  to  form  a  thickness  of 


218 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


six  inches,  and  supported  upon  the  scantling  of  an  eighty- 
gun  ship,  with  the  result  that  no  shots  perforated  it.  At  the 
same  date,  the  inventor,  R.  L.  Stevens,  was  busy  in  the 
United  States  constructing  a  shot-proof  frigate  plated  with 
4^-inch  iron.  This  vessel,  however,  was  never  completed, 
and  it  appears  that,  if  it  had  been,  it  could  not  have  floated. 
Ericsson,  in  1841,  pointed  out  that  the  shot  from  a  12-inch 
gun  which  he  had  designed  would  pierce  its  plating,  and  some 
years  later,  during  the  Crimean  War,  submitted  to  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  a  rough  sketch  of  an  impregnable  armoured 
monitor.  Between  1849  and  1851,  a  most  important  series 
of  experiments  was  conducted  in  England,  on  the  iron  ship 
Simoom.  Two  iron  plates  -|-inch  thick,  placed  some  distance 
apart,  were  fired  at  with  the  32-pounder,  when  it  was  found 
that  the  shot  in  passing  through  produced  a  most  deadly  hail 
of  splinters.  With  wood  backing  to  the  iron  it  was  still  the 
same,  but  when  the  wood  alone  was  used,  there  were  far 
fewer  splinters.  One  noteworthy  fact,  however,  escaped  the 
consideration  of  the  experts.  It  seems  to  have  been  con- 
clusively proved  that  these  thin  plates  shattered  shells  before 
they  could  burst.  The  importance  of  this  result  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  realised,  nor  were  the  experiments 
pushed  further  to  ascertain  whether  by  increasing  the  thick- 
ness of  plate  the  shells  might  not  be  altogether  excluded.  The 
results  of  1842  were  apparently  overlooked.  Iron  was  con- 
demned as  a  material  for  warships,  and  a  general  prejudice 
was  created  against  armour. 

The  Crimean  War  over,  in  which  the  value  of  the  armoured 
floating  battery  had  been  proved,  France  began  to  construct 
sea-going  ironclads.  The  Glozre,  the  first  of  these,  was  a 
two-decker,  from  which  the  upper  deck  was  removed.  The 
weight  thus  gained  was  applied  in  4^-inch  armour-plating  to  her 
sides.  She  had  no  ram,  but  the  end-to-end  belt  of  iron  made 
her  bow  strong.  She  was  masted  and  rigged,  but  was  also 
fitted  with  steam  power,  which  gave  her  a  trial  speed  of 
thirteen  knots.    In  general  outline  she  was  like  any  other 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  219 

frigate  of  her  day,  but  slightly  longer  and  heavier  in  appear- 
ance. Her  gun-ports  were  only  feet  above  water.  Her 
armament  was  composed  of  thirty-four  50-pounder  guns  on 
her  main  deck,  whilst  on  her  upper  deck  were  two  heavy  shell 
guns.  The  English  Admiralty,  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of 
having  possibly  to  meet  a  French  ironclad  fleet  with  an 
English  unarmoured  one,  ordered  the  construction  of  the 
armoured  frigate  Warrior,  in  1859.  But  whereas  the  Gloire 
was  a  wooden  ship  converted  to  her  new  shape,  the  Warrior 
was  of  iron,  and  designed  expressly  to  carry  armour. 
M.  Dupuy  de  Lome  was  the  architect  of  the  French,  Messrs. 
Scott  Russell  and  Isaac  Watts,  of  the  English  vessel.  The 
Warrior  is  remarkable  for  the  fineness  of  her  lines.  Her 
great  length,  in  proportion  to  her  breadth,  gave  her  a  speed 
extraordinary  for  her  day,  since  on  her  trial  she  achieved 
fourteen  knots.  Unlike  the  Gloire  she  was  not  armoured 
from  end  to  end,  but  had  a  large  patch  of  plating,  218  feet 
long  and  \\  inches  thick,  over  her  battery  and  water- 
line  amidships.  Athwartship  she  had  armoured  bulkheads, 
enclosing  a  portion  of  her  battery.  As  her  total  length  was 
420  feet  over  all,  only  about  half  her  side  was  protected.  In 
exchange  for  this  loss,  she  was  a  better  sea  boat  than  the 
Gloire,  but  her  rudder  head  was  completely  exposed  to  the 
smallest  shot,  and  she  never  steered  really  well.  She  was 
fully  rigged,  having  three  masts  ;  and  her  two  funnels  could  be 
telescoped  when  under  sail.  Forward,  she  had  a  projecting 
figure-head,  which  hid  a  slight  spur  designed  for  ramming. 
Her  battery  at  first  consisted  of  twenty-six  68-pounders  on 
her  main  deck,  behind  armour,  and  twelve  which  had  no 
protection,  outside  the  armour  ;  whilst  ten  more  guns  of  the 
same  size  were  disposed  on  the  upper  deck.*  Forward  and 
aft  of  her  armour  she  had  water-tight  compartments,  which, 
with  those  amidships   reached  a  total  of  ninety-two. t  In 

*  Later  altered  to  two  no-pounder  rifled  Armstrong  pivots  ;  four  40-pounder 
rifles,  all  on  upper  deck ;  thirty-four  68-pounders,  smooth-bore,  on  lower  deck. 

f  Viz.  ;  In  hold  space,  35  ;  in  double  bottom,  &c,  57.  The  Royal  Sovereign 
has  145  compartments. 


220 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


the  water  her  appearance  was  most  imposing;  indeed,  as  a 
conception,  she  was  excellent  in  every  respect.  Her  designers 
rightly  saw  that,  for  England  to  retain  her  command  of  the 
sea,  her  ships  must  be  sea-going  and  sea-keeping.  She  was 
no  radical  departure  from  the  established  form  of  ship,  but 
descended  lineally  from  the  frigate,  yet  in  her  there  was  an 
increase  in  displacement,  a  concentration  of  armament  as  yet 
hardly  dreamt  of,  although  her  fire  right  ahead  and  right 
astern  was  nil.  The  weight  of  armour  was  975  tons,  as 
compared  with  350  tons  in  the  floating  batteries  of  Louis 
Napoleon.  A  sister  ship,  the  Black  Prince,  of  the  same  size 
and  armament,  was  constructed  at  the  same  time.  Both  ships 
long  outlived  the  Gloire* 

In  i860,  Captain  Coles,  who  had,  during  the  Crimean  War, 
prepared  a  raft  with  a  shot-proof  iron  shield  four  inches  thick, 
to  carry  one  68-pounder  gun,  brought  forward  a  design  for  a 
turret-ship — the  first  such  design  that  was  made  public,  ante- 
dating by  over  a  year  Ericsson's  Monitor.^  Coles'  ship  was  to 
carry  nine  conical  turrets,  each  containing  a  pair  of  guns. 
The  guns  were  to  be  "  self-acting,"  running  out  after  their 
recoil  down  a  slope.  As  early  as  1855,  the  great  engineer 
Brunei  had  told  Coles,  with  true  insight,  "  You  only  need  a 
breechloader  to  make  your  shield  perfect."  A  remoter 
ancestor  of  the  turret  may  be  found  in  Captain  Waymouth's 
proposal  in  the  sixteenth  century,  to  mount  "  murtherers  "  in 
turrets  on  the  upper  decks  of  ships,  the  turrets  to  revolve 
upon  swivels.  In  1862,  the  first  English  turret-ship  was 
commenced,  but  to  her  and  her  progeny  we  must  recur  later. 

The  design  of  the  Warrior  was  reproduced  in  an  improved 
form  in  the  Achilles,  which  was  larger,  belted  from  end  to 
end  with  4^-inch  armour,  and  slightly  faster.  She  carried  no 
less  than  1200  tons  of  plating.  Simultaneously  a  large  number 
of  wooden  ships  were  cut  down,  converted  after  the  pattern 

*  The  Defence  and  Resistance,  iron  ships  very  similar  to  the  Warrior,  but  a 
little  smaller,  followed  her  immediately. 

f  See  i.  33. 


4  5 


D 


Warrior.  1859. 


65 


^     .  ,  .  .  ,  f  ,  ,  ■  .  c  .  .  ,  ,  ,  ,  T~r~r~i—\ 


Minotaur.  1861. 


J 


s-s 


jQ^r/ff. /ro/7.       Roy al Sovereign.  Hull.tujid^ 
6 

— 1  ?7  i  —  

Hi    ■     •  v  »  Tl 


4^ 


Arm.  Iron. 


\  r 


Sellerophon .  1864-       Hull. iron. 


Hercules.  1866. 


Hull.  Iron. 


10 


Arm. iron.  Monarch  .  1866. 


-0/7.  y 


5 


Arm.  Iron.  A  u  d a  C 10  US .  1 8  6 7  Hull. Iron. 


12 

mem 

f" 

\  -            il               -  ^  "--l 

|  Arm.  Iron. 

G /at  ton. 

1839. 

Hull  Iron. 

3X1 


Arm. Iron.  Devastation.  1869 .  Hulf.lror 


5 


Arm. iron.  Alexandra.  1873.  Hull 


"lro~n~~^^^ 


.   ■.     y~ 

I  Arm. Iron.  Te  m  e r  a  i r  e .  !8? '3 .  Hull.lrcr^y 

British    Ironclads  .       1859  —  1673 
Figures  give  the  thick ness  cf  armour  in  inches. 
Plate  XXXVII. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  221 


of  the  Gloire,  and  given  an  armour  belt.  Amongst  these 
were  the  Zealous,  Repulse,  Ocean,  Research,  Royal  Alfred, 
Royal  Oak, Prince  Consort,  and  Caledonia*  Their  upper  decks 
having  been  removed,  they  were  lengthened  like  their  French 
prototype  and  plated,  but  were  not  altogether  a  success. 
They  were  cheaper  in  the  first  instance,  but  far  less  durable 
than  iron  ships,  and  vanished  from  the  fleet  at  an  early  date. 
The  series  of  broadside  ships  was  further  developed  in  the 
Minotaur,  Agincourt,  and  Northumberland,  with  an  end-to- 
end  belt,  an  increase  of  displacement,  and  a  more  powerful 
armament  than  the  Warrior.  They  were  all  ships  of 
enormous  length,  and  were  somewhat  deficient  in  handiness. 
With  the  advance  in  artillery,  their  armour  was  made  54  inches 
instead  of  4^  inches  thick,  but  the  backing  was  thinner. 

In  1862,  Sir.  E.  J.  Reed  was  appointed  to  the  post  of  Chief 
Constructor,  and  signalised  his  appointment  by  designing  a 
series  of  ships,  of  moderate  size,  well-armoured,  handy,  and 
fairly  fast,  which  if  re-armed,  would  be  capable  of  rendering 
great  service  to  us  to-day.  The  first  of  these  was  the  Belle- 
rophon,  with  plating  8  inches,  thick  on  the  water-line.  Her  guns 
were  concentrated  amidships,  in  a  small  central  battery  pro- 
tected as  heretofore,  not  only  on  the  two  sides,  but  by  stout 
bulkheads  athwartship,  which  prevented  her  from  being  raked. 
In  her,  for  the  first  time,  the  bracket-frame  system  of 
construction  was  employed.  She  mounted  the  12-ton  and 
6J-ton  rifled  muzzle-loader, f  but  had  no  bow  or  stern  fire  from 
guns  behind  armour.  The  Hercules  was  of  the  same  class, 
but  a  vast  improvement.  In  her,  the  expedient  of  recessed 
ports,  which  had  been  tried  in  the  Pallas  of  1866, J  received 

*  Wooden  ironclads  of  a  more  powerful  type  were  the  Lord  Clyde  and  Lord 
Warden,  with  7-inch  armour  on  the  water-line,  1300  tons  of  plating,  and  a 
strong  bow  fire.  They  carried  each  sixteen  8-inch  muzzle-loaders,  and  four 
100-pounders. 

t  Ten  12-ton  and  two  (%-ton. 


X  A  small  armoured  ship  for  service  in  distant  seas. 
Enterprise,  Research,  and  Favourite. 


Similar  to  her  were  the 


222 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


its  final  sanction,  and  henceforward  appears,  whether  for  the 
heavy  or  the  auxiliary  armament,  in  most  of  our  ships,  though 
the  sponson*  competes  with  it  as  a  means  of  giving  increased 
arcs  of  fire.  Her  armour  was  at  its  thickest  nine  inches 
whilst  two  io-inch  muzzle-loaders  could  fire  within  a  few 
degrees  of  the  keel-line.  She  was  at  her  launch  a  splendid 
ship,  superior  to  anything  afloat,  and  she  is  still  a  favourite  in 
our  service.  At  the  same  time,  six  smaller  central-battery 
ships  of  the  Audacious  class  were  designed  for  work  on 
distant  stations.  Two  thousand  five  hundred  tons  smaller 
than  the  Hercules,  they  had  8-inch  armour  and  a  central 
box  battery  t  But  above  this  was  a  second  battery, 
very  slightly  projecting  from  the  side,  at  each  corner  of 
which  was  a  recessed  port,  giving  right  ahead  or  right 
astern  fire.  They  thus  fulfilled,  for  the  first  time  in  an 
English  ship  of  high  freeboard,  the  ideal  of  all-round  fire. 
They  were  the  first  English  ironclads  to  carry  an  upper 
deck  battery. 

Following  the  Hercules  came  the  first-class  battleship 
Sultan,  still  of  the  central-battery  type,  but  with  considerable 
improvements  on  the  Hercules.  The  latter  ship  was  ex- 
tremely deficient  in  axial  fire ;  this  defect  was  to  some  extent 
remedied  in  the  Sultan  by  an  upper-deck  battery,  in  which 
two  12^-ton  guns  were  carried.  Forward,  quite  unprotected, 
are  two  more  12^-ton  guns.  In  the  Hercules  a  12^-ton 
gun  had  been  placed  forward,  and  a  second  aft,  with  very 
slight  armour  protection.  These  exposed  weapons  at  the 
ships'  extremities  henceforward  disappear.  The  speed  was  a 
little  higher  than  in  the  Sultan's  predecessor.  With  the  grow- 
ing tendency  amongst  naval  men  at  this  period  to  favour  attack 

*  A  sponson  is  a  curved  projection  from  the  side  ;  for  example,  the  frame- 
work which  on  paddle-steamers  carries  the  paddle-wheels.  Other  examples  can 
be  seen  in  the  illustrations  of  the  Chih  Yuen  (p.  114)  amidships,  just  below, 
and  a  little  to  the  left  of  her  funnel,  and  in  the  illustrations  of  the  Royal 
Sovereign  (h  56),  Blenheim  (i.  174),  and  Dupuy  de  Lome  (i.  310). 

f  They  were  armed  with  ten  12-ton  guns. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  223 


with  the  ram,  it  was  now  decided  to  give  a  better  bow-fire  to 
battleships.  The  last  but  one  of  our  central-battery  ironclads, 
the  Alexandra  exemplifies  that  decision.  Her  guns  are 
mounted  amidships  in  a  central  battery,  which  rises  per- 
pendicularly from  her  greatest  breadth  at  the  water-line, 
whilst  fore  and  aft  her  sides  "tumble  home,"  or  fall  in  towards 
the  upper  deck,  thus  allowing  four  heavy  guns  to  fire  very 
nearly  right  ahead,*  whilst  two  heavy  weapons  can  be  trained 
astern.  No  high-freeboard  ship  had  as  yet  mounted  such  heavy 
guns  or  carried  such  thick  armour.  She  had  two  25-ton  and 
ten  18-ton  muzzle-loaders,  and  her  plating  reached  a  thick- 
ness of  12  inches.  Her  belt  was  carried  down  over  her 
ram  to  strengthen  it  for  shock  tactics.  Her  speed  was 
fifteen  knots. 

Last  of  this  great  group,  and  standing  midway  between  the 
central-battery  and  the  barbette  ship,  came  the  Temeraire. 
She  was  commenced,  like  the  Alexandra^  in  1873,  but  her 
design  differed  considerably  from  that  ship.  Amidships,  as  in 
the  Alexandra,  was  a  box  battery  with  axial  fire,  mounting 
two  25-ton*  and  four  18-ton  guns.  But  the  feature  which 
differentiated  her  from  the  Alexandra  was  the  introduction  of 
two  barbette  towers  placed  fore  and  aft,  each  containing  one 
25-ton  gun, f  mounted  upon  a  disappearing  carriage.  After 
each  shot,  the  recoil  upsets  the  gun  and  brings  it  under  the 
shelter  of  the  armour.  The  gun,  when  loaded,  is  carried 
back  to  the  firing  position  by  hydraulic  power.  These 
guns  had  an  all-round  fire,  and  were  placed  at  a  great 
height  above  the  water,  but  the  protection  given  to  them 
was  not  very  satisfactory,  as  the  barbettes  were  open 
underneath.  There  was  an  armoured  ammunition  trunk 
leading  down  from  them  to  the  magazines,  but  the  smallest 
shell  exploding   under  the   guns   would  put  them   out  of 

*  The  two  25-ton  11-inch  guns  fire  right  ahead;  two  18-ton  weapons  within 
three  degrees  of  the  keel-line, 

f  Eleven-inch  in  calibre.  There  is  another  pattern  of  25-ton  gun,  12-inch  in 
calibre,  carried  on  board  the  Monarch  and  other  ships. 


224 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


action.  As  in  the  Alexandra,  the  armour-belt  was  carried 
down  over  the  ram.* 

We  must  now  return  some  years  to  the  Royal  Sovereign. 
She  was  a  three-decker,  cut  down  on  Captain  Coles'  plan,  to 
the  level  of  the  lower  deck,  ten  feet  from  the  water.  The  hull 
thus  left  was  plated  on  the  water-line  and  above  it  with 
4|-inch  iron,  whilst  upon  the  deck  four  turrets  were  placed. 
The  foremost  carried  two  12^-ton  guns,  the  others  one  each. 
The  turrets  had  armour  10  inches  thick  near  the  gun  ports, 
and  elsewhere  5  inches.  They  were  rotated  by  hand-power 
applied  by  rack  and  pinion  or  winches.  The  bases  of  the 
turrets  rested  upon  the  lower  deck,  and  the  weight,  instead 
of  being  supported  upon  spindles,  as  in  the  American 
monitors,  was  carried  on  a  roller-way.  The  ship  had 
only  three  light  signal-masts  and  no  rig.  Her  crew  consisted 
of  300  officers  and  men.  She  had  a  lightly-armoured  conning- 
tower  placed  just  forward  of  her  one  funnel.  On  her  trial,  in 
July,  1864,  she  proved  herself  to  be  a  most  satisfactory  vessel. 

The  Prince  Albert  was  contemporary  with  the  Royal 
Sovereign,  and  like  her  carried  four  turrets  placed  in  the 
centre-line,  with  five  guns,  but  differed  in  being  built  of  iron, 
expressly  to  suit  Captain  Coles'  designs,  instead  of  having 
been  merely  adapted  to  them.  She  was,  then,  the  first  English 
ship  built  to  carry  the  turret.  Like  the  Royal  Sovereign  she 
was  designed  for  coast  defence,  and  was  not  a  sea-going  ship. 
Coles,  emboldened  by  his  success,  was  anxious  to  see  the 
turret  system  applied  to  sea-going  battleships,  and  as  the 
result  of  his  energetic  insistence  the  Monarch  was  laid  down. 
She  was  a  moderate-freeboard  turret-ship  of  8300  tons, 
carrying  two  turrets  placed  on  the  centre-line,  and  containing 

#  In  1878  when  war  with  Russia  was  thought  imminent,  four  ironclads  were 
purchased  by  England.  They  had  been  designed  and  built  in  England  for 
foreign  powers,  and  thus  are  not  necessarily  of  English  type.  The  following 
were  the  ships:  The  Superb,  generally  resembling  the  Hercules,  but  more 
heavily  armed ;  the  Neptune,  a  rigged  turret-ship,  similar  to  the  Monarch,  but 
more  recent,  and  armed  with  the  35-ton  Whitworth  breechloader,  which  was 
exchanged  for  the  38-ton  muzzle-loader;  the  Belleisle  and  Orion,  small  central 
battery  vessels  of  limited  sea-going  power. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  225 

each  two  25-ton  guns.  Forward  was  a  forecastle  which  cut 
off  the  ahead  fire  of  the  fore-turret,  but  contained  two  6J-ton 
guns*;  these  were  protected  by  a  screen  from  ahead  fire. 
Astern  she  had  a  poop  which  mounted  one  gun  of  similar 
pattern.  Thus  one  great  advantage  of  the  turret,  the  all- 
round  fire  which  it  gives,  was  lost.  The  vessel  was  fully 
rigged  and  had  three  masts.  Under  steam  she  made  very 
nearly  fifteen  knots.  Her  armour  on  her  turrets  was  10 
inches  at  its  thickest  point,  on  her  side  7  inches.  Her 
forecastle  made  her  a  tolerable  sea  boat,  and  in  her  day  she 
was  considered  the  finest  ironclad  afloat. 

Captain  Coles,  however,  had  never  considered  her  as  an 
ideal  ship.  He  criticised  her  contiffually  whilst  she  was  on 
the  stocks,  and  complained  of  her  high  freeboard  and  her  loss 
of  all-round  fire.t  Supported  vehemently  by  the  press,  he  was 
permitted  in  1867  to  design  the  ill-fated  Captain. %  He  gave 
her  less  than  half  the  freeboard  of  the  Monarch,  and  quite  as 
much  rigging.  Her  displacement  was  7900  tons,  and  her 
armour  was  a  little  thicker  than  the  Monarch 's.  The 
speed  was  half  a  knot  or  more  slower  than  the  Monarch's. 
The  vessel  capsized,  in  1870,  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  no 
more  low-freeboard  monitors,  fully  masted  and  rigged,  were 
designed  for  our  service.  The  Monarchy  and  the  purchased 
Neptune  are  the  only  survivors  of  the  type. 

Instead,  the  class  of  mastless  turret-ships  for  sea-going 
purposes,  was  developed.  The  first  exemplar  of  this  type  is 
the  admirable  Devastation,  designed  by  Sir  Edward  Reed  in 
1869.  She  was  of  9300  tons,  the  largest  battleship  built  for 
the  navy  since  the  broadside  ironclad  went  out  of  fashion. 
She  had  neither  forecastle  nor  poop,  but  was  frankly  and 
entirely  a  sea-going  monitor.  In  two  turrets,  placed  fore  and 
aft,  she  carried  four  35-ton  guns.  The  thickness  of  her  plating 

*  Afterwards  changed  to  two  12-ton  guns. 

f  It  is  somewhat  strange  to  find  that  Coles'  own  ideal  ship,  the  Captain,  had 
a  forecastle  and  poop  in  spite  of  these  criticisms. 

%  See  Chapter  XXIY.,  pages  183-4. 
Vol.  II.  Q 


226 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


ranged  from  10  to  14  inches.  Between  her  turrets  was  a  light 
superstructure  with  a  flying  deck.  On  the  loss  of  the  Captain 
deep  misgivings  were  aroused  as  to  the  value  of  low-freeboard 
turret-ships,  and  a  searching  inquiry  was  made  into  her 
stability  and  seaworthiness.  She  emerged  triumphant,  and 
though  she  is  not  altogether  a  comfortable  ship,  as  her  decks 
are  awash  in  any  sea,  she  has  earned  golden  opinions  as  an 
almost  invulnerable,  powerful  and  handy  ship.  She  has 
recently  been  reconstructed  and  re-armed  with  the  10-inch 
breechloader,  and  though  now  an  old,  is  none  the  less  a 
fine,  and  valuable,  vessel.  She  is  impervious  to  the  deadly  hail 
of  the  quick-firer,  and  might  fare  better  in  an  action  at  sea 
than  many  larger  and  more  modern  battleships. 

Following  her,  with  considerable  improvements,  the  Thun- 
derer and  Dreadnought  were  laid  down  for  sea  service,  whilst 
contemporary  with  her,  or  earlier,  were  the  coast-service  ships, 
Hotspur,  G/atton,  the  four  Cyclops,*  and  the  Rupert.  These 
ships  constitute  a  very  formidable  group,  apart  from  the  rest 
of  the  fleet,  and  the  Rupert  and  Hotspur  are  something 
better  than  mere  coast-defence  ships.  They  were  the  ulti- 
mate development  of  the  low-freeboard  turret-ship  which 
Ericsson  and  Coles  had  devised.  The  Dreadnought  differed 
little  from  the  earlier  Devastation.  Her  armour  was  thicker, 
her  guns  heaviest  and  her  displacement  larger  by  a  thousand 
tons.  The  freeboard  was  also  increased,  and  hydraulic  gear 
was  fitted  to  her  turrets  and  guns. 

The  steady  advance  of  artillery  had  now  developed  the  gun 
till  none  but  the  thickest  armour  would  exclude  the  newest 
projectiles.  Hitherto  it  had  been  possible  to  design  a  ship, 
which  should  be  plated  from  stem  to  stern  with  mail  impene- 
trable, under  the  conditions  of  the  battle,  to  any  projectile, 
though  it  might  be  easily  perforated  on  the  proving  ground. 
Henceforward,  the  great  extent  of  moderate  armour  disappears, 

*  Their  names  were  :  the  Cyclops,  Gorgon,  Hecate,  Hydra. 
f  38-ton  instead  of  35-ton. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  227 


to  re-appear  in  1893,  and  is  replaced  by  a  small  surface  pro- 
tected by  very  thick  plating.  The  vitals  only  of  the  ship  are 
thus  sheltered :  the  engines,  the  boilers,  the  heaviest  guns,  the 
captain's  station,  the  lines  of  communication.  All  else  is  left 
open,  on  the  principle  that  no  resistance  is  better  than  a  weak 
one.  The  ships  of  the  period  which  we  are  now  approaching 
have  never  given  entire  satisfaction.  In  their  own  day  they 
offered  very  nearly  the  whole  area  of  their  side  to  the  smallest 
gun's  attack.  Before  the  development  of  the  quick-firer 
and  the  appearance  of  high  explosives  this  was  not,  perhaps,  a 
matter  of  great  importance.  But,  when  great  attention  was 
paid  to  auxiliary  armaments,  and  the  number  of  moderate- 
sized  shells  that  could  be  projected  in  a  given  time  increased, 
it  became  evident  that  these  ships  could  be  disabled  without  a 
hit  upon  their  thick  armour. 

The  removal  of  armour  from  the  ship's  side  is  contemporary 
with  the  introduction  of  horizontal  plating  in  the  shape  of  a 
protective  deck.*  In  the  earlier  turret-ships  of  the  Devastation 
and  Rupert  period,  low-freeboard  vessels,  which  would  be 
much  exposed  to  a  plunging  fire,  we  find  2  or  3  inches 
of  armour  placed  above  the  belt,  horizontally,  protecting  the 
deck.  In  the  Alexandra  and  Te7neraire  an  armour-deck  is 
also  present,  but  again  above  the  belt  and  above  the  water- 
line.  Henceforward  we  shall  see  it  employed,  often  without 
the  belt  and  below  the  water-line,  for  a  considerable  extent  of 
the  ship's  side,  serving  to  divide  the  ship  into  two  portions  : 
the  one  below  the  water-line  containing  the  vitals,  protected 
from  gun-fire  by  the  water  on  either  side  and  the  stout 
deck  of  iron  above,  off  which  projectiles  would  glance ;  the 
other  above  the  water-line  open  to  every  shot  and  shell  over 
the  greater  part  of  its  surface,  but  containing  nothing,  which, 
if  injured,  might  compromise  the  ship's  safety.     In  theory, 

*  The  Mississippi  gunboats,  designed  by  Mr.  Eads  in  i86i,had  curved  decks, 
plated  with  thin  iron.  Ericsson's  Monitor  was  similarly  protected,  but  these  were 
low  freeboard  vessels.  The  step  forward  lay  in  applying  such  a  deck  to  vessels 
of  high  freeboard.  The  Comus,  designed  in  1875,  was  the  first  English 
unarmoured  ship  in  which  it  appeared 

Q  2 


228 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


this  part  might  be  riddled  and  shot  away  without  damage  to 
the  flotatory  or  righting  qualities  of  the  ship."* 

The  first  armourclad  of  this  description  was  the  Shannon, 
a  vessel  intended  for  cruising  purposes.  The  first  battleship 
was  the  Italian  Duilio,  which  was  copied  in  the  English 
Inflexible.  Her  displacement  was  11,800  tons,  or  more  than 
2000  tons  in  excess  of  the  Dreadnought,  which  was  her 
immediate  predecessor  in  the  line  of  turret-ships.  Instead  of 
a  water-line  belt  of  plating  running  right  round  the  ship, 
the  armour  was  stripped  off  the  extremities,  and  applied  to 
increase  the  thickness  on  a  square  citadel  placed  amidships. 
This  carried  two  thicknesses  of  iron  armour,  together  reaching 
from  1 6  to  24  inches  of  metal, t  and  occupied  less  than  one- 
third  the  ship's  length.  Strong  bulkheads  ran  athwartship, 
whilst  an  armour-deck  forward  and  aft,  below  the  water-line, 
protected  the  vitals.  The  two  turrets,  each  containing  two 
8 1 -ton  guns,  and  plated  with  compound  armour,  were  placed 
upon  this  citadel,  en  echelon  amidships.  In  this  way,  great 
concentration  of  fire  was  obtained.  Four  guns  could  bear 
ahead  and  four  on  either  broadside,  though  the  arc  of  two  of 
the  four  guns  was  limited  ;  but  astern  only  two  could  be  fired, 
inasmuch  as  of  the  two  superstructures  fore  and  aft,  which 
gave  comfortable  quarters  for  the  crew,  the  after  one  was 
broader,  and  obstructed  the  inmost  gun  in  each  turret.  The 
breadth  was  extreme,  and  the  speed  low.  Mr.  Barnaby,  who 
had  designed  this  vessel,  was  denounced  in  no  measured 
terms  by  numerous  critics,  and  the  ship  was  christened  a 
coffin,  owing  to  her  want  of  armour  on  the  water-line. 

A  wholly  anomalous  vessel,  neither  battleship  nor  cruiser, 
was  the  Polyphemus,  designed  in  1873  and  launched  in  1 88 1 . 
She  has  a  steel  cigar-shaped  hull,  plated  on  its  upper  portion 
with  3-inch  armour.  To  accommodate  her  crew  and  add  to 
her  seaworthiness,  a  light  superstructure  has  been  added. 

*  See  the  transverse  sections,  Plate  XXXVIII.,  which  will  make  the  text  clearer, 
f  An  additional  defect  in  the  Inflexible^  Ajax,  and  Agamemnon  is  that  their 
armour  is  not  rolled  in  one  thickness,  but  is  made  up  of  two  plates. 


Half-Sections  showing     System    of    P rote ction 

I.  Low  freeboard    Furret-ship  3.    Deck  protected  cruiser 

.with  armour  deck  No  armour  belt 

Devastation  type  Edjar  type. 

2  High  freeboard    barbette-ship  4    Deck  below     belt  armour, 

with  armour  deck  Majestic  type 

Admiral   Bnud/n  type 

Figures   give    thickness  of 
"plats    in  inches. 

Plate  XXXVIII. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP  229 

Her  primary  object  is  the  use  of  the  ram  and  the  torpedo. 
She  carries  no  heavy  guns,  and  only  a  few  light  quick-firers. 
She  cost  £200,000  or  more,  though  only  a  small  ship,  and  her 
design  has  not  been  repeated  in  England,  but  in  America  her 
chief  features  have  been  embodied  in  the  Kaiahdin. 

Two  vessels  of  smaller  size  but  similar  features,  the  Ajax 
and  Agamemnon,  followed  the  Inflexible.  They  carried  the 
38-ton  gun  and  were  a  decided  failure ;  slow,  ill-armoured, 
ill-armed,  unsteerable.  They  are  the  last  vessels  built  for  our 
fleet  which  were  equipped  with  the  heavy  muzzle-loader. 
Henceforward,  all  guns  mounted  are  breech-loaders.  An 
auxiliary  armament — guns  of  moderate  power  and  penetration, 
midway  between  weapons  whose  work  it  is  to  perforate  armour 
and  the  smaller  anti-torpedo-boat  artillery  makes  its  appear- 
ance upon  the  Inflexible  type,  though  it  is  at  first  very  weak. 
On  board  the  Inflexible  it  was  composed  of  eight  4-inch  guns; 
on  the  Ajax  of  two  6-inch.  On  this  latter  ship,  steel-faced  or 
compound  armour  was  adopted  throughout. 

The  next  battleships  of  the  "  echeloned"  turret  type,  the 
Edinburgh  and  Colossus,  launched  in  1886,  are  an  enormous 
advance.  Not  only  are  the  guns  twice  as  powerful,  new- 
pattern  breech-loaders,  but  the  speed  is  high,  16*5  knots 
instead  of  the  wretched  13*25  of  the  Ajax  and  13-8  of  the 
Inflexible.  Instead  of  four  38-ton  guns,  there  are  four  of 
45-tons  in  the  two  turrets.  Instead  of  the  two  6-inch  guns, 
there  are  five  in  the  auxiliary  battery.  The  armour  is  still 
eighteen  inches  thick,  and  still  concentrated  amidships,  leaving 
the  ends  exposed.  But  the  proportions  are  not  so  unfavourable 
to  speed  as  in  the  Ajax  or  Inflexible ;  the  length  is  greater 
and  the  beam  less. 

Contemporary  with  these  two  ships  was  the  coast-service 
turret-ram  Conqueror,  which,  launched  in  1882,  was  followed 
six  years  later  by  the  precisely  similar  Hero.  They  are  useful 
little  ships  of  6200  tons,  with  a  low  freeboard  forward.  A 
little  before  the  ship's  centre  is  a  single  turret  containing  two 
45-ton  guns,  with  a  good  arc  of  fire  ahead  and  on  the  broadside. 


230  IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 

Astern  of  this  is  a  high  superstructure  to  house  the  crew,  in 
which  are  mounted  four  6-inch  guns.  The  turret  armour  is 
twelve  inches  at  its  thickest,  and  very  nearly  all  the  water- 
line  is  protected ;  the  belt  is  carried  down  to  the  ram.  Both 
vessels  are  bad  sea  boats,  and  they  are  very  weak  in  stern 
fire,  but  they  are  perhaps  stronger  ships  than  the  Ajax 
or  Agamemnon.  In  a  sea-way  their  speed  falls  from  its 
nominal  fifteen-and-a-half  knots  to  nearer  eleven.  They 
are  not  suited  to  work  on  open  waters,  from  their  low 
freeboard. 

Whilst  the  Colossus  was  in  hand,  another  and  a  very 
different  type  of  battleship  was  designed  and  commenced. 
This  was  the  first  of  the  u  Admiral "  class,  the  Collingwood. 
In  proportions  and  displacement  she  was  closely  similar  to  the 
Colossus,  but  the  disposition  of  her  armour  and  armament  was 
widely  contrasted.  The  central  citadel,  with  its  vicious  con- 
centration of  armament,  was  abandoned,  and  the  four  heavy, 
45-ton  breechloaders  were  placed  fore  and  aft  in  two  lofty 
barbette  towers,  protected  by  thick  armour.  The  guns  were 
left  very  much  exposed,  but  perfect  shelter  was  given  to  the 
gunners,  except  from  shells  bursting  underneath  the  barbettes. 
To  load,  the  breeches  of  the  gun  are  depressed  till  they  come 
below  the  roof  of  the  barbette,  when  the  hydraulic  apparatus, 
which  is  placed  behind  armour,  drives  the  shot  and  powder 
into  the  gun.  Forward  and  aft,  the  Collingwood  has  a 
moderate  freeboard.  Amidships  is  a  superstructure  carrying 
six  6-inch  breechloaders  behind  one  inch  of  steel  plating. 
Against  raking  fire  there  are  6-inch  bulkheads  fore  and  aft. 
The  auxiliary  armament  is  thus  about  the  same  as  that  of  the 
Colossus,  but  has  a  certain  measure  of  protection  given  it, 
which,  as  we  shall  find,  tends  steadily  to  increase.  With 
great  prescience  a  good  speed  was  assured  to  the  ship,  and  on 
the  measured  mile,  under  forced  draught,  she  accomplished 
1 6*8  knots.  Her  armour  extends  for  140  feet  in  a  narrow  belt 
on  the  water  line ;  the  barbette  towers  are  thickly  plated, 
and  from  each  of  them  a  well-protected  shaft  runs  down  to 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  231 

the  armour  deck,  which  is  placed  below  the  water-line.*" 
Strong  bulkheads  at  each  extremity  of  the  water-line  belt  run 
athwartship,  giving  security  against  raking  fire.  There  is  a 
well-plated  conning-tower  and  one  mast  with  two  fighting- 
tops.  The  thickness  of  the  armour  varies  between  eighteen 
and  twelve  inches,  and  it  is  compound. 

This,  then,  was  a  ship  which  could  steam  fast  and  hit  hard, 
which  was,  moreover,  well  adapted  for  fighting  in  line  ahead. 
The  end-on  fire  is  not  that  of  the  Colossus,  but  the  broadside 
fire  is  better,  as  the  guns  can  be  trained  through  a  wider 
angle.  Yet  the  unprotected  ends  are  long,  and  the  barbettes 
could  be  put  out  of  action  by  lodging  shells  beneath 
them.  Still  the  Collingwood  was  a  great  advance  upon  her 
predecessors,  and  in  general  outline  differs  little  from  our 
newest  ships.  She  was  completed  in  1886,  and  has  proved 
very  satisfactory. 

Five  similar  ships,  the  Anson,  Benbow,  Ca?7iperdow7i,  Horce, 
and  Rodney  followed  her.  They  were  a  little  larger  and  a 
little  faster,  exhibiting  that  continuous  progress  which  marks 
our  battleships.  In  the  disposition  of  their  armour  and 
armament  there  was  no  change.  The  45-ton  gun  on  four  of 
them  was  replaced  by  the  far  more  powerful  67-ton  gun,  which 
for  ten  years  was  to  be  the  standard  heavy  gun  of  the  fleet. 
The  auxiliary  and  anti-torpedo-boat  armament  suffered  no 
change.  The  weight  of  armour  carried  exceeded  2500  tons, 
whereas  in  the  Colossus  it  had  been  2360  tons,  and  in  the  Ajax, 
2220.  The  Benbozv  differed  from  the  other  four  considerably. 
Instead  of  the  four  67-ton  guns  she  was  given  two  of  111-tons, 
one  fore  and  the  other  aft,  and  her  auxiliary*  armament  grew 
from  six  6-inch  to  ten  6-inch  guns.  The  speed  of  these  ships 
was  seventeen  knots,  and  they  were  faster  than  any  French 
battleship  of  their  day.  Their  defect  was  still  the  insufficient 
protection  given  to  the  water-line,  and  the  absence  of  strong 
armour  over  the  auxiliary  battery. 

*  Except  amidships  where  it  is  carried  across  between  the  upper  edges  of  the 
belt.    As  in  Fig.  2,  Plate  XXXVIII. 


232 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


In  these  six  vessels  there  was  a  visible  tendency  to  abandon 
the  development  of  bow  fire,  and  to  increase  broadside  fire. 
The  next  pair  of  battleships  exhibit  no  such  tendency. 
Indee*d,  in  them  bow  fire  attained  its  greatest  proportions, 
though  at  the  expense  of  stern  fire.  They  may  be  described 
as  greatly  enlarged  Conquerors.  They  retain  the  essential 
features  of  that  ship  :  the  single  turret,  the  weak  stern  fire, 
the  low  freeboard  forward,  the  high  superstructure  aft  ;  but 
they  carry  a  shorter  and  thicker  armour-belt.  The  displace- 
ment rises  from  6200  tons  to  10,500  tons.  Forward,  in  a 
single  great  turret,  are  two  huge  110-ton  guns,  firing  right 
ahead  or  on  either  broadside.  The  turret,  unlike  the  bar- 
bettes of  the  "  Admiral"  class,  has  its  base  well  protected  by 
a  large  armoured  redoubt.  Astern  is  a  single  29-ton  gun, 
sheltered  only  by  a  shield.  The  superstructure  contains  twelve 
6-inch  guns,  placed  behind  steel  plating  3  inches  thick,  with 
a  bulkhead  of  the  same  thickness  across  the  stern  of  the 
battery,  and  one  of  6  inches,  protecting  the  guns  from  raking 
fire,  forward.  The  thick  armour-belt  on  the  water-line  is 
162  feet  long,  and  there  are  the  usual  English  athwartship 
bulkheads.  The  redoubt  is  pear-shaped  and  contains  the 
loading  apparatus  and  the  base  of  the  turret.  The  conning- 
tower  is  heavily  armoured.  Forward  and  aft  of  the  belt 
there  is  an  armour-deck  below  the  water-line  3  inches 
thick.  The  speed  is  seventeen  knots  or  more.  In  these 
vessels  for  the  first  time  triple-expansion  engines  appear 
on  board  a  British  ironclad.  The  machine-gun  armament 
is  unusually  powerful,  including  twenty-four  6-pounder 
and  3-pounder  quick-firers,  and  many  smaller  guns.  These 
vessels  were  christened  Victoria  and  Sanspareil,  and  were 
the  last  ships  armed  with  the  110-ton  gun.  Completed 
in  1889  the  Victoria  came  to  an  early  and  tragic  end  in 
1893. 

The  appearance  of  high  explosives  and  the  growing  potency 
of  the  quick-firer,  which,  though  as  yet  it  only  projected  shells 
of  61bs.,  was  still  capable,  in  the  opinion  of  many  experts, 


'Arm  'iron  "s.  Compd' 


Inflexible  1374 


Compound  Con^ueror  l87Sm  Hull  Steep? 


■ 


<rm.  Compound  A»„sos  /e79 


2? 


Arm.  Compound 


tolling  wood  1879. 


Iflr/n.  Compound  Imperieuse  18 SI. 


Hull.  Steel. 


Arm.  Compound 


Victoria  1835 


,  Trafalqar  1886 

Compound  J 


8                  /  1  17 

\ — 

t 

( 

1 

 feM 

Arm.  Compound  *°y«*'  So"ere'^n 


///.  Stee/ 


— J  4 

1 — 1 

,s 

/ 

]♦/ 

i  

.  Centurion  1890. 
Arm. Compound Ana  Nickzl  stebl 


mm     |       i  tet 


Majestic  1894. 


lull.  Sree, 


SWffrfi  Ironclads.  18  74.- 1 894-. 

Figures   o^ive  thicknes   of    Armour    in  ir.chei 


Plate  XXXIX. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  233 

of  riddling  the  unarmoured  sides  and  ends*  of  the  "Admirals" 
and  Victorias,  and  impairing  their  flotatory  qualities, 
led  to  a  distinct  change  in  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar, 
which  followed.  The  general  idea  of  their  design  was  a 
Devastation  improved  and  brought  up  to  date,  and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  idea  was  realised,  and  that  two  remark- 
ably formidable  ships  were  the  product.  They  show  a  great 
increase  in  size  :  length,  beam,  and  displacement  are  all 
enlarged.  The  armour-belt  on  the  water-line  is  230  feet 
instead  of  162  feet  long,  and  rises  to  a  great  height  above 
the  water.  It  is  no  longer  a  narrow  streak  3  feet  above 
the  surface,  but  ascends  10  feet  to  the  level  of  the  upper 
deck,  thus  forming,  with  the  athwartship  bulkheads — 16 
inches  and  14  inches  thick — at  each  end,  a  great  citadel, 
encased  with  plating  from  14  inches  to  20  inches  thick.  At 
each  end  stands  a  turret,  similarly  protected,  and  containing 
two  67-ton  guns.  There  are  two  steel,  armoured  screens 
crossing  the  citadel,  to  prevent  splinters  from  raking  it.  The 
unarmoured  ends  are  comparatively  insignificant,  and  their 
loss  would  not  damage  the  ship's  flotation.  In  the  super- 
structure between  the  turrets  are  six  sponsons,  three  on  each 
side,  in  which  are  mounted  six  47-inch  quick-firers,  behind 
4-inch  steel,  a  thickness  sufficient  to  withstand  machine-gun 
bullets,  and  projectiles  from  the  small  quick-firers.  There 
are  5-inch  bulkheads  to  protect  the  men  from  a  raking  fire. 
The  weight  of  armour  reaches  the  high  figure  of  3400  tons, 
exclusive  of  the  deck,  which  would  add  another  iooo  tons; 
and  thus  these  two  ships  are,  for  their  size,  the  best  pro- 
tected in  the  service.  The  speed  is  not  so  high  as  in  their 
predecessors,  but  it  is  by  no  means  inadequate,  as  sixteen- 
and-three-quarter  knots  were  accomplished  on  the  measured 
mile.  In  general  appearance  the  two  Niles  recall  the 
Devastation. 

*  The  elevations  of  the  Collingwood  and  Victoria  (Plate  XXXIX.)  show  the 
small  extent  of  surface  above  the  water-line  protected  by  armour.  The  "  Admirals," 
with  their  unarmoured  ends  riddled;  sink  15  inches.    See  also  page  174-5. 


234 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


It  was  asserted  in  England  that  these  two  ships  were  the 
last  ironclads  that  would  be  laid  down,  as  the  torpedo  was, 
at  the  date  of  their  commencement,  growing  in  favour,  and 
the  torpedo-boat  was  threatening  the  large  ship.  But  a  year 
before  their  completion  this  prediction  was  falsified  in  the 
most  singular  manner,  by  the  great  Naval  Defence  Act  of 
1889.  This  provided  for  the  construction  of  eight  large 
battleships,  the  Royal  Sovereigns,  and  two  smaller  ones,  the 
Centurions.  The  Royal  Sovereigns  show  a  yet  further 
growth  of  displacement,  which  becomes  in  them  14,150  tons.* 
They  are  longer  and  broader  than  the  two  Niles.  Their 
primary  armament  is  still  the  67-ton  gun,  carried  in  two  pairs, 
forward  and  aft,  but  the  secondary  artillery  attains  an  extra- 
ordinary importance.  The  six  47-inch  quick-firers,  whose 
collective  discharge  weighs  2yolbs.,  give  way  to  ten  6-inch 
quick-firers,  discharging  in  one  round  from  each  gun  iooolbs. 
weight  of  metal.  The  machine-gun  armament  has  grown, 
whilst  the  coal  supply  is  enormous.  Sevenf  of  the  group  are 
high-freeboard  barbette-ships,  and  the  eighth,  the  Hood, 
a  moderate-freeboard  turret-ship.  But  whilst  the  barbette 
reappears,  it  is  no  longer  the  barbette  of  the  "  Admirals,"  a 
shallow  steel  cylinder  standing  upon  the  upper  deck,  and 
undefended  below.  The  thick  plating  is  in  the  Royal 
Sovereigns  carried  down  to  the  armour-deck,  forming  two 
great  redoubts  at  each  end  of  the  ship.  The  bulkheads  below 
the  turrets  were  somewhat  thin,  at  their  lower  edge,  in  the 
Nile;  here  they  are  thick  enough  to  give  thorough  protection. 
The  water-line  belt  is  250  feet  long,  against  230  feet,  but  its 
maximum  thickness  is  reduced  from  20  inches  to  18  inches, 
and  its  breadth  amidships  from  1 feet  to  8^  feet.  As  the 
guns  of  all  ironclads  are  differentiated,  some  mounted  to 
attack  the  enemy's  armoured  positions,  some  to  wreck  his 

*  The  progress  in  size  of  the  English  battleship,  is  tabulated  in  Table  XXII. 

f  Royal  Sovereign,  Resolution,  Revenge,  Repulse,  Royal  Oak,  Ramillies,  and 
Empress  of  India, 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  235 


superstructures  and  defenceless  sides,  some  to  pour  a  hail 
upon  port-holes  and  gunners,  so  in  the  Royal  Sovereign  the 
armour  is  differentiated.  For  6\  feet  above  the  thick  belt, 
between  the  heavy-gun  barbettes  fore  and  aft,  is  a  thinner 
plating  of  5  inches  of  steel,  thus  giving  g\  feet  of  protected 
side  above  the  water  amidships.  The  thin  plating  of  steel 
is  in  two  thicknesses,  an  outer  of  4  inches,  and  an  inner  of 
1  inch.  Behind  this  side  are  10  feet  of  coal.  At  each  end 
of  the  light  citadel,  which  has  a  length  of  145  feet,  is  a 
3-inch  bulkhead,  rising  to  the  upper  deck. 

The  auxiliary  armament  is  thus  carried.  Four  6-inch  guns 
are  on  the  main  deck  in  armoured  casemates,  two  on  each 
side.  On  the  front  of  these  casemates  the  plating  is  6  inches 
thick,  and  on  the  rear  2  inches.  The  other  six 'guns  are  on 
the  upper  deck,  protected  only  by  shields.  Five  6-inch  guns 
fire  on  each  broadside,  two  ahead,  and  two  astern.  The 
speed  is  high,  ranging  from  eighteen  knots  in  the  Royal 
Sovereign  to  seventeen  knots  in  the  Hood.  At  sea,  with 
natural  draught,  the  Royal  Sovereign  steamed  to  Gibraltar, 
1 08 1  knots,  in  seventy  hours,  burning  487  tons  of  coal.  This 
gives  her  a  sea  speed  of  15*4  knots.  She  carries  enough 
coal  in  her  bunkers  for  three  such  trips. 

Her  barbette  guns''  are,  of  course,  much  exposed.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  men  working  them  are  most  admirably 
protected.  There  is  one  very  serious  defect,  however,  in 
their  mounting,  since  they  require  to  be  brought  back  to  the 
fore  and  aft  position  before  they  can  be  loaded.*  The  conning- 
towers  are  two  in  number;  on  the  forward  one  are  14  inches 
of  armour,  on  the  after  one  3  inches.  Numerous  search-lights 
are  provided,  and  there  are  two  military  masts.  In  sea- 
worthiness, comfort,  armament,  armour,  speed,  coal  endurance, 

*  If  the  enemy  is,  for  instance,  to  starboard,  the  heavy  guns,  after  being  fired, 
cannot  be  kept  trained  in  his  direction,  when  the  only  target  is  their  muzzles, 
but  they  must  be  revolved  back  till  they  are  parallel  with  the  keel  line,  when 
they  practically  present  their  whole  length  as  a  target.  Modern  French  ships, 
in  most  instances,  have  a  central  load,  which  allows  the  guns  to  be  kept  trained 
on  the  enemy. 


236 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


and  homogeneity  of  structure,  there  is  nothing  like  this 
splendid  group  of  ships  outside  our  navy.  Other  powers  may 
have  ships  better  in  one  or  two  points:  the  Royal  Sovereigns 
are  generally  excellent,  and  combine  power  with  grace  of  form. 
The  gulf  between  them  and  the  Inflexible,  though  it  does  not 
represent  more  than  fifteen  years'  progress,  is  profound. 

Little  less  excellent  are  the  two  Centurions*  With  4000 
tons  less  displacement  than  the  Royal  Sovereigns,  so  much 
power  cannot  be  expected.  But  they  are  admirable  com- 
promises, and  contain  all  the  elements  of  a  good  fighting  ship. 
Their  speed,  as  they  were  designed  for  service  on  foreign 
stations,  is  slightly  higher  than  that  of  the  Royal  Sovereigns, 
reaching  18  5  knots.  Their  coal  supply  is  the  same.  The 
heavy  armament  consists  of  four  29-ton  guns  mounted  in  pairs 
in  barbettes  fore  and  aft.  The  guns  have  the  advantage  of  a 
very  strong  nickel-steel  shield  6  inches  thick,  which  revolves 
with  the  gun.  Somewhat  unwisely  this  shield  has  been  left 
open  at  the  rear,  with  the  result  that,  if  the  ships  found  them- 
selves engaged,  with  an  enemy  upon  either  beam,  the  heavy 
guns  would  be  quickly  out  of  action  as  the  gunners  would  be 
exposed  to  every  projectile. t  The  armour  on  the  barbette  is 
9  inches  as  against  the  Royal  Sovereign1  s  18  inches  ;  on  the 
belt  12  inches,  where  the  Royal  Sovereign  has  18  inches. 
The  belt  is  only  200  feet  long,  being  thus  50  feet  shorter  than 
that  of  the  Royal  Sovereign  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  heavy 
guns  are  carried  two  feet  higher  above  the  water-line.  As 
in  the  larger  battleships,  there  is  a  lightly  armoured  citadel 
above  the  thicker  belt.  The  quick-firers,  ten  47-inch  guns, 
are  carried,  four  on  the  main  deck  in  casemates,  and  six  on 
the  upper  deck.  In  general  appearance,  the  Centurions 
closely  resemble  the  Royal  Sovereigns.  They  have  two 
military  masts  and  two  funnels.  Their  freeboard  is  high,  and 
they  are  good  sea  boats. 

*  The  Centurion  and  Barfleur. 

f  The  open  rear  of  the  barbettes  must  in  this  position  always  be  turned 
towards  one  enemy  when  the  guns  are  trained  on  the  other. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESIHP.  237 


The  Renown,  which  was  laid  down  in  1893,  is  a  greatly 
developed  Centurion.  Her  armour  is  rather  more  evenly 
distributed,  and  the  differentiation  of  plating  is  beginning  to 
disappear.  She  has  a  water-line  belt  of  8-inch  Harveyed 
steel,  with,  above  it,  6  inches  of  the  same  material,  instead  of 
the  Centurion 's  4  inches.  Her  two  barbettes  placed  fore  and 
aft,  and  each  containing  a  pair  of  29-ton  guns,  have  10  inches 
of  plating  upon  them.  There  is  a  novel  arrangement  of  the 
deck  which  greatly  adds  to  the  strength  of  the  vessel  amid- 
ships. In  the  Centurion  and  all  other  ironclads,  the  armour- 
deck  runs  across  the  ship  from  the  upper  extremities  of  the 
thick  belt,  only  dipping  below  the  water-line  forward  and  aft. 
In  the  Renown  it  is  curved,  and  arches  down  to  the  lower 
edge  of  the  belt.  Thus  any  projectile  which  perforates  the 
side,  has  to  encounter  this  further  obstacle  before  it  can  do 
vital  damage.  The  auxiliary  armament  is  not  only  a  very 
powerful,  but  also  a  very  well-protected  one.  Instead  of  the 
Centurion }  s  ten  4* 7-inch  guns,  the  Renown  carries  ten  6-inch 
guns,  of  course  quick-firers,  and  all  the  ten  are  in  casemates, 
on  the  faces  of  which  are  6  inches  of  Harveyed  steel.  There 
are  no  large  weapons  exposed  upon  the  upper  deck.  Four  of 
the  casemates  are  located  upon  the  upper,  and  six  upon  the 
main  deck.  The  light  armament  is  also  extremely  powerful, 
including  eight  12-pounder  quick-firers.  The  speed  is  to  be 
eighteen  knots,  and  the  draught  is  such  as  to  enable  her, 
like  the  Centurions,  to  pass  through  the  Suez  Canal.  She  is 
a  far  more  formidable  ship  than  the  Centurion,  and  might 
even  venture  to  face  the  Royal  Sovereign,  but  her  displace- 
ment is  12,350  tons  instead  of  10,500,  as  in  the  Centurion. 

The  twelve  huge  battleships  of  the  Majestic  class  *  are  rather 
developed  Renowns  than  Royal  Sovereigns.  The  water-line 
protection  consists  of  a  belt  of  Harveyed  steel  9  inches  thick 
and  16  feet  deep,  extending  for  220  feet  amidships.  Bulk- 
heads, with  an  outward  curve  at  either  end,  enclose  a  great 

*  Their  names  are  :  the  Majestic,  Magnificent,  Ccesar,  Hannibal,  Illustrious, 
Jupiter,  Mars,  Prince  George,  Victorious,  and  three  improved  ships  building. 


238 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


citadel  a  little  over  300  feet  long.  With  their  bases  pro- 
tected by  this  citadel,  stand  at  each  end  of  it  two  barbettes, 
containing  each  two  46-ton  guns.  The  barbettes  carry 
14-inch  armour.  On  the  main  deck  are  eight  casemates,  each 
containing  one  6-inch  quick-firer,  and  on  the  upper  deck  are 
four,  similarly  armed.  Each  casemate  is  protected  on  its  outer 
face  by  6-inch  Harveyed  steel.  As  in  the  Renown,  the  deck 
springs  from  the  lower  edge  of  the  side  armour.  The  speed 
is  to  be  that  of  the  Royal  Sovereigns,  but  we  may  hope  that, 
on  trial,  the  anticipated  rate  may  be  exceeded."*  Certainly 
the  only  weakness  of  our  new  battleships  seems  to  lie  in  their 
comparatively  low  boiler  and  engine  power.  The  length  is 
390  feet,  and  thus  the  Majesties  are  the  largest  battleships 
afloat  in  our  service.  The  displacement  is  15,000  tons,  and 
no  less  than  1850  tons  of  coal  will  be  carried.  The  weight  of 
armour  is  3400  tons,  or  a  little  less  than  is  carried  by  the 
Royal  Sovereigns,  but  the  improved  quality  of  the  mail  gives 
far  greater  security  for  less  weight.  The  minor  armament 
includes  sixteen  12-pounder  quick-firers.  In  the  design  the 
effect  of  the  quick-firer  is  plain,  since  the  main  effort  of  the 
architect  has  been  to  render  the  side  impervious  to  the  6-inch 
and  4- 7-inch  shell,  whilst  abandoning  all  effort  to  make  it 
proof  to  the  heaviest  projectiles. 

Six  ships  of  the  Canopus  class  followed  the  Majesties. 
The  armament  is  the  same,  but  the  side  armour  is  of  Harveyed 
nickel-steel,  6-inches  instead  of  9-inches  thick.  The  nominal 
speed  is  18J  knots.  These  ships  are  the  most  weakly 
protected  battleships  of  their  size,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Italian  Sardegna  and  Italia  classes.  They  displace  13,000 
tons,  and  draw  26  feet  of  water ;  in  consequence  they  can 
pass  through  the  Suez  Canal. 

We  may  next  consider  in  general  outline  our  thirty-five 
years  of  progress  in  battleship  construction.    And  first,  whilst 

*  The  Magnificent  has  done  ij'6  knots,  and  the  Majestic  17*8  knots;  the 
others  tried  up  to  August  1897  have  ranged  between  these  speeds  and  187 
knots.  The  three  new  Majesties  laid  down  in  1897-8  are  10  feet  longer  than 
the  others,  have  water  tube  boilers,  and  are  to  be  about  a  knot  faster. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  239 


English  ironclads,  as  a  rule,  show  a  steady  advance,  each 
being  better  than  its  predecessor,  and  closely  related  to  it, 
there  are  yet  certain  types  which  appear  from  time  to  time 
and  die  out,  because  they  prove  to  be  unfitted  for  the  conditions 
of  war,  or  because  the  advance  of  naval  opinion  discards  them. 
The  descendants  of  the  Royal  Sovereign,  the  first  English 
turret-ship,  display  a  great  mortality.  Four  varying  types 
appear  from  time  to  time,  and  three  of  these  may  be  said  to 
have  died  an  early  death :  the  low-freeboard  masted  turret- 
ship,  which  expired  with  the  Captain  ;  the  single-turret-ship, 
which  disappears  with  the  Victoria,  and  the  <l  echeloned" 
turret-ship,  of  which  the  Colossus  is  the  last  example. 
The  mastless  turret-ship  of  the  Devastation  type,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  a  singular  vitality  ;  just  as  it  might  appear 
defunct,  it  turns  up  again  in  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar,  and 
from  them  hands  on  some  of  its  features  to  the  later  Majestic 
class. 

The  tendency  towards  high  freeboard  and  good  speed  in 
our  recent  battleships  is  well  marked.  Both  these  features 
characterised  our  older  ships,  but  the  rage  for  impregnability 
drove  them  out.  We  had  to  learn  that,  admirable  though  our 
mastless  monitors  of  the  Devastation  type  were  as  fighting- 
machines,  a  ship  has  to  do  other  things  besides  fighting.  She 
must  be  fairly  comfortable,  if  her  crew  are  to  retain  their 
health,  and  without  health  the  sailor  must  necessarily  lose  a 
great  deal  of  his  nerve.  High-freeboard  ships,  in  which  the 
crews  need  not  be  battened  down  in  a  moderate  sea,  become 
essential,  when  it  is  desired  to  maintain  in  good  physical 
condition  the  men  who  have  to  fight  and  work  the  ships.  Nor 
is  this  the  only  gain  which  a  high  freeboard  gives.  When  the 
guns  are  placed  very  low,  in  rough  weather  the  waves  may 
cut  off  the  enemy's  hull  from  sight,  and  seas  breaking  over 
the  forward  part  of  the  ship  may  bury  the  forward  turret  or 
barbette  in  spray  and  foam.  On  the  other  hand,  the  low- 
freeboard  ship  is  a  small  target  to  hit,  a  fact  which  was 
remarked   by    the    Shah's   gunners    when    they  faced  the 


240 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


Huascar.  Still  the  advantages  of  a  high  freeboard  are  greater 
than  the  disadvantages,  and  the  high  freeboard  appears  to 
have  come  to  stay.  The  last  low-freeboard  vessels  in  our 
fleet  were  the  two  Niles  and  the  single  turret-ship  of  the 
eight  Royal  Sovereigns^  the  Hood. 

The  early  ironclads  had  to  face  guns  of  comparatively  feeble 
power.  The  round  shot  of  the  68-pounder  would  not  perforate 
the  Warrior' s  plating,  even  upon  the  proving  ground.  The 
subsequent  advance  in  the  thickness  and  resisting  power 
of  armour  was  entirely  due  to  the  advance  of  artillery. 
Successively  \\  inches  of  wrought  iron  gave  place  to 
6  inches  and  9  inches.  But  the  gun  kept  pace  with  this 
progress,  and  before  a  ship  had  left  the  stocks  had  usually 
rendered  it,  in  a  sense,  obsolete.  The  first  armour  was 
uniform  in  thickness.  Then,  as  the  attack  grew  more  formid- 
able, and  the  weight  of  iron  required  to  give  protection 
heavier,  a  greater  thickness  was  given  to  the  vital  parts  of 
the  ship.  None  of  our  older  vessels  were  really  "  ironclad," 
and  it  goes  without  saying  that  none  of  our  modern  battle- 
ships are  such.  The  low-freeboard  turret-ships,  of  the  period 
1870-5,  are  the  only  vessels  to  which  the  term  can  in  strict 
correctness  be  applied.  It  was  found  necessary  with  high 
freeboard  ships  to  denude  a  great  portion  of  the  side  of 
armour,  in  order  to  increase  the  thickness  over  the  battery 
and  vitals.  This  denudation  reached  its  extreme  limits  in  the 
Inflexible  and  the  "  Admirals,"  where  there  are  absurdly 
small  patches  of  plating,  and  where  by  far  the  greater  portion 
of  the  side  is  open  to  the  smallest  shell.  It  was  the  aim  of 
naval  architects  to  keep  out  the  heaviest  projectiles  from 
certain  portions  of  the  ship,  but  in  their  effort  to  ensure  this 
they  went  too  far.  The  secondary  armament  of  the  French 
ships  was  formidable  even  in  the  period  1875 — 1885,  and 
would  have  wrought  terrible  havoc  on  the  unprotected  upper 
works  and  water-line,  forward  and  aft.  Quite  possibly  the 
Inflexible  or  Colossus  would  have  been  put  out  of  action 
without  their  thick  armour  being  struck.    Sounder  counsels 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  241 


appear  in  the  Royal  Sovereigns,  where  there  is  a  combination 
of  thick  and  thin  armour.  The  purpose  of  the  thin  armour  is 
to  exclude  high  explosives  which  have  a  devastating  effect 
upon  the  ship's  interior.  But  even  in  the  Royal  Sovereign 
there  is  very  much  ill  defended,  the  loss  of  which  might  cause 
the  vessel  harm.  In  the  Majesties  thin  side-armour,  except 
over  the  auxiliary  guns,  disappears,  and  there  is  one  moderate 
thickness. 

But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  is  not  the  ship  made  invulnerable? 
Of  course,  it  could  be  done,  but  not  probably  with  a  displace- 
ment smaller  than  that  of  the  Great  Eastern.  The  danger  of 
destruction  by  the  ram  or  torpedo  forbids  such  a  monster,  and 
as  the  ship  has  after  all  to  fight  other  ships,  she  will  find  them, 
if  they  are  of  her  date  and  if  she  is  well  planned,  as  vulnerable 
as  herself.  If  she  cannot  resist  every  projectile,  neither  can 
they  ;  if  her  upper  works  can  be  riddled,  so  can  theirs  ;  if  she 
is  open  to  the  deadly  assault  of  ram  and  torpedo,  so  also  are 
they.  The  naval  architect's  business  is,  given  a  certain  dis- 
placement, to  effect  the  best  compromise  between  the  warring 
factors,  speed,  stability,  power  to  wound,  invulnerability,  coal- 
endurance;  or  given  the  required  degree  in  which  these  factors 
must  be  present,  to  produce  them  on  the  lowest  displacement. 
A  battleship  B,  of  15,000  tons,  may  look  no  better  than  one.  C, 
of  10,000  tons,  to  the  casual  eye,  but  as  constructors  are  not 
born  idiots  there  is  something  somewhere  which  will  give  the 
larger  ship  the  advantage.  It  may  be  a  heavier  and  stronger 
hull,  which  will  wear  better  and  stand  the  tremendous  concus- 
sion of  the  guns  longer ;  it  may  be  a  surplus  of  ammunition  or 
coal.  We  may  quarrel  with  the  constructor  for  giving  in- 
sufficient attention  to  one  factor  or  another  in  his  compromise, 
but  we  can  rarely  say  that  with  a  higher  displacement  he  has 
produced  an  inferior  ship. 

The  growth  in  displacement  is  one  of  the  most  striking 
features  of  our  more  recent  battleships.  Seeking  perfection, 
striving  to  improve  each  type  before  it  has  entered  upon 
service,  wre  have  been  driven  to  greater  and  greater  size.  It 
Voi,.  11.  R 


242 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


is  inevitable,  but  it  is  perhaps  regrettable,  as  numbers  are 
shown  by  the  history  of  the  past  to  be  a  more  decisive  factor 
than  the  size  of  individual  ships.  There  must  be  a  limit  to 
this  increase  of  size,  and  we  may  have  reached  it.  Overgrown 
ships  are  not  less  objectionable  than  overgrown  guns  and 
overthick  armour. 

The  system  of  mounting  guns  has  changed  widely  since 
the  days  of  the  Warrior.  We  began  with  the  broadside 
battery,  in  which  the  guns  were  ranged  side  by  side  bearing 
on  the  beam,  with  no  effort  to  obtain  axial  fire.  We 
advanced  from  this  to  the  central  battery,  in  which  the  guns 
were  larger  and  fewer,  concentrated  in  a  small  box  amidships 
with  a  varying  amount  of  axial  fire.  The  turret  was  the  next 
improvement,  and  this  in  turn  begot  the  barbette,  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two  lying  in  the  fact  that  in  the  turret  the 
armoured  wall  revolves  with  the  gun,  whilst  in  the  barbette 
the  armoured  wall  is  fixed  and  the  gun  revolves  inside  it 
upon  a  turntable.  Our  latest  ships  exhibit  a  combination  of 
broadside  and  barbette  or  turret  mounting,  as  the  heavy  guns 
are  placed  fore  and  aft  in  barbettes  or  turrets,  whilst  the 
medium  weapons  are  disposed  on  the  broadside. 

If  we  compare  the  latest  English  type  of  battleship,  the 
Majestic,  with  similar  French,  German,  and  American  ships  as 
the  Charlemagne,  Brandenburg,  and  Iowa,  we  shall  find  that 
foreign  architects  have  apparently  produced  ships  as  good  as 
ours  on  a  smaller  displacement.  But,  as  we  have  said  above, 
this  can  be  easily  explained.  The  English,  French,  and 
American  ships  all  agree  in  the  disposition  of  the  heavy  guns, 
which  are  mounted  in  pairs  fore  and  aft.  The  Germans  have 
preferred  three  pairs  of  heavy  guns,  all  placed  on  the  keel- 
line.  The  Majesties  guns  are  27  feet  above  the  water- 
line  ;  the  Charlemagne' s  forward  pair  nearly  29  feet,  and 
her  stern  pair  21  feet,  the  Iowa's  are  nearly  18  feet.  The 
forward  pair  of  guns  in  the  Brandenburg  have  a  good 
command,  but  the  other  two  pairs  are  mounted  low.  The 
French  and  Americans  have  preferred  the  turret,  whilst  the 


THE  DEVELOP 'M EXT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  243 

English  and  Germans  adhere  to  the  hooded  barbette.*  In  the 
German  ship  the  barbettes  are  unprotected  underneath  ;  in 
the  other  three,  the  armour  runs  down  to  the  deck.  The 
auxiliary  armament  differs  widely  in  the  four  vessels.  The 
Majestic  has  twelve  6-inch  quick-firers  in  as  many  armoured 
casemates,  each  protected  by  six  inches  of  steel.  The  French 
ship  has  ten  66-pounder  5*5-inch  quick-firers,  eight  of  which  are 
mounted  behind  3-inch  armour. t  The  Iowa  has  eight  8-inch 
guns  carried  in  pairs,  in  four  turrets  armoured  with  7  and  8 
inches  of  steel.  She  also  carries  six  4-inch  quick-firers  behind 
thin  armour.  The  Brandenburg  carries  a  very  feeble  battery 
of  quick-firers,  as  she  has  only  six  30-pounder  and  eight 
20-pounder  Krupps  of  this  pattern.  The  four,  however,  agree 
curiously  in  the  weight  of  the  heavy  gun  adopted  as  the 
primary  armament.  The  English  ship  carries  the  46-ton  gun  ; 
the  French  the  48-ton  gun  ;  the  German  the  42-ton  gun ;  and 
the  American  the  45-ton  gun.  The  weight  of  the  English 
broadside,  from  guns  above  the  20-pounder,  is  400olbs  ;  of 
the  French,  3293^.  ;  of  the  German,  473olbs.  ;  and  of  the 
American,  4532lbs  ;  but  the  English  ship  is  superior  to  anv 
in  the  number  of  large  quick-firers  carried,  and  would  in  a 
given  time  discharge  as  great  a  weight  of  metal  as  any  of  the 
other  three.  In  gun-power  the  English,  German,  and  American 
ships  are  about  equal,  and  the  French  a  little  inferior. 

For  protection,  the  Majestic  has  a  broad  but  incomplete  belt 
of  9  inches  uniform  thickness  ;  the  Iowa,  a  narrow  incomplete 
belt  of  14  inches  maximum  thickness  with  a  strake  of  5-inch 
armour  above  it  ;  the  Charlemagne,  a  narrow  end-to-end  belt, 
which  tapers  from  16  inches  to  9  inches,  and  above  it  again 
3J-inch  armour;  the  Brandenburg,  a  narrow  end-to-end  belt 
16  inches  to  12  inches  thick.  The  armour  upon  the  heavy 
gun  positions  is  12-inch  in  the  Brandenburg,  14-inch  in  the 

*  The  English  hooded  barbette,  however,  differs  very  little  from  the  French 
and  American  turret,  except  that  the  armour  is  thinner. 

f  She  has  also  six  3-o,-inch  quick-firers,  which  are  mounted  on  her  super- 
structure 

R  2 


244 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


Majestic,  15-inch  in  the  Iowa,  and  16-inch  in  the  Charlemagne. 
The  latter  ship,  the  Iowa,  and  the  Brandenburg  expose  a 
considerable  extent  of  side  below  their  quick-firers,  which 
might,  on  being  riddled,  render  the  quick-firers  unworkable. 
The  American  and,  German  ship  have  each  one  armoured 
position  from  which  the  ship  can  be  fought ;  the  Majestic  two, 
and  the  Charlemagne  three.  The  Iowa  has  the  lower  freeboard, 
and  would  be  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  a  sea-way ;  the  other 
three  ships  rise  well  out  of  the  water,  though  the  German  is 
inferior  in  freeboard  aft  to  the  English  and  French. 

As  at  present  designed,  the  Charlemagne  has  two  heavy 
military  masts  with  two  tops  and  an  officer's  position  on  each ; 
the  Majestic,  two  of  much  lighter  type,  each  with  two  tops  ; 
the  Brandenburg,  two  light  masts  with  one  top  for  guns,  and 
one  position  for  officers  on  each  ;  on  the  Iowa,  the  cumbrous 
military  mast  vanishes  altogether.^" 

In  speed,  the  Charlemagne  is  expected  to  cover  eighteen 
knots  on  the  measured  mile  ;  the  Majestic  has  done  eighteen  ; 
the  Iowa,  seventeen ;  and  the  Brandenburg,  sixteen-and- 
a-half.  In  coal  endurance,  the  Iowa  and  Majestic  are 
about  equal,  with  2000  tons  and  1850  tons  respectively;  the 
Charlemagne  comes  third  with  11 00  tons,  a  very  big  drop 
from  the  Majestic  ;  and  the  Brandenburg  last.  The  English 
ship  could  keep  the  sea  for  a  month,  steaming  continuously  at 
ten  knots ;  the  Iowa,  five  weeks  ;  the  Charlemagne,  eighteen 
days  ;  and  the  Brandenburg,  twelve  or  fourteen.  In  practice, 
however,  as  a  large  reserve  must  be  maintained,  this  time 
should  be  reduced  by  at  least  a  quarter. 

The  deck  of  the  Charlemagne  is  double,  3^-inch  above  and 
ij-inch  below,  over  the  machinery.  The  Majestic }s  deck  is 
single,  4-inch  on  the  slopes  and  a  little  less  on  the  flat,  but,  as 
has  been  said,  it  springs  from  the  lower  edge  of  the  armour- 
belt,  and  thus  has  the  full  advantage  of  the  protection  which 
the  latter  gives.  In  the  Iowa,  the  greatest  thickness  is 
3  inches,  and  in  the  Brandenburg,  2\  inches. 

#  There  is  a  short  steel  tower,  with  a  top  a  few  feet  above  it, 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  245 

In  displacement,  the  English  ship  is  largest,  as  her  tonnage 
is  15,000;  the  Iowa  follows  with  11,500  tons;  then  the 
Charlemagne,  with  11,200  ;  and  last  comes  the  Brandenburg, 
with  9850.  Of  the  four  ships,  the  Braiidenburg  is  an  older 
design  than  the  other  three,  and  therefore  lacks  the  extensive 
side-protection  which  is  given  in  them.  In  offensive  qualities 
the  English  and  American  ships  would  seem  to  excel,  but  as 
far  as  armament  goes  there  is  not  much  to  choose.  If  the 
Iowa  mounts  8-inch  quick-firers,  she  will  be  able,  at  close 
quarters,  to  bring  eight  guns,  capable  of  piercing  thick  armour, 
to  bear  on  either  broadside,  and  six  ahead  or  astern. 

The  development  of  the  ironclad  has  proceeded  side  by 
side  with  the  development  of  artillery.  At  the  date  of  the 
introduction  of  armour,  during  the  Crimean  War,  the  guns  in 
existence  were  of  very  moderate  power.  Artillery  had  made 
no  great  advance,  and  for  all  practical  purposes  there  was  no 
difference  between  the  guns  of  1856  and  those  of  1806,  except 
that  the  former  fired  shell  and  were  slightly  larger.  The 
carronade  of  681bs.,  which  was  the  heaviest  weapon  of  Nelson's 
day,  had  given  way  to  the  68-pounder  long  gun,  a  smooth 
bore  of  8  inches  calibre,  and  4  tons  15  cwt.  weight.  This 
gave  a  muzzle  velocity  of  1579  feet  per  second  to  its  round 
shell,  whilst  the  total  energy  of  the  projectile  was  only 
452  foot  tons.*  The  gun  was  of  cast  iron,  mounted  upon  a 
clumsy  wooden  carriage,  which  rendered  accurate  shooting 
very  difficult. 

The  rifled  gun  had  already  been  tried  in  the  Crimean  War,  in 
the  embryo  form  of  the  elliptical  Lancaster  gun,  which  gave  its 
shot  a  twist,  but  it  was  in  the  Armstrong  form  that  it  entered 
the  British  service.  The  first  Armstrong  gun,  completed  in 
1858,  had  a  forged  steel  barrel,  and  was  built  up  of  a  number 
of  wrought-iron  cylinders  fitted  closely  over  this  by  shrinkage. 
Thus,  at  one  bound,  the  distinctive  features  of  our  newest 
guns,  the  use  of  steel,  and  the  building  up  of  the  gun  from  a 


*  At  1000  yards. 


246 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


number  of  parts,  instead  of  casting  it  whole,  were  anticipated. 
The  projectiles  for  this  weapon  were  of  r8  inches  diameter, 
at  first  entirely  of  lead,  and  then  of  iron,  lead-coated  to  take 
the  grooves  of  the  rifling.  The  gun  was  a  breech-loader,  and 
the  breech  action  consisted  of  a  plug  which,  working  in  a  slot 
in  the  breech,  was  held  tight  by  a  hollow  screw,  which  fitted 
inside  the  bore.*  To  prevent  the  escape  of  gas  the  breech- 
block had  a  copper  bush,  and  the  gun  a  copper  face,  which, 
by  slightly  yielding  when  the  breech  screw  was  tightened, 
hermetically  sealed  the  gun. 

These  early  breech-loaders  were  before  their  day.  Accidents 
occurred  with  them,  and  men,  who  were  not  accustomed  to 
complicated  weapons,  preferred  the  apparent  simplicity  of  the 
muzzle-loader.  The  breech-loading  system  had  been  success- 
ful with  guns  of  1 1  olbs.  and  4olbs.  shot,  and  was  being  widely 
adopted  abroad,  but  still,  at  that  time,  the  arguments  for  it 
were  not  as  overwhelming  as  they  have  since  become.  The  first 
breech-loader  had  only  a  short  life,  from  i860  to  1865.  From 
the  latter  year  to  1880,  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years,  the 
muzzle-loader  reigned  in  our  fleet. 

The  resistance  of  the  first  ironclads  to  artillery  was  surprising. 
At  Lissa,  where  two  large  fleets  met,  on  neither  side  was  the 
armour  perforated.  In  America  the  Monitor  and  Merrimac 
cannonaded  one  another  for  the  whole  of  a  morning  without 
anyone  being  much  the  worse  for  it.  The  monitors  before 
Charlestown  in  1863-4  received  a  great  number  of  hits,  yet 
their  efficiency  was  little  impaired.  The  Montauk  was  struck 
214  times;  the  Ironsides,  a  broadside  vessel,  193;  the 
Weehawken,  T87  ;  the  Patapsco,  144;  the  Passaic  134;  the 
Cat  skill  i  106;  the  Nahant,  105;  the  Nantucket,  104;  the 
Lehigh,  36.  Yet  the  gunners  were  not  long  before  they 
re-established  the  ascendancy  of  their  weapon.  In  quick 
succession  rifled  guns  followed  the  feeble  smooth-bores ;  the 
rifles  grew  heavier  and  heavier,  whilst  armour,  to  resist  the 


See  Fig.  1,  Plate  XL. 


Armstrong    Breechloader  of  1859 

A.  Breech  pluy.   B  Screw  for  tightening, 
or  loosening  A.    C  Hollow  in  B  to 
introduce  charoe  when  A  is  removed 
Movable  part's  black. 


Armstrong  Breechloader  of  1889. 

A  Lever  to  release  B  by  a  fifth  turn 
B  Breech  plug  with  interrupted  screw 
Movable  part  shaded. 


Plate  XL. 


English  BreeceloaderSj  18:9  and  i-SSg. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  247 

increasing  vehemence  of  the  attack  became  thicker  and  thicker. 
In  England  the  no-pounder  screw  breech-loader  was  followed 
by  muzzle-loading  97-pounders.  1 12-pounders,  174-pounders, 
250-pounders,  400-pounders,  550-pounders,  and  so  forth.  The 
perforating  power  of  the  gun,  which  in  the  first  muzzle-loaders 
was  very  low,  rose  till  the  35-ton  gun  could  pierce  16  inches 
of  wrought  iron  at  the  muzzle.  But  with  this  increase  in 
power  came  a  great  increase  in  weight,  till  instead  of  three  or 
four  tons  the  gun  reached  35  tons.  Such  guns  could  not  be 
mounted  on  the  ordinary  wooden  carriage,  but  required  excel- 
lent mechanical  contrivances,  if  they  were  to  be  handled  at 
sea,  and  such  contrivances  were  quickly  forthcoming.  In 
1864  iron  had  supplanted  wood  in  gun-carriages  ;  slides  and 
traversing  platforms  appeared,  and  the  recoil  was  controlled 
not  by  ropes  or  breechings,  but  by  compressors  which  exerted 
great  friction.  Minor  improvements  were  introduced  as  time 
went  on.  but  the  35-ton  gun  was,  in  muzzle-loaders,  the 
largest  hand-worked  weapon. 

As  the  development  of  armour  and  artillery  proceeded  side 
by  side,  a  new  phase  of  evolution  appeared,  the  phase  of  the 
monster  machine-worked  gun.  The  12-inch  25-ton  muzzie- 
loader  gave  place  to  the  35-ton,  which  could  only  be  man- 
handled with  difficulty.  In  the  Devastation  the  gun  was  worked 
by  hand,  but  the  turret  was  rotated  by  steam  ;  in  the  Thunderer 
the  after-turret  had  man-handled  35-ton  guns,  the  fore-turret 
hydraulic-handled  38-ton  weapons.  The  hydraulic  system  of 
working  guns  proved,  after  extensive  trial,  to  be  altogether 
satisfactory,  and  was  henceforward  adopted  for  all  British 
heavy  guns,  till  the  time  when  it  gave  way  in  its  turn  to 
electricity.  With  the  appearance  of  hydraulics,  the  com- 
pressor, as  a  means  of  arresting  recoil,  yielded  before  the 
hydraulic  brake,  when  the  strain  upon  the  mounting  was 
lessened,  and  the  power  of  the  recoil  used  to  run  out  the  gun 
after  the  discharge.  Hydraulic  mountings  were  adopted  in  the 
French  navy  on  board  the  Devastation,  and  as  in  England,  appear 
in  every  subsequent  battleship,  till  the  advent  of  electricity. 


248 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


But  the  progress  of  the  gun  did  not  stop  when  the  12-inch 
35-ton  and  the  12^-inch  38-ton  muzzle-loaders  appeared. 
They  were  succeeded  by  the  last  of  the  muzzle-loaders,  the 
81-ton  of  1875,  and  the  Armstrong  100-ton  of  1876.  These 
were  huge  and  unwieldy  weapons,  far  longer  in  proportion 
than  muzzle-loaders  had  been  hitherto,  but  the  craze  between 
1875  and  1885  was  for  heavy  guns  which  should  deal  crushing 
blows,  and  abroad  ordnance  was  increasing  in  length,  with  the 
substitution  of  slow-burning  powders  for  the  older  quick- 
burning  powder.  The  difference  between  these  two  kinds 
of  powder  may  be  roughly  expressed  as  this :  the  quick- 
burning  powder  started  the  projectile  with  a  violent  jerk,  and 
all  its  force  was  exerted  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  breech, 
thus  necessitating  a  very  great  thickness  of  metal  round  the 
breech,  and  rendering  a  long  gun  unnecessary ;  the  slow- 
burning  powder,  on  the  other  hand,  started  the  projectile 
more  gently,  straining  the  breech  less,  and  gradually  increased 
its  push,  rendering  a  long  gun,  fairly  strong  in  the  chase  as 
well  as  the  breech,  essential.  A  muzzle-loader  of  any  length 
must  necessarily  be  difficult  to  load,  as  it  has  to  be  run  in  till 
the  muzzle  is  inboard.  Thus,  here  was  one  cause  which 
would  compel  England  to  adopt  the  breech-loader,  unless  she 
was  ready  to  be  distanced  in  ballistics  by  foreign  competitors. 

We  clung,  however,  to  our  muzzle-loaders,  which,  though 
good  enough  in  the  sixties  and  early  seventies,  were  now 
being  beaten  abroad,  and  not  till  a  lamentable  accident  on 
board  the  Thunderer,  when  on  January  2nd,  1879,  a  38-ton 
muzzle-loader  gun  burst,  through  double  loading,  killing  two 
officers  and  eight  men,  did  we  begin  to  waver.  Such  an 
accident  could  not  occur  with  breech-loaders.  In  1878  the 
Armstrong  Company  had  turned  out  a  6-inch  and  an  8-inch 
breech-loader,  using  slow-burning  powder.  In  practice  these 
guns  behaved  admirably.  They  gave  muzzle  velocities  of 
2000  feet  per  second,  and  were  vastly  better  for  their  size 
than  any  muzzle-loader.  In  1880,  the  English  Government 
decided  to  return  to  the  breech-loader,  and  the  muzzle-loader 
was  for  ever  abandoned. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  249 


The  breech  action  of  the  new  guns  differed  considerably 
from  the  earlier  and  cruder  type.  The  interrupted  screw 
gearing  into  the  breech  of  the  gun  was  adopted.*  Originally 
of  American  invention,  it  was  the  system  employed  in  France, 
and  is  at  once  simple  and  safe.  To  enable  the  plug  to  be 
quickly  withdrawn,  the  thread  is  not  continuous  either  in  the 
breech-plug  or  the  gun,  but  is  in  each  cut  away  at  intervals. 
Thus,  one  quarter  or  one-fifth  turn,  according  to  the  number 
of  such  intervals,  will  disengage  the  plug,  when  it  is  withdrawn 
and  swung  clear.  To  give  a  gas-tight  joint,  at  first  a  steel 
cup  with  its  concave  side  towards  the  charge,  so  that  the 
explosion  would  press  it  against  the  breech-plug  and  rear  of 
the  gun,  was  employed,  and  later,  a  pad  of  asbestos  encircling 
a  "  mushroom  stalk"  of  steeL  The  "  mushroom  head"  is 
driven  back  by  the  explosion  towards  the  breech,  compressing 
the  pad  and  driving  it  outwards  against  the  bore  of  the  gun. 
A  thoroughly  tight  joint  is  thus  secured. 

With  breech-loaders,  there  was  at  first  the  same  craze  for 
monster  guns.  The  8-inch  gun  of  14  tons  was  followed  by  a 
12-inch  of  45-tons,  a  13^-inch  of  68  tons,  and  a  i6J-inch  of 
no  tons.  But  with  the  latter  was  reached  the  limit  in  size, 
and  efforts  were  now  made  to  increase  the  power  of  guns  in 
other  directions,  without  sensibly  adding  to  their  weight. 
The  great  object  of  the  heavy  gun  is  to  fire  as  many  projectiles 
as  possible  in  a  given  time,  and  to  fire  them  through  as  great 
a  thickness  of  plating  as  possible.  By  constant  improve- 
ments in  the  mountings,  the  rapidity  of  fire  of  heavy  guns  has 
been  raised  till  it  stands  as  follows  t  : 

1 10-ton  gun  Machine-handled,  3  shots  in  6  minutes  starting  loaded  .  (joolbs.  1  . 
67  „       7  shots  in  12  minutes,  6  hits  on  target .    700IDS.  coS 

45  „  „  ,,       4  shots  in   6  minutes   476IDS.  g£g 

46  ,,  1  shot  in  70  seconds    728IDS.  >  berg's 

29  ,,  Man-handled  1  shot  in   2  minutes  10  seconds       ...  23oibs.  \'Z  *•  jj 

22  „  ,,  5  shots  in   6  minutes    3i61bs.  ^gu 

14  „  ,,        ,,  1  shot  in    1  minute    2iolbs.  J 

The  gain  in  rapidity,  which  results  from  employing 
machinery,  is  sufficientlv  obvious.     In  perforating  power, 

•    *  See  Fig.  2,  Plate  XL.    The  illustration  of  the  8-inch  quick-firer  also  shows 
the  present  system  of  breech-action  well.     Page  250. 
f  These  are  all  actual  performances  at  sea. 


250 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


great  progress  has  been  made  by  increasing  the  length  of  the 
gun.  Our  older  muzzle-loaders  were  of  12  or  13  calibres;  our 
early  breech-loaders  of  25  calibres'*,  whilst  in  our  newest 
heavy  gun,  the  12-inch  46-ton,  we  have  gone  to  38  calibres. 
The  French  have  advanced  even  further,  and  are  actually 
mounting  great  guns  of  50  calibres.  The  gain  through  increas- 
ing the  length,  and  thus  giving  time  for  a  slow-burning 
powder  to  exert  its  full  power,  is  evident  from  these  figures  of 
Canet,  which  show  the  perforation  with  guns  of  the  same 
calibre,  but  of  varying  length  : 

375-pounder,  (j^-inch  gun  of — 

25  cals.  30  cals.  36  cals.  43  cals.  50  cals.    in  length. 

Weight  of  gun    14  tons     19  tons     22  tons     30  tons     34!  tons 

charge   127IDS.  i6ilbs.  iq81bs.  231IDS.  2661bs. 

Inches  of  wrought  iron")      rAmfi  tH>t  ",.  „  •  ... 

perforated  at  1000 yards)      ^  6  181  21  *  239         V  ° 

Muzzle  velocity,  ft.  sees.        1772  2001  2231         2428  2624 

By  this  expedient,  with  a  gun  of  quite  moderate  size  and 
proportions,  enormous  power  can  be  obtained.  Instead  of 
guns  growing  larger  in  calibre,  they  are  now  tending  to  grow 
smaller  with  increased  length,  increased  strength,  increased 
charges,  and  increased  muzzle  velocities. 

Whilst  heavy  guns  have  thus  progressed,  there  has  been 
not  less  striking  advance  in  small  and  moderate-sized  weapons. 
The  appearance  of  the  torpedo-boat,  which  could  not  be 
readily  followed  in  its  rapid  motion  by  a  heavy  gun,  necessi- 
tated a  light  quick-firing  weapon  which  should  get  off  so  many 
shots  during  the  period  of  the  boat's  approach,  as  to  make 
certain  of  hitting  her.  The  Hotchkiss  and  Nordenfelt,  3  and 
6-pounders,  were  the  result  of  this  demand.  They  were 
placed  upon  mountings  which  gave  no  recoil,  and  were  able 
to  fire  ten  to  twenty  aimed  shots  a  minute.  It  was  not  long 
before  heavy  guns  followed  upon  the  same  road.  In  1886 
appeared  the  Armstrong  30-pounder  quick-firer,  which,  after 
winning  universal  approval,  became  the  4* 7-inch  45-pounder 

*  A  gun  of  25  calibres,  is  a  gun  the  length  of  which  is  twenty-five  times  the 
diameter  of  the  bore.  Thus  a  1 2-inch  gun  of  25  calibres  is  25  feet  long  in  the 
bore,  i.e.,  25  times  12  inches. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  EXGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  251 


quick-firer.  This  gun  can  in  a  given  time  fire  five  times  as 
many  rounds  as  a  breech-loader  of  similar  size,  but  older 
pattern.  It  is  marked  by  a  simplicity  and  strength  which  are 
essential  in  war  material.  Xext,  a  year  or  two  later,  came  the 
6-inch  quick-firer,  and  last,  and  latest  of  all,  the  8-inch  gun  of  the 
same  type,  in  which  the  breech  opens  automatically  by  the  force 
of  the  gun's  recoil."*  It  is  probable  that  the  gun  of  the  future, 
whether  large  or  small,  will  be  wholly  and  entirely  automatic. 

In  the  so-called  quick-firers,  rapidity  of  fire  is  obtained, 
firstly,  by  the  simplicity  and  rapidity  of  the  breech  action  ; 
secondly,  by  the  use  of  recoilless  sights,  which  do  not 
necessitate  re-laying  after  each  shot,  and  enable  the  gunner 
to  aim  his  gun  whilst  the  weapon  is  being  loaded  ;  thirdly,  by 
the  use  of  a  cartridge  case.t  which  abolishes  the  necessity 
of  sponging  out  the  gun  and  is  easy  to  manipulate  ;  fourthly, 
by  the  introduction  of  a  mount,  in  which  friction  is  all  but 
abolished,  and  recoil  controlled  and  used  to  bring  the  gun 
back  to  firing  position. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  rate  of  fire  can  be  further 
increased,  unless  automatic  guns  of  the  Maxim  type  are  intro- 
duced ;  otherwise  we  have  neared  finality.  Without  a  mass 
of  machinery  it  is  impossible  to  fire  more  than  five  or  six 
shots  in  the  minute  from  a  6-inch  gun,  but  it  is  satisfactory  to 
note  that  England,  whether  in  moderate  artillery  or  in  heavy 
guns,  is  leading  the  world  in  1895  as  sne  ^  it  *n  1865.  The 
English  12-inch  gun  of  46  tons  is  superior  to  any  weapon  of 
equal  size  whether  in  perforation  or  rapidity  of  fire.  Un- 
fortunately we  have  still  a  large  number  of  old  pattern  muzzle- 
loaders  afloat,  which  reduce  the  average  of  our  artillery. 

*  Vide  Plate  XLI.,  which  shows  the  gun  with  breech  open.  The  breech  can,  if 
necessary,  be  opened  by  hand.  The  large  shield  gives  good  protection  to  the 
gunners ;  and  the  ammunition  comes  up  an  armoured  hoist  to  a  door  in  the 
gun-pivot.  One  shot  in  fifteen  seconds  is  the  greatest  rapidity  of  aimed  fire. 
Even  if  this  be  halved,  the  gun  fires  5601b.  weight  of  metal  a  minute,  or  7501b. 
starting  loaded.    Krupp  has  constructed  a  9/4-inch  quick-firer. 

f  The  Whitworth  breech-loader  of  i860  appears  to  have  been  the  first  gun  to 
use  fixed  ammunition.    The  powder  was  contained  in  a  tin  cartridge. 


252 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


In  projectiles  and  powder  there  has  been  a  great  progress, 
as  in  guns  and  armour.  The  old  cast  and  wrought-iron  round 
shot  have  given  way,  first  to  elongated  Palliser  projectiles, 
of  iron  with  chilled  heads,  then  to  forged  steel  shot,  and 
finally  to  nickel  steel  for  armour-piercing  purposes.  The  old 
lead  covering  which  took  the  rifling  was  replaced,  first  by 
studs  fitting  into  grooves  in  the  bore,  then  in  projectiles  for 
the  breech-loader,  by  copper  rings  which  are  cut  into  by 
ridges  in  the  bore  of  the  gun.  To  enable  shot  to  perforate 
the  new  and  very  hard  armour,  produced  by  the  Harvey 
process,  the  point  of  the  shot,  which  is  liable  to  fracture  upon 
impact,  is  capped  with  soft  iron,  which  enables  the  projectile 
to  bite.  Gunpowder  is  no  longer  the  only  explosive  agent 
with  which  shells  are  charged.  High  explosives  have  been 
discovered  which  are  infinitely  more  powerful.  Melinite, 
a  preparation  of  picric  acid,  cordite,  gun-cotton,  nitro- 
benzols,  even  dynamite,  have  been  tried,  with  many  others. 
Experiments  with  these  terrible  substances  have  been 
conducted  in  secret  by  most  European  states,  but  certain 
details  have  leaked  out.  The  effect  of  their  explosion  is 
terrific,  and  some  at  least  of  them  produce  dense  choking 
fumes  which  will  suffocate  those  who  are  not  blown  to 
pieces. 

Gunpowder  which  is  a  stable  and  trustworthy  substance, 
but  has  the  disadvantage  of  producing  thick  smoke  when  fired 
in  the  gun,  is  giving  way  to  smokeless  powders.  In  the 
English  service  the  quick-firers  of  various  size  use  cordite 
ammunition,  which  makes  next  to  no  smoke,  and  the  new 
46-ton  gun  is  constructed  to  burn  cordite.  The  time  is  at 
hand  when  no  gun  will  fire  gunpowder.  A  ship  wreathed  in 
smoke  could  be  attacked  with  comparative  impunity  by  the 
torpedo-boat,  but  the  case  is  very  different  when  smokeless 
ammunition  is  used.  Thus  the  tactical  effect  of  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  new  powders  has  been  to  handicap  the  torpedo- 
boat,  and  to  make  the  issue  of  naval  battles  less  a  matter  of 
chance.     Is  progress  the  elimination  of  chance  ? 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  EXGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  251 


The  quality  of  armour  has  also  improved,  whilst  the  gun 
and  its  accessories  have  been  improving.  The  Kinburn 
batteries  had  plating  of  a  very  inferior  quality,  as  the  metal- 
lurgical science  of  the  day  was  not  sufficient  to  avoid  burned 
metal  and  layers  of  scoria  The  grade  of  the  iron  used  was 
poor,  whilst  steel  could  not  be  produced  in  a  trustworthy  form  at 
a  moderate  price.  Gradually  the  iron  improved;  the  mechanical 
agencies  for  preparing  and  rolling  it  were  perfected;  and  its 
resistance  steadily  rose.  till,  with  advances  in  the  art  of 
preparing  steel,  it  gave  way  to  steel.  Yet,  at  first,  solid  steel 
armour  did  not  win  approval,  and  it  was  thought  better  to 
face  soft  iron  with  hard  steel.  This  gave  the  compound  plate 
which  was  first  adopted  by  England  for  the  Inflexible 's  turret. 
Italy  and  France  preferred  solid  steel,  which,  though  more 
brittle,  had  greater  power  of  resistance.  In  the  United  States, 
nickel-steel  was  adopted  for  the  new  battleships  of  the  1891 
programme,  and  was  employed  in  England  for  the  decks  of 
the  Royal  Sovereigns,  and  the  thin  plating  on  the  side  of  the 
Centurions.  The  nickel  fills  up  the  pores  of  the  steel  and 
gives  great  homogeneity  and  toughness  to  the  mass. 
Tungsten  is  said  to  srive  even  more  satisfactory  results.  Last 
came  the  Harvey  process  of  hardening  steel  or  nickel-steel 
plates.  By  this,  the  steel,  after  being  rolled  to  the  required 
thickness,  is  heated,  face  downwards  on  a  bed  of  charcoal  for 
a  fortnight.  This  done,  it  is  bent  to  shape,  heated  again, 
and  hardened  again  by  the  application  of  water.  In  the 
finished  state,  the  surface  is  so  hard  that  drills  will  not  bite 
upon  it,  and  special  arrangements,  whilst  hardening,  are 
necessary  to  leave  soft  places  for  rivet  holes.  The  first 
English  battleships  in  which  it  appears  are  the  Majesties 
and  the  Renown.  A  plate  thus  hardened,  iS-inches  thick, 
has  in  the  United  States  defied  the  attack  of  the  13-inch 
66-ton  gun.  The  projectile,  weighing  noolbs.,  and  striking 
with  a  force  sufficient  to  lift  a  weight  of  1000  tons  twenty- 
five  feet,  crushed  in  the  backing  of  oak,  but  only  dented  the 
plate. 


254 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


Various  improvements  in  the  method  of  applying  the  armour 
and  building  up  the  ship's  side,  have  also  to  be  chronicled. 
The  Warrior  carried  her  4^-inch  plates  upon  a  cushion  of 
oak  from  10  to  18  inches  thick.  She  had  not  a  strong  iron 
inner  skin.  But  as  Mr.  Chalmers  demonstrated  that  the 
application  of  iron  stringers,  placed  horizontally  between  the 
timbers  of  the  backing,  and  a  thick  skin  inboard,  behind  the 
backing,  gave  better  power  of  resistance,  this  system  was 
adopted.  In  the  Bellerophon  were  6  inches  of  iron  upon 
10  inches  of  oak,  with  three  thicknesses  of  f-inch  plate  as  the 
inner  skin.  The  framing  of  this  ship  was  far  stronger  than 
that  of  her  predecessors.  In  later  ships,  steel  has  replaced 
iron  in  the  ship's  structure,  teak  has  replaced  oak  in  the 
backing,  and  many  minor  improvements  have  been  introduced. 

As  to  engineering  progress,  the  Penelope  was  the  first 
British  ironclad  to  be  fitted  with  twin  screws  ;  the  Alexandra 
the  first  to  carry  compound  engines  ;  and  the  Victoria  the 
first  to  carry  triple-expansion  engines.  Forced  draught,  which 
consists  in  pumping  air  into  the  furnaces  from  below,  appears 
in  the  "  Admirals  "  ;  induced  draught,  which  consists  in  suck- 
ing air  through  the  furnaces  from  above,  in  the  Magnificent. 
The  water-tube  boiler  was  introduced  in  the  French  Navy, 
and  has  been  widely  adopted  in  our  own.  It  is  carried  in  all 
the  newest  battleships  and  cruisers,  from  the  Canopus  to  the 
Pelorus. 

Turning  now  to  the  cruiser,  the  progress  has  been  immense. 
The  cruiser  as  a  distinct  conception  is  the  descendant  of  the 
frigate,  and  does  not  appear  in  the  earliest  days  of  ironclads. 
During  the  Civil  War,  the  North,  to  protect  its  commerce, 
laid  down  a  class  of  wooden  vessels,  of  great  length,  the 
Wampanoags,  which  were  to  have  a  speed  of  seventeen  knots, 
and  a  coal  endurance  of  5600  knots.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
never  did  more  than  fifteen  knots,  and  could  hardly  be 
considered  a  success.  In  1866,  before  they  were  completed, 
the  English  Government  replied  to  them  with  the  Inconstant, 
and  some  years  later  with  the  Shah  and  Raleigh.  These 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  255 

were  noble  ships,  fully  rigged,  comfortable,  and  fast  for 
their  day,  as  the  first  two  did  sixteen-and-a-half  knots  on  the 
measured  mile,  but  they  were  entirely  destitute  of  protection 
other  than  that  which  was  afforded  by  the  arrangement  of 
their  coal  bunkers.  They  were  followed  by  the  Bacchante  class, 
launched  in  1875-7,  and  the  Active  class  launched  in  1869, 
which  were  slower  and  smaller.  The  UC  class"  launched  in 
1878- 188 1,  were  still  smaller,  but  embodied  one  new  and 
interesting  feature  which  henceforward  appears  in  all  large 
cruisers — the  armour-deck.  The  Canada  and  her  sisters 
carried  a  1 4-inch  steel  deck  over  engines,  boilers,  and 
magazines  at  a  level  of  three  feet  below  the  water-line.  These 
ships  were,  however,  too  slow  for  cruising  purposes,  as  their 
speed  was  not  sufficient  to  enable  them  to  escape  the  battle- 
ship, and  they  were  far  too  weak  to  encounter  her  when  they 
were  overtaken. 

Between  1877- 1880,  were  completed  three  large  cruisers, 
the  Shannon,  Nelson,  and  Northampton  which  had  partial 
belts  on  the  water-line  and  athwartship  bulkheads.  They 
may  be  described  as  dismal  failures — large,  costly,  slow,  and 
vulnerable.  1877-8,  however,  saw  the  launch  of  two  fast  and 
lightly  armed  cruisers,  which,  built  expressly  for  the  purpose 
of  scouting,  have  done  good  service  with  the  fleet,  the  Iris 
and  Mercury.  In  1883  were  launched  four  fine  vessels  of  the 
Amphion  class,  with  a  speed  of  seventeen  knots. 

In  1884,  an  immense  step  forward  was  taken.  That  year, 
the  Armstrong  company  launched  the  famous  Esmeralda,  a 
vessel  which  on  a  very  small  displacement,  carried  a 
tremendous  armament.  Her  speed  on  the  mile  reached  the 
figure  of  18-28  knots,  phenomenal  at  that  time.  She  had  an 
end-to-end  steel  deck  1  inch  thick,  curving  up  amidships.  In 
her,  forced  draught  was  employed,  air  being  pumped  into  the 
stokehold  and  driven  into  the  furnaces,  thus  greatly  increasing 
the  rate  of  combustion.  The  influence  of  her  design  is  visible 
in  at  least  three  classes  of  English  ships,  or  indeed,  in  every 
cruiser  we    have    built    since  her  day.     The  four  second- 


256 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


class  cruisers  of  the  Mersey  type,  launched  in  1885-6,  are  an 
improvement  upon  her.  They  are  larger,  have  far  stronger 
end-to-end  decks,  and  an  armament  in  which,  whilst  the  heavy 
guns  are  not  so  large,  the  auxiliary  guns  are  much  more 
numerous.  In  1885,  too,  were  commenced  seven  "belted 
cruisers,  "  which  might  again  be  called  greatly  enlarged  and 
improved  Esmeraldas.  They  had  been  preceded  a  year  or 
two,  by  the  two  Imperieuses  which  are  French  in  type  and 
design,  and  approach  the  battleship  more  closely  than  the 
cruiser.  The  new  belted  cruisers  of  the  Aurora  type  were  of 
5600  tons,  and  were  more  heavily  armed  than  the  Merseys. 
They  carried  amidships,  a  belt  of  10-inch  armour,  and  were 
protected  by  bulkheads  against  raking  fire.  A  third  class 
of  cruisers,  designed  more  especially  to  combat  the  torpedo- 
boat,  appeared  in  the  Archer  and  her  sisters — small  ships 
heavily  armed. 

Cruisers  having  diverged  and  developed  as  a  class  apart 
from  the  battleship,  now  begin  to  subdivide,  and  to  develop 
classes  amongst  themselves.  In  first-class  cruisers  designed 
for  ocean  work,  with  a  powerful  armament  to  fight  all  comers, 
the  Blake  succeeds  the  "  belted  cruiser."  She  is  far  larger, 
far  faster,  and  is  heavily  armed,  whilst  some  of  her  guns  are 
behind  thin  armour.  The  only  protection  on  the  water-line 
is  a  stout  armour  deck.  She  and  her  sister  Blenheim  are 
followed  by  the  nine  Edgars,  a  little  smaller  and  slower,  but 
none  the  less  splendid  ships.  Then  in  1894,  follow  the  two 
largest  unarmoured  cruisers  which  have  ever  been  laid  down, 
the  Powerful  and  Terrible,  each  of  14,200  tons,  with  water- 
tube  boilers,  phenomenal  speed,  and  armament  almost  wholly 
behind  armour.  Following  these  again  in  1895-6,  are  eight 
rather  smaller  vessels  of  11,000  tons,  with  an  armament 
wholly  quick-firing."* 

In  other  navies,  the  "belted  cruiser"  has  persisted  and 
developed,  and  there  are  signs  that  we  shall  recur  to  it. 


*  For  tabulated  details  of  the  leading  English  cruisers  see  Table  XXIII. 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  EXGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  257 


Russia  has  in  hand,  or  completed,  three  huge  vessels  of  this 
type,  whilst  France  has  launched  six  very  remarkable  ships 
almost  wholly  covered  with  thin  armour.  These  are  the 
Dupny  de  Lome  and  her  daughters  ;  and  their  thin  mail  might 
render  them  awkward  antagonists  to  our  unbelted  ships.* 

In  second-class  cruisers  we  dropped  a  little  in  size,  with  a 
reduction  in  armament,  from  the  Merseys  to  the  Medea s. 
which  are  now  rated  third-class.  But  from  the  date  of  the 
Medeas  begins  a  steady  rise  in  displacement,  armament, 
freeboard,  and  coal  endurance.  The  Apollo  class  of  1889, 
eleven  in  number,  are.  the  parents  of  the  larger  Aeolus  class 
and  of  the  Astreas.  The  Astreas,  again,  lead  up  to  the 
Minerva  class,  which  are  of  the  displacement  of  our  first-class 
"belted  cruisers/'  the  Auroras,  and  they  are,  in  their  turn, 
followed  by  larger  vessels. 

Of  third-class  cruisers,  descended  from  the  Medea  or 
Archer,  the  chief  types  are  the  Blanche  and  Pearl  class,  with 
the  newer  Pelorus.  Here,  also,  the  tendency  to  increased 
displacement  is  visible,  though  not  so  plainly. 

In  smaller  craft  the  torpedo-boat  has  grown  and  progressed 
till  it  has  attained  extraordinary  speeds,  and  is  capable  of 
keeping  the  sea  in  moderate  weather.  Between  the  French 
Chevalier  of  1893,  steaming  twenty-seven  knots,  and  the 
small  launch  of  1877,  which  could  not  exceed  seventeen  knots, 
there  is  an  immense  difference.  But  in  its  progress  the 
torpedo-boat  has  produced  new  types  of  ships  expressly 
designed  to  combat  it,  and  harry  it.  The  first  type  is  the 
torpedo-gunboat,  of  which  the  French  Bombe  of  1885  was  the 
predecessor.  In  England  it  appeared  with  the  Rattlesnake, 
and  as  usual,  grew  rapidly  in  size,  till  our  later  vessels  of  the 
class  approach  in  size  the  third-class  cruisers.  Experience, 
however,  showed  that  these  vessels  could  not,  on  the  open 

*  Since  the  above  was  first  written,  France  has  laid  down  several  more 
armoured  cruisers,  and  England  has  decided  to  build  four  cruisers  of  the  largest 
size,  carrying  6-inch  side  armour  and  the  batter}-  of  the  Powerful.  Their 
displacement  is  11,850  tons,  and  speed  twenty-one  knots. 

Vol.  II.  .5 


258 


IRONCLADS  IN  ACTION. 


sea,  run  down  a  hostile  torpedo-boat,  as  their  speed  was  not 
sufficiently  great.  Some  kind  of  craft  which  should  be  able 
to  deal  with  the  torpedo-boat  was  urgently  required  ;  and  the 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  appeared  to  serve  the  purpose.  These 
little  vessels  are  very  large  and  very  fast  torpedo-boats,  and 
are  not  only  well  adapted  for  the  task  of  harrying  the  torpedo- 
boat  pure  and  simple,  but  are  also  capable  of  acting  as 
torpedo-boats  themselves.  The  speed  which  they  have  at- 
tained is  extraordinary ;  on  the  mile,  the  earliest  vessels  of 
this  type  achieved  twenty-seven  knots,  and  thirty  to  thirty- 
three  knots  are  promised  in  those  now  under  construction. 
Here  at  last  progress  seems  to  be  reaching  its  limit,  as  the 
screw  is  not  adapted  to  give  a  higher  speed  than  this. 
Other  methods  of  propulsion  may,  however  be  perfected  in 
the  future. 

The  torpedo  has  not  remained  stationary  amidst  the  whirl 
of  change.  We  have  seen  it  in  its  crude  form  scoring  successes 
in  the  American  Civil  War,  when  it  may  be  said  to  have  been 
brought  to  birth.  Stationary  "  infernal  machines "  were 
succeeded  by  "  infernal  machines "  which  were  towed  by 
ships  ;  these  were  by  no  means  satisfactory,  and  were  aban- 
doned in  the  seventies.  The  spar-torpedo,  carried  on  a  boom, 
which  could  be  run  out  from  a  boat  or  ship,  lived  longer,  and 
it  is  not  certain  whether  at  the  present  day,  in  the  hands  of 
cool  and  determined  men,  it  might  not  claim  as  many  victims 
as  the  Whitehead.  The  latter  weapon  differed  from  its 
precursors  in  being  automobile.  It  was  first  tried  in  1868,  in 
a  crude  and  imperfect  form.  Its  distinctive  feature  lay  in  this, 
that  it  was  a  small  ship  propelled  by  engines,  driven  by  com- 
pressed air,  and  carrying  a  heavy  charge  of  gun-cotton  forward. 
It  was  of  16  inches  diameter,  the  speed  was  nine  knots,  and 
the  charge  carried  nylbs  of  explosive.  England  purchased 
the  right  to  manufacture  it,  and  was  followed  by  most 
European  powers.  The  early  English  type  of  torpedo  was 
14  inches  in  diameter  with  a  speed  of  eighteen  knots,  and  a 
charge  of  32lbs.    Gradually  the  speed  and  charge  rose  till  the 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  EXGLISH  BATTLESHIP.  259 


newer  varieties  of  14-inch  torpedo  run  thirty  knots  and  carry 
65IDS  of  gun-cotton.  As  it  was  doubtful  whether  even  this 
amount  of  explosive  would  fatally  injure  a  large  and  modern 
ship,  it  has  been  succeeded  by  the  18-inch  torpedo  with  icjolbs. 
to  2oolbs.  of  gun-cotton. 

The  range  of  a  Whitehead  of  the  latest  pattern  does  not 
much  exceed  750  yards  when  the  ship  which  fires  it  is  in 
motion.  A  vessel  at  rest  may  make  hits  at  a  range  of 
1000  yards,  but  at  such  a  distance  practice  is  very"  erratic,  and 
500  yards  is  perhaps  the  extreme  limit  for  ordinary-  purposes. 

There  are  numerous  varieties  of  automobile  torpedo  other 
than  the  \Yhitehead,  but  none  are  so  perfect,  or  have  been  so 
widely  adopted.  Last  of  all  has  appeared  the  steerable  or 
controllable  torpedo,  which  is  guided  in  its  course  from  the 
ship  or  the  shore.  Of  this  type  are  the  Brennan,  Halpine. 
and  Xordenfelt  torpedoes,  and  though  they  have  not  as  yet 
won  favour,  they  may  do  so  with  gradual  improvements. 

Whilst  dealing  with  the  torpedo  we  must  notice  the  various 
attempts  at  submarine  navigation.  The  Confederate  "  Davids'' 
were  the  first  attempt  at  warfare  below  the  surface.  The 
French  Goubet  was  a  small,  egg-shaped  craft,  propelled  by 
electricity  at  a  speed  of  only  five  knots,  with  a  torpedo 
attached  outside  by  a  bayonet  catch.  This  vessel  was 
launched  in  1888  and  is  of  little  value.  Italy  claims  in  the 
Pullino  to  have  a  thoroughly  satisfactory  submarine  boat, 
and  the  United  States  are  building  a  vessel  which  can  be 
driven  awash,  or  below  the  surface,  by  steam  or  electricity. 
But  the  problem  of  steering  a  boat  below  the  surface  has 
yet  to  be  overcome,  and  there  is  some  possibility  that  a  com- 
pletely immersed  vessel  might  be  very  seriously  affected,  even 
at  some  distance,  by  the  explosion  of  her  own  torpedo.  More- 
over, most  craft  of  this  kind  display  a  dangerous  tendency  to 
dive,  when  their  sides  would  be  crushed  in  by  the  tremendous 
pressure.  None  the  less  submarine  attacks  upon  ships  in 
harbour  are  a  possibility  of  the  future. 

S  2 


APPENDIX  I. 


THE   DEVELOPMENT    OF    THE    FRENCH  NAVY, 


We  have  seen  that  it  was  France  who  led  the  way  in  the  adoption  of 
armour,  whether  for  such  harbour  service  craft  as  the  Kinburn 
batteries,  or  for  the  sea-going  battleship  in  the  shape  of  the  Gloire. 
The  lead  that  she  obtained  in  1858  she  has  on  the  whole  maintained 
since,  and  there  is  no  country  where  more  ingenuity  and  audacity 
have  been  displayed  in  the  designing  of  warships.  A  short  summary 
of  French  naval  progress  will  best  enable  Englishmen  to  check 
their  own  advance. 

Contemporary  with  the  Gloire,  and  precisely  similar  to  her,  were 
the  armoured  frigates  Invincible  and  Normandie  of  wood,  and  the 
Couronne  of  iron.  All  were  armed  with  the  French  50-pounder 
smooth-bore  of  16*  centimetres  calibre.  They  were  followed  by  two 
larger  vessels,  the  Magenta  and  Solferino,  laid  down  in  1859,  anc^ 
carrying  fifty-four  16-centimetre  guns  in  a  two-decked  battery.  In 
them  a  spur  for  ramming  appears  for  the  first  time.  They  again 
were  followed  in  1862  by  ten  frigates  of  very  similar  pattern  to  the 
Gloire,  but  carrying,  instead  of  her  4"/  inch  plates,  armour  5*9  inches 
thick.  They  were  also  a  trifle  faster  and  more  manageable.  They 
were  uniform  in  type,  and  this  uniformity  beyond  doubt  gave  France 
an  advantage  which  has  in  more  recent  years  passed  to  England. 
They  carried  from  880  to  950  tons  of  plating  each.  Their  successor 
was  the  small  ironclad  Belliqueuse,  of  3750  tons,  generally  similar 
in  design  to  our  Bellerophon,  though,  of  course,  on  a  smaller  scale. 
She  was  intended  for  cruising  in  distant  waters  and  was  of  wood. 
Her  battery  consisted  of  four  19-centimetre,  four  16-centimetre,  and 

*  The  following  are  the  English  equivalents  of  the  French  calibres  in 
centimetres  ; 


I855—I895- 


in.  {  gglb.  [■ 
I  1651b. 
I3i7lb.  J 


f  3ilb.  "1 
I  661b.  I 


Weight  of 
shell. 


^7 
30 
32 
34. 


=  io"8 
=  ii*8 
=  12-6 
=  13*4. 


! 


in. 


(  4761b. 
)  6261b. 
)  76olb. 


Weight 
of  shell. 


.88ilb.&  9251b. 


APPENDIX  I. 


261 


four  14-centimetre  guns.  In  1865  the  Alma  type  was  introduced, 
and  seven  vessels  were  built  after  it.  Wood  was  abandoned  for  the 
upper  works,  but  still  retained  for  the  hull  of  the  ship  below  the 
water-line.  There  was  an  end-to-end  belt,  a  central  battery,  and 
above  this  on  either  beam  a  barbette  tower  with  fire  ahead  and 
astern.  The  barbettes  were  slightly  sponsoned  out  from  the  sides, 
and  each  contained  one  19-centimetre  gun.  In  1868  the  Ocean,  a 
far  more  powerful  ship,  was  launched,  and  in  1869  and  1870  she 
was  followed  by  the  sister  ships  Marengo  and  Suffren.  The  weight 
of  armour  carried  rose  to  1370  tons,  and  the  thickness  to  8*6  inches 
on  the  water-line.  The  hull  was  of  wood,  the  upper  works  of  iron. 
The  battery  was  carried  in  a  central  armoured  enclosure,  and  in  four 
barbette  towers,  resting  upon  the  armoured  walls  of  the  enclosure, 
amidships  on  either  beam.  The  guns,  as  usual  in  the  French 
type  of  tower,  revolved  on  a  turn-table  inside  a  fixed  armoured  turret. 
The  gunners  were  not  adequately  protected,  but  then  on  the  other 
hand  they  could  obtain  a  clear  view  of  their  enemy.  In  each  tower 
was  one  27  or  one  24-centimetre  gun,  and  in  the  central  work  four  to 
six  other  heavy  guns.  Besides  the  heavy  weapons  an  auxiliary 
armament  of  12  and  14-centimetre  guns  was  carried.  The  engines 
of  the  Suffren  were  compound.* 

In  1868  the  Richelieu,  an  improved  Ocean,  was  laid  down.  She 
had  the  four  barbette  towers  of  the  earlier  type,  but  a  longer  central 
battery.  She  carries  in  each  tower  a  24-centimetre  gun ;  in  her 
central  battery  are  six  guns  of  27  centimetres,  whilst  one  of 
24  centimetres  is  placed  forward  under  the  forecastle.  The  armour 
is  8*6  inches  thick.  The  speed  on  trial  was  13*1  knots.  The  hull  is 
of  wood  below  the  water-line ;  above  it,  outside  the  central  battery, 
of  iron.  The  weight  of  plating  rises  to  1690  tons.  She  was 
followed  by  three  ships  of  similar  type,  which,  however,  differ  slightly 
from  her  and  from  each  other.  The  Trident  has  two  barbette  towers, 
and  carries  eight  27-centimetre  guns  and  two  24-centimetre.  The 
Colbert  and  Friedla?id  carry,  the  former  eight  27-centimetre  and  six 
24-centimetre,  the  latter  eight  27-centimetre  guns,  as  their  heavy 
armament.  Their  hulls  are  of  wood,  and  their  armour  8'6  inches  at 
its  thickest. 

In  1872  an  enormous  advance  was  made.  Wood  was  abandoned, 
the  draught  of  the  ships  designed  reduced;  deck  protection  was 
introduced,  and  recessed  ports  adopted.    The  Redoubtable  was  the 

*  Particulars  of  most  of  these  vessels  are  given  in  Table  X. 


262 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


first  battleship  laid  down  which  embodied  these  innovations.  She  is 
a  central-battery  and  barbette  ship,  carrying  in  her  central  battery 
four  27-centimetre  guns  ;  in  two  barbettes  above  the  casemate,  one 
on  each  beam,  two  more  27-centimetre  weapons,  and  aft  a  seventh 
gun  of  this  calibre.  The  barbettes  have  no  protection  against 
artillery  fire,  but  the  central  battery  is  completely  enclosed  by  armour 
10  inches  thick.  There  is  an  end-to-end  water-line  belt,  which 
amidships  is  14  inches  thick  :  2502  tons  of  plating  are  carried.  The 
ahead  fire  is  delivered  by  four  27-centimetre  guns,  two  in  the  barbettes 
and  two  in  the  central  battery.  The  light  or  auxiliary  battery  is  not 
forgotten,  and  eight  14-centimetre  guns  are  disposed  on  the  forecastle 
and  quarter-deck.  The  speed  on  trial  was  14' 2 6  knots.  The  ship 
was  originally  fully  rigged,  but  now  only  carries  light  military  masts. 

The  Devastation  and  Courbet  followed  the  Redoubtable.  The 
weight  of  armour  is  increased  to  2700  tons,  and  the  maximum 
thickness  to  15  inches,  but  the  belt  is  not  end-to-end,  the  stern  being 
left  unarmoured.  The  general  features  of  the  Redoubtable  s  design 
are  retained ;  there  is  the  central  battery  carrying  four  guns, 
34-centimetre  in  place  of  27-centimetre,  with  fore-and-aft  fire;  there 
are  the  unarmoured  barbettes  above  the  central  battery,  carrying 
the  27-centimetre  gun;  but  a  heavy  gun  forward  is  added. 
Hydraulic  gear  of  the  Rendel  pattern  was  fitted  to  the  Devastation, 
and  subsequently  to  her  sister,  and  to  successive  French  ironclads. 
The  Devastatio7i  is  perhaps  the  finest  central  battery  ship  that  has  ever 
been  designed,  and  in  all  round  fire  was  greatly  superior  to  the 
English  ironclads  of  her  type  and  date.  On  trial  she  steamed 
15*1  knots.    She  carries  900  tons  of  coal. 

The  Amiral  Dupen-e  was  begun  in  1876,  some  months  after  the 
Devastation.  In  her  the  central  battery  completely  disappears,  and 
the  barbette  is  triumphant.  There  are  four  barbette  towers,  two 
placed  forward,  one  on  either  bow,  one  amidships  and  one  astern,  at 
a  height  of  27  feet  above  the  water.  These  barbettes  are  protected 
by  15-inch  armour,  and  each  contains  one  34-centimetre  48-ton 
gun.  They  are,  however,  mere  shallow  trays  of  armour,  resting 
upon  the  upper  deck,  with  an  armoured  trunk  running  down  to  the 
protective  deck ;  and  they  expose  the  gunners'  heads  and  shoulders, 
whilst  shells  bursting  underneath  might  bring  them  down  through 
the  ship's  deck  and  bottom.  There  is  a  narrow  end-to-end  belt  of 
armour  21 -J-  inches  thick  amidships.  The  weight  of  armour  is 
2900  tons.    There  are  fourteen  14-centimetre  guns  mounted  amid- 


Iron 


Magenta  1859 


5 


4-7  73 


Ocean  1866. 


Wood 


: 


Iron 


Redoubtable  1872 


>n  &  Sree 


15-75 


trr  .7.  ■ 

Amiral    Baud  in  1873 


Iron  &  Sreel 


Types   of    French      Ironclads.  1858-1891. 
Material    of     Hull   to  Rjaht. 

Armour    to  Left. 
Figures   cj'ive  thickness    of   Armour  in  inches. 

Plate  XLII. 


APPENDIX  I. 


263 


ships.  The  chief  defect  of  the  ship  is  the  great  extent  of  unprotected 
side  which  she  exposes  to  the  enemy's  fire.  In  this  she  resembles 
the  Inflexible,  though  she  differs  widely  from  that  ship  in  her  high 
freeboard  and  end-to-end  belt. 

The  Amir  al  Band  in  and  Formidable,  which  followed  the  Duperre, 
are  generally  similar  to  her.  There  are  three,  instead  of  four,  barbettes, 
and  all  are  placed  on  the  centre-line.  The  armour  is  of  steel, 
i6|  inches  thick  on  the  barbettes  and  2\\  inches  amidships  on  the 
water-line,  its  weight  reaching  the  very  high  figure  of  4000  tons. 
The  guns  carried  are  three  7  5 -ton  weapons  in  the  barbettes,  and 
twelve  14-centimetre  guns  amidships.  As  in  the  Duperre,  practically 
the  whole  of  the  ship's  side  is  open  to  the  smallest  projectile,  and 
only  little  patches  and  strips  of  very  thick  armour  are  carried.  In 
1880  were  laid  down  three  more  barbette-ships,  the  Marceau, 
Neptune,  and  Magenta,  and  a  fourth,  barbette-ship  and  turret-ship 
combined,  the  Hoche.  In  these  ships  there  are  four  heavy  gun 
positions  disposed  lozenge-wise,  one  forward,  one  aft,  and  one  on 
each  beam.  Thus,  three  guns  can  in  most  positions  be  brought  to 
bear  on  an  enemy.  The  7  5 -ton  weapons  of  the  Baudin  give  way  to 
the  long  34-centimetre  gun  in  the  first  three.  The  armour  is 
1 7|  inches  thick  on  the  narrow1  end-to-end  belt ;  1 3  J  inches  on  the 
barbette ;  and  3!  inches  on  the  deck.  The  Hoche  differs  from  the 
others  in  having  two  turrets,  instead  of  barbettes  forward  and  aft, 
containing  each  one  34-centimetre  gun ;  amidships  she  had  two 
barbettes,  each  with  one  27-centimetre  gun.  Her  weight  of  armour 
is  3618  tons,  and  she  is  reported  to  be  dangerously  unstable  ;  indeed, 
great  fault  has  been  found  with  all  the  four  ships  of  this  class.  But 
if  they  are  indifferently  protected  above  the  water-line,  they  carry 
very  powerful  armaments,  as  they  have  no  less  than  seventeen 
14-centimetre  guns  besides  their  main  artillery.  The  Hoche,  Formid- 
able, and  Baudin  have  been  reconstructed,  and  in  the  lasi  two  one  of 
the  75-ton  guns  has  been  removed  with  its  barbette.  The  Hoche  s 
quick-firing  battery  has  been  reduced. 

The  Brennus  followed  them  after  an  interval  of  eight  years,  during 
which  France  only  laid  down  second-class  ships.  She  carried  two 
turrets,  fore  and  aft;  in  the  forward  one  are  two  34-centimetre  long 
guns  of  about  71  tons  weight;  in  the  after  turret  is  one  34-centi- 
metre gun.  From  end  to  end  runs  a  I5f-inch  belt  of  compound 
armour,  and  above  this,  amidships,  is  a  lightly  plated  citadel.  On 
this  citadel  stand  four  small  turrets,  two    on   each  beam,  each 


264 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


carrying  one  16-centimetre  quick-firer.  Six  more  of  these  weapons 
are  mounted  in  the  citadel  and  separated  from  each  other  by  splinter- 
proof  traverses.  Thus  ten  16-centimetre  quick-firers  are  carried,  of 
which  five  fire  on  either  broadside  and  four  ahead  or  astern.  The 
ship  has  not  ram  bows  but  a  perfectly  straight  stem.  As  originally 
equipped  for  sea  she  was  so  grievously  overloaded  that  she  lacked 
stability.    Very  considerable  alterations  have  been  made  in  her. 

The  Naval  Defence  Act,  passed  by  the  British  Parliament  in  1889, 
stimulated  France  to  great  exertions.  In  1891  three  first-class 
battleships  were  commenced — the  Charles  Martel,  Carnot,  and 
Amiral  Jaureguiberry.  A  return  was  made  to  the  lozenge-wise 
disposition  of  the  heavy  guns  which  had  been  abandoned  in  the 
Brennus,  The  armament  consists  of  two  30-centimetre  guns,  one 
fore  and  one  aft,  and  one  27-centimetre  gun  on  either  beam.  The 
open  barbette  is  abandoned  and  the  turret  adopted.  An  auxiliary 
armament  of  eight  14-centimetre  quick-firers  is  carried;  in  the 
Jaureguiberry  the  quick-firers  are  placed  in  pairs  in  four  lightly 
armoured  turrets ;  on  the  other  two  each  weapon  has  a  separate 
armoured  turret  and  ammunition  hoist.  Thus  the  guns  are  well 
separated,  and  all  in  armoured  positions.  The  plating  carried  is 
thick  on  the  heavy  gun  positions  and  water-line,  where  it  varies 
between  17I  and  10  inches.  There  is  an  end-to-end  belt  of 
this  stout  armour.  Above  this  again  is  a  belt  of  4-inch  armour 
about  4  feet  deep,  running  from  end  to  end,  but  carried  up 
forward  and  aft  in  the  line  of  the  bow  and  stern  waves.  The 
small  turrets  all  have  4-inch  armour.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  these  are  extremely  fine  and  powerful  ships,  carrying  as  they  do 
over  4000  tons  of  armour,  but  they  expose  a  very  large  unarmoured 
surface.    Their  speed  is  to  reach  eighteen  knots. 

Of  closely  similar  design  are  the  Bouvet  and  Massena,  in  which  the 
enormous  weight  of  4160  tons  of  armour  is  carried.*  The  St.  Louis, 
Charlemagne,  and  Gaulois,  however,  are  widely  different.  In  them 
a  return  is  made  to  the  fore  and- aft  system  of  mounting  heavy  guns, 
and  the  lozenge  is  abandoned.  Four  30-centimetre  guns  are  carried 
forward  and  aft,  mounted  in  pairs  in  two  turrets  behind  15!  inches 
of  armour.  Eight  14-centimetre  quick-firers  are  mounted  on  the 
main  deck,  four  on  each  side,  behind  3-inch  hardened  steel.  Two 
more  are  on  the  upper  deck,  protected  only  by  shields,  whilst  on  the 

*  Eight  10-centimetre  quick-firers  are  carried  on  these  two  ships  in  addition 
to  the  14-centimetre  quick-firers. 


APPENDIX  I. 


hurricane  deck  six  io-centimetre  quick-firers  are  carried.  There  is 
an  end-to-end  water-line  belt  15  J  inches  thick  amidships,  tapering 
to  the  ends,  and  over  this  again  a  3|-inch  belt.  The  armour-decks 
are  two  in  number ;  one  3  J  inches  thick  at  the  upper  level  of 
the  thick  belt,  the  other  i\  inches  thick  at  its  lower  level.  This 
gives  these  ships  great  protection  against  both  ram  and  gun,  as  the 
belt  is  so  strongly  supported  that  it  could  scarcely  be  crushed  in. 
The  axial  fire  is  very  powerful.  Six  14-centimetre,  four  10-centi- 
metre,  and  two  30-centimetre  guns  fire  ahead  or  astern:  on  the 
broadside  four  30-centimetre,  five  14-centimetre,  and  three  10- 
centimetre.  The  guns  carried  are  of  enormous  length  and  have 
very  high  muzzle  velocities.  The  three  ships  and  the  Massena  all 
have  the  triple  screw,  which  probably  will  add  considerably  to  their 
manoeuvring  power  if  not  to  their  speed.  The  Jena  and  two  sister 
ships  are  similar  in  design  to  the  St.  Louis.  The  Jena  carries 
a  different  auxiliary  armament  —  eight  16-centimetre  and  four 
1  o-centimetre  quick-firers — has  more  coal,  and  higher  speed. 

No  survey  of  the  fighting  strength  of  France  would  be  complete 
which  did  not  include  her  garde-cotes  cuirasses,  or  armour-plated 
coast-defence  ships.  A  few  of  these  are  good  for  nothing  but 
harbour- work,  but  the  great  majority  are  capable  of  going  to  sea  in 
moderate  weather,  and  would  certainly  have  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
the  Mediterranean.  The  first  of  the  class  were  the  five  armoured 
batteries  built  in  1855.  The  Taureau,  a  wooden  ram  with  one 
24-centimetre  gun,  mounted  forward  in  a  barbette,  followed  in  1863, 
and  a  little  later  four  similar  vessels  carrying  two  24-centimetre  guns 
in  a  revolving  turret  forward.  In  1864  a  number  of  floating  batteries 
for  harbour  defence  were  laid  down.  They  were  very  inferior  ships 
even  at  the  date  of  their  design,  and  were  good  for  little  work  at 
sea.  In  1872,  after  the  war  with  Germany,  a  new  type  of  vessel  was 
introduced,  similar  in  general  design  to  our  Rupert  and  Glatton. 
The  vessels  of  this  class  are  mastless  monitors,  carrying  one  turret 
and  two  guns  each.  Their  names  are  the  Tempete,  Tomierre,  Vengeur, 
and  Fulminajit.  They  were  succeeded  by  two  vessels  of  somewhat 
different  design,  the  To?i?iant  and  Furieux.  These  have  one  barbette 
forward,  and  another  aft,  with  one  34-centimetre  gun  mounted  in 
each.  There  is  a  very  thick  end-to-end  belt,  but  the  freeboard  is  low, 
and  the  pair  are  not  too  seaworthy.  Their  design,  however,  was 
received  with  favour,  and  was  repeated  with  improvements  in  the  four 
ships,  Caiman,  Indomptable,  Requin,  and  Terrible,  which  are  larger, 


266 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


just  as  heavily  armoured,  and  even  more  heavily  armed.  They  carry 
each  two  75-ton  4 2 -centimetre  guns,  placed  forward  and  aft,  besides 
four  10-centimetre  weapons.  They  were  launched  between  1881 
and  1885,  and  have  been  reconstructed  and  re-armed.  About  the 
same  date  eight  small  armoured  gunboats  of  very  doubtful  value 
were  added  to  the  fleet. 

In  the  Jemmapes  class  the  French  coast-service  vessel  draws  closely 
to  the  sea-going  battleship.  The  Jemmapes  and  Valmy  are  of  the 
Caiman  pattern,  with  a  34-centimetre  70-ton  gun  fore  and  aft  in 
closed  turrets.  Amidships  is  a  high  superstructure,  at  the  angles  of 
which  are  mounted  four  10-centimetre  guns.  These  are  excellent 
little  ships,  very  well  armed,  handy,  fast ;  and  even  better  are  the 
Bouvines  and  Trehonart,  in  which  there  is  a  high  freeboard  forward ; 
in  them  the  34-centimetre  guns  are  replaced  by  weapons  of 
30  centimetres,  and  the  number  of  10-centimetre  quick-firers  is 
increased  to  eight.  The  speed  is  also  raised.  An  improved  ship  of 
this  class,  the  Henri  IV.,  was  laid  down  in  1897. 

By  purchase  at  the  close  of  the  American  Civil  War,  France 
acquired  the  monitor  Onondaga,  and  the  large  casemate-ship 
Dunderberg,  which  was  renamed  Rochambean.  Both  soon  dis- 
appeared from  the  French  Navy  List. 

A  third  class  of  armourclad  which  has  been  built  by  France  is  the 
vessel  for  cruising  on  distant  waters,  or  for  encountering  at  home  the 
cruisers  which  are  now  beginning  to  abound  in  all  navies.  The  first 
ships  of  this  class  were  the  Alma  and  her  sisters.  These  were 
followed  some  years  later  by  the  three  small  ironclads  Galissoniere, 
Triomphante,  and  Victor ieuse.  They  are  all  three  of  wood,  with 
a  complete  belt  6  inches  thick,  and  4|  inches  of  armour  on  their 
battery  or  barbettes.  They  are  merely  weak  and  slow  ironclads, 
and  have  no  important  advantages  as  cruisers.  For  fighting  purposes 
they  are  about  as  bad  ships  as  our  Nelson.  They  were  succeeded  by 
four  much  better  ships — the  Turenne,  Bayard,  Duguesclin,  and 
Vauban.  The  first  two  have  hulls  of  wood,  the  last  pair  hulls  of 
iron  and  steel.  They  are  reduced  copies  of  the  Duperre,  carrying 
four  barbettes,  arranged  as  hers  are,  one  sponsoned  out  on  each  bow, 
one  amidships  in  the  centre  line,  and  one  astern.  The  thickness  of 
armour  and  weight  of  guns  are  reduced  by  one  half,  and  the  heaviest 
weapon  carried  is  the  24-centimetre  breechloader.  The  speed  of 
the  four  varies  between  fourteen  and  fourteen  and  a-half  knots. 

Three  years  passed  between  the  launch  of  the  Duguesclin,  the 


APPENDIX  I. 


267 


most  modern  of  the  four,  and  the  designing  of  the  Dupuy  de  Lome. 
In  the  meantime  the  importance  of  speed  had  been  recognised,  and 
the  advent  of  high  explosives  had  made  armour  more  than  ever 
necessary.  The  Dupuy  de  Lome  was  commenced  in  1886  and 
completed  in  1894.  She  is  a  fast  cruiser  with  a  broad  belt  of 
hardened  steel  4-inch  armour  reaching  from  some  feet  below  the 
water-line  to  the  level  of  her  upper  deck.  Her  armament  consists  of 
two  19-centimetre  guns  mounted  amidships,  one  on  either  beam  in 
sponsoned  turrets,  and  six  16-centimetre  quick-firers,  each  in  a 
separate  turret.  Three  of  these  guns  are  grouped  forward,  and 
three  astern.  End-on,  two  19-centimetre  and  three  16-centimetre 
guns  can  be  brought  to  bear  ;  on  the  broadside,  one  19-centimetre 
and  four  16-centimetre.  There  is  a  double  armour-deck  as  in  the 
newest  French  battleships,  and  the  speed  is  twenty  knots,  which  has 
not  been  in  practice  attained,  There  are  two  military  masts,  and  the 
funnels  are  of  unequal  size — a  great  disfigurement  to  the  ship.  But 
there  is  no  denying  her  fighting  value  :  she  is  well-gunned,  fast,  and 
well-protected.  She  was  followed  by  a  group  of  four  similar  but 
smaller  cruisers.  These  have  a  wide  belt  of  3i-inch  steel,  and 
3-^-inch  hardened-steel  turrets  containing  their  armament  —  six 
14-centimetre  and  two  19-centimetre  guns.  As  in  the  Dupuy  de 
Ld??ie,  the  axial  fire  is  very  powerful.  The  speed  is  to  be  nineteen 
knots.  In  the  Latouche-Treville  the  turrets  and  ammunition  hoists  are 
operated  by  electricity.  A  fifth,  a  slightly  larger  and  faster  cruiser, 
the  Pothuau,  succeeded,  and  the  type  has  been  further  developed  in 
the  Jeanne  d' Arc  and  the  cruisers  of  the  extraordinary  programme. 

To  unarmoured  cruisers  France  has  of  recent  years  given  great 
attention.  Of  the  large  first-class  cruisers  similar  in  design  to  the 
English  B lakes  and  Edgars,  she  has  as  yet  few  constructed,  but 
several  are  in  hand.*  In  second-class  cruisers  she  began  with 
the  Sfax,  and  the  admirable  Isly,  Alger,  and  Jean  Bart,  which 
are  fast  and  powerful  vessels.  In  all  her  modern  cruisers  she 
has  aimed  at  two  things,  speed  and  powerful  axial  fire.  Ton 
for  ton  her  cruisers  are  more  heavily  armed,  than  those  of 
England.  The  best  known  types  are  the  Alger,  Davout,  and  Pascal. 
The  first  carries  four  16-centimetre  and  six  14-centimetre  guns; 
the  second  six  16-centimetre  quick-firers  and  four  of  10  centimetres; 

*  The  Tage,  laid  down  in  1885,  was  the  first  protected  cruiser  of  large 
dimensions  and  high  speed.  France  shows  no  tendency  to  build  unarmoured 
cruisers  of  the  Powerful' s  or  Diadem's  displacement, 


268 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


the  last  four  1 6-centimetre  and  ten  io-centimetre  quick-firers.  In 

smaller  cruisers  of  the  third  class  are  the  Condor  and  Forbin  types, 
which  are  better  suited  for  scouting  than  for  fighting.  They  are  by 
no  means  strong  ships,  and  are  too  small  to  be  of  much  use  at  sea. 

In  the  construction  of  torpedo  gunboats  France  led  the  way  with 
her  eight  vessels  of  the  Bombe  class,  which  proved  too  weak  for 
severe  work  at  sea.  The  Leger  and  Levrier,  which  followed,  are 
larger,  but  larger  still  are  the  three  fine  vessels,  Casabia?ica,  Cassini, 
D  Iberville.  The  latter,  which  has  been  tested  on  the  measured  mile 
and  at  sea,  is  probably  faster  than  any  of  our  many  torpedo  gunboats; 
indeed  she  is  perhaps  the  fastest  torpedo  gunboat  in  Europe. 

With  torpedo-boats  France  is  very  well  supplied.  From  the  first 
her  sailors  have  attached  great  importance  to  torpedo  warfare,  and 
they  are  certainly  second  to  none,  whether  in  practical  knowledge  of 
their  craft,  or  in  the  numerical  strength  of  which  they  dispose.  The 
French  torpedo-boats  fall  into  three  classes.  In  the  first  are  fifty-five 
large  sea-going  boats,  over  125  feet  in  length.  These  might  be  able  to 
accompany  a  squadron  to  sea  even  in  the  rough  waters  of  the 
Atlantic.  They  regularly  cruise  with  the  French  ironclads,  but  have 
not  seldom,  in  bad  weather,  to  make  for  port.  Next  come  173  boats 
of  limited  sea-going  quality,  some  not  good  for  much  work  at  sea  even 
in  fine  weather,  others  little  inferior  to  the  true  sea-going  craft. 
Finally,  there  are  fourteen  boats  which  are  less  than  86  feet  in  length, 
and  which  could  be  used  only  for  harbour  defence  or  attack.  One 
has  a  hull  of  aluminium  alloy,  and  did  twenty-and-a-half  knots  on  the 
measured  mile.  In  her  newest  boats  France  has  obtained  very 
high  speeds.  Thus  the  sea-going  Chevalier,  on  the  measured  mile, 
accomplished  27*2  knots  in  an  hour.  The  Forban  has  surpassed 
the  SokuVs  record  of  thirty  knots.* 

Of  submarine  boats  France  has  four  —  the  Goubet,  Gymnole, 
Gustave  Zede,  and  Morse.  The  first  two  are  of  little  serious  value : 
the  last  two  are  larger,  but  perhaps  not  much  better.  The  Zede  has 
a  cigar-shaped  hull,  131  feet  long.  Her  displacement  is  266  tons,  and 
she  carries  a  crew  of  eight  men.  Her  motive  force  is  electricity,  stored 
in  accumulators.  The  fumes  from  these  have  proved  a  source  of 
great  annoyance  to  her  crew,  and  there  have  been  extraordinary 
explosions  on  board  when  they  were  being  charged.  During  her 
trials  she  descended  forty  and  sixty  feet,  and  moved  about  below  the 

*  The  Sokul,  a  Russian  destroyer,  built  by  Messrs.  Yarrow,  did  30  knots  for 
a  short  time  on  her  trial ;  the  Forban,  31. 


APPEXDIX  I. 


269 


surface  at  a  rate  of  six  or  eight  knots,  launching  torpedoes.  As. 
however,  it  is  impossible  to  see  at  this  depth  she  is  a  vessel  of  very 
doubtful  value.  The  Morse  is  understood  to  be  very  similar  to  her 
in  design. 

Considering  the  French  fleet  as  a  whole,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  it  is  a  most  formidable  force.  The  first-class  battleships  are 
all  extremely  well  protected  on  the  water-line,,  have  a  good  freeboard, 
and  a  great  height  of  command  for  their  guns.  But  in  the  older  vessels 
very  little  protection  is  given  to  the  guns,  and  practically  none  to  the 
gunners.  The  large  auxiliary  batteries  could  not  be  used  in  action 
against  a  modern  ship.  Again,  a  very  great  extent  of  the  side  is 
left  exposed  to  any  projectile — a  fault,  however,  which  is  equally 
shared  by  English  battleships  of  their  date.  The  French  battleships 
of  1879 — 1886  have  all  one  perilous  weakness — that  their  heavy  guns 
could  be  put  out  of  action  by  bursting  common  shell  underneath  : 
this  weakness  occurs  in  our  six  "  Admirals,''  but  not  in  our  turret- 
ships  of  the  Inflexible  type,  nor  in  our  battleships  subsequent  to  the 
"  Admirals. "  The  French  ships,  too,  are  in  many  cases  defective  in 
the  very  important  matter  of  stability.  The  Hoche,  when  three  heavy 
guns  are  trained  abeam,  inclines  fifteen  degrees  with  quite  a  moderate 
helm.  At  this  inclination  her  belt  is  submerged  on  the  one  side  and 
her  unarmoured  bottom  exposed  on  the  other.  Nor  is  the  lozenge 
disposition  of  heavy  guns  without  grave  inconveniences.  When  the 
two  heavy  weapons  amidships  are  trained  axially,  right  ahead  or  right 
astern,  their  blast  impinging  upon  the  ship's  works  is  liable  to  cause 
serious  injuries  to  the  structure,  whilst  it  greatly  interferes  with  the 
working  of  the  auxiliary  armament ;  a  bugle  has  to  sound  for  the 
gunners  in  the  line  of  the  blast  to  retire.  The  great  difficulty 
and  confusion  which  would  result  from  this  in  battle  are  obvious. 
The  French  cruisers  and  battleships  all  exhibit  this  fault,  and  thus 
the  axial  fire,  which  is  so  formidable  on  paper,  would  dwindle  very 
much  in  action.  For  example,  the  Dupuy  de  Lome  could  never 
fight  five  guns  end-on.  Her  19-centimetre  weapons  firing  past  her 
16-centimetre  turrets  would  stun  the  men  in  them,  besides  blowing 
away  the  upper  works  of  the  ship.  Of  course  the  French  understand 
this  as  well  as  their  critics,  and  would  never  be  likely  to  train  the 
19-centimetre  guns  axially.  They  have  striven  to  give  their  guns  the 
widest  possible  angles  of  fire,  and  might  find  these  wide  angles  of 
great  value,  when,  under  a  heavy  fire,  portions  of  the  ship's  armament 
had  been  disabled. 


270 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


To  compare  the  naval  strength  of  France  with  the  naval  strength 
of  England  is  a  difficult  matter.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  evaluate 
personnel,  and  it  is  not  much  easier  to  evaluate  materiel.  The  ships 
which  these  two  rival  claimants  to  sea  power  have  built  in  the  past 
are  so  widely  different  that  action  alone  can  decide  their  respective 
merits,  and  it  is  just  possible  that  the  test  of  war  might  prove  one 
or  other  type  wholly  unsuitable.  Generally,  English  designers  have 
striven  to  protect  the  men  working  the  guns  :  to  do  this  they  have 
reduced  the  length  of  the  ship's  armour.  French  naval  architects, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  given  little  attention  to  the  protection  of  the 
men,  and  a  great  deal  to  the  protection  of  the  water-line.  In 
consequence  they  have  reduced  the  breadth  of  the  ship's  armour. 
Perhaps  the  English  ironclads  of  the  1875-1885  period  are  a  little 
better  than  the  French,  though  they  are,  where  the  muzzle-loader 
has  been  retained,  worse  armed.  The  Inflexible  at  least  gives  her 
gunners  good  shelter,  and  protects  well  the  bases  of  the  heavy  gun 
positions.  The  Duperre  and  Baudin  are  defective  in  each  of  these 
points,  and  their  barbettes  with  their  thin  gun-shields  are  mere  shell- 
traps. 

Within  recent  years  England  has  advanced  with  such  giant  strides 
that  already  in  the  matter  of  materiel  the  French  fleet  has  been  left 
far  behind.  There  are  points  in  which  the  French  have  incontest- 
able advantages ;  their  cruisers  building,  for  instance,  are  faster,  and 
they  have  several  vessels  of  the  valuable  Dupuy  de  Lome  type,  which 
is  not  to  be  found  in  our  navy.  In  torpedo  craft  they  outnumber  us 
still,  if  in  quality  we  lead.  But,  generally  speaking,  there  can  be  not 
the  slightest  doubt  as  to  which  is  the  strongest  power  in  each  class 
and  type.    Especially  are  we  strong  in  new  ships. 

The  test  of  a  battleship's  capacity  to  fight  in  line  is  age,  and  here 
it  is  a  case  of  the  younger  the  better.  Indeed,  naval  progress  generally 
removes  ships  from  the  first-class  in  ten  or  twelve  years,  Not  that 
they  necessarily  become  valueless  :  a  good  and  well-built  ship  can 
generally  be  re-armed  and  refitted.  But  after  ten  or  twelve  years 
the  advance  of  artillery,  of  metallurgy,  of  boiler  or  engine-making, 
renders  fresh  combinations  of  the  items  which  make  up  the  com- 
promise necessary.  Quick-firers  may  lead  to  the  substitution  of  a 
great  extent  of  thin  armour  for  a  little  thick  armour,  and  automatic 
heavy  guns,  firing  large  projectiles  with  great  rapidity,  may  again 
compel  a  return  to  a  limited  extent  of  thick  plating. 

It  is  usual  to  divide  battleships  into  classes,  but  no  two  writers  will 


APPENDIX  I. 


271 


divide  them  in  quite  the  same  way.  There  may  be  a  general  agree- 
ment, but  there  will  always  be  difference  as  to  individuals.  Keeping 
in  mind  the  fact  that  an  old  battleship  or  ironclad  is  of  insignifi- 
cant value,  unless  reconstructed  and  brought  up  to  date  in  her 
armament  and  boiler  department,  that  foreign  coast-defence  ships 
must  be  reckoned  with,  if  the  English  fleet  blockades,  and  that 
small  modern  battleships — though,  of  course,  they  must  be  less 
powerful  than  such  ships  as  the  Campus  or  St.  Louis — are  also  not 
to  be  disregarded,  we  shall  attempt  a  comparison  of  the  fleets  of 
England,  France,  and  Russia,  as  they  stood  in  August  1897,  includ- 
ing ships  built,  building,  and  projected. 

The  battleships  which  are  unquestionably  first  class  of  the  three 
powers  are  these : 

France. 

3  Jenas. 

3  Charlemagnes. 
1  Henri  IV. 

4  Carnots. 
I  Jaureguiberry. 
1  Brennns. 

Total,   13.  Type 


England. 
12  Majesties. 
6  Canopuses. 

1  Renown. 
8  Royal  Sovereigns. 

2  Centurions. 
2  Niles. 

Total,  31.  Types,  ( 
Ships  of  each  type,  5' 16 


Ships  of  each  type,  2"  16. 


Russia. 

2  Peresviets. 

3  Tri  Sviatitelias. 
3  Poltavas. 
3  Sissoi  Velikis. 
1  Georghi  Pobyedonosets. 
1  Navarin. 

1  Dvenadsat  Apostolov. 

Total,  14.  Types,  7. 
Ships  of  each  type,  2. 


Of  the  Russian  ships  five,  and  of  the  French  one,  are  of  compara- 
tively small  size,  and  of  the  English  two  are  very  feebly  armed.  The 
immense  advantage  of  uniformity  which  the  British  first  class 
possesses  leaps  to  the  eye.  Ready  for  sea  in  the  above  class  the 
numbers  were,  in  1897,  England  nineteen,  France  four,  and  Russia 
eight. 

The  Canopuses,  Majesties,  and  the  Royal  Sovereigns  form  three 
homogeneous  squadrons,  in  which  each  individual  ship  is  equal 
to  any  vessel  that  France  possesses.  Eight  indifferent  but  closely 
similar  ships  would  probably  be  found  superior  in  war  to  eight  ships, 
each  of  which  was  better  than  those  of  the  homogeneous  squadron, 
but  each  of  which  was  at  the  same  time  different  from  the  other.  If 
ships  are  kept  as  far  as  possible  identical — if  a  large  number  of  each 
type  are  always  laid  down,  the  sailor  who  knows  one  knows  all,  and 
the  training  of  the  personnel  is  simplified.  Similar  and  interchange- 
able armaments,  similar  turning-circles,  and  similar  speed  are  factors 
of  great  value,  and  in  our  fleet  they  are  combined  with  superior 
armament,  coal  endurance,  and  ammunition  supply.  The  excess  of 
tonnage  which  our  newer  ships  exhibit  when  contrasted  with  French 


272 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


ships  under  construction  is  given  mainly  to  these  important  elements 
in  the  compromise.  On  the  other  hand  the  French  ships  have 
thicker  armour  and  rather  more  weight  of  it. 

The  next  class  includes  older  but  powerful  ships,  usually  ranked 
as  first  class,  with  some  smaller  but  modern  ships.  All  have  fair 
speed  and  would  be  found  in  the  line  of  battle. 


Russia. 

3  Sinopes. 

2  Alexander  II. 
I  Gangoot. 

4  Admiral  Seniavins. 

Total,  io. 


England.  France. 

1  Sanspareil.  3  Magentas. 
6  "  Admirals.''  1  Hoche. 

2  Colossus.  2  Formidables. 
2  Conquerors.  1  Duperre. 

Total,  11.  \Jemmapes. 

4  Caimans. 
2  Devastations. 
Total,  17. 


Individually,  the  French  ships  in  this  class  are  as  powerful,  or 
even  more  powerful,  than  ours  ;  they  are  more  modern  and  better 
armed.  The  Russians  are  about  as  good.  There  remain  a  certain 
number  of  old  ships  which  have  been  reconstructed,  re-engined,  and 
re-armed.  Where  this  has  been  done  completely  the  ship  may  be 
capable  of  much  hard  work. 

England.  France. 
3  Devastations.  I  Redoubtable. 

I  Rupert.  \  1  Furieux. 

The  above  completely  refitted. 


1  Hercules. 
I  Alexandra. 
1  Sultan. 
1  Monarch. 


1  Friedland. 
1  Richelieu. 
1  Tonnant. 


The  above  partially  refitted. 


And,  lastly,  the  class  of  old  ships  with  old  guns,  old  engines,  and 
old  boilers,  which  are  in  their  actual  state  of  negligible  value.  This 
class  is,  unfortunately,  exceedingly  large  in  our  navy,  numbering,  as 
it  does,  nineteen  ships ;  in  the  French  navy  it  numbers  eight,  and  in 
the  Russian  five.  To  these  must  be  added  various  coast-defence 
ships,  of  which  England  has  eleven,  France  four  and  eight  armoured 
gunboats,  and  Russia  seven  and  four  armoured  gunboats.  These 
last  two  classes  are  not  likely  to  be  employed  at  the  outset  in  any 
war,  except  for  harbour  work.  Many  of  the  ships  would  want  a 
year's  hard  work  put  into  them  before  they  could  take  the  sea ;  and 
it  need  scarcely  be  said  that  the  dockyards  would  be  too  busy  at 
such  a  time  to  spare  shipwrights  for  them. 


APPENDIX  I. 


273 


Deducting  all  the  rossignols,  the  three  fleets  stand  thus  in  effective, 
modern,  or  modernised  battleships :  England  forty-nine  (of  which 
four  armed  with  muzzle-loaders),  France  thirty-five,  Russia  twenty- 
five.  Considering  the  great  strength  of  England  in  the  best 
class,  and  the  large  size  of  many  of  her  ships,  her  battleships 
are  to  the  French  about  as  two  to  one,  and  to  the  Russian  as  five 
to  two. 

For  armoured  cruisers  which  are  capable  of  being  placed  in  the 
line  of  battle  the  figures  are  : 


These  ships  cannot,  however,  for  a  moment  be  ranked  as  equal  to 
good  modern  battleships,  though  they  might  be  quite  capable  of 
hitting  a  second  or  third  class  ship  very  hard.  It  is  usually 
inexpedient  for  a  ship  to  go  out  of  her  class  and  assail  a  ship  of 
different  species,  the  only  exception  to  this  rule  being  on  the  case  of 
the  torpedo  boat.  Of  other  armoured  cruisers  England  has  seven, 
France  none,  and  Russia  five. 

With  cruisers  England  is  well  provided,  but  here  her  ships  are 
usually  more  feebly  armed  than  their  French  or  Russian  rivals. 
They  have,  however,  more  coal  than  these,  and  they  are,  as  a  rule, 
comfortable,  seaworthy,  and  moderately,  if  not  excessively,  fast.  In 
23-knot  ships  France  is  ahead,  as  she  has  four  built  and  building  and 
we  have  none.  In  the  figures  given  below  cruisers  with  a  protective 
deck  of  armour  are  alone  included.  There  are  unprotected  vessels 
of  good  age,  but  of  some  fighting  value,  figuring  in  most  navy  lists. 
These  are  all  doomed  to  disappear  before  many  years  have  passed. 


England,  6;  France,  11  ;  Russia,  2. 


Over  7000  tons.      Over  3000  tons.      Under  3000  tons. 


Total. 
105 
33 

6 


England 
France  .. 
Russia  .. 


For  torpedo  craft  the  figures  are : 


Catchers. 


Destroyers.     Sea-going  Boats. 


Others.    Total  (Boats  only). 


England 
France 
Russia  . 


33 

8 


101    262 

1 70    267 

1 20    204 


Of  the  English  torpedo  boats — sea-going  and  others — most  are  old 
and  of  very  doubtful  value.   France  and  Russia  have  more  new  boats 

Vol.  II.  T 


274 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


in  these  classes,  but  our  magnificent  destroyers  make  up  for  this 
deficiency.  We  have  also  eight  sea-going  and  twelve  other  boats, 
which  are  the  property  of  Colonial  governments. 

As  torpedo-boats  are  the  weapon  of  the  weaker  power,  England 
has  given  attention  rather  to  vessels  designed  to  combat  them — to 
torpedo  gunboats  and  destroyers.  It  is  doubtful  whether  either  of 
these  types  will  prove  able  to  endure  much  work  at  sea,  and  there 
are  many  who  hold  that  the  third-class  cruiser  is  the  vessel  to 
meet  the  torpedo-boat.  But  if  they  are  useless  for  cruising,  the 
new  destroyers  will  at  least  be  superior  to  any  torpedo-boat  for 
torpedo  work. 

Tables  of  naval  strength,  however,  are  only  of  value  to  give  some 
faint  adumbration  of  the  truth  :  they  cannot  from  their  very  nature 
deal  with  such  vital  points  as  organisation,  training,  discipline,  and 
character.  And  here  we  have  no  means  of  comparison,  no  test 
except  the  stern  trial  of  war.  Yet  the  English  sailor  should  be 
superior  to  the  average  French  sailor,  from  the  fact  that  the  former 
is  a  long-service  man,  whilst  the  latter  in  many  cases  serves  no  more 
than  four  or  five  years  in  the  fleet.  Steadiness  and  discipline  can 
only  be  assured  by  a  long  training,  and  there  is  little  doubt 
that  war  would  not  find  our  sailors  wanting  in  these  essential 
qualities.  On  the  other  hand,  with  long  service  the  provision  of 
a  trained  reserve  becomes  difficult,  and  here  France  is  better  off 
than  England. 

Lastly,  the  numerous  claims  upon  the  British  fleet  in  war  are  to  be 
considered.  It  is  not  enough  to  be  stronger  than  France ;  England 
must  possess  that  degree  of  superiority  which  will  enable  her  to 
confine  her  opponents'  ironclads  to  their  ports,  and  prevent  the 
hostile  commerce-destroyers  from  plundering  her  commerce.  It  is 
possible  that  two  battleships  to  the  French  one  would  be  necessary 
for  a  close  blockade.  It  is  certain  that  four  cruisers  to  the  French 
one  will  not  be  found  any  too  many  in  war. 

The  probability  of  England  having  to  confront  an  alliance,  herself 
without  allies,  is  one  which  politicians  should  consider.  Russia  and 
France,  to  say  nothing  of  Germany,  will  unquestionably  be  nearly  as 
strong  in  materiel  as  England  before  the  end  of  the  century,  unless 
England  continues  her  determined  efforts.  On  the  other  hand 
the  single  power  has  a  great  advantage  against  an  alliance,  and 
England  holding  the  interior  position  could  operate  against  the  two 
allies,  attacking  each  in  detail. 


APPEXDIX  I. 


2/5 


In  a  final  table  the  results  already  obtained  are  recapitulated  : 

France 

England.        France.  Russia.       &  Russia. 

Standard  battleships    31    13    15    28 

Second-class  battleships   11    17    10    27 

Third-class  battleships    7    5    o    5 

Old  battleships   20    8    5    13 

Harbour  service  ironclads    11    12    11    23 

Cruisers  (armoured)   13    11    7    18 

,,    (unarmoured)  over  6000  tons  21    4    o    5 

„                        over  3000  tons  53    18    5    23 

„                      under  3000  tons  31    11    1    12 

Torpedo  gunboats    33    17    8    25 

Destroyers   96    11    4    15 

Sea-going  torpedo-boats   65  ......  69    72    141 

Smaller  torpedo-boats   101    170    120    290 


T  2 


275B 


APPENDIX  II. 


*  Report   of  the   French    Committee   in    1870   upon  the 
practicability  of  attacking  the  Prussian  Littoral. 

Members  of  the  Committee  :  Rear- Admiral  Dieudonne  ; 
Duburquois,  Chief  of  the  Staff ;  Lacour,  Colonel  of  Artillery ; 
Captains  Quilio  and  Serras. 


Alsen.  The  depth  of  water  will  not  permit  an  approach  to  this  point 
within  at  most  3300  yards,  at  which  distance  attack  would  be 
useless  owing  to  the  plunging  fire  of  the  forts.  Nothing  can 
be  done  here  without  a  force  to  land.  It  is  further  most 
probable  that  there  is  defence  by  submarine  mines  along  the 
shore.  These  would  have  to  be  removed,  and  this  could  not 
be  attempted  until  the  squadron  was  supplied  with  the 
necessary  apparatus. 

Duppel  and  Kappeln.  Quite  out  of  reach  of  the  ships'  guns.  Too 
little  water  in  the  bays.  We  could  get  at  them  with  armoured 
gunboats. 

Eckernford.  The  isolated  works  could,  easily  be  destroyed.  They 
are,  however,  of  no  importance,  and  unless  troops  can  be 
thrown  on  shore  the  reduction  of  the  forts  would  be  insignificant. 

Kiel.  It  would  be  necessary  to  employ  the  whole  strength  of  the 
squadron.  The  success  of  gun-fire  is  uncertain,  on  account 
of  the  height  of  the  forts  above  the  shore,  and  the  losses  which 
the  assailants  will  certainly  incur  unless  they  can  occupy  the 
forts  as  they  are  silenced.  The  forts  of  Friedrichsort  being 
destroyed,  as  the  squadron  would  be  unable  to  penetrate  to 
the  bottom  of  the  bay  within  range  of  Kiel,  owing  to  the 
obstructions,  the  torpedoes  and  all  the  means  of  defence  which 
have  there  been  accumulated,  the  French  ships  would  soon 
be  forced  to  retire  without  even  knowing  the  result  of  their 
attack. 


276 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


Neustadt.  An  open  town  without  defence.  The  bay  is  so  shallow 
that  the  French  ships  could  not  even  reach  with  their  projectiles 
the  merchant  ships,  which  are  anchored  some  distance  from 
the  port,  properly  so  called. 

It  is  the  same  along  the  coast  as  far  as 

Kolberg.  A  strong  place,  besieged  in  1807,  and  attackable  from 
the  sea  at  2400  yards.  Before  attacking  there  it  will  be 
necessary  to  make  a  reconnaissance  to  make  certain  that  the 
houses  along  the  shore,  especially  the  Casino,  do  not  mask 
fortifications  which  would  compel  changes  in  the  plan  of 
attack. 

Danzig.  The  fort  at  the  entrance  of  the  bay  is  within  range  of  our 
upper-deck  guns,  but  only  at  a  distance  of  4500  yards.  The 
battery  guns  could  not  be  used  elsewhere  with  advantage. 

Conclusion.  Kolberg  and  Danzig  alone  can  be  attacked ;  but 
the  small  effect  which  will  result  from  these  two  attempts  will 
be  of  a  nature  to  deprive  the  French  squadron  of  the  prestige 
of  its  force.  In  order  to  operate  usefully,  special  vessels  are 
required,  and  the  prospect  of  forcing  the  enemy  to  assemble 
his  troops  on  this  part  of  the  littoral.  But  this  end  is 
unattainable  without  a  landing  force. 

*  Rene  de  Pont  Jest  J. U.S. I.,  xxxiii.,  230,  and  the  original  in  the  Moniteur 
(Tours). 


APPENDIX  III. 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY. 

1866-1897. 

At  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  navy  had 
reached  an  extraordinary   degree  of   strength,  though  the 
American  ironclads,  being  for  the  most  part  of  low  freeboard, 
were  not  capable  of  much  work  at  sea,  and  had  the  further 
disadvantage  which  attached  to  a  smooth-bore  short-range 
armament,  at  a  time  when  the  rifle  was  being  everywhere 
adopted  abroad.    There  were  674  ships  in  service,  and  eighty 
more  under  construction  or  out  of  commission.    Of  the  total, 
sixty,  excluding  the  armoured  gun-boats  built  for  service  on 
the  Mississippi,  were  ironclads.    Two,  the  Dunderberg  and 
New  Ironsides,  were  sea-going  casemate  ships,  and  fifty-eight 
were  monitors  of  various  type,  eleven  being  of  large  size. 
The  plating  of  all  the  monitors  was  laminated,  applied  in 
successive  sheets  of  1  inch  thickness  and  not  rolled  solid,  a  fact 
which  greatly  detracted  from  its  power  of  resistance.  The 
unarmoured   ships   of   the  navy  do  not   merit  a  detailed 
description,  as  allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  only 
important  class,  the  seven    Wampanoags,  which  were  the 
precursors  of  the  fast  cruiser,  but  which,  being  built  of  green 
wood,  soon  went  to  decay. 

Though  this  great  force  had  rendered  the  people  of  the 
United  States  such  signal  service ;  though  it  had  fought  with 
unsullied  brilliance  in  more  than  a  hundred  actions ;  and 


278 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


though  the  want  of  a  strong  fleet  had  rendered  the  secession 

formidable,  and  indeed  possible,  the  navy  rapidly  declined 
after  the  war,  and  the  ships  which  had  been  built  so  speedily 
were  sold  or  suffered  to  rot.  The  Miantonomoh,  a  double- 
turret  Ericsson  monitor,  was  sent  across  the  Atlantic  to 
England  in  1866,  and  by  her  singular  appearance  attracted  no 
little  attention  and  caused  no  small  alarm,  filling  the  Times 
with  concern  for  our  sea-going  broadside  ironclads ;  the 
Monadnock,  a  similar  ship,  made  a  voyage  to  the  Pacific,  and 
the  Terror  for  some  years  served  on  the  Atlantic  station  ;  but 
the  others  quickly  fell  into  disrepair,  and  were  one  by  gathered 
to  the  scrap-heap.  The  Dunderberg  and  Onondaga  escaped 
their  fate  by  being  sold  to  France,  and  fire  saved  the  New 
Ironsides  from  this  last  indignity,  or  rather  hastened  it.  By 
1868,  393  of  the  peace-service  steamers,  bought  and  adopted 
for  war  purposes,  had  again  changed  hands.  Two  of  the 
monitors  were  sold  to  Peru  during  the  trouble  with  Spain. 
And  thus  by  1880  the  United  States  were  left  without  a  single 
efficient  battleship. 

Between  the  close  of  the  war  and  the  year  1881  five  large 
double-turret  monitors  were  laid  down,  which  progressed  very 
slowly,  owing  to  want  of  funds  and  a  general  controversy  as  to 
their  value.  They  were  intended  to  replace  five  older  vessels 
bearing  their  names — the  Puritan,  Amphitrite,  Miantonomoh, 
Monadnock,  and  Terror.  In  1877  work  was  altogether 
suspended  upon  the  Puritan,  Amphitrite,  and  Terror,  when 
they  were  about  half  completed,  whilst  the  other  two  received 
but  little  attention.  They  were  virtually  new  iron  hulls  built 
to  carry  the  old  Ericsson  turrets  and  smooth-bores  of  their 
predecessors,  and  though  they  had  double  bottoms,  and 
embodied  many  improvements  upon  the  earlier  monitors,  were 
at  the  same  time  of  very  low  freeboard  and  quite  insufficient 
speed.  Whilst  they  lingered  upon  the  stocks  a  large  wooden 
cruiser,  the  Trenton,  was  launched  in  1875,  and  completed 
with  a  little  more  haste.  She  attained  a  speed  of  12.8  knots, 
and  carried  a  battery  of  eleven  8-inch  rifled  muzzle-loaders,  of 


APPEXDIX  III. 


279 


converted  pattern,  in  addition  to  six  light  guns  for  saluting. 
In  construction,  speed,  and  armament  she  was  behind  all 
foreign  cruisers  of  her  size  and  date.  But  ^hen  a  chief  of 
bureau  held  that  England  built  iron  ships  because  she  could 
not  get  wood,  it  is  plain  that  conservatism  in  the  American 
navy  was  pushed  to  an  extreme  point.  It  was,  in  fact, 
preparing  the  way  for  a  tremendous  reaction.  The  Trenton 
was  wrecked  in  the  terrible  hurricane  at  Samoa,  from  which 
the  Calliope  escaped  through  her  powerful  engines  and  the 
seamanship  of  Captain  Kane. 

In  1880,  then,  the  United  States  navy  was  at  its  lowest 
point ;  indeed,  without  exaggeration,  we  may  say  that  it  had 
ceased  to  exist.  From  that  date  slowly,  but  surely,  with 
gathering  force,  the  naval  movement  makes  headway.  Early 
in  1880  a  board  of  officers  examined  the  monitors  whose  con- 
struction had  been  suspended,  and  recommending  the  general 
modernisation  of  their  design,  armour,  and  armament,  urged 
that  they  should  be  completed  without  further  delay.  Next, 
in  1 88 1,  a  large  and  thoroughly  competent  committee  was 
appointed  to  consider  and  report  upon  "  the  pressing  need  of 
appropriate  vessels  in  the  service  at  the  present  time."  Later 
in  the  same  year  the  report  was  made  to  this  effect.  Seventy 
unarmoured  ships  for  cruising  purposes  were  the  smallest  num- 
ber which  could  possibly  be  considered  adequate,  and,  as  there 
were  only  thirty-two  available  ships  alreadv  in  service,  thirty- 
eight  new  vessels  should  be  built,  whilst  those  existing,  as 
they  fell  into  disrepair,  should  be  replaced  bv  new  cruisers.  The 
first  quality  to  be  demanded  from  the  new  ships,  if  efficiency 
was  to  be  secured,  was  that  they  should  be  able  to  maintain  a 
high  rate  of  speed  at  sea  for  a  protracted  period.  All  except 
the  smallest  class  were  to  be  constructed  of  steel.  The  pro- 
gramme suggested  was  as  follows  : 

2  15  knot  ships  of  5873  tons  each  carrying  359  tons  of  armament. 

6  x4     11  4560  „         280  „ 

10  x3     .»       »,     3°43        .»         11  161 

20  10     m       »       793  „  32 


28o 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


"  A  bold  and  decided  step  should  be  taken  to  win  back  from 
Europe  our  former  prestige,  as  the  best  ship-builders  of  the 
world,"  said  the  committee.  Coming  to  minor  details,  a 
powerful  fore  and  aft  fire  was  recommended,  sponsons  and 
recessed  ports  being  mentioned  as  the  means  by  which  to 
obtain  this  end  ;  there  were  to  be  heavy  pivot-guns ;  and  the 
armament  was  to  be  composed  of  high-power  breech-loading 
rifles  of  at  least  twenty-six  calibres  length,  and  6  or  8-inch  bore. 
Finally  the  cruisers  were  to  have  a  moderate  amount  of  sail- 
power. 

This  wise  and  far-sighted  report  was  accompanied  by  some 
remarks  on  ironclads.  The  committee  held  that  though  these 
vessels  were  not  required  in  peace  they  (<  were  absolutely 
needed  for  the  defence  of  the  country  in  war!1  emphasizing 
this  declaration  by  the  use  of  italics  ;  but,  they  continued,  since 
it  was  the  experience  of  foreign  navies  up  to  that  time  that 
any  type  of  ironclad  vessel  introduced  became  so  inferior  as 
to  be  almost  obsolete  for  general  purposes  in  a  period  of  about 
ten  years,  and  since  the  study  of  designs  for  ironclads  was  not 
in  their  instructions,  they  did  not  recommend  the  immediate 
commencement  of  any  such  vessels.  Moreover,  they  reminded 
Congress  that  the  country  had  no  plant  for  heavy  forgings,  and 
therefore  they  urged  that  officers  should  be  permitted  to 
familiarise  themselves  with  "  such  developments  as  are  not 
understood  in  the  United  States/' 

As  for  other  craft,  they  recommended  the  construction  of 
five  small  armoured  rams,  five  torpedo  gunboats  of  450  tons, 
ten  sea-going  and  as  many  harbour  defence  torpedo  boats.  A 
minority  report  demanded  that  the  ships  in  each  class  should 
be  first  rate  and  possessed  of  the  highest  qualities,  larger  and 
faster  than  were  the  corresponding  vessels  of  other  nations, 
as  was  the  case  with  the  famous  United  States  frigates  of 
18 12  ;  maintained  that  ironclads  did  not  by  any  means  become 
ineffective  in  ten  years,  and  should  therefore  be  laid  down  ; 
and  pronounced  against  the  rams. 

Nothing  was  done  by  Congress,  though  the  Congressional 


APPENDIX  III. 


281 


Naval  Committee  examined  the  ship-building  resources  of  the 
country,  and  in  1882  reported,  urging  the  construction  of  six 
steel  cruisers,  a  ram,  and  eight  torpedo-boats.  At  last,  in 
March,  1883,  the  building  of  three  cruisers,  the  Chicago, 
Atlanta,  and  Boston,  and  of  one  despatch-boat,  the  Dolphin, 
was  sanctioned.  They  were  at  once  laid  down  by  the 
contractors,  wTho  wTere  to  use  only  mild  steel  of  American 
manufacture.  The  Chicago*  was  a  twin-screw  cruiser  of 
4500  tons  and  15-3  knots  trial  speed.  She  was  divided  by 
nine  bulkheads  into  ten  water-tight  compartments,  and  for 
136  feet  amidships  had  a  double  bottom.  A  protective  deck 
i-l-  inches  thick  over  the  boilers  and  machinery,  and  \  inch  thick 
over  the  magazines  was  fitted,  but  forward  and  aft  of  this 
there  was  no  horizontal  armour  beyond  a  ^-inch  water-tight 
deck.  Above  this  and  round  the  ship's  vitals  was  a  series  of 
bunkers  offering  9  feet  of  coal  to  any  projectile.  The  battery 
consisted  of  four  8-inch  guns  placed  in  as  many  sponsons,  one 
upon  each  bow  and  quarter,  so  that  two  fired  ahead,  astern,  or 
upon  either  broadside.  The  guns  were  fought  in  large  open 
ports,  and  the  gunners  were  protected  only  by  shields  on  the 
carriages.  Besides  these  there  were  eight  6-inch  weapons 
mounted  on  the  broadside,  two  firing  ahead,  and  four  on  either 
beam,  and  two  5-inch  guns  astern.  Thus  the  fire  in  various 
directions  was  : 

Ahead    2    8  inches,    2    6  inches. 

Astern   2    8  inches,    2    5  inches. 

Broadside   2    8  inches,    4    6  inches,    1    5  inches. 

There  were  also  fourteen  6  and  1 -pounder  quick-firers  and 
two  machine  guns. 

The  gap  between  this  ship  and  the  Trenton  is  immense.  At 
one  bound  the  United  States  pass  through  the  transition  stage 
from  the  old  wooden  unprotected  ship  or  frigate  to  the  new 
protected  steel  cruiser,  from  low  to  high  speed,  from  the  feeblest 

*  Very  considerable  alterations  have  now  been  made  in  her.  She  has  been 
re-engined,  lengthened,  and  has  received  fourteen  5-inch  quick-firers  in  place  of 
her  old  armament. 


282 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


muzzle-loaders  to  breech-loaders  of  great  muzzle-energy.  A 
comparison  of  the  weight  and  energy  of  the  heavier  projectiles 
discharged  by  either  ship  in  various  directions  will  show  the 
progress  made  : 

Trenton.  Chicago, 
Ahead.       Broadside.        Ahead.  Broadside. 

No.  of  projectiles    2...  7  ...  4  ...  7 

Weight,  lb   360  ...     1260  ...       700  ...  950 

Muzzle  energy,  foot  tons...  2600  ...  18,300  ...  19,200  ...  26,400 

The  gap  which  in  the  development  of  the  English  fleet  is 
filled  by  so  many  ships,  is  here  unbridged.  It  was,  however, 
only  through  the  experience  which  foreign  nations  had 
obtained,  and  through  the  results  which  they  made  known  to 
the  United  States  Government,  that  this  progress  was  possible. 
A  critic  might  have  found  some  fault  with  the  armament  of  the 
Chicago,  which  included  an  unnecessary  number  of  calibres, 
8  inch,  6  inch,  and  5  inch,  tending  to  cause  confusion,  and  which 
has  now  been  simplified ;  nor  was  she,  taken  all  in  all,  superior  to 
our  Amphion  class.  None  the  less  she  was  a  fine  and  power- 
ful vessel,  and  in  continual  service  as  a  flagship  has  performed 
very  well.  She  was  fully  rigged,  carrying  three  masts,  but  her 
rigging  has  been  removed. 

The  Atlanta  and  Boston  are  sister  ships  of  smaller  size  than 
the  Chicago,  displacing  3000  instead  of  4500  tons,  and  pro- 
pelled by  a  single  screw  instead  of  twin- screws.  They  are 
fully-rigged  steel  sloops,  without  poop  or  forecastle,  and  with 
a  superstructure  amidships.  Two  8-inch  guns  are  mounted  in  as 
many  barbettes  of  2-inch  steel,  placed  fore  and  aft  of  the  super- 
structure, but  not  in  the  centre  line,  the  fore  barbette  being  to 
port  and  the  after  barbette  to  starboard,  which  gives  room  for 
one  6-inch  gun  with  axial  fire,  to  be  mounted  at  each  end  of  the 
superstructure.  This  disposition  was  novel,  but  it  has  not 
been  repeated,  and  it  must  manifestly  tend  to  strain  the  ship. 
In  the  superstructure  are  four  more  6-inch  weapons,  in  addition 
to  the  guns  firing  axially.  There  is  a  i^-inch  steel  deck  over, 
and  a  double-bottom  under  the  boilers  and  engines.  There 


APPENDIX  III. 


283 


are  nine  main  water-tight  compartments.  The  trial  speed  was 
16*3  knots.  The  Dolphin  displaces  1485  tons,  steamed 
15  knots,  and  originally  carried  a  6-inch  pivot  forward,  which 
has  now  been  replaced  by  two  4-inch  guns.  She  is  a  single 
screw  vessel,  weak  and  unsatisfactory,  contrasting  very  un- 
favourably with  the  English  Archer  class,  the  ships  of  which 
are  a  little  larger,  much  faster,  and  far  better  armed. 

The  heavy  forgings  for  the  guns  and  armour  of  the  fore- 
going ships  were  ordered  from  England,  as  they  could  not  be 
procured  in  the  United  States;  but  after  March,  1885,  a 
new  policy  was  pursued.  Orders  were  withheld  till  there 
should  be  a  sufficient  accumulation  to  guarantee  work  to 
American  manufacturers,  who  would  erect  the  very  expensive 
plant  necessary.  Thus  the  apparent  suspension  of  shipbuilding 
between  1883  and  1887  does  not  indicate  any  abandonment  of 
the  new  naval  policy ;  but  owing  to  the  accumulation  of 
orders  the  Bethlehem  Company,  of  Bethlehem,  Pennsylvania, 
in  June,  1887,  was  able  to  undertake  the  erection  of  plant  for 
forging  armour  and  guns,  to  be  ready  within  two  and  a  half 
years  of  that  date.  The  company  acquired  by  purchase  the 
trade  secrets  of  Sir  Joseph  Whitworth  and  Co.,  and  was  very 
quickly  able  to  deliver  any  quality  or  weight  of  steel.  Other 
firms  have  subsequently  followed  in  the  same  direction,  and 
the  United  States  have  fully  regained  their  self-dependence,  as 
everything  required  for  the  construction  of  a  battleship  is  now 
made  in  America. 

Early  in  1887  shipbuilding  was  resumed,  three  second-class 
cruisers,  the  Charleston,  Newark,  and  Baltimore,  two  third- 
class  vessels,  the  Yorktown  and  Petrel,  and  the  dynamite- 
gunboat  Vesuvius  being  laid  down.  The  Charleston  was 
built  to  an  Elswick  design,  reproducing  with  a  lighter  arma- 
ment and  an  enlarged  displacement  the  features  of  the 
Esmeralda.  She  is  of  4040  tons  and  18*2  knots.  Her  battery 
consists  of  two  8-inch  guns  mounted  fore  and  aft  behind  2-inch 
shields,  and  six  6-inch  guns  amidships  on  sponsons,  two  firing 
ahead  and  two  astern.    She  has  a  complete  protective  deck 


284 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


from  3  to  2  inches  thick,  coal  bunkers  round  the  vitals,  and  a 
cellular  system  above  the  water  line.  The  ship  has  one  funnel 
and  two  military  masts,  each  with  one  top.  The  Baltimore 
is  larger,  displacing  4600  tons.  Her  deck  is  much  thicker, 
reaching  4  inches  on  the  slope  and  remaining  at  2\  inches  on  the 
flat  and  at  the  ends ;  her  speed  is  higher  by  about  a  knot  and 
a  half ;  and  her  coal  supply  is  greatly  augmented.  Her 
battery  includes  four  8-inch  guns,  two  on  the  forecastle  and  two 
on  the  poop,  and  six  6-inch  guns  mounted  on  sponsons  in  the 
waist  of  the  ship,  Two  8-inch  and  two  6-inch  guns  fire  axially 
and  two  8-inch  and  three  6-inch  guns  on  the  broadside.  There 
are  two  military  masts  and  two  funnels.  The  Newark  is 
smaller  by  500  tons;  her  speed  is  19  knots,  and  her  armament 
consists  of  twelve  6-inch  guns  all  mounted  on  sponsons,  and 
protected  by  shields,  six  firing  on  the  broadside  and  four 
axially.  She  has  a  continuous  double  bottom,  a  steel  deck 
3  inches  and  2  inches  thick,  and  a  cellular  system  above  it,  while 
there  are  two  barque-rigged  masts,  each  with  one  top.  The 
Yorktown  displaces  1700  tons  and  resembles  closely  the 
English  Archer,  with  a  speed  of  17  knots;  she  carries  six 
6-inch  guns  mounted  on  sponsons,  and  has  a  deck -|  inch  thick. 
Two  similar  vessels,  the  Bennington  and  Concord,  were  laid 
down  in  the  following  year.  The  dynamite-gun  cruiser 
Vesuvius  is  the  most  original  conception  that  the  American 
navy  has  yet  produced,  though  as  it  is  said  that  she  is  going 
to  be  rebuilt  and  deprived  of  her  dynamite  guns,  she  can 
hardly  be  considered  a  success.  She  is  a  vessel  of  929  tons, 
steaming  21  knots,  and  protected  by  a^--inch  steel  deck.  Her 
singularity  lies  in  her  main  armament,  which  consists  of  three 
15-inch  pneumatic  guns,  mounted  parallel  to  each  other  in  the 
keel  line,  with  a  fixed  elevation  of  eighteen  degrees.  The 
muzzles  project  from  the  deck  at  a  distance  of  37  feet  from  the 
bow.  The  contract  conditions  were  that  thirty  shells,  each 
containing  200-lb.  of  dynamite,  were  to  be  carried ;  that  the 
guns  were  to  fire  one  shell  each  every  two  minutes  ;  and  that 
the  range  was  to  be  at  least  one  mile.    The  projectiles  were 


APPENDIX  III. 


285 


not  to  tumble  in  the  air,  to  break  up,  or  to  explode  prematurely, 
and  at  least  half  the  shots  were  to  hit  a  target,  50  feet  by 
150  feet. 

Since  the  ship  was  designed  the  gun  has  been  greatly 
improved,  and,  as  it  may  have  a  great  future  before  it,  it  merits 
a  detailed  examination.  Its  chief  advantage  is  that  it  can 
discharge  shells  loaded  with  the  highest  explosives  with  great 
speed  and  perfect  safety  from  premature  explosions  in  the 
gun.  Compressed  air  is  the  propulsive  agent,  which  starts 
the  projectile  gently  without  raising  the  temperature  inside  the 
bore  to  a  great  heat.  The  weapon  is  simple,  and  is  free  from 
the  uncertainty  which  damaged  powder  causes,  and  which  has 
led  to  the  loss  of  more  than  one  ship.  As  the  initial  velocity 
is  low  there  is  no  strain  on  the  gun,  but  on  the  other  hand, 
the  trajectory  being  very  high,  the  range  must  be  accurately 
known,  as  otherwise  the  projectile  will  pass  over  or  fall  short 
of  the  attacked  ship.  The  shells  can  be  fired  at  the  rate  of 
one  a  minute  or  rather  less,  and  are  of  four  sizes,  containing 
respectively  5001b.,  3501b.,  20olb.,  and  ioolb.  of  explosive. 
It  is  supposed  that  the  explosion  of  20olb.  of  dynamite,  even 
at  a  distance  of  fifty  feet  from  a  ship  would  disable  her,  though 
experiments  made  in  England  make  this  more  than  doubtful. 
Should  the  shell  fall  short  and  strike  the  water,  a  delayed- 
action  fuse  will  prevent  its  explosion  till  it  touches  the  ship's 
side,  which,  having  a  very  flat  trajectory  in  the  water,  it  is  very 
likely  to  do.  Any  such  hit  would  certainly  disable  the  most 
powerful  vessel  afloat,  even  if  it  did  not  prove  instantly  fatal. 
In  a  preliminary  trial  during  May,  1891,  against  a  stationary 
target,  the  Vesuvius,  moving  slowly,  made  78  per  cent,  of  hits, 
rejecting  errors  due  to  a  bad  system  of  firing;  and  when  the 
target  was  towed  at  the  rate  of  10  knots  across  her  bows  the 
practice  was  good,  though  the  Vesuvius  herself  was  steaming 
17  knots.  In  a  later  trial  against  a  target  representing  the 
Philadelphia,  at  ranges  varying  from  2000  to  1000  yards,  the 
average  for  the  three  guns  was  44  per  cent.,  the  practice  being 
best  at  the  longer  range.    The  middle  gun,  which  had  received 


286 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


certain  improvements,  performed  far  better  than  the  other 
two. 

As  the  danger  zone  for  a  ship  broadside  on  is  about  50  yards, 
the  best  method  of  employing  the  guns  is  to  train  them  with  a 
difference  of  50  yards  between  each,  when  a  total  error  of  150 
yards  in  guessing  the  range  will  be  allowed  for,  and  if  fired  at 
once  one  projectile  should  strike  the  target.  The  shells  take 
twelve  seconds  to  cover  3000  yards — the  extreme  range — 
and  thus,  before  firing,  the  position  which  the  enemy  will 
occupy  twelve  seconds  after  the  discharge  must  be  known. 
It  would  not  be  difficult  for  a  fast  enemy,  by  turning  rapidly, 
changing  her  direction,  and  varying  her  speed,  to  baffle  the 
dynamiter,  though  against  a  fleet  which  cannot  suddenly  alter 
direction,  and  vary  speed  without  considerable  danger  of  con- 
fusion, the  weapon  might  be  effective.  "The  accuracy  of  fire 
was  remarkable/'  says  Lieutenant  Hanus,  "  and  the  perfection  of 
the  system  is  only  a  question  of  time/'  The  United  States 
Navy  Board  held  that  the  weapon  was  "  of  decided  value." 
Practically,  it  is  a  torpedo  projector  rather  than  a  gun,  and 
possibly  the  dynamite-ship  might  take  the  place  of  the  torpedo 
boat  for  attacks  by  day  upon  a  fleet  of  large  ships,  as  it  has 
not  closely  to  approach  its  prospective  victim.  It  would  pro- 
bably be  useful  for  counter-mining,  bombarding,  and  for  coast 
defence,  but  on  shipboard,  if  the  vessel  which  carries  it  is  not 
to  act  solely  by  surprise,  and  is  to  face  quick-firers,  guns  and 
loading  stations  should  be  protected  by  armour,  as  the  explo- 
sion of  a  small  shell  near  one  of  the  dynamite  projectiles 
would  certainly  cause  a  horrible  catastrophe.  It  is  generally 
agreed  that  the  Vesuvius  is  too  small,  and  hitherto  her  type 
has  not  been  reproduced. 

From  this  novel  craft  we  recur  to  the  more  conventional 
cruiser.  In  1888  two  more  of  this  type — the  Philadelphia 
and  San  Francisco — were  laid  down,  which  differ  slightly  in 
detail,  but  are  generally  similar,  displacing  upwards  of 
4000  tons  each.  Each  is  armed  with  twelve  6-inch  guns,  of 
which  four  fire  ahead  and  astern,  and  six  on  the  broadside. 


APPENDIX  III. 


287 


The  Philadelphia  is  slightly  the  larger,,  and  has  a  thicker  deck 
than  the  San  Francisco,  4  inches  against  3  inches  on  the  slopes, 
and  2-j  inches  against  2  inches  on  the  flat ;  but  in  speed  the  San 
Francisco  is  faster,  having  done  20*2  knots  against  her  rival's 
19*7.  Two  smaller  sister-ships,  the  Raleigh  and  Cincinnati, 
commenced  in  1889  and  1890,  followed.  They  are  of  3183 
tons,  with  a  speed  of  19  knots;  their  battery  consists  of  one 
6-inch  gun  and  ten  4-inch  quick-firers,  of  which  the  6-inch 
and  two  4-inch  guns  fire  ahead,  the  6-inch  and  five 
4-inch  on  the  broadside,  and  four  4-inch  astern.  The  deck 
is  2\  inches  on  the  slopes,  and  1  inch  on  the  flat.  The 
coal  supply  is  very  insufficient,  and  the  type  has 
been  severely  criticised  by  American  naval  officers.  The 
Detroit,  Montgomery,  and  Marblehead,  laid  down  in  1890, 
are  still  smaller  and  even  more  unsatisfactory  craft,  coming 
midway  between  the  gunboat  and  the  cruiser.  They  displace 
2000  tons,  steam  18  knots,  are  armed  with  nine  5-inch  quick- 
firers,  and  carry  decks  less  than  half-an-inch  thick. 

Perhaps  the  finest  unarmoured  cruiser  possessed  by  the 
United  States  is  the  Olympia,  laid  down  in  1890.  She 
displaces  5800  tons,  and  combines  in  a  high  degree  offensive 
and  defensive  qualities.  Forward  and  aft,  in  two  hooded 
barbettes,  plated  with  4-inch  steel,  are  four  8-inch  guns  mounted 
in  pairs  26  feet  above  the  water,  and  between  them,  in  a  high 
superstructure  behind  2-inch  steel,  are  ten  5-inch  quick-firers, 
firing  four  ahead  or  astern  and  five  on  the  broadside.  There 
are  two  fixed  and  four  training  torpedo  tubes ;  two  masts, 
each  with  two  tops  and  a  light  fore  and  aft  rig ;  and  a 
protective  deck  4-J  inches  thick  on  the  slopes  amidships,  and 
elsewhere  from  3  inches  to  2  inches  The  8-inch  barbettes  are 
connected  with  this  deck  by  tubes  of  3-inch  steel.  From  the 
armour  deck  to  a  height  of  4  feet  above  the  water-line  is  a  series 
of  cofferdams  packed  with  cellulose.  The  trial  speed  was  2i\ 
knots,  with  about  17,000  horse-power,  so  that  at  sea  she  may 
be  expected  to  do  20  knots.  Of  coal  1300  tons  are  stowed, 
which  is  sufficient  for  13,000  knots  steaming.     There  is  a 

Vol.  ii,  .  U 


288 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


double  bottom  throughout ;  and  the  accommodation  for 
officers  and  men  is  excellent.  She  compares  most  favourably 
with  our  Eclipse,  which  is  of  about  the  same  displace- 
ment, but  inferior  in  speed  and  armament.  Her  cost  was 
£477,000  complete. 

In  1890  and  1891,  two  cruisers  of  a  new  type,  the  Columbia 
and  Minneapolis^  known  as  commerce-destroyers  or  "  pirates," 
were  laid  down.  As  their  name  denotes,  their  primary  object 
is  to  prey  upon  trade,  and  they  are  given  an  armament  so 
feeble  that  they  can  scarcely  hope  to  encounter  any  ordinary 
protected  cruiser  of  their  size  with  success.  As  a  consequence 
of  their  weak  battery,  and  to  overtake  merchant  steamers, 
they  have  very  powerful  engines,  triple  screws,  and  a  high 
nominal  speed.  The  Columbia  has  done  22'8  knots,  and  the 
Minneapolis  23*07,  on  trial.  They  are  ships  of  8050  tons 
displacement,  of  41  \\  feet  length.  Except  for  their  armament 
and  protective  deck,  they  resemble  very  closely  in  build  an 
Atlantic  liner.  They  have  light  masts  without  tops,  and  a 
battery  of  two  6-inch  guns  placed  forward  and  firing  right 
ahead,  one  8-inch  gun  astern,  and  eight  4-inch  quick-firers  in 
sponsons,  four  firing  ahead,  astern,  or  on  either  broadside. 
The  protective  deck  is  4inches  thick  on  the  slopes,  and  2-i  inches 
on  the  flat  ;  there  is  also  a  cellulose-packed  cofferdam  sur- 
rounding the  ship.  The  horse-power  is  21,000,  and  2450  tons 
of  coal  can  be  stowed,  giving  a  very  large  radius  of  action. 
The  type  has  been  sharply  criticised,  in  particular  by  Rear- 
Admiral  Meade  of  the  United  States'  Navy,  who  considers 
these  ships  no  faster  than  the  swift  liner,  and  not  con- 
spicuously better  for  fighting  than  an  armed  merchant 
steamer.  They  are  weak,  expensive,  and  not  too  fast,  as 
their  trial  speed  is  mythical  more  or  less,  in  the  sense  that  it 
was  obtained  on  a  light  draught,  and  can  never  be  realised 
again.  On  a  recent  run  from  Southampton  to  New  York  the 
Columbia  averaged  18*41  knots  an  hour,  with  picked  coal  and 
immense  exertion  on  the  part  of  her  crew.  When  she  reached 
New  York  her  boilers  were  at  their  last  gasp,  and  her  crew 


APPENDIX  III. 


289 


exhausted.  The  performance  is  no  better  than  the  run  of  the 
Blenheim  from  Madeira  at  the  rate  of  21  knots,  and  the 
Blenheim 's  battery  could  blow  the  Columbia  out  of  the  water. 
Certainly  the  commerce-destroyer  does  not  commend  itself  to 
English  critics. 

In  1891,  two  small  cruisers,  the  Machias  and  Castine,  a 
number  of  peace  service  gunboats,  and  one  torpedo  gunboat 
of  750  tons  and  23  knots  speed  were  laid  down.  The  Machias 
and  Castine  were  found  deficient  in  stability  when  completed, 
and  have  been  lengthened  and  altered. 

After  thus  tracing  the  progress  of  the  unarmoured  ship  in 
the  United  States,  it  now  remains  to  go  back  some  years  and 
follow  the  development  of  the  armourclad.  The  five  double 
turret  monitors  were  taken  vigorously  in  hand  in  1886,  and, 
being  remodelled  entirely,  were  converted  into  powerful  vessels 
for  coast  defence.  The  A?nphitrite,  Miantonomoh)  Monadnock^ 
and  Terror \  each  displace  3990  tons,  and  carry  four  10-inch 
breech-loaders  in  two  turrets  behind  n^-inch  plating,  the  first 
and  the  third  having  in  addition  two  4-inch  quick-firers. 
The  speed  varies  from  10  to  14  knots  with  the  new  engines 
supplied.  The  Puritan,  of  6060  tons,  carries  four  12-inch 
guns  in  two  turrets  behind  14-inch  armour,  has  six  4-inch 
quick-firers,  and  steams  12  knots. 

In  1886,  Congress  sanctioned  the  construction  of  two  sea- 
going armoured  vessels,  double-bottomed,  displacing  about 
6000  tons  each,  and  steaming  16  knots.  Designs  for  these 
vessels  were  invited  from  English  as  well  as  American  ship- 
builders, and  thus  by  entering  late  upon  the  field,  and  bv 
making  the  fullest  use  of  foreign  experience,  the  United  States' 
government  was  able  to  avoid  mistakes  which  had  been  made 
in  England  France,  and  Italy.  Of  the  two  ships,  one 
was  to  be  a  battleship,  and  the  other,  though  virtuallv  a 
battleship,  by  the  specification  an  armoured  cruiser.  For 
the  battleship  Texas,  the  design  of  the  English  Barrow 
Shipbuilding  Company  was  accepted,  and  the  vessel  was 
laid  down  in  1889.    For  the  cruiser  Maine,  an  American 

U  2 


290 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


Navy  Department  design  was  preferred,  and  she  was  laid 
down  in  1888. 

The  Maine  is  an  enlarged  copy  of  the  Brazilian  Riachuelo, 
a  ship  which  had  at  that  date  attracted  some  attention.  She 
has  two  turrets  placed  en  echelon,  plated  with  8-inch  armour, 
and  carrying  four  10-inch  guns.  Each  turret  stands  upon  a 
separate  redoubt  plated  with  10-inch  steel.  The  four  heavy  guns 
fire  right  ahead  and  right  astern,  whilst  on  the  broadside  they 
can  be  brought  to  bear  through  an  arc  of  about  fifty-seven 
degrees.  The  auxiliary  battery  comprises  six  6-inch  guns, 
placed  two  forward,  two  astern,  and  two  on  the  superstructure 
amidships.  On  the  water-line  is  a  belt  of  armour  180  feet  long 
and  1 1  inches  thick  at  the  upper  edge  ;  above  which  is  the  usual 
armour  deck  4  inches  and  2  inches  thick.  The  trial  speed  was 
19-9  knots  on  a  draught  of  6650  tons.  The  ship  is  unrigged, 
having  two  military  masts,  and  two  funnels. 

The  Texas  is  similar  in  many  respects,  except  that  whilst 
the  Maine  is  a  fairly  satisfactory  ship,  the  Texas  has  proved 
wholly  unsatisfactory.  She  is  of  the  "  echeloned  "  turret-ship 
type,  having  a  diagonal  breastwork  across  the  ship  plated 
with  12-inch  armour,  on  which  stand  the  two  turrets,  similarly 
protected,  and  each  armed  with  one  12-inch  gun.  The  breast- 
work does  not  descend  to  the  armour  deck,  or  to  the  belt 
which,  12  inches  thick,  covers  one  half  of  the  water-line;  but 
coal  bunkers  afford  a  measure  of  safety.  The  disposition  of  the 
heavy  guns  is  faulty,  as  in  spite  of  the  diagonal  arrangement, 
only  one  12-inch  weapon  can  fire  right  ahead  or  right  astern, 
and  on  either  broadside  the  arc  of  one  gun  is  very  limited. 
Four  6-inch  guns  are  placed  in  separate  sponsons,  one  on  each 
bow  and  quarter,  and  two  more  are  carried  on  the  super- 
structure. There  are  two  military  masts  and  one  funnel ;  the 
speed  is  17  knots.  The  hull  of  the  ship  has  proved  too  weak, 
some  of  her  frames  having  buckled  up  in  dock.  In  1896 
her  bulkheads  were  found  to  be  far  from  water-tight,  and  she 
sank  in  dry  dock.  Too  much  was  probably  aimed  at  on  a 
displacement  of  6300  tons. 


APPENDIX  III. 


In  1889  the  coast-defence  ship  Monterey,  of  4130  tons,  was 
laid  down.  She  is  a  low  free-board  monitor,  carrying  two 
turrets  plated  with  8-inch  and  7^-inch  armour,  and  standing 
upon  redoubts  armoured  with  14  inches  and  \\\  inches  of 
steel.  The  fore  turret  contains  two  12-inch,  the  after  turret 
two  1  o-inch  guns.  There  is  a  complete  belt  of  armour  on  the 
water-line,  tapering  from  18  inches  amidships  to  6  inches  at 
the  ends,  a  3-inch  deck,  and  large  water-ballast  tanks  which 
render  it  easy  to  lower  her  freeboard  for  battle.  Her  speed 
is  very  moderate,  not  exceeding  14  knots,  but  she  is  a  most 
formidable  vessel  for  coast-defence  work. 

The  armoured  cruiser  New  York,  commenced  in  1890,  is  of 
very  different  type.  She  is  a  twin-screw  vessel  of  8150  tons, 
with  a  trial  speed  of  21  knots,  and  a  powerful  and  well- 
protected  armament.  Fore  and  aft  she  has  two  pairs  of  8-inch 
guns  mounted  in  turrets  behind  5^-inch  armour,  standing  upon 
small  redoubts  plated  with  1  o-inch  steel,  and  connected  bv 
armoured  tubes  with  the  magazines.  Amidships,  on  either 
beam,  is  an  8-inch  gun  sponsoned  out,  and  protected  only  by  a 
shield.  Thus  four  8-inch  guns  fire  axially  and  five  on  the  broad- 
side. On  the  main  deck  are  twelve  4-inch  quick-firers  in 
sponsonSj  four  firing  ahead  or  astern  and  six  on  the  broadside. 
There  are  three  funnels  and  two  military  masts  with  numerous 
tops.  Protection  on  the  water-line  is  given  bv  a  belt  of 
nickel-steel  5  inches  thick,  including  the  inner  skin,  for  170  feet 
amidships,  and  this  is  supplemented  by  cofferdams.  The 
armour-deck  is  6  inches  thick  on  the  slope,  and  3  inches  on  the 
flat.  The  vessel  verges  on  the  battleship  ;  she  has  been  called  a 
cruiser  destroyer,  and  with  reason,  as  she  is  faster  and 
stronger  than  most  vessels  of  her  size  and  class.  The  radius 
of  action  is  about  6600  miles. 

Three  large  battleships,  the  Indiana,  Oregon,  and  Massa- 
chusetts, were  the  next  laid  down,  in  1891  ;  officially  classed 
as  "  coast-line  battleships,' '  they  may  for  all  practical  purposes 
be  regarded  as  sea-going.  They  displace  10,300  tons,  and 
were  expressly  designed  to  face  "vessels  carrying  the  heaviest 


292 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


guns  and  armour."  The  battery  which  they  carry  is  a  very 
powerful  one,  though,  as  is  the  case  with  certain  of  the  United 
States  cruisers,  there  is  an  unnecessary  multiplicity  of  calibres. 
All  the  guns  of  any  size  are  very  thoroughly  protected  by 
armour.  Fore  and  aft  are  two  pairs  of  13-inch  60-ton  guns  in 
turrets,  with  a  command  of  17^  feet.  The  weapons  can  be 
loaded  in  any  position,  and  need  not,  as  in  our  Royal 
Sovereigns,  be  brought  back  to  a  fixed  position.  On  the  super- 
structure between  these  turrets,  at  a  height  of  24!  feet  from  the 
water,  are  four  more  turrets,  each  containing  a  pair  of  8-inch 
guns  ;  and  on  the  main  deck  are  four  6-inch  weapons  in  case- 
mates, which  are  protected  by  5-inch  armour.  This  disposition 
of  the  artillery  should  enable  a  very  heavy  fire  to  be 
concentrated  upon  any  given  point,  as  these  figures  will 
show : 

13-in.  8-in.  6-in. 

C  Ahead  or  astern    2    4    2 


Guns 
bearing 


Broadside    4    4    2 

Bow  or  quarter   2    2    1 


Unfortunately,  as  is  so  often  the  case  with  warships,  the 
tests  of  practice  have  dispelled  the  hopes  of  theory.  An 
observer  was  placed  at  the  sighting  hood  of  the  Indiana' 's 
turret  containing  the  13-inch  guns,  and  then  the  8-inch  weapons 
were  fired  at  various  angles  forward.  Between  50  and  70 
degrees  forward  from  the  beam  the  effect  of  their  blast  was 
decidedly  unpleasant ;  at  80  degrees  it  was  sufficient  to  show 
that  with  a  greater  angle  it  would  be  practically  impossible  to 
lay  the  13-inch  guns.  Though  no  material  injury  was  inflicted 
upon  the  observer,  he  recommended  that  stops  should  be  fitted 
to  the  8-inch  turrets  to  prevent  a  greater  train  than  80  degrees. 
Thus  the  four  8-inch  guns  lose  their  axial  fire,  but  they  still 
command  a  wide  angle.  Another  experiment  was  the  training 
of  the  13-inch  weapons  in  the  after  turret  at  the  extreme  angle 
forward,  thus  firing  past  one  of  the  6-inch  casemates.  The 
effect  of  this  shot  would  have  been  to  kill  or  injure  the  crew 
of  the  6-inch  gun,  had  men  been  stationed  there.    The  arcs  of 


APPENDIX    III.  293 

the  heavy  guns  thus  interfere  with  one  another  to  a  dangerous 
extent  ;  on  British  ships  where  these  matters  have  been  care- 
fully studied  and  thought  out,  this  is  not  the  case.  It  must, 
however,  be  admitted  that  the  13-inch  guns  were  fired  fore  and 
aft  without  elevation,  and  that  the  injury  to  the  ship  was  very 
small.  There  are  few  British  battleships  which  could  do  this 
without  blowing  in  their  decks,  or  inflicting  on  themselves 
serious  damage. 

The  defensive  qualities  of  the  Indiana  are  fully  equal  to,  if 
indeed  they  do  not  exceed,  her  offensive  qualities.  The 
13-inch  turrets  are  plated  with  15-inch  Harveved  steel  and  the 
redoubts  upon  which  they  stand  with  1  7  inches  ;  the  8-inch  guns 
are  behind  6-inch  plates,  and  rest  on  8-inch  plated  redoubts. 
As  the  8-inch  turrets  do  not,  like  the  turrets  for  the  heavier 
guns,  stand  upon  cylindrical  redoubts  descending  to  the  pro- 
tective deck,  their  bases  are  plated  with  2-inch  steel,  and  there 
is  a  3-inch  ammunition  shaft  to  the  magazine  directly  below 
that  deck.  On  the  water  line  is  a  steel  belt  196  feet  long, 
7i  feet  wide,  and  18  inches  thick  at  its  upper  edge,  but  tapering 
below  the  water-line.  On  this  is  placed  a  3-inch  armour  deck  ; 
and  to  protect  the  upper  works  of  the  ship  a  belt  of  5-inch  steel 
with  10  feet  of  coal  behind  it  is  carried  up  to  the  level  of  the 
upper  decks  between  the  main  turrets.  Care  has  been  taken 
to  keep  the  muzzles  of  the  heavy  guns  quite  clear  of  the  deck, 
and  thus  to  enable  them  to  fire  ahead  with  a  minimum  of 
damage  to  the  ship.  There  is  one  military  mast  with  a  stair- 
way and  ammunition  hoist,  placed  forward  above  the  conning 
tower.  The  coal  bunkers  are  large  enough  to  contain  1800 
tons,  though  the  normal  supply  is  only  400  tons  ;  the  sea 
speed  is  to  be  15  knots. 

The  defects  of  this  redoubtable  class — for  no  ship  is  perfect 
— appears  to  be  :  first,  the  low  freeboard,  which  is  only  12  feet 
forward,  and  which  would  prevent  the  foremost  13-inch  guns 
from  firing  ahead  in  anything  of  a  sea  ;  second,  the  low  speed, 
which  will  be  yet  lower  when  a  full  supply  of  coal  is  on  board ; 
third,  the  absence  of  a  powerful  quick-firing  armament  of  medium 


294 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


calibre,  such  as  is  carried  on  all  modern  battleships  ;  and  fourth, 
the  complicated  armament,  the  8-inch  guns  being,  in  the  opinion 
of  many  officers,  a  source  of  trouble  and  an  unnecessary  inter- 
mediary between  the  6-inch  and  the  13-inch  weapons.  They 
would,  however,  be  very  effective  against  thin  armour,  such  as 
is  coming  into  fashion  for  the  upper  works,  and  their  great 
height  of  command  would  enable  them  to  fire  with  the  best 
effect.  The  arrangements  for  ammunition  supply  appears  to 
be  excellent ;  the  hoist  direct  to  the  breech  of  each  gun  would 
obviate  confusion.  The  three  are  superior  to  the  Royal 
Sovereign  in  the  full  protection  given  to  each  gun,  and  in  the 
armament  carried,  though  the  higher  freeboard,  simpler 
armament,  greater  ammunition  supply  and  increased  speed  of 
the  English  ships  would  reduce  this  advantage  in  a  protracted 
action  during  bad  weather. 

A  harbour-defence  ram,  the  Katahdin,  generally  similar  to 
the  Polyphemus,  was  also  laid  down  in  1891.  She  displaces 
2183  tons,  and  was  designed  to  steam  17  knots  an  hour,  a 
speed  which,  in  practice,  she  has  failed  to  attain.  Her  free- 
board is  low,  and  she  must  be  an  uncomfortable  craft  as  she 
has  no  superstructure  in  which  to  house  her  crew.  She  has  a 
curving  upper  deck  6  inches  thick  on  the  slopes  and  2^  inches  on 
the  flat,  but  is,  when  her  ballast-tanks  are  filled,  almost  flush 
with  the  water.  On  her  conning-tower  is  18-inch  armour,  and 
her  funnel  and  ventilator-shafts  are  also  protected.  She 
carries  neither  heavy  guns  nor  torpedo-tubes,  trusting  solely 
to  her  chisel-shaped  ram  for  offence.  It  is  not  obvious  how  a 
comparatively  slow  vessel  is  to  ram  modern  battleships  faster 
than  herself. 

In  1893  an  armoured  cruiser,  the  Brooklyn,  and  a  battleship, 
the  Iowa,  were  placed  on  the  stocks.  The  Brooklyn  is  an 
improvement  upon  the  New  York,  and  displaces  9100  tons.  Her 
main  armament  is  composed  of  eight  8-inch  guns  mounted  in 
four  turrets  behind  8-inch  and  5-i-inch  armour.  The  turrets  are 
disposed  lozenge-wise  in  the  French  fashion,  and  thus  six  8-inch 
guns  fire  ahead,  astern,  or  on  the  broadside.    As  an  auxiliary 


APPENDIX  III. 


295 


battery  there  are  twelve  5-inch  quick-firers  in  armoured  case- 
mates, four  firing  axially  and  six  on  the  beam.  The  freeboard 
is  higher  than  on  the  New  York,  and  there  is  a  forecastle  on 
which  is  placed  the  foremost  turret.  The  funnels,  three  in 
number,  are  immensely  tall,  rising  100  feet  from  the  furnaces, 
but  the  masts  are  dwarfed  into  two  low  iron  towers  each  with 
two  tops,  thus  somewhat  injuring  the  appearance  of  the 
ship.  On  the  water  line  is  a  belt  of  steel  170  feet  long  and 
4|-  inches  thick,  including  the  inner  skin.  The  deck  is  of 
the  same  thickness  as  on  the  New  York.  The  speed  on  trial 
was  21*9  knots  with  a  displacemeut  of  about  8000  tons. 

The  Iowa  differs  from  the  Indiana  class  in  these  respects  : 
she  has  a  higher  freeboard  forward ;  her  heavy  guns  are  1 2-inch 
in  calibre  instead  of  13-inch;  the  four6-inch weapons  give wayto 
six  4-inch  quick-firers ;  the  extent  of  water-line  protected  is 
greater,  being  77-A-  per  cent,  against  the  Indiana }s  66  ;  the 
coal-supply  and  displacement  are  augmented  ;  and  the  side 
armour,  owing  to  the  satisfactory  results  given  by  experiments 
with  Harveyed  plates,  is  reduced  in  thickness  from  18-inch  to 
14-inch.  The  high  military  mast  becomes  a  stunted  tower,  the 
two  funnels  on  the  contrary  grow  taller ;  and  the  8-inch  turrets 
are  moved  a  little  nearer  the  ship's  side,  and  a  little  further  from 
the  keel-line.  The  six  4-inch  guns  are  mounted,  two  in  case- 
mates forward,  two  in  casemates  amidships,  and  two  on  the 
after  end  of  the  superstructure,  behind  shields.  The  speed  is 
to  be  a  knot  higher  than  the  Indiana 's. 

Hitherto  the  American  battleships  have  revealed  no  new 
feature,  but  have  reproduced  the  patterns  of  old,  worn-out 
Europe,  with  certain  notable  improvements  ;  the  Indiana 
class,  for  instance,  at  once  recalling  the  Royal  Sovereigns. 
In  the  two  battleships  Kearsarge  and  Kentucky,  whose  keel 
plates  were  laid  in  1896,  there  is  a  novel  feature — the  double- 
storied  turret.  There  are  two  of  these  placed  forward  and  aft 
in  the  centre  line.  In  the  lower  story  of  each,  behind 
Harveyed  steel  17  inches  to  15  inches  thick,  is  a  pair  of  13-inch 
guns  ;  in  the  upper  story,  which  is  smaller,  and  a  little  to  the  rear 


296 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


of  the  lower,  is  a  pair  of  8-inch  weapons  behindg-inch  and  1  i-inch 
steel.  An  armoured  redoubt  connects  the  lower  story  of  each 
turret  with  the  protective  deck.  Between  the  two  turrets  is  a 
casemate  plated  with  6-inch  armour,  containing  fourteen  5-inch 
quick-firers,  seven  of  which  bear  on  either  broadside ;  and 
each  gun  is  isolated  by  2-inch  splinter  screens.  On  the  water- 
line  is  a  belt  extending  from  the  after  barbette  to  the  ram  ;  it 
is  7-|-feet  deep  and  1 6^  inches  thick  amidships  at  its  upper  edge, 
but  from  the  fore  barbette  it  quickly  tapers  down  to  4  inches  at 
the  ram.  Above  this  main  belt,  between  the  turrets,  is  5-inch 
armour  extending  to  the  lower  edge  of  the  casemate  plating. 
A  protective  deck  2-|  inches  thick  rests  on  the  upper  edge  of  the 
main  belt,  sloping  down  under  water  forward  and  aft,  where  its 
thickness  is  increased  to  3  inches  and  5  inches.  Cofferdams 
packed  with  cellulose,  and  coal  bunkers  give  yet  further  pro- 
tection. The  conning-tower  has  10-inch  armour,  and  a  tube 
plated  with  7-inch  steel  leads  the  voice-pipes,  telegraphs,  and 
steering-rods  to  the  protective  deck.  There  are  two  engines, 
between  them  developing  10,000  horse-power,  with  moderate 
forced  draught,  and  driving  the  ship  at  a  pace  of  16  knots.  With 
410  tons  of  coal  the  displacement  will  be  11,500  tons,  but 
there  is  bunker  space  for  12 10  tons,  and  about  500  tons  more 
could  be  carried  in  bags.  The  ammunition  supply  is  fair — 
for  the  13-inch  guns  200  rounds  are  carried  ;  for  the  8-inch, 
500  ;  and  for  the  5-inch,  3500.  There  are  two  funnels,  and 
two  military  masts,  each  with  two  tops. 

As  fighting  machines,  these  two  vessels  are  most  remark- 
able. The  double  turret  gives  extraordinary  concentration  of 
fire,  and  the  effect  of  four  projectiles,  whose  total  weight  is 
27001b.,  striking  simultaneously  would  be  terrific.  The  bases 
of  the  8-inch  turrets  are  well  protected  by  the  lower  story,  so 
that  there  is  no  possibility  of  bringing  them  down  by 
concentrating  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  lower  works,  as  could  be 
done,  perhaps,  against  the  Indiana  or  Iowa.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  double  turret  is  a  big  target  ;  the  ammunition  hoists 
to  the  upper  story  must  necessarily  cramp  the  working  of  the 


APPENDIX  HI. 


297 


13-inch  guns  ;  all  four  guns  must  fire  in  one  direction  and  at 
one  common  target ;  and  a  single  lucky  hit  might  silence  half 
the  ship's  main  armament.  It  also  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  in  practice  it  will  be  found  easy  to  work  and  fire  all 
four  guns  at  once.  Compromises,  however,  are  always 
necessary  at  sea,  whereas  all  critics  tend  to  compare  the  ship 
criticised  with  an  unattainable  ideal  in  which  protection, 
speed,  armament,  and  the  distribution  of  armament,  are  the 
best  imaginable.  Contrasted  with  the  English  Majestic  of 
nearly  4000  tons  greater  displacement,  the  American 
Kearsarge  shows  no  great  inferiority ;  and,  supposing  her 
guns  to  be  of  the  latest  pattern,  her  artillery  will  be  far  more 
powerful.  The  recurrence  from  the  12-inch  to  the  13-inch  gun 
is  an  instructive  incident  in  the  battle  of  calibres,  and  points  to 
the  fact  that  the  very  heavy  weapon  is  still  considered,  in  the 
States  at  least,  an  essential  of  the  battleship.  In  a  trial  against 
a  target  representing  the  Iowa's  side,  a  12-inch  projectile  failed 
to  perforate  a  plate  izj-inches  thick,  whereas  the  13-inch  shot  went 
clean  through,  with  1800  feet-seconds  initial  velocity.  The 
thicker  plating  of  the  Kearsarge  is  probably  due  to  the  wish 
to  make  her  vitals  proof  against  the  heaviest  guns.  The 
amount  of  unarmoured  surface  left  open  to  the  attack  of  light 
guns  is  very  small,  and  the  extension  of  the  belt  forward  to 
the  ram,  shows  that  the  United  States  officers  are  aware  of 
the  great  injury  to  the  manoeuvring  qualities  of  the  ship 
which  a  chance  hit  or  two  forward  might  inflict.  In  the 
newest  English  battleships,  also,  the  forward  end  of  the  ship 
is  receiving  thin  armour  on  the  water-line. 

The  double  turret  has  been  abandoned  in  the  latest 
American  battleships,  and  is  evidently  in  some  danger  of 
rejection  even  on  board  the  Kearsarge  and  Kentucky.  It  is, 
in  fact,  a  development  in  the  wrong  direction,  much  as  was 
the  "  echeloned  "  turret-ship,  tending  to  the  over-concentra- 
tion of  armament.  In  the  three  new  ships,  Alabama, 
Wisconsin,  and  Illinois,  laid  down  in  1896,  the  8-inch  weapons, 
intermediate  in  calibre  between  the  heavy  guns  and  the  large 


298 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


quick-firers,  disappear,  and  the  battery  is  composed  of  four 
13-inch  guns  and  fourteen  6-inch  quick-firers,  besides  smaller 
weapons.  The  13-inch  guns  are  mounted  fore  and  aft  in  two 
turrets,  which  are  protected  by  armour  from  17  inches  to  15 
inches  thick.  These,  again,  stand  upon  redoubts  which  have 
plating  from  10  inches  to  15  inches  thick.  The  6-inch  quick- 
firers  are  distributed:  twelve  on  the  main  deck,  in  a  long  battery 
protected  by  5-i  inches  of  steel,  with  splinter  screens  of  i^-inch 
steel  ;  two  on  the  upper  deck,  in  as  many  casemates,  with  the 
same  thickness  of  armour.  Four  6-inch  and  two  13-inch  guns 
fire  ahead  or  astern  ;  seven  6-inch  and  four  13-inch  on  either 
broadside.  The  hull  is  protected  by  a  belt  of  armour  7J  feet 
wide,  extending  from  the  after  turret  to  the  ram.  The 
extreme  thickness  amidships  over  the  engines  and  boilers  is 
16^-  inches,  whence  it  gradually  tapers  down  to  4  inches  at  the 
ram.  Above  the  thick  armour  belt  amidships  a  thinner  plating  of 
5^-inch  steel  extends  to  the  armour  of  the  6-inch  battery.  Thus, 
from  below  the  water-line  to  the  level  of  the  upper  deck,  the 
Alabama  class,  like  the  Kearsarge,  is  well  protected.  The 
armour  deck  is  5  inches  thick  on  the  slopes,  and  2\  inches  on 
the  flat.  A  cellulose  belt  runs  the  whole  length  of  the  water- 
line  to  assure  flotation.  The  freeboard  will  be  midway 
between  that  of  the  Indiana  and  Iowa.  The  engines  are  to 
give  the  ships  a  speed  of  16  knots,  and  1200  tons  of 
coal  can  be  carried  in  the  bunkers.  The  allowance  of 
ammunition  is  good  —  fifty  rounds  are  carried  for  each  of 
the  13-inch  guns;  200  for  each  of  the  6-inch;  and  625  for 
each  6-pounder. 

Comparing  the  Alabama  with  the  Kearsarge,  it  is  probable 
that  the  former  is  the  better  armed  ship.  The  weight  of  metal 
fired  in  one  discharge  from  the  Kearsarge1  s  broadside  is 
indeed  heavier,  but,  taking  into  account  the  greater  power  of 
the  Alabama1  s  quick-firers,  and  their  increased  rapidity  of 
discharge,  as  contrasted  with  the  Kearsarge 's  8-inch  weapons,  it 
seems  that  the  Alabama  would  in  a  given  time  fire  a  heavier 
weight,  whilst  the  average  perforation  and  power  of  each  shot 


APPENDIX  III. 


299 


would  be  greater.  The  following  figures,  which  are  only 
approximate,  will  show  the  difference  : 


Kearsarge 


Alabama. 


No.  of  Rounds 
No.  of  Guns    fired  by  each 
Gun  in 
minutes. 

I 


firing  on 

Calibre. 

Broadside. 

1 3 -in. 

...        4  ■ 

8-in. 

4  •• 

5-in. 

...      7  .. 

15  ■• 

13-in. 

4    •  • 

6-in. 

7 

11 

Perforation, 
through 
wrought-iron, 
of  each  Shot- 


Total  Weight 
of  Metal. 

44001b   34'6-in 

3                30001b   2o-6-in 

o                70001b   13'o-in 


14,4001b. 


1    44001b   34'6-in. 

15    10,5001b   16'4-in. 


i4,QOolb. 


Of  torpedo  boats  there  are  twenty-two  built  or  building, 
besides  one  old  vessel,  the  Alarm,  designed  by  Ericsson,  and 
now  of  little  value.  A  submarine  boat  of  138  tons  is  under 
construction.  She  is  78  feet  long,  and  12  feet  in  diameter,  cigar- 
shaped,  propelled  when  on  the  surface  by  steam,  and  when 
submerged  by  electricity.  She  has  fuel  for  16  hours'  steaming, 
and  power  in  her  accumulators  for  as  long  again.  Her  speed 
is  to  be  16  knots  when  beneath  the  surface. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider  the  United  States' 
navy  as  a  whole.  In  tabular  form  its  strength  may  be 
summarised  thus,  excluding  obsolete  and  valueless  ships: 


First-class  battleships 


<u  I  Second-class  battleships  .. 
o  \  Coast-defence  battleships.. 

r  J  Armoured  cruisers   

<    Ram   .-  


9  Commerce  destroyers  ...  2 

2  Cruisers,  over  4000  tons  6 

6           Cruisers,  2000-4000   8 

2  Cruisers,  under  2000  ...  8 

1           Torpedo  gunboat   1 

—          Dynamite  gunboat    1 

to          Torpedo  boats    22 

Submarine  boat    1 


49 


Small  though  this  force  is  on  paper,  it  is  the  creation  of  the 
last  ten  years,  and  therefore  new  and  homogeneous.  The 
aim  of  building  ships  individually  superior  to  any  European 


3o6 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


vessel  of  their  class  and  size  has  been  attained,  on  the  surface 
at  any  rate,  and  only  the  actual  trial  of  war  can  settle  the 
question  whether  with  a  given  weight  for  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion, it  is  better  to  have  more  guns  and  less  ammunition,  or 
fewer  guns  and  more  ammunition.  If  the  action  were  fought 
at  close  quarters  the  greater  number  of  guns,  as  in  the  war  of 
1812,  should  give  certain  victory,  but  here  we  can  only  ask, 
will  the  action  be  fought  at  close  quarters,  and  grope  for  an 
answer.  The  Japanese,  who  may  be  presumed  to  know  some- 
thing of  modern  war,  seem  to  prefer  the  English  system,  which 
does  not  endeavour  to  get  too  much  on  a  small  displacement. 
The  Majestic  has  only  268  tons  of  guns  to  15,000  tons  dis- 
placement, the  Kearsarge  335  tons  to  11,500  tons.  Ameri- 
can officers  are  amongst  the  severest  critics  of  their  own 
cruisers  ;  thus  Lieutenant  Niblack  asserts  :  "  We  unquestion- 
ably try  to  get  too  much  on  small  displacements.  We  cannot 
get  sustained  sea-speed  on  a  small  displacement.  ...  I 
cruised  practically  for  several  years  in  the  dynamo-room  of  a 
ship  at  a  temperature  of  about  90  degrees,  and  I  suffered 
physically  from  the  result.  Now  in  the  New  York,  it  is  esti- 
mated by  a  very  good  authority,  that  the  temperature  of  the 
berth-deck  will  be  110  degrees."  The  heat  in  the  stokeholds 
of  some  of  the  cruisers  is  reported  as  terrible.  On  the 
Cincinnati,  with  half  the  boilers  only  in  use,  it  reached 
a  high  figure,  though  with  fresh  ventilators  fitted  it  was  a  little 
better.  What  the  temperature  would  be  with  all  openings 
closed  for  action  and  forced  draught  in  use  may  be  left  to  the 
imagination.  Nor  is  this  a  small  thing.  The  stokehold  is  one 
of  the  most  important  quarters  of  the  ship  ;  the  efficiency  of 
the  machine  depends  upon  the  efficiency  of  the  men  who  are 
at  work  there;  and  the  rapid  exhaustion  of  stokers  would  be 
fraught  with  almost  inevitable  disaster.  "  With  a  crew  out  of 
condition  of  what  use  is  a  vessel?"  asks  the  officer  whose  words 
we  have  quoted  above.  And  the  number  of  engineers  recently 
disabled  by  service  under  these  painful  conditions  shows  that 
weakness  exists.     Nor  have  the  fast  cruisers  been  exempt 


APPEXDIX  III. 


301 


from  the  boiler  troubles  which  we  have  experienced.  The 
Columbia  on  her  run  could  not  use  forced  draught  for  the  last 
twenty-four  hours,  as  had  been  intended  "'because  of  the 
unreliability  of  the  boilers  (we  were  blowing  out  tubes  at 
140-lb.  pressure),  and  the  loose  state  of  the  engines."  It  may 
be  said  that  our  ships,  if  so  severely  tested,  would  cut  as  bad 
a  figure.  That  might  be  so,  but  there  are  indications  that 
they  can  in  practice  reach  their  trial  speeds,  which  few 
American  ships  can  do.  The  subdivision  of  the  United  States 
cruisers  is  also  found  fault  with,  and  in  one  or  two  instances 
they  are  unsatisfactory  gun  platforms.  The  Columbia  in  a 
moderate  gale  rolled  26  to  30  degrees,  in  spite  of  bilge-keels, 
and  at  times  her  heel  reached  35  degrees. 

Still  a  new  fleet  has  come  into  being,  and  it  is  a  good  fleet 
for  all  the  holes  that  can  be  picked  in  it.  The  United  States 
are  leading  the  world  in  the  manufacture  of  armour ;  their 
tests  are  more  thorough  than  ours  ;  and  the  reforged  Harveyed 
nickel-steel  plate  seems  better  than  any  made  in  Europe.  The 
country  has  regained  its  self-dependence,  and  there  are  clear 
indications  that  before  long  Yankee  ingenuity  will  be  a  for- 
midable competitor  to  England  and  France  in  the  trade  of 
building  warships.  The  American  officer  is  as  good  as  any  in 
the  world  ;  nor  is  there  any  country  where  more  attention  is 
given  to  science,  and  where  theory  is  more  happily  combined 
with  practice.  In  seamen  the  navy  is  weak  as  it  has  but  a 
small  trained  personnel,  and  that  little  is  polyglot.  But  the 
force  has  great  and  splendid  traditions,  and  we  Englishmen 
can  only  hope  that  if  ever  it  goes  forth  to  battle,  it  will  be  to 
battle  side  by  side  with  us  against  a  common  enemy 


APPENDIX  IV. 


Broadside. 
C  Warrior* 
(.Black  Prince 
f  Defence* 
(.Resistance  * 
{"Hector* 
1  Valiant* 

Research*  J 

Achilles 
f  Royal  Oak*  J 

Prince  Consort  *  + 
■>  Ocean* X 
J  Caledonia*  J 
L  Royal  Alfred  *  J 
rLord  Clyde* % 
(.Lord  Warden *J 
rZealous*| 
(.Repulse*  % 
f  Minotaur 
<  Agincourt 
(  Northumberland 


BRITISH  IRONCLADS 

Sea-going  Ships. 

Barbette. 


Central 
Battery. 


C  Enterprise* 
(.Favourite* 
Bellerophon 
Pallas*  % 
Penelope 
Hercules 
Invincible 
Audacious 
Vanguard  f 
L.Iron  Duke 
f  Swiftsure 
(.Triumph 
Sultan 
Alexandra 
Temeraire 
Superb 
f  Belleisle 
(.Orion 


Turret. 
Monarch 
Captain  f 
Devastation 
Thunderer 
Dreadnought 
Neptune 
Inflexible 
Ajax 

Agamemnon 
C  Colossus 


(.Edinburgh 
rNile 
(.Trafalgar 
rVictoriaf 
(.Sanspareil 
Hood 


Armoured 
Cruiser. 

Shannon 

C  Nelson 

(.Northampton 

C  Imperieuse 

(.Warspite 

Aurora 

Australia 

Galatea 

Immortalite 

Narcissus 

Orlando 

(.Undaunted 


*  Struck  off  Navy  List. 


Collingwood 
c  Howe 
i  Rodney 
Benbow 
c  Anson 
Camperdown 
Royal  Sovereign 
Empress  of  India 
Ramillies 
\  Repulse 
I  Revenge 

Resolution 
l  Royal  Oak 
j  Centurion 
(Barfleur 
Renown 
'Majestic 
Magnificent 
Prince  George 
Victorious 
Jupiter 
Mars 
Caesar 
Illustrious 
Hannibal 
New  ship 
New  ship 
.New  ship 
f  Albion 
Canopus 
Glory 
Goliath 
Ocean 
^Vengeance 
f  Lost  at  sea.  %  Wooden  hul 


Sister  ships  are  bracketed. 


APPENDIX  IV. 


303 


BRITISH     IRONCLAD  S — contd. 
Coast  Service  Ships. 


fGlatton** 
I  Meteor*t 
Thunder  *t 
.Trusty  *+ 
f /Etna* 
I  Terror* 
J  Thunderbolt' 
LErebus* 


Total  ironclad  ships  built  since  1855   

Lost  at  sea   

Struck  off  the  list   

Leaving  ninety-one  serviceable. 
*  Struck  off  Navy  List.  t  Wooden  hull. 

Sister  ships  are  bracketed. 


Scorpion  * 

'"Cyclops 

"^Vivern  * 

Gorgon 

Royal  Sovereign*! 

Hecate 

Prince  Albert* 

^Hydra 

Viper* 

Glatton 

Vixen  * 

Hotspur 

Watenvitch  * 

Rupert 

Cerberus  ( 

'Conqueror 

Magdala 

wHero 

Abyssinia 

127 


33 


Vol.  II. 


X 


APPENDIX  V. 


LEADING  AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED. 


GENERAL   NAVAL  HISTORY. 

*Mahan.    Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History.  London. 

*  „        Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution. 

2  vols.  London. 
James.     Naval  History.     6  vols.     London,  1886.     {Cited  as 
James.) 

Yonge.    History  of  the  British  Navy.    2  vols.    London,  1863. 
*Colomb.    Naval  Warfare.    London,  1895.    (Cited  as  Colomb.) 

*  ,,         Essays   on   Naval    Defence.     London.      {Cited  as 

Colomb's  Essays.) 
Laughton.    Letters  and  Despatches  of  Nelson.    London,  1886. 

„  Nelson.    London,  1895. 

Chabaud-Arnault.    Histoire  des  Flottes  Militaires.    Paris,  1889 

RECENT   NAVAL   ARCHITECTURE,  ETC. 
*Naval  Annuals.  Portsmouth. 

*Eardley  Wilmot.    Development  of  Navies.    London,  1892. 

Ledieu  et  Cadiat.    Materiel  Naval.    3  vols.    Paris,  1889. 

Croneau.    Architecture  Navale.    2  vols.    Paris,  1894. 

White.    Manual  of  Naval  Architecture.    London,  1894. 
*Paris.    L'Art  Navale.    2  vols.    Paris,  1869. 

Hauser.    Cours  de  Construction  Navale.    Paris,  1886. 

Dislere.    La  Guerre  d'Escadre.    Paris,  1876. 

Tromp.    Navires  Cuirasses.    Utrecht,  1880. 
#Brassey.    The  British  Navy.    5  vols.    London,  1882 
*King.    Warships  of  the  World.    London,  1880. 


APPENDIX    V.  305 

Reed.    Our  Ironclad  Ships.    London,  1869. 

„       Modern  Ships  of  War.    London,  1888. 
Coles.    Letters,  and  the  Opinion  of  the  Press.    London,  1866. 
Kronenfels.    Das  Schwimmende  Flottenmaterial  der  Seemachte. 
Wien.,  1880. 

Hunier  [Pseud.].    Du  Navire  de  Combat.    Paris,  1892. 
Balincourt.    Etude  sur  les  Navires  d'Aujourd'hui.    Paris  1892. 
Leroi.    Les  Armements  Maritimes  en  Europe.    Paris,  1889. 
Fournier.    La  Flotte  Necessaire.    Paris,  1896. 
Pene-Siefert.    Flottes  Rivales.    Paris,  1890. 
Weyl.    La  Flotte  de  Guerre  et  les  Arsenaux.    Paris,  1894. 
Robinson.    The  British  Fleet.    London,  1894. 
The    Technical    Press,    especially    Engineer ;     Engi?ieering  ; 
Le  Yacht ;  Rivista  Marittima  ;  Revue  Maritime. 

ARMOUR,   GUNNERY,   TORPEDOES,  &c. 
Holley.    Ordnance  and  Armour.    New  York,  1865. 
Dahlgren.    Shells  and  Shell  Guns.    Philadelphia,  1857. 
Howard  Douglas.    Naval  Gunnery.    London,  1861. 
Orde  Browne.    Armour  and  its  attack  by  Artillery.  London, 

1887— 1894. 
Cooke.    Naval  Ordnance.    New  York,  1875. 
Very.    Armour  for  Naval  Use.    Annapolis,  1883. 
Treatise  on  Service  Ordnance.    London,  1893. 
*Lloyd  and  Hadcock.    Artillery  and  its  Progress.  Portsmouth, 

1893. 

Modern  Naval  Artillery.  London. 
Dredge.    Modern  French  Artillery.    London,  1892. 
Sleeman.    Torpedoes.    Portsmouth,  1889. 
Barnes.    Submarine  Warfare.    New  York. 
Hovgaard.    Submarine  Boats.    London,  1887. 
Buchard.    Torpilles  et  Torpilleurs.    Paris,  1886. 
Brandt.    Gunnery  Catechism.    New  York,  1864. 
Normand.    Etude  sur  les  Torpilleurs.    Paris,  1885 
*Clarke.    Fortification.    London,  1890. 


306 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS. 

Clarke  and  Thursfield.    The  Navy  and  the  Nation.  London, 

1897. 

Clerk.    Naval  Tactics.    Edinburgh,  1804. 
Howard  Douglas.    Naval  Warfare  with  Steam.    London,  1864. 
Butakov.    Nouvelles  Bases  de  Tactique.    Paris,  1864. 
Phillimore.    Naval  Tactics.    London,  1859. 
Penhoat.    Elements  de  Tactique  Navale.    Paris,  1879. 
Farret.    Etudes  Comparatives  de  Tactique  Navale.    Paris,  1883. 
„         Etudes  sur  les  Combats  Livr£s  sur  Mer  de  i860 — 1880. 
Paris,  1 88 1. 

Chabaud-Arnault.    Essai  Historique  sur  la  Strategic  et  la  Tac- 
tique.   Paris,  1889. 
Lullier.    Tactique  Navale.    Paris,  1867. 
Elliot.    Treatise  on  Future  Naval  Battles.    London,  1885. 
Bethell.   Remarks  on  the  Manoeuvres  of  Two  Vessels  in  Action. 

Portsmouth,  1881. 
Campbell.    Naval  Tactics.    London,  1880. 
*Hoff.    Naval  Tactics.    Portsmouth,  1885. 

„        Elementary  Naval  Tactics.    New  York,  1894. 
Noel.    The  Gun,  Ram,  and  Torpedo.    Portsmouth,  1885. 
Z.  and  Montechant.    Essai  de  Strategic  Navale.    Paris,  1893. 

„  „  Guerres  Navales  de  Demain.    Paris,  1891. 

Papers  by  *Sturdee,  *Calthorpe,  #Laird  Clowes,  Long,  Fremantle, 
*Colomb,  *Crutchley,  *May,  and  others,  in  the  Journal  of 
the  United  Service  Institution.  London. 
Papers  by  Wainwright,  Alger,  and  others,  in  the  Proceedings  of 

the  United  States  Naval  Institute.    Annapolis,  U.S.A. 
Anonymous  Articles  in  the  Quarterly  and  Edinburgh  Reviews. 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW,   COMMERCE-DESTRUCTION,  &c. 
Danson.    Our  next  War.    London,  1894. 
Waraker.    Naval  Warfare  of  the  Future.    London,  1892. 
Nys.    Droit  de  la  Guerre.    Bruxelles,  1882. 
Lemoine.    Precis  de  Droit  Maritime.    Paris,  1888. 
Hall.    International  Law.    Oxford,  1890. 

Cobbett.    Leading  Cases  in  International  Law.    London,  1885. 


APPENDIX    V.  307 

Wheaton.    International  Law.    London,  1889. 
Holland.    Manual  of  Naval  Prize  Law.    London,  1888. 
Twiss.    Continuous  Voyages.    London,  1877. 

„       Belligerent  Right  on  High  Seas.    London,  1884. 
Faucheville.    Du  Blocus  Maritime.    Paris,  1882. 
Lawrence.    Essays  on  Disputed  Questions  in  International  Law. 

Cambridge,  1885. 
Phillimore.    Commentaries  upon  International  Law.    4  vols. 
London,  1882. 

TECHNICAL  PERIODICALS  CONSULTED. 

Journal  of  the  United  Service  Institution.    London.    {Cited  as 
J.U.S.I.) 

Proceedings  of  United  States'  Naval  Institute.  Annapolis,  U.S.A. 
Information  from  Abroad.    Navy  Department.    Office  of  Naval 

Intelligence.    Washington,  U.S.A. 
Transactions  of  the  Institution  of  Naval  Architects.  London. 
U7iited  Service  Magazine.  London. 
Army  and  Navy  Gazette.  London. 
Broad  Arrow.  London. 
Engineer.  London. 
Engineering.  London. 
Revue  Maritime.  Paris. 
Le  Yacht.  Paris. 
La  Marine  Francaise.  Paris. 
Rivista  Marittima.  Rome. 
Mittheilungen  des  Seewesens.  Pola. 
Army  and  Navy  Journal.    New  York. 
Engineer.    New  York. 
Mechanics'  Magazine.  London. 
Marine  Rundschau.  Berlin. 

KINBURN,   BOMBARDMENT  OF. 
Yonge.    History  of  the  British  Navy. 
Russell.    The  War.    2  vols.    London,  1855. 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  vol.  xiii.  Paris. 
Mechanics'  Magazine.  London. 


3o8 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


GENERAL  HISTORY   OF   AMERICAN   CIVIL  WAR. 

*Johnson.    Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War.    4  vols.  New 
York,  1887.    {Abbreviated  to  Battles  and  Leaders.) 
A  series  of  articles  on  the  various  actions  by  those 
who  took  part  in  the  struggle :  a  storehouse  of  informa- 
tion, and  well  illustrated. 

*Scharf.    History  of  the  Confederate  Navy.    New  York,  1887. 
{Cited  as  Scharf.) 

From  the  Confederate  point  of  view. 
Porter.    Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War.    London,  1887.  {Cited 
as  Porter.) 

Gives  original  documents,  &c,  but  often  inaccurate. 
*Maclay.    History  of  the  United  States  Navy.    2  vols.  London, 
1894.    {Cited  as  Maclay.) 

A  concise  and  accurate  account  of  the  U.S.  Navy. 
Reports  of  the  Secretary  for  the  Navy,  1862 — 5.  Washington. 
Official  documents,  &c. 
*The  Navy  in  the  Civil  War.    3  vols.    New  York,  1883. 

Viz. :  Soley.  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers.  {Cited as  Soley.) 
Ammen.    The  Atlantic  Coast.    {Cited  ^Ammen.) 
Mahan.     The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters.     {Cited  as 
Mahan's  Gulf.) 
Deal  fully  with  the  strategic  aspects  of  the  war. 
Boynton.    History  of  the  Navy  during  the  Rebellion.    2  vols. 

New  York,  1867. 
Stenzel.    The  American  Civil  War.     United  Service  Magazine, 

vol.  cxxxi.    London.    (Cited  as  Stenzel.) 
Badeau.    Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant.    3  vols.  London, 
1881. 

Bulloch.     Secret  Service  of  the  Confederate  States.     2  vols. 

London,  1883.    {Cited  as  Bulloch.) 
Davis.    Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government.    2  vols. 
London,  1881. 

Pollard.    Secret  History  of  the  Confederacy.    Philadelphia,  1869. 

Greeley.    American  Conflict.    Hartford,  1864. 

Southern  Historical  Society's  Papers.  Richmond. 

Von  Scheliha.    Coast  Defence.    London,  1868. 

Daily  Despatch.  Richmond. 

New  York  Herald.    New  York. 


APPENDIX  V. 


309 


Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  relation  to  Armoured 

Vessels.    Washington,  1864. 
Bigelow.  Franceandthe  Confederate  States' Navy.  New  York,  1888. 
Smith.    Confederate  War  Papers.    New  York,  1884. 

The  War  of  the  Rebellion.    Washington,  1880,  &c. 

Official  documents,  Confederate  and  Federal. 
Nicolay  and  Hay.    Abraham  Lincoln.    10  vols.    London,  1890. 

WORKS  BEARING  UPON  PARTICULAR  INCIDENTS  OF 
THE  AMERICAN  CIVIL  WAR. 
(in  addition  to  the  more  general  histories.) 

Monitor. 

Church.    Life  of  Ericsson.    2  vols.    London,  1890.  {Cited  as 

Church,  Ericsson.) 
Swinton.    The  Twelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War.  New 

York,  1867. 

Shippen.     In    Lippincott's    and    United    Service  (U.S.A.) 
Magazines. 
Mississippi,  Opening  of. 

Dorsey.    Recollections  of  H.  W.  Allen.    New  York,  1866. 

Mahan.    Admiral  Farragut.   London,  1893.  {Cited  as  Mahan, 
Farragut.) 

Mobile. 

Parker.    Battle  of  Mobile  Bay.    Boston,  1878. 
Reports,   &c,   of    [Confederate]    Secretary   of    the  Navy. 
Richmond. 
The  Cruisers  and  the  Blockade. 

Semmes.    Service  Afloat.     London,  1887.    {Cited  as  Semmes.) 
Haywood.    Cruise  of  the  Alabama.    Boston,  1886.  {Cited  as 
Haywood.) 

Hobart  Pasha.    Sketches  from  My  Life.    London,  1886. 
„  „        Never  Caught.  [Pseudonym,  Captain  Roberts.] 

London,  1867. 
Taylor.    Blockade  Running.    London,  1896. 
Alabama    Claims.     Case   on  the  part    of    Her  Majesty's 

Government.  London. 
Alabama  Claims.    Correspondence  concerning  Claims  against 
Great  Britain,  transmitted  to  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States.    5  vols.  Washington, 
1869— 1870. 


IRONCLADS    IN  ACTION. 


THE   AUSTRO-ITALIAN   WAR  OF  1866. 

*Osterreichs  Kiimpfe   im  Jahre    1866.     Vol.   v.     Wien,  1869. 
{Cited  as  Staff  History.) 

The  official  Austrian  account,  probably  revised  by 
Tegetthoff. 

Crousse.    Bataille  de  Lissa.    Brussels,  1891. 

A  translation  of  the  above. 
*Rendiconti  delle  Udienze  Pubbliche  dell  'Alta  Corte,  &c.  Contro 
rAmmiraglio  Conte  Carlo  Pellion  di  Persano.  Firenze, 
1867.    {Cited  as  Rendiconti.) 

The  evidence,  &c.  given  at  Persano's  trial. 
L'Ammiraglio  C.  di  Persano  nella  Campagna  Navale  dell'  Anno 
1866.    Torino,  1873.    {Cited  as  Persano.) 

Persano's  own  story  of  the  battle  of  Lissa. 
Amico.    I  Fatti  di  Lissa.    1868.    {Cited  as  Amico.) 
Processo  del  Conte  C.  Pellion  di  Persano.    Milano,  1867. 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  November,  1866.  Paris. 
Revue  Mariti??ie,  vols,  xviii.,  xix.  Paris. 

Ritter  von  Attlmayr.    Der  Krieg  in  des  Adria  im  Jahre  1886. 

Pola,  1896. 

*Laughton.    Studies  in  Naval  History.    London,  1887.    {Cited  as 
Laughton.) 

An    admirable   account    of    the   war    is    given  in 
Chapter  V.,  "  Tegetthoff." 
La  Guerra  in  Italia  nel  1866.    Milano,  1867. 
Times,  Standard,  Army  and  Navy  Gazette. 

SOUTH  AMERICAN  WARS,  1866— 1870. 

Revue  Maritime,  vol.  xvii.  Paris. 

Gives  Commodore  Rodgers'  (U.S.N.)  Report  on  the 
Bombardment  of  Callao. 
* Illustrated  London  News,  1866.  London. 

Letters  from  British  Officers  at  Valparaiso  and  Callao. 
Mackenna.    Las  dos  Esmeraldas.    Santiago,  1879. 
Garmendia.     Recuerdos  de  la  Guerra  del  Paraguay.  Buenos 
Aires,  1889. 

*Thompson.    Paraguayan  War.    London,  1869. 
*  Washburn.    Paraguay,  2  vols.    Boston,  1871. 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  1866 — 73.  Paris. 

Numerous  articles   on  the   Paraguayan   War;  two 
on  the  Spanish  War,  vols.  lii.  and  lxxvii. 

Chabaud  Arnault.    Histoire  des  Flottes  Militaires. 
Kennedy.    La  Plata,  Brazil,  and  Paraguay.    London,  1869. 
Burton.    Battlefields  of  Paraguay.    London,  1870. 


APPENDIX  V. 


3" 


FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

Chevalier.   La  Marine  Francaise  et  la  Marine  Allemande  pendant 
la  Guerre  de  1870— 71.    Paris,  1873.    (Cited as  Chevalier.) 

Bouet-Willaumez.   Questions  et  Reponses  au  Sujet  de  nos  Forces 
Navales.    (Cited  as  Bouet.) 

*Rene  de  Pont- Jest.    Campaign  in  the  North  Sea  and  Baltic. 

Journal  United  Service  Institution.    Vol.  xxxiii. 
Tesdorpf.     Geschichte  der  Kaiserlich  Deutschen  Kriegsmarine. 
Kiel,  1889. 

Chabaud  Arnault.    Histoire  des  Flottes  Militaires. 
F.  Julien.    L'Amiral  Bouet-Willaumez.    Paris,  1872. 
The  Franco-German  War.      Translated  by  Captain  F.  C.  H. 
Clarke.    London,  1872,  &c.    (Cited  as  Staff  History.) 

RUSSO-TURKISH  WAR. 
*Z' Annie  Maritime,  1878 — 1879.  Paris. 

*  Journal  United  Service  Institution,  vol.  xxii. — iii.  London. 
Hob  art  Pasha.    Blackwood's  Magazine,  1885.  London. 

ALEXANDRIA,   BOMBARDMENT  OF. 
Walford.   Journal  United  Service  Institution,  vol.  xxvii.  London. 
^Goodrich.    Egyptian  War.    Two  Parts.    Washington,  1883. 
I' Annie  Maritime,  1882.  Paris. 
Times,   Standard,  Army  and  Navy  Gazette. 

CAPTURE   OF  SFAX. 
*Revue  Maritime^  vol.  lxxvi.  Paris. 
L?  Annie  Maritime,  1881.  Paris. 

CHILI   AND  PERU. 

Markham.     War  between    Chili    and   Peru.     London,  1882. 

(Cited  as  Markham.) 
Mackenna.    Guerra  del  Paciflco.    4  vols.    Santiago,  1880-2. 
*Mason.    War  on  the  Pacific  Coast.  Washington. 
Barros  Arana.    Histoire  de  la  Guerre  du  Pacifique.  Paris,  1881. 

*  Journal  United  Service  Institution,  vol.  xxv.  London. 

*  Revue  Maritime,  vols.  Ixv — viii.,  lxxi.  Paris. 
L' Annie  Maritime.    1879 — 81.  Paris. 

Gives  official  documents. 


312 


IRONCLADS   IN  ACTION. 


SHAH  AND  HUASCAR. 

^Parliamentary  Papers.    52.    1877.  London. 

Times,  Standard,  Army  and  Navy   Gazette,  Ha?isard  Parlia- 
mentary Debates. 

FRANCO-CHINESE  WAR. 

Roche  and  Cowen.    The  French  at  Foochow.    Shanghai,  1884. 
Carrall.    Report  of  Imperial  Chinese  Customs. 
*Loir.    L'Escadre  de  l'Amiral  Courbet.    Paris,  1894.    (Cited  as 
Loir.) 

De  Doncourt.    Les  Francais  dans  l'Extreme  Orient.   Lille,  1884. 

CHILIAN   CIVIL  WAR. 

*Laird  Clowes.    Naval  Annual,  1892.    Portsmouth.    (Cited  as 
Clowes.) 

Hervey.    Dark  Days   in   Chile.     London,    1892.     (Cited  as 
Hervey.) 

Times,  Standard,  Army  and  Navy  Gazette. 
Revue  Maritime,  vol.  xcv.,  Paris. 

BRAZILIAN   CIVIL  WAR. 

*Laird  Clowes.     Naval  Annual,  1894.  Portsmouth. 

*  Information  from  Abroad.    1894.  Washington. 

*  Revue  Maritime.    March,  1895.  Paris. 

Times,  Standard,  Army  and  Navy  Gazette,  Le  Yacht. 

CHINO-JAPANESE  WAR. 

Norman.    The  Far  East.    London,  1895. 
*Jukuchi  Inouy£.    Japan-China  War.  Yokohama. 
*Laird  Clowes.    Naval  Annual,  1895.  Portsmouth. 
„  „         Blackwood 's  Magazine,  1895.  London. 


APPENDIX    V.  313 

McGiffin.     Century  Magazine,  1895.     New  York.     {Cited  as 
McGiffin.) 

Vladimir  [Pseud.]    The  China- Japan  War.    London,  1896. 
Broad  Arrow,  1894.  London. 

A  series  of  articles  on  the  Yalu;  in  which  the  hand 

of  an  eminent  British  strategist  and  tactician  will  be 

recognised. 

Blackwood' s  Magazine,  October  and  November,  1895. 

Times,  Standard,  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  Daily  News,  Army  and 
Navy  Gazette,  United  Service  Gazette,  Le  Yacht,  Marine 
Francaise,  Le  Moniteur  de  la  Flotte,  Marine  Rundschau, 
Journal  of  the  U.S.  Naval  Institute,  Revue  Maritime. 

NAVAL  CATASTROPHES. 

Parliamentary  Papers  on  sinking  of  Captain,  Vanguard,  and 
Victoria. 

Times.  Engineer,  and  E?igineering  on  the  same,  and  on  the  loss 
of  the  Grosser  Kurfurst. 
*Thursfield.    The  Loss  of  H.aI.S.   Victoria.     Naval  Annual, 
1894. 

*Elgar.    The  Loss  of  the  Victoria.    Nature,  vol.  xlix.    {Cited  as 
Elgar.) 

Fitzgerald.    Life  of  Admiral  Tryon.    London,  1897. 

IMAGINARY  NAVAL  WARS  AND  BATTLES. 

Great  Naval  War  of  1887.    London,  1887. 
Plus  d'Angleterre.    Paris,  1887. 

Arxold-Forster.    In  a  Conning  Tower.    London,  1 891. 

Nelson  Seaforth.    The  Last  Great  Naval  War.    London,  1 891 . 

Rope.    Rome  et  Berlin.    Paris,  1888. 

The  "Russia's  Hope.*'    London,  1888. 

Eardley  Wilmot.    The  Next  Naval  War.    London,  1894. 

Laird  Clowes.    The  Captain  of  the  Mary  Rose.    London,  1892. 


Note. — For  completeness  a  few  recent  works  have  been  added  which  were 
not  consulted  by  the  author. 


APPENDIX    VI.— ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Originally  I  had  intended  that  authentic  and  accurate  illustrations 
of  the  various  incidents  described  should  be  included,  but  as  there 
were  difficulties  in  the  way  of  procuring  such,  which  would  have 
added  largely  to  the  size  and  cost  of  the  book,  I  decided  that 
photographs  of  the  leading  English  and  French  ships  would  be 
preferable,  and  probably  as  useful.  These  have  been  necessarily 
placed  at  intervals  throughout  the  two  volumes,  and  not  opposite  the 
matter  which  they  illustrate.  Captain  Mahan's  flagship,  the  Chicago, 
has  been  given  as  an  example  of  a  fine  type  of  modern  rigged  cruiser 
with  heavy  armament  and  fair  speed.  A  number  of  Chinese  and 
Japanese  ships  are  reproduced  from  Mr.  Ogawa's  photographs.  The 
Huascar  is  from  a  print  in  the  "  Illustrated  London  News,"  and  the 
battle  of  Lissa  from  an  Austrian  painting.  For  the  6-  and  8-inch 
quick-firers  I  have  to  thank  Sir  W.  Armstrong,  Mitchell,  &  Co.;  for  the 
elevations  of  the  Chen  Yuen  and  Naniwa,  which  are  from  the  "  Naval 
Annual"  of  1889,  the  Hon.  T.  A.  Brassey;  and  for  the  "  Chen  Yuen 
in  action,"  Mr.  F.  T.  Jane.  The  elevations  of  English  and  French 
ironclads  are  all  drawn  to  the  same  scale,  and  are  compiled  from  the 
"  Naval  Annual,"  the  "Engineer,"  Croneau's  "Architecture  Navale," 
and  "Information  from  Abroad."  The  diagram  of  the  Victoria 
sinking  is  from  the  Parliamentary  Paper  on  the  court  martial.  The 
"  End  of  a  Battleship  "  is  reproduced  from  the  "  Cosmopolitan," 
and  originally  represented  the  destruction  of  the  Aquidaban  by  a 
dynamite  shell.  The  maps  and  plans  are  compiled  by  myself  from 
various  sources :  the  diagrams  of  the  Yalu  are  necessarily  to  some 
extent  conjectural.  They  are  based  upon  the  plans  of  Mr.  Laird 
Clowes,  Mr.  Jukuchi  Inouy£,  and  the  "Revue  Maritime"  for  January, 

1895. 


APPENDIX  VI. 


315 


The  illustration  in  the  second  volume,  called  "  The  Last  of  the 
Victoria"  is  from  a  photograph  taken  by  Staff -Surgeon  Collot,  of 
H.M.S.  Collingwood,  and  depicts  H.M.S.  Victoria  as  last  seen  off 
Tripoli,  Syria,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd  of  June,  1893.  It  has 
been  reproduced,  by  kind  permission,  from  a  print,  the  copyright  of 
Mr.  R.  Ellis,  of  Valetta,  Malta. 


316 


TABLES. 


TABLE  l.-UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  ORDNANCE,  1861-5. 


Name  of  Gun. 


Description. 


Smooth-bore 
Smooth-bore 

Smooth-bore 

Smooth-bore 

Smooth-bore 

Smooth-bore 

Smooth-bore 

Parrot  Rifle. 

Parrot  Rifle. 

Parrot  Rifle. 
Parrot  Rifle  ., 
Parrot  Rifle  .. 


Weight 
of 
Gun. 

lbs. 


42,000 
iS,7oo 
(  16,000 
1  12,000 
9000 
(  10,000 
I  5500 

IOCWt. 

(  57cwt.^ 

(27CWt.  J 


Weight  in  lbs 
of 

Shot.  Shell 


440 
166 

124 

90 
65 
64 
32 

135  \ 
154  / 

10 

100 

60 
30 
20 


352 
135 


73 

S3 
52 

26 

135 
80 

IOO 

50 
29 
18 


Charge. 


Maxi 
mum 


Ordi- 
nary. 


35 
IS 

25  ■ 

I2i 

102  ■ 

16 

6 
8 

6} 
3 


Where  there  are  two  or  more  guns  of  the  same  calibre,  but  of  different  weights  and  sizes, 
and  only  one  figure  is  given  for  range  and  elevation,  that  figure  refers  to  the  most  powerful 
pattern. 


TABLES. 


317 


§ 

:  :  : 

FORTS  AND  SQUADRON. 

Grand 
Total. 

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TABLES. 


319 


TABLE  V.-UNION  FLEET  AT  THE   SECOND  BOMBARDMENT 
OF  FORT   FISHER,  WITH   ITS  ARMAMENT. 


-' 

— 

— 

30-pr.  R., 

Shots 

ded. 

bi 

</} 

7- 

jd-o 

32-pr.  S.B. 

Fired. 

01111 

issir 

ao 

0 

6 

6 

> 
> 

Line  No.  1. 

20 

2 

2 

2 

12 

0 

Mohican  

6 

1 

2 

436 

12 

0 

0 

Tacony   

2 

4 

670 

0 

0 

0 

2 

1 

1 

485 

0 

1 

0 

2 

1 

1 

225 

2 

2 

0 

Unadilla  

1 

—  .... 

4°3 

-  0 

0 

-  0 

1 

1 

300 

0 

5 

0 

Maumee  

1 

1 1  ) 

Q 

0 

0 

1 

1 1  i 

498 

3 

5 

0 

Pawtucket  

1 

4 

1 

463 

0 

0 

0 

Seneca   

1 

1 

2^2 

0 

0 

0 

Pontoosuc   

.4 

2 

318 

0 

1 

0 

Xereus  

540 

3 

3 

0 

Line  No.  2. 

Minnesota  

1 

42 

1 

4 

1654 

13 

23 

0 

Colorado  

1 

46 

1 

786 

3 

14 

0 

Wabash   f  

42 

I935 

12 

0 

12 

2 

858 

3 

8 

1 

14 

3 

3 

»9 

Juniata   

1 

!!! 

1003 

5 

10 

0 

Shenandoah   

2 

1 

... 

31/ 

6 

Ticonderoga   

1 2 

; 

552 

1 

6 

0 

Vanderbilt  

12 

2 

2 

170 

0 

0 

0 

Mackinaw  

1 

6 

939 

0 

2 

0 

Tuscarora   

6 

1  ... 

2 

214 

3 

1 2 

0 

Line  No.'S. 

Sant.  de  Cuba   

(3  ] 

(.5  S.B.  J 

199 

1 

9 

Ft.  Jackson   

8 

10 

0 

Osceola  

I 

4 

iq 

0 

0 

0 

Sassacus   

... 

4 

2 

2 

262 

0 

0 

Chippewa   

\ 

74 

0 

0 

0 

R.  R.  Cuvler  

49 

0 

0 

0 

Maratanza  

1 

... 

0 

0 

0 

Rhode  Island  

299 

8 

2 

0 

2 

1 

3 

262 

4 

4 

0 

Alabama   

1 

... 

{os.b.} 

0 

0 

0 

Montgomery  

1 

4 

580 

2 

4 

0 

4 

2 

558 

2 

12 

0 

Ironclads. 

... 

2 

2 

971 

0 

0 

0 

4 

... 

44i 

0 

0 

0 

2 

... 

297 

0 

3 

0 

Mahopac   

2 

153 

0 

0 

0 

Saugus   

2 

212 

0 

0 

Flagship. 

Malvern  "  

3 

1 

0 

R.  =  Rifled.       S.B.  =  Smooth-bore. 


Vol.  II. 


320 


TABLES. 


TABLE  VI. -THE   SOUTHERN    COMMERCE-DESTROYERS  AND 
THEIR  PRIZES.* 


Steamers. 

Vessels  whose  fate 
is  not  stated. 

Vessels 
destroyed. 

Vessels  on  which 
Cargo  only  was 
destroyed. 

Vessels  Bonded 
or  Sold. 

Vessels  Released 
or  Recaptured. 

Vessels  used  as 
Cruisers. 

Total 
Prizes. 

53t 

2 

ii 

2 

I 

69 

1 

2 

9 

18 

Florida  

28 

4 

4 

i 

31 

5 

4 

9 

Shenandoah   

3i 

5 

36 

Tallahassee   

22 

S 

2 

Olustee  (ex-Tallahassee)   

4 

2 

'I 

Nashville   

i 

I 

2 

3 

3 

i 

2 

I 

4 

2 

Sailing  Vessels. 

York   

1 

"s 

4 

I 

IS 

1 

i 

8 

1 

I 

8 

Winslozv   

s 

S 

I 

I 

3 

Echo   •.. 

2 

2 

I 

2 

4 

261 

*  The  figures  given  in  this  table  are  based  upon  the  returns  of  ships  captured,  in  Scharf, 
p.  807-816,  and  differ  slightly  from  those  given  in  the  text  in  some  instances.  There  are  the 
same  differences  and  discrepancies  in  Scharf. 

+  Includes  the  Hatteras. 


TABLES. 


321 


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Total. 

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a, 

::::::  *o   :  «  oo   :  m  o>o 
.   .   .   :   .   :  o   ■  m  n   .  o  * 

Total 
Heavy 
Guns. 

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Guns. 

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TABLES. 


327 


TABLE  XV.-FRENCH  AND  CHINESE  SHIPS   ENGAGED  OFF  FOOCHOW. 

FRENCH, 


u  a 


Crew. 


Guns. 


Damage,  &c. 


Triomphante  ... 
Duguay  Trouin 
Miliars   


D'Estaing   

Folta  Courbet 


Lynx 
Aspic 
ftpere 


Armoured  corvette 
6-4I"  plating 

Composite  cruiser 

Cruiser,  Wooden 

Cruiser,  Wooden 
Sloop,  Wooden  ... 

Gunboat   

Gunboat   

Gunboat   


4727 
3189 

2268 

2236 
1300 

452 
47i 
471 


2400 
3740 

2790 

2790 
1000 

450 
42  7 
427 


300 
250 


250 

160 


120 
120 


VI  24-c/m,  III 
19  -  c/m.,  VI 
14-c/m. 

V  19-c/m.,  V 
14-c/m. 

XV  14-c/m. 


XV 

III 
III 


[4-c/m. 
14-c 'm. 
10-c  m. 


Ill  14-c  m.: 

10-c/m. 
II    14-c  m., 

10-c/m. 
II    14-c  m., 

10-c  m. 


None. 


Hammock  nettings  amid- 
ships, starboard  side, 
carried  away. 

Struck  a  little  forward  of 
3rd  gun-port. 

None. 

Shot-hole  a  little  above 
W.L.  amidships  to  star- 
board. 

None. 

None. 
None. 


Two  Torpedo  Launches,  Nos.  45  and  46,  16  knots  speed,  spar-torpedoes,  crews  of  10  men  each. 


CHINESE, 


•o  2 

V  C 

CO 


Crew. 


Guns. 


Damage,  &c. 


Yang  Woo 

Foo  Poo   

Chi-an   

Fei  Yuen   , 

Ching  Wei  .... 

Foo  Sing   

Yu  Sing  

Yang  Pao  ") 
Chun  Hing  j 
Chen  Sing\ 
Fuh  Sing  )"' 


13      Composite  cruiser 

10      Sloop,  Wooden  ... 
Sloop,  Wooden  ... 


Sloop,  Wooden 
Sloop,  Wooden 

Sloop,  Wooden 


Sloop,  Wooden  .. 
Transports   

Rendel  Gunboats 


1258 
12  S8 


I2<8 
?7S 


1450  5 
250") 
250  5 


1250 

610 
610 
610 


610 
389 


270     VIII     3§  ton 


150 
150 


30 
ISO 

30 


Torpedoed,   set  on  fire, 
and  sunk. 


Ran    away,    sunk,  and 

back  broken. 
Burnt  and  sunk. 


M.L.R.,   I  6 
ton  M.L.R. 
VI  4<-pr.,  I  18 
ton  M.L.R. 
I  6-in. 
VI  45-pr. 
VI  4?-pr.  Burnt  and  sunk 

I3§ton  M.L.R.  Sunk. 
IV.  45-pr. 
l3|ton  M.L.R.  Sunk. 
II    45-pr.,  II 


40-pr. 
Ill  Small 


None 


I  16  ton,  10-in. 
M.L.R. 


Sunk. 
("Sunk. 

\  Burnt  and  sunk. 
Both  sunk. 


Eleven  war  junks  ;  seven  launches  fitted  with  spar-torpedoes. 


328 


TABLES. 


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TABLES. 


329 


TABLE  XVI I. -BRAZILIAN   CIVIL  WAR, 

Melloist  Fleet. 


— - 

(—■13.SS  of 

Ship. 

Name. 

Tons. 

I.II.P. 

Date. 

Thickest 
Armour. 

Speed. 

Li 

Armament. 

m. 

Knots 

2nd  Class 

Aquidaban 

5000 

6200 

'85 

n| 

15 

5 

IV  9'2-in.  21-ton  B.,  IV  $•>]• 

Battleship 

in.  B.,  VI  47-in.  Q.F.,  II 

2-in.,  XI  i-in.,  and  V-45-in. 

Nordenfelts 

Coast  defence 

Javary   

3640 

2500 

'l$ 

13 

11 

IV    10-in.    M.L.,    IV  i-in. 

monitor 

Nords.,  II  Machine 

River  monitor 

34° 

180 

'86 

4h 

1 

I  70-pr.  M.L.,  II  i-in.  Nords. 

Deck 

Cruiser   

Almirante 

4465 

7500 

'90 

i| 

I? 

6 

X6-in.  Q.F.,  II  4>in.  Q.F., 

Tamandare 

V  i-in.  Nords. 

Republica 

1300 

33oo 

'92 

2 

17 

4 

VI  4'7-in.  Q.F.,  VT6-pr.  Q.F., 

VI  Machine 

Guanabara 

2200 

3000 

'77 

14 

IX  5'7-in.  M.L.,  IV  machine 

Hulk 

or  Nords. 

1400 

2400 

'13 

13 

VI  4-in.  M.L.,  II  i-in.  Nords., 

f  3 

II  machine 

Gunboat   

Marajo   

4So 

400 

'85 

1  g 

10 

II  6-in.  B.,  II  6-pr.  O.F.,  II 

>  >-  \ 

i-in.  Nords. 

250 

280 

'84 

\<  I 

IS 

IV  12-pr.  B.,  IV  i-pr.  Q.F., 

1  ^  1 

IV  i-in.  Nords. 

Madeira,  paddle 

1400 

1200 

'13 

12 

II  9-pr.  B. 

Purus,  paddle  ... 

1355 

1200 

'14 

:  12-3 

II  12-pr.  S.B. 

Armed  Merchant  Steamers:  Mercurio  (1120  tons),  Jupiter  (1124),  Urano  (1119),  Venus  (1171), 
Meteoro  (1082),  Marte  (1121),  Pallas  (845),  Esperanca  (823),  Vieira  da  Cunho. 

Torpedo  Boats  :  Iguatemy,  Marcilio  Diaz,  Araguary,  each  150  tons,  1550  H.P.,  25  knots,  4  torpedo 
tubes,  2  6-pr.  Q.F.  :  four  torpedo-boats  (probably)  52  tons,  600  H.P.,  13  knots,  2  torpedo-tubes,  2  i-in. 
Nords. 


Peixotoist  Fleet. 


Class  of 
Ship. 

Name. 

Tons. 

I.II.P. 

Date. 

Thickest 
Armour. 

Speed. 

II 
zC 

Armament. 

in. 

Knots 

Coast  defence 

Bahia   

1000 

1640 

'65 

5i 

10 

II  7-in.  M.,  II  i-in.  Nords. 

monitor 

Gunboat  ...... 

Tiradentes   

800 

1200 

'92 

i4'5 

2 

IV  4-7-in.  Q.F.,  III  6-pr.  O.F., 

IV  i-in.  Nords. 

Primeiro  de 

780 

75o 

'81 

10 

VII  4'5-in.  B.,  IV  i-in.  Nords. 

Marco 

Braconnot  

160 

160 

'72 

8 

}  } 

Paranahvba 

840 

900 

'78 

12 

I   6-in.    M.,   II  32-pr.  B.,  II 

i-in.  Nords. 

Cabedello    ,  ,  . 

210 

200 

'86 

9 

II  4'5-in.  B.,  IV  i-in.  Nords. 

260 

260 

'83 

9 

II  4-5-in.  B.,  IV  3-pr-  Q-F., 

IV  i-in.  Nords. 

Torpedo  Gun- 

Gustavo 

480 

2300 

'93 

18 

II  20-pr.  Q.F.,  IV  3-pr.  Q.F. 

-  boat 

Sampaio 

Armed  Merchant  Steamers  :  Nictheroy,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Itaipu,  America,  Advance,  Finance,  Allianfa, 
Seguranga,  Figilangia. 

Torpedo  Boats  :  Piratiny,  12  of  various  tvpes,  Yarrow  and  Schichau  built;  2  American  built. 
B.  =  Breech-loader.    Q.F.  =  Quick-firer.    M.  =  Muzzle-loader.    Nord.  =  Nordenfeldt. 


33o 


TABLES. 


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:     ::::::  I  ::: 

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jo  suiq  •ajoqeuj 


I 


TABLES. 


33i 


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TABLES. 


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CO  M 

be  bp  ^ 


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TABLES. 


333 


TABLE  XXI.-DETAILS  OF  JAPANESE  LOSSES  AT  THE  YALU. 


Name  of  Ship. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Died  of 
Wounds. 

Position 
of  Ship 
according 

Officers. 

Men. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Officers. 

Men. 

to  her 

loss. 

Matsushima   

2 

33 

5 

7i 

1 

21 

1 

3 

2 

16 
13 

9 

3 
2 

34 
17 
15 

0 
0 
0 

4 
0 

2 
3 
4 

I 

4 

0 

10 

0 

0 

5 

0 

2 

2 

10 

1 

2 

6 

0 
2 

2 
0 

9 

9 

0 

0 
0 

7 
8 

0 

0 

10 

1 

0 

9 

0 

0 

2 

0 

0 

10 

O 

0 

0 

I 

0 

0 

11 

Chiyoda   

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

12 

10 

80 

16 

188 

4 

28 

294 

TABLES. 


lllllllllJll  |||| 

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jo  jqSiaAV  ibjoj, 

si  11  until! 

Xxepuooag 

::::::::««*«»  v, 

11- 

•Ajaj:reg 
Xjbuiuj 

Water-line  Belt. 

•ssaujjojqx 

e^COxjJOOg-OOQOOO  OQO       «  00 

Length. 

Feet. 

220 

Whole  length 
Whole  length 
Whole  length 
Whole  length 
Whole  length 

1 10 

123 
140 
162 
230 
250 

200 
200 
220 
220 

•5{03Q  jnouuy 

=           ^^^^^    *  *»*t 

Material  of  Armour. 

J 

Iron   

Irnn  d  n  A  romnrmnH 

Compound  

Compound  and  nickel- 
steel 

Nickel-steel   

Harveyed  steel  

Harveyed  steel  

Harveyed  nickel-steel... 

•P93dS 

U3M.Od-3SJOH 

illlfiiiilll  mi 

•aSisuuoj, 

lillllfll; 

q}Suaj  jo  oi;b>j 

•qjSuai 

Name. 

I 

* 

Achilles   

Hercules  

Sultan  

Devastation   

Alexandra   

Nile   

Royal  Sovereign  ... 

Renown   

•uoi;3[d 

-UI03    jo  3}BQ 

TABLES. 


336  TABLES. 


•33U13 

-jnpug  jbo3# 


•XBIM  P99dS  g 


jo  }qSi3M. 


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oooooooo 
i-ocoooooo 


O  O  vimo 


N  H  OOOOOOOO 
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Vvb  o>"n  b  «  b 


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O  O  O  m  O  *0  O  O  O  O  O  O  'O        -3-  10  10  Vi  io  o  '>o 


t)-\0  O  1-   hi  CO  CO  ON  CO  Tl- 


OOOOO 


O  O  in  i 

o  o  o  o  o  o 

CO  CO  «    CA    CO  CO  CO  CO  CO 


0000000 


OOOOO  OOOOOO' 

OOvOOO  CO  O  O   O  WW  I 

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CO  CO      WO  t^CC  W»r.  f 


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Fd4JUUK  J       00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00  00 


53  t  <u    -2  <u 


00  00  00  00  00  00  00 


Of  i 


TABLES. 


337 


TABLE  XXIV.-ENGLISH   HEAVY  GUNS. 


u 
u 

0  «j 

Z.P 
c  c 

Jj'~ 

Weight  of  Gun 
in  Tons. 

Weight  of 

Muzzle  Velocity. 
Foot-seconds. 

Muzzle  Energy. 
Foot-tons. 

Perforation  of 
Wrought  Iron  at 
Muzzle. 

Energy  of  Gun  at 

Muzzle  per 
Ton  of  Weight. 

> 

Projectile.  | 

Charge. 

A.  Muzzle-loaders. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

inches. 

7-inch   

15-8 

4 

114 

22 

1325 

1395 

7'9 

310 

8-inch   

T4'75 

9 

179 

35 

1390 

2398 

9*r 

266 

13*9 

12 

256 

5o 

1440 

3681 

11-4 

307 

io-inch   

T4'5 

18 

410 

70 

1379 

5408 

T3-* 

300 

u-inch   

i3"i 

25 

548 

85 

1360 

7028 

14-2 

281 

12-inch   

12 

25 

614 

85 

1292 

7190 

13*4 

288 

13  "5 

35 

714 

140 

1390 

9566 

1 5  '9 

273 

i2j-inch  

15-84 

38 

818 

21c 

1575 

14,070 

19*3 

37i 

16-inch   

18 

80 

1700 

45o 

1540 

27,960 

24"3 

35o 

B.  Breechloaders. 

7-inch*  

14-2 

108 

1 1 

1 100 

909 

5 

222 

26  * 

5 

100 

48 

i960 

2665 

I2'4 

533 

8-inch   

29-6 

15 

210 

118 

2150 

6730 

17-1 

449 

3.i"5 

22 

380 

166 

2036 

10,920 

20*3 

496 

9'2-inch  (wire.) 

40 

24 

380 

63  c 

2347 

14,520 

27-6 

58i 

32 

29 

500 

252 

2040 

14,430 

22-3 

498 

12-inch   

25*25 

45 

714 

259 

1914 

18,130 

22"6 

403 

35'43 

46 

850 

167c 

2400 

33.940 

38-5 

738 

30 

67-69 

1250 

630 

2016 

35,230 

34'2 

526 

30 

IIO§ 

1800 

960 

2087 

54,39o 

37*5 

492 

C.  Quick-firers. 

4/7-inch   

40 

2 

45 

I2C 

2188 

1494 

12 

711 

6-inch   

40 

7 

100 

3°C 

2200 

3356 

16-1 

479 

8-incht   

44-6 

20 

250 

55C 

2500 

10,830 

26-I 

54* 

*  Old-type  screw  breech. 

t  New  type  wire  gun  (Majestic  class). 

t  Not  as  yet  mounted  in  the  English  fleet.  An  Armstrong  gun. 
c  Cordite. 


Z  2 


338 


TABLES. 


<?                         ?     ■  -    "f             V  ab  o         <P  u, 

CO                     CO                                       «                W                      ON       CO                O                      N                Tf         «       OnO                   M          <M  « 

O                OO            OO           «                OOn          On               On          OnOnco             On  co._co 

Damage 
to 

Assailants. 

either 

13  bullet  holes 
in  boat ;  two 
men  cap- 
tured 

Boat  sunk and 
all  drowned 

H'vy  fire  open- 
ed, but  boat 
got  away 

Escaped  with- 
out injury 

Boat  sunk 

Boat  sunk; 
two  drown- 
ed, 19  taken 
prisoners 

Nil 

Nil 
Nil 

One  launch 

sunk 

Nil 
Nil 
Nil 

Nil 
Nil 

Nil 

Slight  injuries 
toonelaunch 

Result  of  Attack  to 
Assailed. 

No  damage  to 

No  damage ;  torpedo 
exploded  against  the 
side-armour 

Sunk 

Severe  damage 

Sank  the  boat  before 
she  was  hit 

Sunk 

Torpedo  missed 

Torpedo  fouled  Tur- 
kish ship  but  failed 
to  explode 

Seif6  sunk  ;  both  tor- 
pedoes exploded  un- 
der her 

Both  torpedoes  prob- 
ably struck  booms ; 
no  result 

Attack  easily  repulsed 

Both  torpedoes  missed; 
no  harm  done  toT'rks 

One  torpedo  exploded 
without  effect ;  a 
second  fouled  Assar, 
but  did  not  explode 

Ship  sunk ;  both  tor- 
pedoes probably  hit 

Torpedoes  ran  back  on 
Huascar,  and  endan- 
gered ship 

Torpedo  exploded 
against  boom ;  no 
damage  done 

Chinese  ship  sunk 

uaqA\  J3qiB3yv\.jo 

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Night 

Night 
Night 

Night 

Dark  & 
ra  i  ny 
night 

Day 

Night 

Night, 
dark 
and 
rainy 

Night 

Day 
Night 

Night, 
m  oon 
eclips- 
ed 

Night, 
foggy 

Day 

Night 

Dark 
night 

State  of  ship 
when 
Attacked. 

At  anchor 

At  anchor 

Slipped  her 
cables  and 
in  motion 

At  anchor 

Slipped  her 
cables  and 
in  motion 

Moored  to 
shore,  log 
boom 
round 

In  motion  at 
sea 

At  anchor 

Stat  ion  ary 
in  River 
Danube 

At  anchor, 
had  nets 
out 

In  motion, 
nets  out 

At  anchor 

At  anchor, 
boats, &c, 
round  her 

At  anchor 

At  anchor 

At  anchor, 
behind 
boom 

At  anchor 

Name  of 

ship 
Attacked. 

Ironsides 
Ironsides 

Housatonic 
Memphis 

Minnesota 
Wabash 

Albemarle 
Huascar 

Seife 
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Mahmudieh  ? 

Assar  i 
Che'v'ket 

Ahtao  and 
Magellanes 

Union 
Yuyen 

Minimum 
Distance 
between 

Assailant 
and 

Assailed. 

n  before 
could  be 
used 
Contact 

Contact 

could  not 
used 

Contact 

n  before 
could  be 
used 
Contact 

which  did 
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Contact  ? 
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Spar 

Spar 
Spar 

Spar 

White- 
head 
Towing 

Spar 

Spar 

Spar 

Wh  i  t  e- 

head 
Towing 

White- 
head 
Lay 

Spar 

Spar 

Means 
Employed. 

Special  launch 
Special  launch 

Submarine  boat 
Special  launch 

Launch 

Special  launch 
Launch 

Shah's  launch 

carriage 
4  launches 

4  launches 

6  launches 

2  launches 
4  launches 
<J  launches 

2  launches 

Huascar's  diri- 
gible torpedo 

Janequeo,  Gua- 
colda,  torpedo 
boats 

2  launches 

Assailed 
Party. 

Federals 
Federals 

Federals 
Federals 

Federals 
Federals 

Confeds. 

Peruvian 
Turks 

Turks 

Turks 

Turks 
Turks 
Turks 

Turks 
Chilians 

Peruvians 

Chinese 

Assailant 
Party. 

Confeds. 
Confeds. 

Confeds. 
Confeds. 

Confeds. 
Confeds. 

Federals 

English 
Russians 

Russians 

Russians 

Russians 
Russians 
Russians 

Russians 
Peruvians 

Chilians 

French 

Place. 

Charleston 
Charleston 

Charleston 

N.  Edisto  River 

Hampton  Roads 
Charleston 

Albemarle 
Sound 

Ylo,  Peru 
Batum 

Brailov 
Sulina 

Danube,  Mouth 

of  Aluta 
Batum 

Sukhum  Kale 

Batum 
Antofagasta 

Callao 

Sheipoo 

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I.— INDEX   OF  ACTIONS. 


I.    Fleet  Actions. 

Lissa,  i,  230-248. 

Yalu  or  Haiyang,  ii,  83-107. 

II.    Action    Between  Single 
Ships  or  Small  Squadrons. 

Aconcagua  and  torpedo-gunboats, 
ii,  29-30. 

Alabama  and  Hatteras,  i,  154-5. 

Kearsarge,  i,  157-164. 

Albemarle,  and  Northern  gunboats, 
i,  108,  109-110. 

Andes  and  Indepe?idencia,  ii,  34. 

Angamos,  Battle  of,  i,  323-332. 

Arkansas  and  Carondelet,  i,  71-2. 

Asan,  Action  off,  ii,  67-71. 

Assar-i-Chevket  and  Vesta,  1,304-5. 

Atlanta  and  Weehawken,  i,  97-100. 

Carthagena,  Actions  off,  i,  285. 

Charleston,  Action  off,  i,  87-9. 

Covadonga  and  Esmeralda,  i,  253. 

Foochow,  Battle  of,  ii,  5-10. 

Fort  Pillow,  ,,      „     i,  67-8. 

Heligoland,  Action  off,  i,  226. 

Iquique,  Battle  of,  i,  315-321. 

Memphis,  Battle  of,  i,  68. 

Merrimac,  Congress,  and  Cumber- 
land, i,  14-20. 

Merrimac  and  Monitor,  i,  25-32. 

Meteor  and  Bouvet,  i,  279. 

Mobile,  Battle  of,  i,  114- 134. 

Riachuelo,  Battle  of,  i,  259-260. 

Shah  and  Huascar,  i,  308-9. 

Selma  and  Metacomet ,  i,  127-8. 


III.    Actions   Between  Shi 
and  Forts. 

Off  Alexandria,  i,  337-357. 

,,  Callao,  i,  254-256. 

,,  Charleston,  i,  92-96,  101-2. 

,,  Fort  Fisher,  i,  137-140,  141-2 
,,      ,,    Donelson,  i,  64-5. 
,,      ,,    Henry,  i,  63-4. 

,,  Grand  Gulf,  i,  79-80. 

,,  Lissa,  i,  220 — 224. 

,,  Min  River,  ii,  1 1-12. 

„  Mobile,  i,  124-7. 

,,  New  Orleans,  i,  45-57. 

,;  Port  Hudson,  i,  74-77. 

,,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  ii,  38. 

,,  Sfax,  ii,  1-4. 

,,  Vicksburg,  i,  70,  78-9. 

,,  Wei-hai-Wei,  ii,  133. 

IV.    Torpedo  Actions. 
[See  also  Table  XXV.] 
Albemarle,  Sinking  of,  i,  110-113 
Aquidaban,  Sinking  of,  ii,  43-49 
Batum,  at,  i,  298,  302,  303-4. 
Braila,  at,  i,  290-2. 
Caldera  Bay,  ii,  22-30. 
She'ipoo,  ii,  13-15. 
Sukhum  Kale,  i,  298-310. 
Wei-hai-wei,  ii,  129-132. 


II.— INDEX   OF  NAMES. 


Abbreviations, — des.  =  described  ;  m.  =  mentioned  ;  M.  =  Map  or  Plan  ; 
n.  =  note  ;  PI.  =  Plate  ;  q.  =  quoted  ;  Tab.  =  Table.  A  few  other  obvious 
abbreviations  have  been  employed. 


A. 

Abtao,  Tab.  xi,  xvi,  xxv ;  des.  i, 
313;  at  Antofagasta,  i,  322. 

Aconcagua  Tab.  xvi  ;  des.  ii,  18  ; 
engages  Lynch  and  Condell,  ii, 
29-30,  27. 

Achilles,  Tab.  xxii,  des.  ii,  220  ; 
at  Alexandria,  i,  343,  349  ;  with 
Channel  fleet,  ii,  189. 

Active,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  255. 

Adalbert  Prince,  commands  Ger- 
man squad.,  i,  273,  275. 

Adalbert,  see  Prinz  Adalbert. 

Adler,  engaged  off  Heligoland,  i, 
226  ;  at  Kiel,  1870,  i,  278. 

Admiral  Ortshakoff,  ii,  145. 

"Admiral"  class  consists  of  six 
barbette  ships,  named  after 
famous  admirals,  ii,  230-1  ; 
bases  of  their  barbettes  un- 
protected, ii,  164,  269  ;  patches 
of  armour  on,  ii,  240;  ii,  272. 

Adria,  Tab.  viii. 

Adriatic,  M.  xi,  i,  216;  Austro- 
Italian  war  in,  i,  209-250. 

Advance,  improvised  warship,  ii,  41. 

j&olus,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  257. 

ALtna,  at  Kinburn,  i,  xxxiii. 


Affondatore,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.  i, 
212-3  »  Persano's  faith  in  her, 
215-6;  tels.  for  her,  217;  waits 
for  her,  218;  she  arrives  at  Lissa, 
222;  place  in  line,  232;  un- 
manageable, 233 ;  Persano  moves 
to  her,  233  ;  part  in  battle,  238, 
240,  242,  243,  244,  250  ;  sinks 
at  Ancona,  245  ;  mentioned  by 
Persano,  249. 

Affonso  Pedro,  des.  ii,  43  ;  torpedoes 
Aquidaban,  46. 

Africa,  Alabama  off  coast  of,  i, 
156,  172. 

Agamemnon,  des.  ii,  229;  m.  228. 

Agamemnon  v.  Melpomene,  ii,  138. 

Agincourt,  des.  ii,  221  ;  in  Chan- 
nel squad.,  185. 

!  Aguilar,  on  Blanco  Encalada,  ii, 
25  ;  drowned,  27. 

Aguirre,  on  Huascar,  i,  328  ;  killed 
329- 

I  Ajax,  des.  ii,  229  ;  m.  35. 

I  Akagi,  Tab.  xix  ;  loss  at  Yalu, 
xxi ;  with  J.  Fleet,  85  ;  not  in  line, 
89  ;  hotly  engaged,  93  ;  retires, 
93 ;  re-enters  battle,  95 ;  loss, 
109;  damage,  112B;  speed, 
1 1 2D;  loses  mast,  167;  devolu- 
tion of  command  on,  181  ;  m.  60, 
104. 


344 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Akerman,  i,  286. 

Akitsusn  or  Akitsushima,  Tab. 
xix  ;  loss  at  Yalu,  xxi  ;  des. 
ii,  60  ;  off  Asan,  68  ;  with  Flying 
Squad,  at  Yalu,  85  ;  position, 
89  ;  off  Port  Arthur,  96 ;  loss, 
109;  off  Wei-hai-wei,  128,  130; 
m.  72,  98. 

Alabama,  State  of,  i,  64  ;  coast 
blockaded,  181. 

Alabama,  Confederate  cruiser,  des. 
i,  152  ;  off  Azores,  153  ;  on  the 
Banks,  153  ;  at  Martinique,  153  ; 
sinks  Hatteras,  154-5  ;  in  central 
Atlantic,  156 ;  at  Pulo  Condor, 
157  ;  reaches  Cherbourg,  157  ; 
action  with  Kearsarge,  158-163; 
sinks,  163  ;  her  crew  saved,  164; 
gunnery,  164-5  >  ner  crew,  153, 
159  n.  ;  prizes  taken,  157;  effects 
of  her  cruise,  153  n.,  169  n.  ; 
measures  which  might  have  been 
taken  against  her,  169-173  ; 
m.  171. 

Alabama,  U.S.N.,  Tab.  v. 

Alabama,  Battleship,  ii,  297-8. 

Alabama  claims,  i,  174  n. 

Alagoas,  Tab.  xvii  ;  at  Curupaity, 

i,  263  ;  m,  ii,  35. 
Alarm,  ii,  299. 

Albatross,  at  Port  Hudson,  i,  74  ; 
destroys  stores,  77. 

Albemarle,  Tab.  xxv;  construction, 
i,  106-7  !  des.  107  ;  actions  with 
Federal  gbs.,  108-110;  first 
torpedo  attack  on,  no;  second, 
II 1- 1 13;  sunk  and  raised,  113. 

Albemarle  Sound,  i,  106,  in,  180. 

Albini  commands  wooden  squadron, 
i,  219;  against  attack  on  Lissa, 
220  ;  conduct,  221-2  ;  insubordi- 
nate, 223  ;  ordered  to  land  men, 
224  ;  position  of,  when  Austrians 
appeared,  225  ;  Persano  signals 
to  him,  232  ;  conduct  during 
battle  of  Lissa,  234-5,  240,  246, 
250  ;  disgraced,  251  ;  m.  248. 

Albrecht,  on  Ting  Yuen,  ii,  88 ; 
saves  her,  99. 


Alderney,  i,  210. 

Alexandra,  English,  elevation,  PI. 
xxxvii,  ii,  220  ;  Tab.  xii,  xxi ; 
PI.  xviii,  i,  350;  des.  i,  338, 
ii,  223 ;  at  Alexandria,  i,  338, 
342,  343  ;  opens  fire,  344 ; 
anchors,  346  ;  loss,  349  ;  damage, 
350  ;  has  armour  deck,  ii,  227  ; 
compound  engines,  254. 

Alexandria,  U.S.A.,  i,  80. 

Alexandria,  Egypt,  M.  xviii,  i,  340  ; 
riots  at,  i,  336  ;  E.  squad,  off, 
336  ;  forts  at,  340- 1  ;  general 
order  of  E.,  342-3  ;  bombard- 
ment, 344-8  damage  to  forts, 
351-2;  Egypt,  account,  356-7; 
E.  sailors  landed,  349 ;  m.  ii, 
137- 

Alger,  ii,  267  ;  PI.  xlv,  ii,  268. 

Algiers.  Line  Toulon-Algiers  in 
war  of  1870,  i,  275,  280  ;  m.  ii,  1. 

Alltanca,  ii.  41. 

Alma,  Tab.  x  ;  elevation,  PI.  xlii, 
ii.  262  ;  des.  ii,  261  ;  at  Sfax, 
2-3  ;  m.  i,  267,  ii,  191. 

Almanza,  in  Pacific,  i,  252  ;  bom- 
bards Callao,  255-6. 

Almirante  Cochrane,  Tab.  xi, 
xvi  ;  cf.  elevation  of  sister  ship, 
Blanco  Encalada,  PI.  xxi,  ii,  28  ; 
des.  i,  313  ;  cleaned,  322  ;  faster 
than  Huascar,  322  ;  sights  her, 
324  ;  comes  up  fast,  325  ;  action 
opened  with  Huascar,  325 ; 
attempts  to  ram,  329,  331  ; 
shells  Arica,  334  ;  explosion  on 
board,  335  ;  declares  against 
Balmaceda,  ii,  16,  17  ;  m.  i, 
321,  ii,  22. 

Almirante  Condell,  Tab.  xvi,  xxv; 
des.  ii,  16-7  ;  arrives  from 
Europe,  21  ;  sinks  Blanco 
Encalada,  23-28  ;  engages  Acon- 
cagua, 29-30  ;  at  Iquique,  31. 

Almirante  Lynch,  Tab.  xvi,  xxv. 
References  as  to  Almirante 
Condell. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


345 


Almirante  Tamandare,  hit,  i,  262-3  ; 
explosions,  ii,  181. 

Almira?ite  Tamandare,  Tab.  xvii ; 

des.  ii,  36  ;    in    Melloist  fleet, 

ib.  ;  fires  ballistite,  39. 
Alsen,  ii,  275B. 
Althea,  i,  134. 

Amazonas  at  Riachuelo,  i,  260. 

America,  South,  Alabama  off,  i, 
156,  170;  wars  in,  252-264,  306- 
335;  ii,  16-50. 

America,  ii,  41,  42. 

American  Civil  War.  See  United 
States,  Confederates;  Index  i, 
actions  ;  Index  in,  Blockade, 
Commerce  Destroyers,  Inter- 
national Law. 

Amethyst,  des.  i,  307  ;  seeks 
Huascar,  ib.  ;  action  with  Unas- 
car,  308-9  ;  not  hit,  310, 

Amezaga,  q.  ii,  1 17. 

Amiral  Baudin,  elevation,  PI. 
xlii,  ii,  262  ;  des.  ii,  263  ;  defects, 
147.  270. 

Amiral  Duperre,  des.  ii,  262-3  ! 
defects,  164,  270. 

Amiral   jfaitreguiberry ,    des.  ii, 

264  ;  m.  271. 
Amoy,  ii,  66. 

Amphion,  Tab.  xxiii  ;  des.  ii, 
255;  in  Mediterranean,  196. 

Amphitrite,  ii,  278,  289. 

Ancona,  It.  fleet  at,  i,  215; 
Austrians  off,  216-7  !  Persano 
delays  at,  218;  leaves,  220; 
Affondatore  sinks  at,  245;  m.221. 

Ancona,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.  i,  213; 
unready,  216  ;  under  Vacca, 
219;  at  Lissa,  225;  position 
in  line,  232  ;  gap  after,  234,  236; 
collision  with  Varese,  240 ;  badly 
handled,  250;  m.  247. 

Andes,  i,  314. 

Andrada,  see  America. 

Angamos,  Battle  of,  M.  xvii,  i, 
326  ;  des.  322-331. 


Angamos  bombards  Callao,  i,  333  ; 
des.  332. 

Angioletti,  Minister  of  marine,  i, 
215. 

Angostura,  i,  264. 

.  Anson,  similar  to  Collingwood ; 
elevation  PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ;  des. 
ii,  231.    See  also  "  Admirals." 

Antilles,  i,  269. 

Antofagasta,  i,  322;  ii,  18. 

1  Apollo,  Tab.  xxiii  ;  ii,  257. 

Aquidaban,  Tab.  xvii,  xxv  ;  ele- 
vation forward,  M.  xxiv,  ii,  46  ; 
hits  on,  37,  39  ;  torpedo  attack 
on,  and  sinking  of,  43-8;  no 
large  q.-f.,  49;  raised  and  re- 
paired, 50;  name  changed  to 
24  de  Maio,  ib.  ;  mainstay  of 
Mello,  49  ;   m.  135,  137. 

Aquidaban,  River,  i,  264. 

Arabi  Pasha,  i,  336,  349. 

I  Araguay,  i,  260. 

I  Archduchess  Frederick.  Tab.  viii, 
i,  230. 

!  Archer,  English,  ii,  256-7  ;  m.  67. 

i  Archer,  Confederate,  i,  149. 

I  Arcona,  i,  270,  278. 

Arcona,  ii,  46. 

I  Arens,  i,  294. 

Argentine.Confederation,  war  with 
Paraguay,  i,  257-9. 

Argonaut,  i,  286  n. 

Arica,  i,  307,  315,  322  ;  bom- 
barded, 334. 

Ariel  captured  b\  Alabama,  i,  154, 
157,  168. 
:  Arkansas,  State,  i,  37. 
Arkansas,  i,  71-2. 

Armide,  Tab.  x,  i,  267  ;  in  Baltic, 
277. 

Arminius,  Tab.  x  ;  des.  i,  269; 
breaks  blockade.  277.  281  ;  in 
Elbe,  278. 


346 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Armstrong,  Sir  W.,  Mitchell,  & 
Co.,  ii,  36,  245,  248,  250,  255; 
v.  also  Elswick. 

Arrogante,  ii,  208. 

Asan,  C.  land  at,  ii,  51  ;  action 
off,  ii,  67-73  5  sinking  of  Kow- 
shing  off,  73-77  ;  m.  82. 

Aspic,  Tab.  xv. 

Assar-i-Chevket,  Tab.  xxv ;  des. 

i,  287  ;  at  Sulina,  289  ;  torpedo 
attack  on,  299-300  ;  action  with 
Vesta,  304-5  ;  m.  ii,  137. 

Assar-i-Tewfik,  i,  287. 

Astrea,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  141,  257. 

Asuncion,  i,  263. 

Atahnalpa,  Tab.  xi  ;  des.  i,  312; 
m-  333- 

Atalante,  Tab.  x,  i,  267  ;  in  North 

Sea,  275. 
Athens,  Policy  of,  in  war,  i,  184  n. 
Atlanta,  i,  179. 

Atlanta,  ex  Fingal,  details  of,  i, 
97-99  ;  defeat  and  capture  by 
Weehawken,  99-100. 

Atlanta,  U.S.N.,  ii,  281-2. 

Atlanta,  see  Tallahassee. 

Atlantic,  Russ.  fleet  in,  1877,  i, 
286. 

Audacious,   elevation,    PI.  xxxvii, 

ii,  220 ;  des.  ii,  222. 
Augusta,  breaks  blockade,  i,  278, 

281  ;  captures  three  French 
ships,  278,  280. 

Aurora,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  256-7. 

Aurora,  see  Gustavo  Sampaio. 

Australia,  ii,  208. 

Austria.  War  with  Italy,  i,  211- 
251  ;  fleet  off  Ancona,  216  ; 
Tegetthoff,  commander,  225  ; 
state  of  fleet,  226-7  J  compared 
with  It.,  227  ;  want  of  guns,  226, 
228  ;  personnel  ill-affected,  227  ; 
ill-trained,  228  ;  Lissa  bom- 
barded, 221 — 225;  fleet  puts  to 
sea,  229 ;  battle  of  Lissa,  230- 
248  ;  war  with  Denmark,  i,  226. 


Avni-Allah,  i,  287. 
Azazieh,  i.  287. 

Azores,  Alabama  at,  i.  152-3  ; 
strat.  importance  of,  170,  172  ; 
Augusta  blockade  at,  278. 

B. 

Bacchante,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  255. 
Bahamas   and  blockade-runners, 

i,  86,  147,  185-187. 
Bahia,    seizure     of    Florida  at, 

i,  150;  importance  of,  170. 

Bahia,  Tab.  xvii,  i,  259,261,  263. 
Bailey,  i,  45. 
Baldwin,  i,  no. 
Bali,  i,  290. 
Balkans,  i,  288. 

Ballistite,  a  smokeless  powder  used 
by  Tamandare,  ii,  39. 

Balmaceda,  President,  revolt 
against,  ii,  16-17  ;  downfall  of, 
32-4- 

Baltic,  Campaign  in  1870,  i,  274, 
276-7;  French  strategy  in,  271- 
281  ;  difficulty  of  landing,  281  ; 
Russian  fleet  in  1877,  286  ;  canal 
to  North  Sea,  285. 

Baltimore,  ii,  283-4. 

Bangkok,  i,  169. 

Banjo,  ii,  85. 

Banks,  General,  i,  75,  80-1,  154. 

Barbadoes,  i,  149. 

Barfleur,  sister  to  Centurion, 
Tab.  xxii  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxix, 

ii,  232  ;  des.  ii,  236. 
Barham,  ii,  196-7. 
Barnaby,  i,  228. 
Barros,  i,  263. 

Barroso,  i,  263-264;  hits  on,  262. 
Barroso,  i,  258,  260-1. 
Basilisk,  i,  226. 
Basques,  m.  i,  252. 
Bat,  i,  188. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


347 


Baton  Rouge,  i,  61,  69,  72. 
Battenberg,  Pr.  Louis  of,  ii,  152. 
Battery  Bee,  i,  87. 

Gregg,  i,  87. 
,,       Marion,  i,  87. 

Batum,  M.  xvi,  i,  298  ;   boom  at, 

i,  297  ;  t.  attacks  on  Turks  at, 
298,  301—  3. 

Batzushka,  i,  286. 

Baudin,  see  Amiral  Baudin. 

Bayard,  in  China  Sea,  ii,  12  ;  at 
Sheipoo  13  ;  des.  ii,  266. 

Bazaine,  Marshal,  i,  251. 

Bazley,  i,  113. 

Beacon,  Tab.  xii,  i,  339. 

Beaufort,  i,  184. 

Beaufort,  i,  15,  19. 

Beauregard,  General,  q.  i,  93,  97. 

Behring's  Sea,  i,  167. 

Beja,  ii,  i. 

Belfast,  i,  170,  172. 

Bell,  Commander,  i,  45. 

Bella  Vista,  i,  261. 

Belleisle,  purchased  from  Turkey, 

ii,  224. 

Bellerophon ,  elevation  PI.  xxxvii. 
ii,  220  ;  des.  ii,  221  ;  improve- 
ments in,  254  ;  m.  185,  260. 

Belliqueuse,  des.  ii,  260  ;  m.  i,  267, 
275- 

Belmont,  Battle  of,  i,  63. 
Belmonte,  i,  260. 

Benbow,  des.  ii,  231  ;  weakness 
of,  164.   See  "  Admirals." 

Benjamin  Constant,  ii,  36. 

Bennington,  ii,  284. 

Benton,  des.  i,  62  ;  at  Vicks- 
burg,  78  ;  at  Grand  Gulf,  79. 

Berenguela,  in  Pacific,  i,  252  ;  at 
Valparaiso,  253-4  ;  at  Callao, 
255-6;  damaged,  255. 


Beresford,  Lord  Chas.,  conduct  at 

Alexandria,  i,  346-7. 
Berkvirdelen,  i,  289. 
Berlin  Decree,  i,  197. 
Bermuda,  case  of  the,  i,  200. 

Bermuda  and  the  blockade,  i, 
86,  98,  168,  186,  193;  Florida 
coals  at,  149. 

Bertin,  ii,  58. 

Biberibe,  i,  260. 

Bilboa,  i,  199. 

Biobio,  Tab.  xvi ;  at  Caldera,  ii, 
23,  26. 

Birkenhead,  i,  152,  168,  307. 
Biscay,  Bay  of,  i,  278  ;  ii,  184-6. 
Bittern,  Tab.  xii ;  at  Alexandria, 

i>  339.  348. 
Bizerta,  ii,  1. 

Black  Prince,  sister  to  Warrior^ 
Tab.  xxii  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxvii, 
ii,  220  ;  des.  220. 

Black  Sea,  Russian  fleet  in,  i,  134, 
286  ;  Turkish  in,  287. 

Blake,  i,  155. 

Blake,  sister  to  Blenheim,  Tab. 
xxiii  ;  PI.  ix,  1,174;  des.  ii,  256  ; 
m.,  i,  311. 

Blakely  guns ;  early  rifled,  i,  147, 
152. 

Blanca  in  Pacific,  i,  252  ;  at  Val- 
paraiso, 253  ;  at  Callao,  255-6. 

Blanche,  ii,  257. 

Blanco  Encalada,  Tab.  xi,  xvi, 
xxv ;  elevation,  PI.  xxi.  ii,  28; 
des.,  i,  313  ;  searches  for  Hua- 
scar,  322  ;  sights  her,  323 ; 
pursues,  324;  enters  action,  328; 
damage,  330- 1  ;  blockades  Callao, 
333.  Revolts  against  Balmaceda, 
ii,  16-17;  under  fire  at  Valparaiso, 
19-20  ;  launch  attacks  Imperial t 
21,  at  Caldera,  22  ;  torpedoed 
and  sunk,  22-29  !  attempts  to 
raise,  33  ;  m,  135,  137. 

Blanquilla,  i,  153. 


348 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Blenheim,  Tab.  xxiii,  PI.  ix.  i, 
174  ;  des.  ii,  256  ;  m.  289. 

Blitz,  i,  226. 

Boggio,  It.  deputy,  on  Re  d'ltalia, 
i,  218  ;  at  Lissa,  221  ;  does  not 
change  ship,  233 ;  drowned,  242  ; 
complains  of  It.  fuses,  247. 

Boghaz  Pass,  i,  343. 

Bolivia.    War  with  Chili,  i,  312  ; 

army,  332. 
Boltun,  i,  286. 
Bombe,  ii,  257,  268. 
Bordeaux,  i,  289. 
Borneo,  i,  157. 
Boston,  i,  184,  202. 
Boston,  ii,  282. 

Bouet  Willaumez,  commands  Baltic 
squad.,  i,  272;  puts  to  sea,  id.  ; 
instructions,  id.  n.  ;  off  Jahde, 
273;  fresh  orders,  273-4;  in 
Baltic,  276-7  ;  strictures  on, 281 -2. 

Bouledogue,  i,  267. 

Bourbaki,  General,  i,  272. 

Bourbon,  i,  269; 

Bourke,  Hon,  M.,  Captain  of 
Victoria,  ii,  197  ;  misgivings, 
197-8  ;  character  of  Tryon,  198  ; 
jockeys  with  screws,  199  ;  goes 
below,  202  ;  acquitted  of  all 
blame,  205-6. 

Bonvet,  gunboat,  des.  i,  279 ; 
action  with  Meteor,  279. 

Bonvet,  battleship,  similar  to 
Carnot ;  elevation,  PI.  xlii,  ii, 
262  ;  des.  ii,  264. 

Bowling  Green,  i,  64,  65. 

Bradford,  Lieutenant,  i,  348. 

Braila,  i,  288,  290-2. 

Brandenburg,      compared  with 

Majestic,  &c,  ii,  242-5. 
Bratec,  i,  286,  n. 

Brazil,  Outrage  on  neutrality  of, 
i,  150- 1,  156;  war  with  Paraguay, 
257-8;  fleet,  259;  personnel, 
259 ;     battle      of  Riachuelo, 


260-1;  Humaita,  262-3;  board- 
ing attacks,  263 ;  defeat  of 
Lopez,  264.  Revolt  of  Mello, 
ii,  35  ;  Peixoto's  fleet,  36;  fight- 
ing at  Rio,  37-40  ;  Peixoto's 
acquired  fleet,  40-41  ;  collapse 
of  Melloists  at  Rio,  42  ;  tor- 
pedoing of  Aquidaban,  43-49  ; 
lessons  of  war,  49-50. 

Brazil,  i,  264. 

Brazos  Island,  i,  185. 

Breckinridge,  Tab.  ii. 

Brennan  Torpedo,  a  controllable 
torpedo  for  coast  defence,  ii,  259. 

Brennus,  PI.  viii,  i,  160 ;  des.  ii, 
263-4;  water-tube  boilers,  254; 
m.  116,  135,  271. 

Brooke,  designs  Merrimac,  i,  4,  5  ; 
m.  167. 

Brooklyn  Navy  Yard,  i,  168. 
Brooklyn,  ii,  294. 

Brooklyn,  Tab.  ii,  iv ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  45 ;  collides  with 
Kineo,  48 ;  receives  a  hot  fire, 
50;  supports  Hartford,  51; 
at  Vicksburg,  70-1  ;  at  Mobile, 
120;  stops  under  Fort  Morgan, 
122-3;  passes  the  fort,  125-6; 
loss,  132  ;  at  Fort  Fisher,  137  ; 
blockades  Mississippi,  144-5  I  °ff 
Galveston,  154-5. 

Brown,  ii,  34. 

Bruat,  i,  xxxiii,  211. 

Brunei,  on  the  turret,  ii,  220. 

Buchanan,  commands  Merrimac,  \, 
6 ;  ill,  15  ;  wounded,  19 ;  com- 
mands Tennessee,  117  ;  his 
attempts  to  ram,  125-6;  tactics, 
127  ;  action  with  Federal  fleet, 
130-1  ;  wounded,  131  ;  m.  25, 
129. 

Buenos  Aires,  i,  259,  261;  ii,  21. 

Bulk  Light,  i,  270. 

Bulloch,  q.  i,  81  n.,  149  n.,  160  n., 
167  n.,  170  n.,  171  n.,  173  n., 
175  n.,  199  n. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


349 


Burgoyne,  commands  Captain,  ii, 
184;  drowned,  188;  m.  185,  187. 

Butler,  General,  i,  138-9. 

Byng,  i,  224,  251. 


Cabral,  i,  259,  263;  boarding  attack 
on,  264. 

Cadiz,  i,  146. 

Ccesar,  Majestic,  ii,  237. 

Caiman,  des.  ii,  265-6;  m.  272. 

Cairo,  i,  38,  62. 

Cairo,  des.  i,  62  n. ;  sunk  by 
mines,  73,  84. 

Caldera  Bay,  M.  xxi,  ii,  21  ; 
torpedo  affair  in,  ii,  22-27;  action 
with  Aconcagua  off,  29 ;  visited 
by  torpedo  craft,  31. 

Caldwell,  i,  44. 

Caleb  Cushing,  i,  149. 

Caledonia,  ii,  221. 

Callao,    bombarded,  i, 
guns    mounted,     255 ; 
affair    off,    332 ;    blockade  of, 
333-4;  long-range  bombardment, 
333;  m.  208,  253,  315. 

Cambrian,  ii,  213. 

Camperdown,  Loss  at,  ii,  110; 
frigates  at,  139. 

Camperdown  see  Collingwood, 
"Admirals";  in  Mediterranean 
fleet,  ii,  196 ;  turning  circle, 
197  ;  turns  towards  Victoria, 
199;  collides  with  her,  200-1; 
precautions  on  board,  201  ; 
damage  to,  205,  160;  telegraph 
fails,  168,  201  ;  force  of  blow,  207. 

Canada,  Tab.  xxiii  ;  ii,  255. 

Canaries,  i,  156  ;  strategical  im- 
portance, 170,  171,  172. 

Canet  guns  on  Japanese  ships,  ii, 
58  ;  hits  at  Yalu,  1 12c  ;  power  of, 
179,  250. 

Canopus,  ii,  238,  271. 


255-6  ; 
torpedo 


Canseco,  i,  322. 

Canton,  i,  169  ;  squad,  ii.  62. 

Cape,  The,  i,  167,  170-1. 

Cape  Blanco,  i,  156. 

Cape  Comorin,  i,  157. 

Cape  Fear  River,  i,  135,  186. 

Cape  San  Roque,  i,  156,  170. 

Capetown,  i,  156. 

Cape  Verde,  i,  171. 

Capitan  Prat,  ii,  17. 

Cappellini,  on  Palestro,  i,  241. 

Captain,  des.  ii,  183 ;  stability 
184;  favourable  opinions  of 
185 ;  in  B.  of  Biscay,  id. 
rolls  heavily,  185-6  ;  vanishes 
186  ;  last  moments,  187-8 
verdict  of  court-martial,  189 
m.  207,  225,  239. 

Carbajal,  i,  327. 

Carignano  v.  Principe  di  C. 
Carlo  Alberto,  Tab.  vii,  i,  222,  242. 
Carlson,  i,  104. 

Carnot,  elevation,  PI.  xlii,  ii,  262; 
des.  ii,  264;  m.  154,  271. 

Carolina,  North,  i,  106,  181. 

Carolina,  South,  i,  86,  177,  181. 

Carondelet,  des.  i,  62  ;  at  Fort 
Henry,  63  ;  at  Fort  Donelson, 
64-5  ;  passes  Id.  No.  10,  67  ; 
at  Fort  Pillow,  68  ;  engages 
Arkansas,  71;  passes  Vicksburg, 
78  ;  at  Grand  Gulf,  79, 

Casablanca,  ii,  268. 
Cassini,  ii,  268. 
Castine,  ii,  289. 

Caste Ifidardo,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.  i, 
213;  short  of  petty  officers, 
215;  at  Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa, 
219,  222,  225  ;  position  in  line, 
232  ;  engages  Kaiser,  239  ; 
damage,  245. 

Catskill,  Tab.  iii ;  at  Charlestown, 
i,  101  ;  hits  on,  ii,  246. 


35o 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Cattegat,  i,  284. 
Caucasus,  i,  287. 

Cayuga,  Tab.  ii  ;  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45  ;  passes  forts,  46-7  ;  en- 
gages Confederate  gunboats,  54. 

Cecille,  ii,  267. 

Centurion,  Tab.  xxii  ;  elevation, 
PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232;  des.  ii,  236; 
nickel  -  steel  armour,  253  ;  m. 
234,  237,  271. 

Cerbere,  Tab.  x,  i,  267. 

Chacabuco,  Tab.  xi ;  i,  313. 

Chacal  at  Sfax,  ii,  2. 

Chalmers,  ii,  254. 

Chalmette,  i,  56. 

Champion,  ii,  6,  27. 

Channel  Isles,  i,  210. 

Channel  Squadron,  French,  in 
1870,  i,  267,  278. 

Chao  Yong  or  Yung,  see  Tshao 
Yong. 

Charlemagne,  des.  ii,  264-5;  com- 
pared with  Majestic,  &c,  242-5  ; 
m.  271. 

Charles  Martel,  ii.  264. 

Charleston,  M.  v,  i,  92  ;  North 
anxious  to  reduce,  i,  86  ;  defences 
of,  86-7  ;  action  off,  87-9  ;  Dupont 
ordered  to  attack,  91  ;  the  attack, 
92-5  ;  Beauregard  on,  97  ; 
Dahlgren  attacks,  101-2;  torpedo 
affairs  off,  103-4;  fall  of,  137, 
185;  blockade  of,  183;  m.  2,  64, 
I2i,  135,  165,  183,  190,  194,  208  ; 
ii,  168. 

Charleston,  ii,  283. 

Chateau  Renault,  ii,  12. 

Chattanooga,  i,  179. 

Chemulpho,  Japs,  land  at,  ii.  51  ; 
m.  81. 

Chen  Sing,  Tab.  xv ;  ii,  5. 

Chen  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii ;  elevation 
and  deck  plan,  PI.  xxiii,  ii, 
62  ;  in  action,  PI.  xxix,  ii,  100  ; 


side  after  battle,  PI. 


xxx,  11, 


no;  cf.  also  Ting  Yuen,  sister 
ship,  PI.  xxxii,  ii,  122;  des. 
ii,  62-3  ;  defects,  63-4 ;  prepara- 
tions on  board,  81  ;  in  G.  of 
Korea,  84  ;  place  in  line,  87,  89  ; 
decks  drenched,  88 ;  in  battle 
of  Yalu,  93-100;  shots  fired, 
H2A;  hits  on,  112c  ;  speed, 
1 1 2D;  on  fire,  100,  113;  torpedoes 
of,  114;  value  of  armour,  121  ; 
at  Wei-hai-wei,  126,  128  ;  sur- 
rendered, 133. 

Cherbourg,    action   off,     i,  157- 

164;     near     Alderney,  210; 

Baltic  fleet  fits  out  at,  271-2; 

m.  275,  276;   harbour  enclosed, 

ii,  134- 

Cherub,  i,  150. 

Chesapeake  Bay,  i,  179,  185. 

Chestakoff,  i,  290-2. 

Chevalier,  ii,  257,  268. 

Chi-an,  Tab.  xv ;  ii,  5  ;  position, 
6  ;  sunk,  9. 

Chicago,  PI.  vi,  i,  96,  ii,  281. 

Chickasaw,  Tab.  iv;  des.  i,  119;  at 
Mobile,  119;  position,  120; 
under  Ft.  Morgan,  123;  attacks 
Tennessee,  131  ;  bombards  Ft. 
Powell,  134. 

Chicora,  blockade-runner,  i,  194. 

Chicora,  Confederate ;  action  off 
Charleston,  i,  87-8. 

Chih  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii  ;  PI.  xxxi, 
ii,  114;  des.  ii,  65;  in  G. 
of  Korea,  84;  position  in  line, 
89  ;  attacks  Akagi,  93,  98  ; 
engaged  by  Yoshino,  94;  at- 
tempts to  ram  and  is  sunk,  94, 
101,  104;  cause  of  loss,  101,  1120; 
deck  did  not  save  her,  120;  m. 
105,  114,  119,  159. 

Childers,  ii,  184. 

Chili.  War  with  Spain,  i,  253  ; 
issues  letters  of  marque,  id.  ; 
Valparaiso  bombarded,  253-4  ; 
captures    Covadonga,    id.  ;  re- 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


35i 


quested  to  seize  Huascar,  306. 
War  with  Peru  and  Bolivia, 
312  ;  fleet,  313-4,  Tab.  xi  ; 
configuration,  314,  ii,  18  ;  good 
gunnery,  i,  318-9  ;  loss  of 
Esmeralda,  315—320  ;  search 
for  Huascar,  322  ;  disposition 
of  fleet,  322-3  ;  capture  of 
Huascar,  330  ;  gains  command 
of  sea,  332.  Congressional  re- 
volt, ii,  16-7  ;  desultory  warfare, 
19-21  ;  torpedoing  of  Blanco 
Encalada,  22-30 ;  downfall  of 
Balmaceda,  32  ;  Itata  affair, 
33-4- 

Chillicothe,  i.  73. 

Chiltem,  i,  337-8. 

China.  War  with  France,  ii,  4; 
squadron  on  the  Min,  5-6  ;  de- 
stroyed, 7-1 1  ;  French  pass 
Min  forts,  12  ;  torpedoing  of 
Yu-yen  at  Shei'poo,  13-15  ; 
rice,  15.  Quarrel  with  Japan, 
51  ;  C.  troops  land  at  Asan,  id.  ; 
government  of  China,  54  ;  C. 
navy  56,  62-65  !  docks,  65-6  ; 
Europeans  in  fleet,  66  ;  action  of 
Tsi  Yuen  and  Yoshino,  68-71  ; 
Konoshing  sunk,  73-7  ;  breaches  | 
of  international  law,  77-79;  C.  ; 
fleet  at  sea,  80  ;  orders  of  Li 
Hung  Chang,  82  ;  fleet  with  i 
convoy  leaves  Taku,  84  ;  battle 
of  Yalu,  88-103;  ships  sunk, 
105  n.  ;  cowardice  of  C,  107  ; 
gunnery,  ib.s  112;  loss,  109- 
110;  guns,  II2-H2A;  damage, 
H2B-C  ;  fleet  at  Port  Arthur, 
126  ;  retires  to  W ei-hai-wei,  126  ; 
Port  Arthur  captured,  127  ;  tor- 
pedo attacks  at  Wei-hai-wei, 
128-132  ;  capture  of  Wei-hai-wei, 
133- 

China  Sea,  i,  170. 

Citing  Yuen,  sister  of  Chih  Yuen, 
PI.  xxxi,  ii,  114;  Tab.  xviii,  \ 
xxv  ;  des.  ii,  65  ;  in  G.  of 
Korea,  84  ;  place  in  line  at 
Yalu,  89 ;  part  in  battle,  93-6, 
102;   loss,  109;   hits  on,  112c;  | 

Vol.  II. 


fires,  102,  1 13  ;  torpedoes  of.  1 14  ; 
at  Wei-hai-wei,  126  ;  torpedoed, 
132  ;  sunk,  133  ;  m.  119. 

Ching  Wei,  Tab.  xv,  ii,  5-9. 

Chippewa,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Chiyoda,  Tab.  xix  ;    losses,  xxi  ; 

des.    ii,    58  ;     at    Yalu,  85  ; 

position,  89  ;  torpedoes  Yang 
Wei,  96  ;  no  loss,  109. 

Chokai,   ii,  85. 

Choutka,  i,  294. 

Chun  Hing,  Tab.  xv. 

Cincinnati,  i,  38. 

Cincinnati,  des.  i,  62  n  ;  at  Fort 
Henry,  63;  rammed,  68;  sunk, 
80-1,  84. 

Cincinnati,  ii,  287. 

City  Point,  i,  105. 

Clarence,  i,  149. 

Clowes,  W.  Laird,  q.,  i,  22  ;  ii,  49, 
86,  159. 

Clydebank,  ii,  208. 

Cochrane,  see  AJmirante  Coch- 
rane. 

Colbert  off  Sfax,  ii,  2-3  ;  des.  261. 

Coles'  turret  design,  i,  8,  33,  306, 
ii,  224-5,  220  !  designs  Captain, 
183-4;  drowned  on  her,  185-6. 

Collingivood,    Tab.    xxii  ;  eleva- 


tion,   PI.    xxxix,  ii, 


of 


"Admiral"  class  ;  des.  ii, 
230-1  ;  defects,  233  ;  m.  196. 

Collins,  i,  1 50-1. 

Colomb,  q.  ii,  138,  169. 

Colombo,  i,  259,  263. 

Colonel  Lovell,  i,  67. 

Colorado,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Colossus,     Tab.    xxii  ;  elevation, 

PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ;   des.  ii,  229  ; 

defects,  240  ;  m.  231,  239. 
Columbia,  ii,  288. 

Columbiad,  a  heavy  smooth-bore 

gun  firing  shell,  i,  1. 
Columbus,  i,  61,  64-5. 

A  A 


352 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Comisa,  i,  220,  222,  224. 

Comus,    sister    to    Canada,  Tab. 

xxiii,  ii,  227. 
Concon,  ii,  32. 
Concord,  ii,  284. 

Condor,  English,  Tab.  xii ;  at 
Alexandria,  i,  340  ;  well  handled 
by  Lord  C.  Beresford,  346-47, 
348. 

Condor,  French,  ii,  268. 
Conestoga,  des.  i,  62  ;  m.  63-4. 

Confederates,  Southerners,  Seces- 
sionists, Rebels,  Citizens  of  the 
Confederacy  of  eleven  States 
which  seceded  from  the  United 
States  in  1861  ;  naval  resources, 

i,  1-2,  106-7,  117-18;  cotton,  177, 
196;  configuration,  179,  204-5; 
population,  179-80;  food  supply, 
37,  82-3  ;  manufactures,  178, 
193-4  ;  importance  of  Missis- 
sippi to,  37,  83  ;  rise  of  prices, 
83,  195-6  ;  artillery,  40,  136  ; 
torpedo  department,  102-5,  115; 
warships,  1-6,  41-2,  87,  98,  106-7, 
116-17;  cruisejs,  144-169. 

Congress,  at  Hampton  roads,  i,  14  ; 
attacked  by  Merrimac,  15  ;  tries 
to  escape,  18  ;  burnt,  19  ;  m.,  34. 

Congreve,  i,  xxxii. 
Connyngham,  i,  173. 

Conqueror,   elevation,   PI.,  xxxix, 

ii,  232  ;  des.,  ii,  229  ;  m.,  232. 
Conrad  or  Tuscaloosa,  i,  156. 
Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  des.  i, 

292  ;  off  Sulina,  293;  off  Sukhum 
Kale,  298-9,  off  Batum,  301-3; 
m.,  286. 

Constantinople,  i,  287 

Cooke,  i,  106-7. 

Copiapo,  ii,  24. 

Coquette,  i,  188,  195. 

Coquirabo,  i,  253. 

Cordite,  a  smokeless  powder,  ii,  1 12. 
Corrientes,  i,  261. 
Corvette  Pass,  i,  342. 


Courbet  at  Foochow,  ii,  4  ;  destroys 
Chinese  squadron,  7 — 12;  passes 
Min  forts,  12;  at  Sheipoo,  13-14. 

Courbet,  des.  ii,  262. 

Couronne,  Tab.  x.;  des.  ii,  260; 
m.  i,  150,  267,  275. 

Couting  Island,  ii,  12. 

Covadonga,  Tab.  xi ;  captured 
from  Spain  by  Ch.,  i,  252-3  ; 
des.  313-14;  left  at  Iquique, 
315;  action  with  Independencia, 
316-19;  escapes,  320;  damage 
to,  321  ;  sunk,  334;  m.,  322,  323, 
329- 

Craven,    T.A.M.,    drowned  on 

Tecumseh,  i,  124. 

Craven,  T.T.,  i,  49-51  ;  311  n. 

Crimean  War.  Bombardment  of 
Kinburn,  i,  xxxiii-vi,  landing  on 
Crimea,  281  ;  high-angle  fire, 
355  ;  m.,  207.     ii,  218,  220,  245. 

Cuba,  i,  147,  187. 

Cumberland,  Hampton  Roads,  i, 
14;  attacked  by  Merrimac,  16- 
17;  heroism  of  her  crew,  17; 
rammed  16  ;  value  of  her  re- 
sistance, 18  ;  m,  ii,  160. 

Cumberland  River,  i,  61,  63. 

Curupaity,  i,  262,  263. 

Curuzu,  i,  262. 

Cushing.  Torpedo  attack  on 
Albemarle,  i,  1 1 1-3. 

Custozza,  i,  217. 

Cuyler,  R.R.,  Tab.  v,  i,  137,  148. 
Cyclops,  des.  ii,  226. 
Cygnet,  Tab.  xii  ;  i,  340. 
Czarevitch,  i,  290-2. 
Czarevna,  i,  290-2. 

D. 

Da  Gama,  ii,  39,  42. 

Dahlgren,  in  command  at  Char- 
leston, i,  100 ;  unsuccessful 
attacks,  101  ;  m.  121,  194. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


353 


Dahlgren  guns,  heavy  smooth- 
bores designed  by  the  above,  i,  I, 
5,  10,  26. 

Dalmatians  in  Austrian  fleet,  i,  227 

D'Amico,  i,  220-1. 

Danube,  torpedo  actions  on,  i, 
289-295  ;  Sulina  attacked,  295-7  > 
m.  287,  288. 

Danzig,  i,  278  ;  ii,  276. 

Daring,  PI.  x,  i,  208. 

Dauphin  Island,  i,  114. 

"  David,"  i,  103,  208  ;  ii,  259. 

Davis,  i,  67,  69,  74. 

Davout,  ii,  267. 

Dawkins,  ii,  191-2. 

Decoy,  Tab.  xii,  i,  340. 

Deer,  i,  188. 

Deerhound,  i,  160,  163. 

Defence,  ii,  220  n. 

De  Grasse,  i,  38. 

De  Gueydon,  i,  277. 

De  Horsey,  commander  on  Pacific 
station,  i,  306  ;  attacks  Huascar,  j 
308-310. 

De  Kalb,  ex  St.  Louis,  des.  i,  62  ; 
at  Ft.  Henry,  63;  at  Ft.  Donel- 
son,  64-5  ;  on  Yazoo,  So  ;  sunk, 
84. 

Delaware,  River,  i,  154. 

Delaware,  State,  i,  149,  179. 

Denmark,    orders    turret-ship,  i, 
8,  33 ;    war   of    1864,  33,  226 ;  | 
France  hopes  for  her  alliance, 
271  ;  m.,  273,  276,  280-81. 

Depretis  succeeds  Angioletti,  i, 
215  ;  despatch  to  Persano,  217-8 ; 
responsible  for  attack  on  Lissa, 
220. 

Desaix,  ii,  2. 

D'Estaing,  Tab.  xv;  at  Foochow, 
ii,  4,  6-9;  descends  Min,  11. 

Desterro,  ii,  43,  45. 
"Destroyer,"   des.   ii,  258;  m.  ii, 
148  ;  i,  208. 


Destroyer,  see  Piratiny. 
Detroit,  ii,  287. 

Devastation,  English,  Tab.  xxii  ; 
elevation,  PI.  xxxvii,  ii,  220  ; 
des.  ii,  225-26;  crew,  213;  deck, 
227  ;  low  freeboard,  239  ;  hand- 
worked guns,  247  ;  m.  233,  272. 

Devastation,  French  floating  bat- 
tery, i,  xxxii-vi. 

Devastation,  French  battleship,  des. 
ii,  262  ;  hydraulic  machinery, 
247  ;  m.  272. 

Diaz,  Marcilio,  Tab.  xvii,  ii,  37. 
D'Iberville,  ii,  268. 
Dieppe,  i,  273. 

Dieudonne,  i,  267,  272,  ii,  275B. 

Dilaver  Pasha,  i,  289. 

Dixon,  i,  104. 

Djigit,  i,  290-2. 

Docka,  i,  286  n, 

Doctor  Batey,  i,  74. 

Dog  river,  i,  117. 

Dolphin,  ii,  281,  283 

Donau,  Tab.  viii,  i,  227. 

Don  Juan  of  Austria,  Tab.  viii  ; 
des.,  i,  226-7  !  position  in  line 
at  Lissa,  230  ;  part  in  battle,  243. 

Doubasoff,  i,  290-1. 

•'  Double-enders,"  des.,  i,  182  n. 

Douglas,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  q.,  i,  4,  34. 

Dover,  i,  157.    ii,  134. 

Drache,  Tab.  viii  ;  des.,  i,  227  ; 
position  at  Lissa,  230  ;  engages 
Palestro,  235  ;  part  in  battle,  243. 

Dragon,  i,  29. 

Dreadnought,  des.,  ii.  226  ;  m., 
196,  202. 

Dryad,  ii,  213. 

Duboc,  ii,  13-14. 

Duburquois,  ii,  275B. 

Duckworth,  Admiral,  i,  38.    ii,  50. 

A  A  2 


354 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Dugnay  Trouin,  Tab.  xv  ;  at  Foo- 
chow,  ii,  4,  6-9  ;  descends  Min, 
11-12. 

Duguesclin,  ii,  266. 

Duke  of  Genoa,  Tab.  vii. 

Dumbarton,  i,  165. 

Duncan,  General,  i,  42,  44,  58. 

Dunderberg,  ii,  277-8. 

Dunkirk,  i,  276,  278. 

Duperre,  see  Amiral  Duperre. 

Dupont  or  Du  Pont,  captures  Port 
Royal,  i,  184,  281  ;  in  command 
before  Charlestown,  89  ;  attacks 
unsuccessfully,  92-95  ;  by  order, 
91  ;  refuses  to  renew  attack, 
95  n. ;  recalled,  100  ;  m.  97,  121, 
194. 

Duppel,  ii,  275B. 

Dupuy  de   Lome,   French  naval 

architect,  ii,  219. 
Dupuy  de  Lome,  PI.  xv,  i,  311; 

des.,  ii,  267;  end-on  fire,  269; 

fit  for  line,  143. 
Dursternbrock,  i,  270. 

E. 

Eads,  J.  B.,  naval  architect  and 
engineer,  designs  Mississippi 
gunboats,  i,  62,  73  ;  monitors, 
119;  introduces  armour-deck,  ii, 
227. 

East  Gulf  Squadron,  i,  185. 
Eastport,  i,  64. 
Echo,  i,  143. 
Eckernford,  ii,  275B. 
Eckernsunde,  i,  33. 
Eclaireur,  ii,  13. 

Eclipse,  Tab.  xxiii ;  m.  ii,  140-142. 

Edgar,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  256  ;  m.  i,  311, 
ii,  155,  196. 

Edward's  Ferry,  i,  106. 

Egypt.  Riots  at  Alexandria,  i, 
336 ;  English  fleet  before,  336- 
340  ;  Egyptian  forts,  340-1  ; 
English  ultimatum,  342-3  ;  bom- 
bardment, 344-348  ;  damage  to 
forts,  351-2. 


Eider  Canal,  i,  278. 
Elbe,  i,  226,  274,  277,  278. 

Electric  Spark,  captured  by  Florida, 

i,  150,  168. 
Elgar,  Professor,  q.  ii,  174,  207. 

Elisabeth,  Kaiserin,  Tab.  viii ;  at 
Lissa,  i,  237-8. 

Elisabeth,  i,  277-8. 

Ellerbeck,  i,  270. 

Ellet,  i,  68. 

Elswick,  ii,  36,  59.  See  also  Arm- 
strong. 

Enterprise,  English,  ii,  221. 
Enterprise,  U.S.N.,  ii,  6-7. 
Era  No.  5,  i,  73. 
Erebus,  i,  xxxiii. 

Ericsson,  J.,  designer  of  Monitor, 
i,  6-7  ;  letter  to  Navy  Depart- 
ment, 6-7  n.  ;  introduces  turret, 
8-9;  his  critics,  11-2;  ships  can- 
not fight  forts,  91  ;  night  attacks, 
97  ;  invulnerability  of  his  ships, 
i,  266,  ii,  246 ;  later  designs,  i, 
89  ;  the  Destroyer,  ii,  40  ;  Stock- 
ton, ii,  211;  and  the  Stevens' 
battery,  ii,  218  ;  armour  deck, 
227;  and  Napoleon  III.,  i,  8,  ii, 
218. 

Esmeralda,  wooden  cruiser,  Tab. 
xi,  des.  i,  313  ;  captures  Cova- 
donga,  253 ;  left  at  Iquique, 
315;  action  with  Huascar,  316- 
319;  sinks,  319;  m.  331.  Steel 
cruiser,  Tab.  xvi ;  des.  ii,  17-8, 
255;  aids  insurgents,  16;  m.  22, 
29. 

Essex,  frigate,  i,  38,  133,  150. 

Essex,  gunboat,  des.  i,  62  ;  at  Ft. 
Henry,  63  ;  attacks  Arkansas, 
72. 

Esperanca,  ii,  39. 

Esploratare,  Tab.  vii,  i,  216,  217, 
220,  225. 

Europeans   in  Chinese   Navy,  ii, 

66,  88. 
Excellent,  i,  152. 


INDEX 

F. 

Faa  di  Bruno,  at  Lissa,  i,  236-7. 

Farragut,  D.  G.  life,  i,  38-9;  at 
New  Orleans,  45  ;  his  conduct, 
48-9  ;  difficulties,  58-9  ;  at  Vicks- 
burg,  69-70 ;  attacks  Arkansas, 
72;  at  Port  Hudson,  74-6; 
destroys  stores,  77  ;  leaves  Mis- 
sissippi, 80;  at  Mobile,  118, 
asks  for  ironclads,  119;  his  dis- 
positions, 120;  letter  to  his  wife, 
1 20- 1  ;  on  position  of  admiral, 
46,  120,  ii,  151-2,  n.  ;  climbs  rig- 
ging, i,  121  ;  takes  the  lead, 
124-5  ;  passes  the  fort,  127  ; 
rams  the  Tennessee,  130  ;  narrow 
escape,  130  ;  on  his  crew,  133  ; 
use  of  chain  armour,  160  ;  com- 
pared with  Tegetthoff,  226,  228  ; 
with  Bouet  Willaumez,  281-2  ; 
on  armour,  ii,  121  ;  m.  50,  144, 
I5i>  153- 

Fasana  Canal,  i,  228,  229,  24S. 

Favourite,  ii,  221. 

Fayal,  i,  153,  273. 

Fearless,  ii,  196-7. 

Federals,  or  Northerners,  the  in- 
habitants of  those  States  which 
were  faithful  to  the  Union  in 
1 861.    See  United  States. 

Feiseen,  renamed  Inhanduay ,  ii,  41. 

Fei  Yuen,  Tab.  xv  ;  at  Foochow, 
ii,  5,  6-9. 

Ferdinand  Max,  Erzherzog.  Tab. 
viii  ;  des.  i,  226-7  ;  flagship,  229  ; 
place  in  line  at  Lissa,  230  ; 
rams  Re  d 'Italia,  236-7  ;  rams 
unknown  vessels,  238  ;  share  in 
the  battle,  242  ;  m.  243  ;  ii,  160. 

Fernandina,  i,  184. 

Fernando  de  Noronha  Island. 
Neutrality  infringed,  i,  151,  156  ; 
strateg.  importance  of,  170-1. 

Ferre  Diego,  killed  on  Huascar,  i, 
327. 


OF   NAMES.  355 

I  Feth-i-Bulend,  i,  287,  293. 

Feth-ul-Islam,  i,  289,  290. 

Fieramosca,    Ettore,    Tab.  vii. 

Finance,  ii,  41. 

Fingal  v.  Atalanta. 

Finisterre,  ii,  185,  186. 

First  of  June,  battle  of,  ii,  no,  115. 

Fishbourne,  q.  i,  34. 

Flandre,  des.  i,  267,  and  Tab.  x. 
272-277. 

Flavio  Gioja,  1,  219. 

Florida,  i,  177,  181,  184.  187. 

Florida,  ex  Oreto,  des.  i,  146-7 ; 
at  Nassau,  147 ;  runs  into 
Mobile,  148  ;  runs  out,  id.  des- 
troys commerce,  148-9  ;  prizes 
captured,  149  j  on  Northern 
coast,  150 ;  seized  at  Bahia, 
150-1  ;  sunk,  151. 

j  Florida  Straits,  i,  170. 

Flusser,  C.  W.,  killed,  i,  108. 

Flying  Squadron,  Japanese,  off 
Asan,  ii,  67;  attacks  Tsi  Yuen, 
68-72  ;  at  Yalu,  85,  89,  124. 

Fong  commands  Tsi  Yuen,  ii,  67- 
70  ;  sentenced  to  death,  73  ;  care- 
lessness, 74  ;  misconduct  at  Yalu, 
102-3. 

Foo  Ching,  ii,  65. 

Foochow,  destruction  of  Chinese 
squad,  off,  ii,  4-1 1  ;  dock,  ii,  65  ; 
squadron,  62,  134. 

Foo  Poo,  Tab.  xv  ;  at  Foo-chow, 
ii,  5,  9- 

I  Foo    Sing,     Tab.    xv,    xxv ;  at 
Foochow,  ii,  5,  6-7,  65,  126. 

Foote,  in  command  on  upper  Mis- 
sissippi, i,  38,  63;  wounded,  67. 

Forbach,  i,  275. 

Forban,  ii,  268. 

For  bin,  ii,  217,  268. 

Forest  Queen,  \,  78. 


356  INDEX  C 

Formidabile,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.,  i, 
212-13  ;  at  bombardment  of 
Lissa,  222-23 >'  position  during 
battle  of  Lissa,  225  ;  steams  off, 
232  ;  damage  during  bombard- 
ment, 245  ;  PI.  xliv,  ii,  266. 

Formidable,  sister  of  Amiral  Ban- 
din,  which  see,  ii,  263,  147. 

Fort  Ada,  Tab.  xiii ;  des.  i, 
340;  guns  disabled,  351;  m., 
342,  347,  349,  355.  356. 

Fort  Ajemi,  Tab.  xiii;  des.  1, 
340;  m.,  356. 

Fort  Andes,  ii,  19. 

Fort  Beauregard,  i,  87,  Tab.  iii. 

Fort  Buchanan,  i,  137. 

Fort  Bueros,  ii,  19. 

Fort  Charles,  i,  69. 

Fort  Constantine,  i,  xxxi. 

Fort  De  Russy,  i,  80. 

Fort  Donelson,  capture  of,  i,  64-5. 

Fort  Fisher,  its  importance,  i,  135  ; 
des.  135-7  !  first  naval  expedi- 
tion against,  137  ;  the  powder 
boat,  138;  bombardment  139-40; 
second  expedition,  140  ;  bom- 
bardment, 141  ;  capture,  142. 

Fort  Gaines,  des.  i,  115;  capture, 
134. 

Fort  Henry,  capture,  i,  63-4. 

Fort  Hindman,  i,  73. 

Fort  Hospital,  i,  347,  352,  Tab.  xiii. 

Fort  Jackson,  des.  i,  40 ;  bom- 
barded by  fleet,  43-4  ;  passed  by 
fleet,  45,  54;  garrison,  57;  m., 
39,  56,  59,  127,  Tab.  ii. 

Fort  Kamaria,  i,  340,  Tab.  xiii. 

Fort  Lage,  ii,  38. 

Fort  La  Mercede,  i,  256. 

Fort  Lighthouse,  i,  342-43,  346 ; 
ceases  fire,  347. 

Fort  Marabout,  Tab.  xiii,  i,  340  ; 
engaged  by  Condor,  346-47. 

Fort  Marsa,  Tab.  xiii,  i,  340,  346. 


]F  NAMES. 

I  Fort  Martello,  i,  351. 

Fort  McAllister,  i,  90. 

Fort  Monroe,  i,  35. 

Fort  Morgan,  des.  i,  114-15; 
passed  by  the  fleet,  122-127; 
shots  fired,  128  ;  captured,  134. 

Fort  Moultrie,  i,  92. 

Fort  Nikolaiev,  i,  xxxiv. 

Fort  Oom-el-Kubebe,  Tab.  xiii ; 
des.  i,  340  ;  guns  disabled,  352  ; 
m.,  343- 

Fort  Pharos,  Tab.  xiii  ;  des. 
i,  340 ;  evacuated,  347  ;  guns 
disabled,  351  ;  m.  343,  349,  355, 
356. 

Fort  Pillow,  i,  61  ;  battle  of,  67-8  ; 
captured,  68. 

Fort  Powell,  i,  114,  134. 

Fort  Ras-el-Tin,  Tab.  xiii ;  des. 
i,  340  ;  Moncrieff  gun,  341 ;  guns 
disabled,  352  ;  m.  337,  342,  346. 

Fort  St.  Philip,  Tab.  ii  ;  des.  i, 
40;  passed  by  fleet,  46-54;  fall 
of,  56;  m.  45. 

Fort  Saleh  Aga,  Tab.  xiii,  i,  340 ; 
guns  disabled,  351. 

Fort  Santa  Cruz,  ii,  37-8. 

Fort  Sao  Joao,  ii,  38,  39. 

Fort  Silsileh,  Tab.  xiii ;  guns 
mounted  at,  i,  337  ;  position, 
340;  m.  342,  351. 

Fort  Sumter,  Tab.  iii  ;  position, 
i,  86-7  ;  attacked  by  Dupont, 
92-95;  by  Dahlgren,  101-102; 
Ericsson  urges  night  attack  on, 
97- 

Fort  Valdivia,  ii,  19. 

Fort  Villegagnon,  ii,  37,  38,  42. 

F^ort  Wagner,  Tab.  iii,  i,  87,  92, 
101. 

Foster,  General,  i,  107. 

Foudroyante,  i,  xxxii. 

Fourichon  commands  French  North 
Sea  squad.,  i,  267,  275-277. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


357 


Fox,  G.  V.,  i,  38,  91,  184. 

France.    Unprepared  state  of  navy 
in  1870,  i,  265;  ships,  266-268; 
expedition  to  Baltic,  271  ;  dis- 
patch of  a  squad.  272-3  ;  Fouri-  j 
chon  leaves  Mediterranean,  275  ;  j 
difficulty  of  coaling,  276;  gunners  ! 
landed,  276  ;  blockade,  278  ;  and 
China,  see  China.    Declares  rice 
contraband,    ii,    15  ;    navy,  ii, 
260-266 ;  compared  with  Eng- 
lish, 270-275. 

Franquet,  i,  279. 

Fraser,  Trenholm  &  Co.,  i,  194. 

Fratesti,  i,  289. 

Friedland,  ii,  261,  272. 

Friedrich,   Erzherzog,    Tab.  viii, 

i,  238. 

Friedrich  Karl,   Tab.   x,   des.  i, 
269;  retires  to  Wilhelmshaven,  j 
273,  278. 

Friedrichsort,  i,  270. 

Frisbee,  i,  53. 

Fuentes,  ii,  22,  30. 

Fuh  Sing,  Tab.  xv,  ii,  5. 

Fulminant,  ii,  265. 

Fu  Lung,  Tab.  xviii. 

Funk,  i,  167. 

Furieux,  ii,  265. 

Fusoo,  Tab.  xix ;    loss,  xxi  ;  des. 

ii,  57  ;  at  Yalu,  85  ;  position,  89  ; 
hotly  engaged,  92  ;  very  slow, 
106  ;  loss,  109  ;  kept  station, 
113  ;  m.  124. 

a. 

Gaeta,  Tab.  vii. 

Gaines,  i,  118,  128. 

Galatz,  i,  288. 

Galena,  Tab.  iv,  i,  9,  120. 

Galissoniere,    des.     ii,    266  ;  at 
Sfax,  ii,  2-3  ;  in  the  East,  12. 

Galsworthy,  Captain,  ii,  75-76. 


Galvez,  i,  256. 
Garezon,  i,  329. 
Garibaldi,  i,  211. 
Garibaldi,  Tab.  vii,  i,  221. 
Gauloise,  i,  267,  272, 
General  Beauregard,  i,  67,  69,  85. 
General  Bragg,  i,  67-8. 
General  Jeff.  Thompson,  i,  67. 
General  Lovell,   Tab.  ii,   i,  68-9, 
85- 

General  Quitman,  Tab.  ii,  i,  42. 
General  Stirling  Price,  i,  67,  68,  78, 
85. 

General  Sumter,  i,  67,  68. 
General  Van  Dorn,  i,  67. 
Genesee,  i,  74-5. 

Geneva  Arbitration,  i,  149,  174. 
Genoa,  i,  213. 

Georgia,  State  of,  i,  177,  178,  181. 

Georgia,  ex  Japan,  des.  i,  165-6  ; 
m.  170,  174. 

Germany,  coast  of,  i,  268;  fleet, 
269,  270 ;  measures  for  coast 
defence,  273;  dispositions  dur- 
ing war  of  1870,  278;  Arminius 
and  Elizabeth,  277  ;  Meteor  and 
Bouvet,  279;  well  prepared,  283. 

Gibraltar,  i,  146;  ii,  134,  217. 

Gibson,  Miiner,  q.  i,  168. 

Giglio,  Tab.  vii. 

Giraffe,  i,  188. 

Gladiateur,  ii,  2. 

Glasgow,  i,  165. 

Glassell,  i,  103. 

Glatton,  floating  battery,  i,  xxxiii. 

Glatton,  turret-ship,  ii,  226. 

Gloire,  Tab.  x;  des.  ii,  218-9, 
260  ;  m.  i,  7,  267  ;  ii  220. 

Gobernador  Island,  ii,  35. 

Golden  Rocket,  i,  145. 

Goni,  ii,  24,  27. 


358 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Gonzalez,  ii,  25. 
Goodrich,  q.  i,  354. 
Gorgon,  ii,  226. 
Goubet,  ii,  259,  268. 
Gourdon,  ii,  13-4. 
Gourko,  General,  i,  287. 
Governolo,  Tab.  vii,  i,  240. 

Governor  Moore,   Tab.    ii  ;  des. 

i,  41-2  ;  engaged,  55  ;  sunk,  56. 

Goya,  i,  261. 

Grand  Duke  Constantine,  see  Con- 
stantine. 

Grand  Gulf  attacked,  i,  70 ;  falls, 
80  ;  m.  70,  77. 

Grant,  General,  i,  63,  64 ;  at 
Shiloh,  65  ;  at  Vicksburg,  73, 
77-8 ;  testimony  to  services  of 
fleet,  82,  83;  m.  24,80,  81,  84. 

Gravelotte,  i,  281. 

Great  Belt,  i,  277. 

Great  Eastern,  ii,  241. 

Greene,  S.  D.,  on  Monitor,  i,  14, 
26,  30-1. 

Greville,  i,  315. 

Griffiths,  i,  328. 

Grille,  i,  278. 

Grosser  Kurfurst,  des.  ii,  196 ; 
with  German  squad.,  192;  ram- 
med by  K'bnig  Wilhelm,  192-3  ; 
sinks,  193-4. 

Guacoldo,  i,  332,  333. 

Guale,  Tab.  xvi ;  ii,  30-1. 

Guanabara,  Tab.  xvii  ;  ii,  36. 

Guerriere,  ii,  174. 

Guiscardo,  Tab.  vii;  i,  220,  221. 

Gustave  Zede,  ii,  268 ;  PI.  xlvi,  ii,  270. 

Gustavo,  Sampaio,  ex  Aurora,  des. 

ii,  36 ;  arrives,  39 ;  torpedoes 
Aquidaban,  44-49  ;  damage  to, 
46;  m.  42,  43. 

Guyenne,  i,  267,  272. 

Guzman,  ii,  27. 

Gymnote,  ii,  268. 


H. 

Habana,  see  Sumter. 

Habsburg,  Tab.  viii ;  des.  i,  226; 
position  at  Lissa,  230 ;  part  in 
battle,  242. 

Haines  Bluff,  i,  80. 
Haiyang,  Battle  of.    See  Yalu. 
Haiyang-tao  Island,  ii,  85,  86. 
Halifax,  i,  168. 
Halpine  torpedo,  ii,  259. 
Hampton  Roads,  i,  14,  22,  24,  104, 
151. 

Hanneken,.  Major  Von,  strate- 
gical adviser  to  Admiral  Ting, 
ii,  66  ;  on  the  Kowshing,  73-77  ; 
on  Ting  Yuen,  88  ;  wounded,  99. 

Hannibal,  ii,  237.  See  also  Majestic. 

Hanus,  Lieutenant,  q.  ii,  286. 

Harding,  I.,  i,  346. 

Harriet  Lane,  i,  183. 

Hartford,  flagship  of  Farragut ;  off 
Mississippi,  i,  37  ;  position  at 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  45-6;  in 
battle,  48-52  ;  at  Vicksburg, 
70-1;  at  Port  Hudson,  75-6; 
destroys  stores,  77  ;  at  Mobile, 
120,  121-5;  engages  Tennessee, 
130;  loss,  132,  Tab.  ii,  iv  ;  m. 
ii,  144. 

Harvey  process,  des.  ii,  253. 

Hashidate,  Tab.  xix  ;  losses,  xxi  ; 
PI.  xxii,  ii,  58;  des.  ii,  58-9; 
at  Yalu,  85  ;  place  in  line,  89  ; 
hoists  Ito's  flag,  94  ;  loss,  109  ; 
hits,  H2B,  167. 

Hatteras  Island,  i,  180,  184. 

Hatter  as,    sunk    by   Alabama,  i, 

154-5.  157. 
Havana,  i,  56,  144,  171,  187,  195, 

279. 

Havre,  i,  278. 
Hayti,  i,  153. 
Hecate,  ii,  226. 
Heckmann,  Herr,  ii,  88. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


359 


Hector,  ii,  189. 

Heimdal,  i,  226  n. 

Helicon,  Tab.  xii ;  i,  340. 

Heligoland,  Action  off,  i,  226  ; 
French  off,  i,  275. 

Henri  Grace  a  Dieu,  ii,  212. 

Henry  Clay,  i,  78. 

Herbal,  i,  263-4. 

Hercules,  Tab.  xxii  ;  des.  ii,  221-2  ; 
m.  185  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxiii,  ii, 
220. 

Hero,  ii,  229. 

Heroine,  i,  267,  275. 

Hertha,  i,  270,  278. 

Hervey,  M.,  ii,  21,  28,  31. 

Hickley,  ii,  190. 

Higgins,  Col.,  i,  44,  52,  58. 

Hirst,  i,  298. 

Hisber  i,  289. 

Hiyei,  Tab.  xix;  losses,  xxi  ;  des. 
ii,  58  ;  at  Yalu,  85  ;  place  in 
line,  89  ;  cut  off  from  line,  92  ; 
passes  between  battleships,  93 ; 
detached  for  repairs,  95 ;  part 
in  battle,  97  ;  loss,  108  ;  hits 
on  her,  112 a;  exterior  appear-  j 
ance,  112B;  slow,  112D;  m.  104, 
126. 

Hobart  Pasha,  runs  American 
blockade,  i,  192,  195  ;  with 
Turkish  fleet,  287  ;  q.  293,  297, 
301. 

Hobby,  Engineer,  i,  no. 

Hoche,  elevation  PI.  xlii,  ii,  262  ; 
des.  ii,  263  ;  m.  269,  272. 

Hoel,  i,  67. 

Hoffman,  Herr,  ii,  88,  100. 
Holyhead,  i,  170,  172. 
Hong  Kong,  ii,  61. 
Hood,  ii,  235,  240, 
Hoste,  Sir  W.,  i,  219. 
Hotchkiss  gun,  ii,  250. 


Hotspur,  ii,  226. 
Hotham,  i,  20. 

Housatonic,  Tab.  xxv  ;  i,  89, 
torpedoed,  103-4,  208. 

Howell  torpedo,  ii,  40. 

Hsutan,  ii,  74. 

Huascar,  Tab.  xi,  xxv  ;  PI.  xvi,  i, 
328 ;  des.  i,  306 ;  crew  mutiny,  306  ; 
molests  Eng.  ships,  306;  attacked 
by  Shah,  308-9  ;  escapes,  309  ; 
damage,  309-10  ;  compared  with 
her  opponents,  310-1  ;  speed  in 
1879,  3T4i  action  with  Esmeralda, 
315-9  ;  rams  and  sinks  Esme- 
ralda, 319;  bad  gunnery,  317-8; 
crew  demoralised,  318;  damage 
320;  attacks  Magallanes,  321; 
harries  coast,  321  ;  captures 
Rimac,  322  ;  sighted  by  Chilians, 
323  ;  battle  of  Angamos,  324- 
331  ;  crew  demoralised,  327  ; 
attempts  to  ram,  328;  surrenders, 
330  ;  repaired,  332.  Under 
Chilian  flag.  Tab.  xvi ;  block- 
ades Callao,  333 ;  declares  for 
Congress,  ii,  16-7 ;  at  Caldera, 
22. 

Huasco,  ii,  22. 

Humaita,  Attacks  on,  i,  262-264; 
abandoned,  264. 

Humber,  i,  343. 

Hunt-Grubbe,  i,  343. 

Huron,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Hiisum  or  Bi'isum,  i,  278. 

Hydra,  ii,  226. 

Hyene,  ii,  2. 

I. 

Ida,  i,  134. 

Idjilalieh,     Tab.    xxv,    i,    287  ; 

torpedo  attack  on,  293-4. 
Ignacio,  Admiral,  i.  263. 
Iguatemi,  Paraguayan,  i,  260. 
Illinois,  State  of,  i,  61. 
Illinois,  ii,  297-8. 
Illustrious,  see  Majestic,  ii,  237. 


360 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


litis,  ii,  77. 

Imperial,  improvised  war  ship,  ii, 
16;  sent  to  Caldera,  20-22,  30; 
stratagem,  32,  Tab.  xvi. 

Imperieuse,  Tab.  xxiii ;  elevation, 
PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ;  des.  ii,  256. 

Inconsta?it,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  185-6, 
189,  254. 

Independencia,  Tab.  xi  ;  des.  i, 
312  ;  action  with  Covadonga, 
316-319;  attempts  to  ram,  319; 
strikes  rock  and  is  abandoned, 
319-20;  m.  314-5,  ii,  177. 

Independenza,  Tab.  vii,  i,  240. 

Indiana,  ii,  291-4. 

Indianola,  des.  i,  73  ;  rammed  and 
sunk,  74,  84. 

hidomptable,  ii,  265. 

Inflexible,  Tab.  xii,  xxii  ;  PI. 
xvii,  i,  338  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxix, 
ii,  232  ;  des.  i,  338,  ii,  228  ;  at 
Alexandria,  338,  343 ;  part  in 
the  bombardment,  344-7  ;  little 
ammunition  left,  348  ;  loss,  349 ; 
damage,  350 ;  effect  of  her  fire, 
352-3  ;  m.  342  ;  tactical  influence 
of  her  design,  ii,  154  ;  denuded 
of  armour,  240  ;  compound 
armour,  253  ;  m.  196,  263,  270. 

Ingles,  on  the  Japanese,  ii,  53,  106. 

Intrepide,  ii,  2. 

Invincible,  English,  see  sister  ship 
Audacious,  Tab.  xii  ;  des.  i, 
339  ;  ii,  222  ;  at  Alexandria,  i, 
337  ;  flagship,  336  ;  manoeuvres, 
347  ;  loss,  350  ;  damage,  id.  ;  m. 
342,  343,  344. 

Invincible,  French,  i,  267  ;  in  North 

Sea,  275  ;  fuel  runs  short,  276. 
Iosco,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Iowa  compared  with  Majestic,  &c, 

ii,  242-5  ;  des.  294-5. 
Ipiranga,  Paraguayan,  i,  260. 

Iquique,  Attack  on  Magallanes 
at,  i,  321 ;  action  off  (Esmeralda), 
315-320  ;  m.  307  ;  ii,  28. 


Iris,  ii,  255. 

Iron  Duke,  with  Channel  squad., 
ii,  189 ;  rams  Vanguard,  190 ; 
her  ram  not  damaged,  192  ; 
court-martial,  192 ;  m.  58,  160, 
190,  191. 

Ironsides,  New;  des.  i,  90;  solid 
armour,  9  ;  at  Charleston,  93-4  ; 
hits,  101;  ii,  246;  torpedo  attack 
on,  i,  103;  at  Fort  Fisher,  137, 
139,  140  ;  ii,  277.  Tab.  iii,  v,  xxv. 

Iroquois,  Tab.  ii  ;  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45  ;  engages  gun-boats,  52  ; 
at  Vicksburg,  70-1  ;  blockades 
Sumter,  145-6. 

Iscodra,  i,  289. 

Island  No.  10,  i,  61,  66,  67. 

Isle  of  Serpents,  i,  293. 

Ismail  Bay,  i,  300. 

Itaipu,  ii,  39,  42. 

Itaipuru,  i,  262. 

Italy  threatens  Austria,  i,  211  ; 
naval  preparations,  212  ;  state 
of  fleet,  212-3;  personnel,  213; 
gunners,  214,  215,  246;  fleet 
arrives  at  Ancona,  215  ;  want  of 
guns,  &c,  216;  fleet  ordered  to 
sea,  218;  attacks  Lissa,  218-224; 
Austrians  appear,  224-5  ;  state 
of  It.  fleet,  225  ;  no  plans,  id.  ; 
the  battle,  231-247;  heroism  of 
Re  d'ltalia's  crew,  237  ;  of 
Palestro's,  241  ;  mistake  of  It., 
248-9  ;  type  of  It.  battleships,  ii, 
59- 

Itasca,  Tab.  ii,  iv  ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  44 ;  position,  45  ; 
passes  forts,  53  ;  retires,  54  ;  at 
Mobile,  120,  128  ;  torpedoed,  134. 

Itata,  ii,  33-4. 

Ito  training,  ii,  53,  85  ;  orders  at 
Yalu,  89;  why  he  drew  off,  105-6, 
115;  after  battle,  126;  at  Wei- 
hai-wei,  id.  at  Port  Arthur,  127; 
blockades  Wei-hai-wei,  128-133  ; 
position  in  battle,  152 ;  m.  56, 
89,  98,  124. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


361 


Itsukushima,  Tab.  xix  ;  loss 
xxi ;  PI.  xxii,  ii,  58  ;  des.  ii,  58-9  ; 
at  Yalu,  85  ;  position  in  line,  89; 
loss,  109 ;  hit  at  Wei-hai-wei, 
133  ;  m,  167. 

Ivahy,  i,  262. 


J. 


Jackson,  Lieutenant,  killed  at  Alex- 
andria, i,  350. 

Jackson,  President,  i,  38. 

Jackson,  Fort,  see  Fort  Jackson. 

Jackson,  Tab.  ii. 

Jacob  Bell,  i,  148. 

Jahde,  i,  270,  273,  276,  277. 

Jamaica,  i,  155. 

James  River,  i,  35,  105,  180. 

Jamestown,  i,  15,  19. 

Janequeo  attacks  Union,  i,  332-3. 

Japan,  revival  of,  ii,  51-3;  fleet, 
57-60;  mercantile  marine,  61; 
docks,  id. ;  personnel,  53,  73  n., 
97,  117;  disregard  of  Chinese, 
82,  83  ;  action  off  Asan,  67-71  ; 
sinking  of  Kovoshing,  73-77  ; 
cruelty,  79-80 ;  battle  of  Yalu, 
86-110;  heavy  guns,  II2B-C; 
quick-firers,  1 12C-D ;  signals,  119; 
captures  Port  Arthur,  127;  block- 
ades Wei-hai-wei,  127-133; 
torpedo  attacks,  128 — 132;  m. 
i,  169,  269,  278. 

Japan,  see  Georgia. 

Jardine  and  Matheson,  ii,  73. 

Jaureguiberry,  i,  280. 

Jaureguiberry,  see  Amiral  J. 

Java,  ii,  174. 

Javary,  Tab.  xvii  ;  ii,  35  ;  sunk, 

38-9. 
Jeff.  Davis,  i,  143. 

Jejui,  Paraguayan,  i,  258 ;  sunk, 
260. 


Jemmapes,  des.  ii,  266;  m.  145, 
272. 

Jena,  ii,  271. 

Jeune  Ecole.  The  followers  of 
Admiral  Aube  in  France.  They 
hold  that  the  torpedo-boat  and 
cruiser  have  displaced  the  battle- 
ship ;  that  speed  is  everything  ; 
and  they  have  a  great  belief  in 
bombardments,  i,  321-2,  355,  ii, 
119  ;  commerce  destruction,  i, 
314,  ii,  119  ;  war  of  coasts,  i, 
321-2,  324,  ii,  119. 

Jih-tao  or  Ihtao,  ii,  128. 

John  Elder,  i,  306. 

Johnston,  on  board  Tennessee,  i, 
129,  131. 

Johnstone,  C,  captain  of  Camper- 
dovon,  ii,  201,  206. 

Jones,  on  Merrimac,  i,  6,  25. 

Jouett,  i,  128. 

Juniata.    Tab.  v,  i,  137,  ii.  6. 
Jupiter,  English,  see  Majestic,  ii, 
237- 

Jupiter,  Brazilian,  ii,  35. 
Jylland,  i,  226  n. 


Kai  Chi,  ii,  65. 
Kai  Koku,  ii,  52-3. 

Kaiser,  Tab.  viii,  i,  227  ;  position 
in  Austrian  line  at  Lissa,  231  ; 
movements,  234  ;  rams  Porto- 
gallo,  239  ;  heavy  loss,  240,  244, 
246  ;  m.  238. 

Kaiser  Maximilian,  Tab.  viii  ; 
des.  i,  227  ;  position  in  Austrian 
line  at  Lissa,  230  ;  threatens 
Palestro,  240  ;  part  in  battle, 
242-3. 

Kamiesch  Bay,  i,  xxxii;. 

Kansas,  State  of,  i,  180. 

Kansas,  Tab.  v,  i,  137 

Kartali,  i,  293. 


362 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Kat ah  din,  gunboat,  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45 ;  passes  forts,  48  ;  at  Vicks- 
burg,  70-1,  Tab.  ii. 

Katahdin,  ram,  ii,  150,  229. 

Kate,  i,  193. 

Katsuragi,  ii,  85,  128,  133. 

Kearsarge,  des.  i,  158-9 ;  chal- 
lenges Alabama,  159;  the  action, 
160-163  >  sinking  of  Alabama, 
163-4;  m.  146,  157,  ii,  137,  158. 

Kearsarge,  Battleship,  ii,  295-8. 

Kelasour,  i,  300. 

Kelung,  ii,  4. 

Kennebec,  Tab.  ii,  iv  ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  45  ;  does  not  pass 
forts,  53;  at  Vicksburg,  70-1; 
at  Mobile,  120,  126,  128. 

Kennon,  i,  55. 

Kentucky,  State  of,  i,  65,  179. 
Kentucky,  ii,  295-8. 

Keokuk,  Tab.  iii  ;  des.  i,  90  ; 
attacks  Sumter,  93  ;  retires,  id.  ; 
founders,  95. 

Keystone  State.    Action  with  Pal- 
metto State,  i,  88-9. 
Key  West,  i,  184. 
Khedive,  i,  336. 
Khroumirs,  ii,  1. 

Kiel,  M.  xv,  i,  274 ;  position,  i, 
270-1  ;  French  dare  not  attack, 
276  ;  ships  at,  278  ;  difficulty  of 
attacking,  282,  ii,  275B  ;  m.  i,  274, 
277,  281. 

Kifz-i-Rakhman,\,2%'];  in  Danube, 
289  ;  attacked  at  Sulina,  295,  297. 

Kilia.  Mouth  of  Danube,  i,  295, 
296. 

Kilidj  Ali,  i,  290. 

Kimpai  Narrows,  ii,  12. 

Kinburn,  des.  i,  xxxiv  ;  bombard- 
ment of,  xxxv ;  captured,  id. ; 
English  loss,  xxxvi;  m.  i,3;  ii,  253. 

Kineo,  Tab.  ii  ;  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45;  collides  with  Brooklyn, 
48,  49  ;  at  Port  Hudson,  74-5. 


Kingstown,  ii,  189. 

King  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii  ;  PI.  xx, 
ii,  14;  des.  ii,  64;  with  Chinese 
fleet  at  Yalu,  84 ;  place  in  line, 
89  ;  moves  out,  92 ;  sunk  by  gun- 
fire, 94;  part  in  battle,  101  ;  ex- 
plosion, 101 ;  hit  by  a  big  Canet 
shell  (?),  H2C;  on  fire,  113;  m. 
104,  105,  120,  169. 

Kobe  Maru,  ii,  61. 

Kolberg,  French  prepare  to  bom- 
bard, i,  276,  277 ;  exposed  to 
attack,  284  ;  ii,  276. 

Kongo,  des.  ii,  57-8 ;  m.  85. 

Kbnig  Wilhelm,  Tab.  x  ;  des. 
i,  269  ;  m.  272,  273,  278  ;  flag  of 
Germ,  squad.,  ii,  192;  rams 
Grosser  Kurfurst,  193-4;  dam- 
age to  ram,  160,  195. 

Korea,  Chinese  and  Japanese  land 
in,  ii,  51  ;  Chinese  troops  sent  to, 
by  sea,  73,  83. 

Korea,  Gulf  of,  ii,  73,  85. 

Kotaka,  des.  ii,  61  ;  at  Wei-hai- 
wei,  127,  129. 

Kowshing  leaves  Taku,  ii,  73  ; 
stopped  by  Naniiva,  74 ;  sunk, 
76  ;  violations  of  international 
law,  77-80  ;  m.  51. 

Krikun,  i,  286. 

Kronprinz,  Tab.  x;  des.  i,  269; 
m.  273,  278. 

Kronstadt,  i,  289. 

Krupp  guns  at  Yalu,  ii,  56,  64,  65. 

Kuang,  &c,  see  Kvuang. 

Kure  or  Hure,  ii,  61. 

Kuwan-shi  or  Kwang  Yi,  ii,  67,  69, 
72. 

Kwang  Kai  or  Kuang  Chia,  Tab. 
xviii  ;  des.  ii,  65  ;  with  Chinese 
fleet  at  Yalu,  84 ;  position,  89  ; 
runs  away,  94  ;  goes  ashore,  96  ; 
destroyed,  96  ;  did  little  fighting, 
102;  on  fire,  113;  m.  105,  112. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES, 


363 


Kivang  Ping,  Tab.  xviii ;  des. 
ii,  65  ;  with  Chinese  fleet  at 
Yalu,  84;  position,  90;  engages 
Main  Squadron,  93 ;  engages 
Saikio,  99  ;  loss,  108  ;  m.  102. 

Kvuang  Ting,  ii,  126,  132. 

Kivang  Tsi,  ii,  126. 

L. 

Labo,  i,  270. 

Lackawanna,  Tab.  iv  j  at  Mobile, 

i,  120  ;  Tennessee  attempts  to 
ram,  126;  rams  Tennessee,  129; 
collides  with  Hartford,  130. 

Lacour,  Col.,  ii,  275B. 

Lafayette,     des.    i,    73  ;  passes 

Vicksburg,  78-9. 
La  Guira  or  Guayra,  i,  199. 
La  Ronciere  le  Noury,  i,  272. 
Laird,    Messrs.,    shipbuilders,  i, 

152,  259;  ii,  183. 
Laird  Clowes,  see  Clowes. 
Lai  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii,  xxv  ;  des. 

ii,  64  ;  with  Chinese  fleet,  84  ; 
position,  89  ;  attacks  Akagi,  set 
on  fire,  98,  102  ;  heat  in  engine- 
room,  165;  loss,  109;  disabled, 
105;  at  Wei-hai-wei,  126;  tor- 
pedoed, 132  ;  m.  120. 

Lalande,  i,  268. 

Lamb,  Colonel,    commands  Fort 

Fisher,  i,  135,  140. 
Lambton,  i,  349. 
Lamoriciere,  i,  211. 
Lancaster  gun,  ii,  245. 
Lancaster,  i,  68,  72,  77. 
Lang,  ii,  80. 

Lanyon,  ii,  199,  202  ;  will  not  leave 

the  admiral,  203. 
La  Seyne,  i,  253  ;  ii,  17,  58. 
Latorre,  i,  322-23. 
Latouche-Treville,  des.  ii,  267. 
Lave,    des.  i,  xxxii,  at  Kinburn, 

xxxiii-vi. 
Lay  torpedo,  i,  322. 
Lebedi,  i,  286,  296. 


Lee,  Admiral,  i,  108. 

Lee,  General,  R.  E.,  i,  135. 

Lee,  R.E.,  ex  Giraffe,  i,  188,  191. 

Leger,  ii,  268. 

Lehigh,  ii,  246. 

Lemoine,  q.  i,  150. 

Leonoff,  Major-Gen.,  i,  294. 

Leopard,  ii,  1-2. 

Lesina,  i,  220,  222. 

Leu-Kung-Tao  or  Tau,  position, 
ii,  127,  128-9;  captured,  133. 

Levant,  French  ships  in,  1870,  i, 
267. 

Levrier,  ii,  268. 

Lexington,    des.  i,    62 ;    at  Fort 

Henry,  63  ;  at  Shiloh,  65. 
"  Le  Yacht,"  q.  ii,  170. 
Liberdade,  Tab.  xvii. 
Lieutenant  Poustchine,  i,  296. 

Li  Hung  Chang,  order  to  Ting,  ii, 
82. 

Lima,  i,  314. 

Lima  Barros,  i,  259,  263. 

Lincoln,  President,  Ericsson  writes 
to,  i,  6  ;  on  "Black  Sunday," 
21  ;  q.  on  importance  of  Missis- 
sippi, 37  n.  ;  student  of  military 
matters,  91 ;  on  services  of  fleet, 
83  n.  ;  proclaims  blockade,  177, 
181  ;  moderation,  202. 

Lindoya,  i,  263. 

Lion,  ii,  77. 

Lisbon,  i,  166. 

Lissa,  M.  xii,  i,  220;  Hoste's 
action  off,  i,  219;  des.  id. ; 
Persano  urged  to  attack,  217, 
218  ;  Albini  against  attack,  220  ; 
report  of  It.  staff,  id. ;  first  bom- 
bardment, 220-2  ;  second  bom- 
bardment, 222-4  ;  Austrian  fleet 
appears,  225  ;  telegrams  to 
Tegetthoff,  229  ;  order  of  Aus- 
trians,  230;  o(  Italians,  231-32  ; 
battle,  231-217;  tactics  of 
Tegetthoff,  247-8  ;  strategy  of 
Italians,  248;  loss  at,  ii,  no. 


364 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Little  Rebel,  i,  67,  69. 

Liu,  ii,  87. 

Liverpool,  i,  152. 

Loa,  Peruvian,  i,  255. 

Loa,  Chilian,  i,  322,  324-25  ;  des- 
troyed by  a  mine,  333-34. 

Long  Island  Sound,  i,  168. 

Lopez,  Marshal,  President  of  Para- 
guay, i,  257,  260,  264. 

Lord  Clyde,  ii,  221. 

Lord  Warden,  des.  ii,  221  ;  m.  185, 
186. 

Louisiana,  State,  i,  181. 

Louisiana,   Tab.   ii  ;    des.  i,  41  ; 

defects,  44  ;    brought  down  to 

forts,  45  ;  m.  51,  58. 
Louisiana,  powder   ship   at  Fort 

Fisher,  i,  138. 
Louis,  Phillippe,  ii,  217. 
Louisville,    des.    i,  62  ;    at  Fort 

Donelson,  64-5  ;  passes  Vicks- 

burg,  78  ;  at  Grand  Gulf,  79. 
Lubeck,  i,  277. 

Lutfi-Djelil,  i,  287  ;  sunk,  289. 

Lynx,  Tab.  xv ;  at  Foochow,  ii, 
4 ;  opens  fire,  8  ;  shells  arsenal, 
10. 

Lyons,  Admiral,  i,  xxxiii. 

M. 

Macedonian,  ii,  174. 
Mackau,  Admiral,  ii,  217. 
Mackinaw,  Tab.  v,  i,  137,  139. 
Madeira  Island,  Sea  King  off,  i, 

166  ;      strategical  importance, 

170-172. 
Madonna  Battery,  i,  222-3. 
Machias,  ii,  289. 

Mafitt;  commands  Florida,  i,  1.47- 
150. 

Magallanes,  des.  i,  313;  action 
with  Huascar,  321  ;  Huascar 
attempts  to  torpedo,  322  ;  off 
Arica,  334;  joins  Congres- 
sionalists,  ii,   16,  Tab.  xi,  xvi, 


Magenta,  early  battleship,  Tab.  x, 

i,  267,  ii,  260. 
Magenta,  modern  battleship,  des.  ii, 

263;    engines,   214;   stern  fire, 

154;  heavy  guns,  how  mounted, 

179  ;  m.  272. 
Magnanime,  Tab.  x,  i,  267,  275. 
Magnificent,  see  Majestic,  ii,  237-8  ; 

induced  draught,  254. 
Mahan,  q.  ii,  106,  118. 
Mahmoodieh,  Tab.  xxv,  i,  287,  302. 
Mahopac,  Tab.  v. 
Maine,  State  of,  i,  168. 
Maine,  ii,  289-90. 
Main  Squadron,  Japanese,  ships 

composing,  ii,  88  ;  m.  90. 
Maipo,  ii,  20,  21. 

Majestic,  Tab.  xxii ;  Frontispiece, 
vol.  i ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ; 
des.  ii,  237-239;  wood  on,  123; 
armour,  121,  241,  253  ;  compared 
with  foreign  battleships,  242- 
244  ;  with  English  cruisers,  141  ; 
m.  i,  96,  ii,  180,  212,  271. 

Makaroff  commands  in  Russian 
torpedo  operations  at  Sulina,  i, 
293;  at  Sukkum,  298,  at  Batum, 
301-2. 

Malacca,  Straits  of,  i,  171. 

Mallory,  Secretary  Confederate 
States'  Navy,  q.  i,  2-3  ;  m.  6. 

Manassas,  des.  i,  41  ;  attacks 
Northern  fleet,  47  ;  rams  Brook- 
lyn, 50  ;  disabled  and  burnt,  56; 
m.  49. 

Manco  Capac,  Tab.  xi,  i,  312,  322. 

Manego,  see  Porto  M. 

Manhattan,  Tab.  iv,  des.  i,  119; 
at  Mobile,  120;  guns  disabled, 
123;  attacks  Tennessee  130-1. 

Marajo,  Tab.  xvii. 
Maratanza,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 
Marblehead,  ii,  281. 
Marceau,  PI.  xii,  i,  270  ;  ii,  263. 
Marengo,  at  Sfax,  ii,  2,  3,  261. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES 


365 


Maria  Adelaide,  Tab.  vii,  flagship 
of  Albini,  i,  245. 

Maria  Pia,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.  i,  213  ; 
at  Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa,  219; 
off  Comisa,  221  ;  position  when 
Austrians  appeared,  225  ;  place 
in  line,  232  ;  in  the  battle,  238  ; 
damage,  245. 

Markham,  second  in  command, 
Mediterranean  fleet,  1893,  on 
Camperdown,  ii,  196;  misgivings 
atTryon's  signal,  199,  201  ;  court 
martial,  206. 

Mars.    See  Majestic,  ii,  237,  n. 

Marseilles,  i,  275. 

Marston,  i,  24. 

Martinique,    Sumter   at,    i,    145  ; 

Alabama  at,  153. 
Maryland,  State  of,  i,  179. 
Mason,  Confederate  envoy,  i,  201-3. 
Massachusetts,  ii,  291. 
Massena,  ii,  264. 

Matamoras,  trade  of  neutrals  with, 
i,  180,  185,  198. 

Matsushima,  at  Yalu,  ii,  85  ;  posi- 
tion, 89;  retires,  94;  disabled, 
96;  on  fire,  97;  shots  on,  112A; 
loss,  109. 

Matthias  Cousino,  with  Chilian 
squad.,  i,  322  ;  sent  inshore, 
323  ;  blockades  Callao,  333. 

Mattabesett  attacks  Albemarle,  i, 
108-9. 

Matuska,  i,  286,  n. 

Maumee,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Maurice,  Col.,  q.  ii,  78. 

Maya,  ii,  85. 

Max.,  abbreviated  form  of  name 
Erzherzog  Ferdinand  Maxi- 
milian, which  see. 

Maximilian,  Archduke,  i,  226. 

McGiffln,  commander  on  board 
Chinese  ship,  Chen  Yuen,  ii,  88  ; 
q.  81,  88-9,  100;  puts  out  fire, 
100  ;  on  Tsi  Yuen,  103  ;  on  hits 
received  by  Chen  Yuen,  112c; 
on  torpedoes  fired,  114. 


Mearim,  Paraguayan,  i,  260. 

Mediterranean,  United  States'  Ships 
in,  1 861,  i,  182  ;  French  fleet  in, 
1870,  267  ;  ships  retained  there, 
275  ;  French  communications 
there  not  threatened,  280  ;  Rus- 
sian squadron  in,  1877,  280; 
French  fleet  in,  1881,  ii,  2  ;  hypo- 
thetical French  and  English  fleets, 
ii,  116;  loss  of  Victoria  in,  196- 
207. 

Medea,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  257. 
Medjemieh,  i,  289  ;  at  Sulina,  295. 
Medusa,    i,    270  ;     blockaded  on 
Japanese  coast,  278. 

Mejillones  or  Mexillones,  i,  323. 
Melbourne,  Shenandoah  at,  i,  167. 

Mello,  Admiral,  revolt  of  Brazilian 
navy  in  his  favour,  ii,  35  ;  lacks 
army,  37  ;  suffers  from  short- 
handedness,  49  ;  collapse  at  Rio, 
42  ;  m.  46. 

Melpomene,  ii,  138. 

Memphis,  battle  of,  i,  68-9  ;  Con- 
federate works  at,  61  ;  railroad 
to,  64. 

Mercedita,  action  with  Palmetto 
State,  i,  87-8  ;  taken  to  Port 
Royal,  89. 

Mercury,  ii,  255. 

Merlin,  ii,  6. 

Merrimac  or  Virginia,  design,  i, 
3-6  ;  discrepancies  in  accounts 
of,  4  ;  the  original  Merrimac, 
3-4,  n.  ;  designers,  4-5  ;  des.  4-5 ; 
crew,  6  ;  armament,  5  ;  Commo- 
dore Smith  on,  13  ;  defects,  15  ; 
action  with  Congress  and  Cumber- 
land, 16-19;  results  of  action, 
20-21  ;  alarm  at  Washington, 
20  ;  not  sea-going,  21  ;  repaired, 
25;  action  with  Monitor,  25-31; 
bad  projectiles,  27  ;  results  of 
action,  31-3;  subsequent  his- 
tory, 35  ;  scuttled,  id.  ;  m.  228,  ii, 
160,  168  ;  type  of  ironclad  widely 
reproduced  in  South,  i,  41,  61, 
71,  87,  97,  106,  116;  in  North, 
90,  266  ;  abroad,  255. 


366 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Mersey,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  256. 
Mesoodieh,  i,  287. 
Messagiere,  Tab.  vii,  i,  220. 
Meteor,  in  West  Indies,  i,  270  ; 

des.  279  ;  action  with  Bouvet,  ib. 
Meteor,  i,  286. 
Mexico,  i,  179-80. 
Mexico,  Gulf  of,  i,  183. 
Miami,  i,  108-9. 
Miantonomohf  ii,  278,  289. 
Milan  Decree,  i,  197. 
Milne,  Admiral,  ii,  184-5. 
Milwall,  i,  212. 
Milwaukee,  i,  134. 

Min  River,  descent  of,  by  French, 
ii,  11-12. 

Mina,  i,  294. 

Minneapolis,  ii,  288. 

Minnesota,  in  Hampton  Roads,  i, 
14,  18  ;  attacked  by  Merrimac, 
19,  25,  29-30  ;  m.  24  ;  torpedo 
attack  on,  104  ;  at  Fort  Fisher, 
137,  Tab.  v,  xxv. 

Minotaur,  ii,  185,  221. 

Mississippi  River,  strategical  im- 
portance, i,  37,  81,  83;  fighting 
upon,  37-85;  open  to  Unionists, 
81  ;  gunboats,  62,  73,  ii,  227  ; 
tactical  lessons,  i,  84-5  ;  value 
of  navy,  83  ;  Grant  upon,  82  ; 
difficulty  of  navigating,  39 ; 
Sumter  in,  144-5  !  blockade  of 
mouth,  181. 

Mississippi  Sound,  i,  114,  180. 

Mississippi,  State  of,  i,  64,  181. 

Mississippi,  Confederate,  i,  41. 

Mississippi,  United  States',  Tab. 
ii  ;  at  New  Orleans,  i,  40  ;  place, 
45  ;  passes  forts,  47-8  ;  tries  to 
ram  Manassas,  56  ;  at  Port 
Hudson,  74;  runs  aground,  76; 
burnt,  ib.  77  ;  m.  84. 

Missouri,  State  of,  i,  37,  179. 

Mitchell  commands  Confederate 
naval  force  at  New  Orleans,  i, 


41-2,  45;  does  not  send  down 
fire  rafts,  46  ;  m.  58. 
Mobile,  M.  vi,  i,  122  ;  Confederate 
defences,  i,  114-5;  mines,  115; 
flotilla,  1 16-8  ;  Northern  fleet  at 
119-20  ;  attack  begins,  121  ; 
Brooklyn  stops,  122  ;  Farragut 
goes  on,  124;  fort  passed,  127; 
action  in  the  Bay,  128 — 131  ; 
Tennessee  surrenders,  132  ;  tac- 
tical importance,  133-4,  59,  70, 
ii,  50;  battle,  m.  59,  70,  282,  ii, 
151,  164;  bay,  i,  180,  185;  town, 
147,  187. 

Mohican,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Moll,  Von,  killed  at  Lissa,  i,  243. 

Moltenort,  i,  270. 

Monadnock,  ii.  278,  289,  Tab.  v. 

Mona  Passage,  i,  170. 

Monarch,  English  turret-ship; 
Tab.  xii  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxvii, 
ii,  220;  des.  ii,  224-5,  h  339 1 
at  Alexandria,  336  ;  position, 
342-3  ;  share  in  the  bombard- 
ment, 346-8  ;  no  damage,  351  ; 
m.  ii,  184-5,  !96;  guns,  223. 

Monarch,  U.S.,  ram,  i,  68-9. 

Monitor,  elevation,  PI.  ii,  i,  10; 
section,  PI.  iii,  i,  26  ;  designed 
by  Ericsson,  i,  6-7  ;  the  turret, 

8-  9,  33  ;  completion  of,  9  ;  des. 

9-  10;  criticism  of,  11 -2;  price, 
13  ;  name,  14  ;  passage  to 
Hampton  Roads,  23-4;  arrival, 
25  ;  action  with  Merrimac,  26- 
31  ;  defects,  27-8  ;  pilot  house 
hit,  30;  results  of  action,  31-4; 
founders  at  sea,  36  ;  m.  ii,  137, 
220  ;  deck,  227,  246,  i,  86  ;  earlier 
designs  by  Ericsson,  i,  8,  ii,  218  ; 
type  Lincoln  believes  in,  i,  91  ; 
later  examples,  89-90,  119  ; 
defects,  i,  136,  266  ;  armoured 
funnels,  ii,  164. 

Monocacy,  ii,  6. 

Monongahela,  Tab.  iv  ;  at  Port 
Hudson,  i,  74-76;  at  Mobile, 
120;  rams  Tennessee,  126;  does 
so  again,  129, 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


367 


Montauky  Tab.  iii  ;  at  Charles- 
ton in  action,  i,  92-4  ; 
damage,  94  ;  attacks  Fort 
McAllister,  S9-90  ;  destroys 
Nashville  90,  105  ;  hits  on,  ii, 
246. 

Montcalm,  i,  267. 
Mont  du  Roule,  i,  160. 
Montechant,  French  strategist,  q. 

i,  209,  ii,  156. 
Montevideo,  ii,  36. 
Monterey,  ii,  291. 
Montgomery ,  Tab.  v  ;  i,  137. 
Montgomery,  ii,  287. 
Monticello,  Tab.  v;  i,  137. 

Montt,  commander  of  Congres- 
sionalist  squadron,  ii,  16. 

Montz,  Von,  commands  Grosser 
Kurfurst,  ii,  194;  saved,  195. 

Moore  commands  Independencia, 
h  315.  3I9»  321. 

Moraga  commands  Condell,  ii,  21  ; 
leads  torpedo  attack  on  Blanco, 
21-2;   his  account,  23;  number 


of  torpedoes  fired, 


fio-hts 


Aconcagua,  29  ;  at  Iquique,  31. 

Morgan,  see  Fort  M. 

Morgan,  des.  i,  118  ;  run  aground, 
128. 

Morlaix,  i,  165. 

Morris,  gallantry  of,  i,  17. 

Morris  commands  Florida,  i,  149, 

15°.  I5I- 
Morse,  ii,  268. 

Mosher,  armed  tug,  i,  48. 

Mouin-i-Zaffre,  i,  287  ;  at  Sulina, 
289,  295.  * 

Mound  Battery,  at  Ft.  Fisher,  i,  142, 
190. 

Mound  City,  des.  i,  62  ;  rammed, 
68  ;  captures  Fort  Charles,  69  ; 
passes  Vicksburg,  78. 

Mount  Vernon,  i,  137. 

Vol.  II. 


Mucangue  Island,  ii,  40. 

MukJiadem  Khair,  i,  287;  at 
Sulina,  289,  293,  295,  297. 

Mustapha  Pasha,  i,  295. 

Muzashi,  ii,  85, 

N. 

Nada,  ii,  41 . 
Nagasaki,  ii,  61. 

Nahant,  Tab.  iii  ;  action  with  Ft. 
Sumter,  i,  93-4 ;  damage,  95  ; 
action  with  Atlanta,  99-100;  hits, 
ii,  246. 

Naniwa,  Tab.  xix  ;  loss,  xxi ; 
elevation,  PI.  xxvi,  ii,  74  ;  des. 
60  ;  efficiency  of,  53  ;  in  G.  of 
Korea,  68  ;  opens  on  Tsi  Yuen, 
68,  70;  attacks  Kuivang-slii,  73  ; 
stops  Kowshing,  74 ;  sinks  her, 
76-7  ;  fires  on  men  in  water,  79; 
at  Yalu,  85  ;  place  in  line,  89  ; 
reconnoitres,  96;  loss,  109;  hits 
on,  112A,  H2B  ;  at  Wei-hai-wei, 
bombards,  128;  hit,  133. 

Nan  Shuin,  ii,  65. 

Nan  Ting,  ii,  65. 

Nantucket,  Tab.  iii,  i,  95  ;  ii,  246. 

Napoleon  III.  and  the  Monitor,  i, 
8  ;  ii,  218. 

Nashville,  destroyed  by  Montauk, 
i,  90,  165. 

Nassau,  Florida  seized  and  re- 
leased at,  i,  147  ;  coals  at,  148  ; 
watched  by  U.S.  cruisers,  186  ; 
centre  of  blockade-running  trade, 
187,  189,  191,  193;  number  of 
ships  clearing  from,  194,  195. 

Naval  Defence  Act,  1889,  ii,  234, 
26 

Navarino  at  Sukhum,  i,  298-9. 

Nedjem-i-Chevket,  i,  287. 

Nelson,  Lord,  his  relations  to  his 
captains,  i,  214,  228  ;  on  frigates 
and  battleships,  ii,  138  ;  place  of 
admiral,  151  ;  m.  i,  59,  133,  219, 
282  ;  ii,  81,  137,  216. 

B  B 


368 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Nelson,  Tab.  xxiii,  255  ;  m.  266. 
Neptune,    English  turret-ship,  ii, 
224-5. 

Neptune,  French  battleship,  ii,  263  ; 
PI.  xliii,  ii,  264. 

Neuse  River,  i,  180. 

Neustadt,  i,  277  ;  ii,  276. 

Newark,  ii,  283-4. 

Newfoundland  Banks,  i,  153,  170. 

New  Ironsides,  see  Ironsides. 

New  Madrid,  i,  66-7. 

New  Orleans,  instructions  to  cap- 
ture, i,  38 ;  forts,  40 ;  flotilla, 
41-2  ;  boom,  42  ;  boom  breached, 
42,  44  ;  Northern  attack  on  forts, 
46-54 ;  action  above  forts,  54- 
56  ;  capture  of  New  Orleans,  56  ; 
consequences,  id.  ;  garrison  of 
forts,  57-8  ;  compared  with 
Mobile,  59,  127  ;  loss  of  fleet,  60; 
blockaded,  183  ;  blockade  run- 
ning, 187  ;  place  of  Farragut,  ii, 
151,  n.;  sandbags  on  board  fleet, 
i,  39  ;  ii,  164  ;  m.  i,  281. 

New  Orleans,  i,  41. 

New  York,  threatened  by  Atlanta, 
i,  167-68  ;  dockyard,  184  ;  m. 
171,  198,  212. 

New  York,  ii,  291,  300. 

Niagara  captures  Georgia,  i,  166  ; 
off  Charleston,  183;  declines  to 
fight  Stonewall,  311,  n. 

Nichols,    on    Ting    Yuen,  ii,  88 
killed,  99. 

Nictheroy,  ex  El  Cid,  des.  ii,  40 
pneumatic  gun,  40-1  ;  appears 
off  Rio,  42  ;  at  Tijucas  Bay,  id. 
m.  151. 

Nielly,  ii,  13. 

Nikolaiev  Fort,  see  Fort  N. 

Nikopolis,  or  Nikopol,  i,  294. 

Nile,  battle  of  the  ;  loss  at,  ii,  no. 

Nile,  English  turret-ship.  Tab. 
xxii  ;  PI.  iv,  i,  32  ;  elevation  PI. 
xxxix,  ii,  232  ;  des.  ii,  233  ;  low 
freeboard,  240;  descended  from 
Monitor,  i,  33  ;  in  Mediterranean 
fleet,  1893,  ii,  196,  199. 


Niloff,  i,  294. 

Nils  jfuel,  Danish,  i,  226,  n. 
Nippon  Yusen  Kaisha,  ii,  61. 
Nitrate  Ports,  ii,  18. 
Nordenfelt  gun,  ii,  250 ;  torpedo, 
259- 

Norfolk,  Virginia,  capture  of  navy 
yard,  i,  4  ;  guns  from,  35  ;  re- 
captured, 184-85. 

Norman,  H.,  q.  on  Ting,  ii,  55-6, 
80;  Chinese  personnel,  56  ;  fore- 
tells Yalu,  57. 

Normand,  i,  129. 

Normandie,  ii,  260. 

North  Atlantic  squadron,  i,  185. 

Northbrook,  Lord,  ii,  184. 

North  Coast  squadron,  ii,  62. 

North  Sea,  French  squad,  in,  1870, 
i,  267  ;  Willaumez  off  Jahde 
272;  Fourichon  in,  275;  his  diffi- 
culties, 275-6;  blockade  con- 
tinued, 277-8;  observation  sub- 
stituted, 278. 

Northampton,  ii,  255. 

Northumberland,  ii,  221,  185. 

Novara,  Tab.  viii,  i,  226,  227. 

Novgorod,  i,  286. 

Numancia,  Spanish,  in  Pacific, 
1865,  i,  252  ;  bombards  Valpa- 
raiso, 253-54  ;  at  Callao,  255-56  ; 
hits,  256. 

Nunez,  Spanish  Admiral,  i,  253, 
256. 

Nyack,  i,  137. 

Nymphe,  i,  277-78. 

o. 

Ocean,  elevation  PI.  xlii,  ii,  262 ; 
des.  ii,  261  ;  in  Baltic  squadron, 
i,  272  ;  withdrawn,  277  ;  m.  272. 

Ocean,  ii,  221. 

Octorara,  Tab.  iv,  at  Mobile,  i, 
120,  123. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


i,  188. 
258  ; 


Odessa,  i,  xxxiv,  211,  218,  293,  296, 
300. 

O'Higgins,  Tab.  xi,  xvi  ;  des.  i, 
313  ;  searches  for  Huascar,  322  ; 
chases  Union,  325  ;  joins  Con- 
gressionalists,  ii,  16;  shells  Val- 
paraiso, 20;  at  Pacocho,  31. 

Ohio  River,  i,  61. 

Ohio,  State  of,  i,  61,  65. 

Old  Dominion  Trading  Co 

01  i)  id  a,      Paraguayan,  i, 
grounds,  260. 

Olnstee,  see  Tallahassee. 

Olympia,  ii,  287. 

Oneida,  Tab.  ii,  iv  ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  45  ;  passes  forts,  47, 
engages  gunboats,  55  ;  atVicks- 
burg,  70  ;  at  Mobile,  120  ;  raked 
by  Tennessee,  126  ;  Florida  runs 
past,  148-9. 

Onohama  dockyard,  ii,  61,  129. 

Onondaga,  purchased  by  France, 

i,  266-7,  278. 
Opinidtve,  i,  266. 
Opyt,  i,  296. 
Oran,  i,  275. 
Oregon,  ii,  291. 
Oreto,  see  Florida. 

Orion,  purchased  from  Turkey,  ii, 

224. 
Osage,  i,  134. 
Osaka,  ii,  61. 

Osceola,  Tab.  v,  i,  137,  139. 
Osmanieh,  i,  287,  300. 
Ossabaw  Sound,  i,  90,  95. 
Ossipee,  Tab.  iv  ;  at  Mobile,  i,  120, 
126. 

Otchakov,  i,  xxxiv. 
Otsego,  i,  113. 
Ontka,  i,  286,  296. 
Owasco,  i,  43. 

P. 

Pacheco,  killed  on  Blanco,  ii,  26. 
Pacific,  Russian  fleet  in,  1877,  i,  286. 


369 
248  ; 


Page,  on  battle  of  Lissa,  i 
on  armour,  ii,  217. 

Pagoda  Point,  ii,  5. 

Paixhans,    General,    inventor  o 
shell-gun,  ii,  217. 

Palacios  wounded  on  Huascar,  i 
329- 

Palestro,   Tab.   vii  ;   des.   i,  213 
at  Ancona,  216  ;  off  Lissa,  225 


position  in  line, 


engages 


point, 


action 


258; 


Drache,  235  ;  takes  fire,  id.  , 
courage  of  her  crew,  241  ;  she 
blows  up,  id.  ;  m,  249  ;  ii,  185. 

Pallas,  English,  ii,  221. 

Pallas,  Brazilian,  ii,  37. 

Palliser  shells  have  a  chilled 
ii,  252. 

Palmer,  gallantry  of,  i,  70. 

Palmer,  Surgeon,  i,  132. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  i,  202. 

Palmetto  State,  des.  i,  87  ; 
off  Charleston,  87-89. 

Pamlico  Sound,  i,  186,  106. 

Para,  i,  263. 

Paraguari,  Paraguayan,  i, 
rammed,  260. 

Paraguay,  M.  xiv,  i,  280  ;  Lopez, 
tyrant  of,  i,  257-8  ;  seizes  Bra- 
zilian ship,  258  ;  enters  La  Plata, 
id.  ;  battle  of  Riachuelo,  260-1  ; 
Itaipuru,  262;  Humaita,  262-4  ; 
boarding  attacks  on  Brazilians, 
263  ;  end  of  the  war,  264. 

Paraguay  River,  i,  257. 

Parana  River,  i,  257,  259,  261. 

Paranahyba  or  Parnahyba,  Tab. 
xvii,  i,  260,  ii,  42. 

Pareja,  Admiral,  Spanish,  on 
Pacific  Coast,  i,  252  ;  commits 
suicide,  253. 

Paris,  i,  276;  treaty  of,  "  free  ships 
free  goods,"  169,  199.  Russian 
Black  Sea  fleet  limited,  287. 

Paris,  i,  xxxi. 

B  B  2 


370  INDEX  OF 

Parrot  guns.  A  species  of  rifled 
gun  :  burst,  i,  139  ;  dangerous, 
141. 

Pascal,  ii,  267. 

Paso  el  Patria,  i,  261. 

Passaic,  Tab.  iii ;   at  Charleston, 

i,  92-94;  damage,  94;  hits  on, 

ii,  246  ;  m.  312. 

Paiapsco,  Tab.  iii  ;  at  Charleston, 

i,  92-94  ;  damage,  94  ;   hits  on, 

ii,  246. 

Patrick  Henry  or  Yorktown,  i,  15. 

Pawtucket,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Payne,  drowned  on  David,  i,  104. 

Peacock,  ii,  174. 

Pearl,  Tab.  xxiii,  ii,  257. 

Pe-chi-li,  Gulf  of,  ii,  66,  127. 

Pedro  Ivo,  sent  against  Aquidaban, 
ii,  43  ;  pressure  falls,  45. 

Peiho,  i,  35. 

Peixoto,  Marshal,  President  of 
Brazil ;  revolt  against,  ii,  35  ;  his 
resources,  37  ;  buys  a  fleet,  40  ; 
its  uselessness,  41  ;  crushes  in- 
surrection at  Rio,  42. 

Pelereschine,  i,  305. 

Pelorus,  ii,  257. 

Pemberton,  General,  i,  74. 

Penelope,  Tab.  xii  ;  des.  i,  339  ; 
twin  screws,  ii,  254 ;  position  at 
Alexandria,  i,  342-3  ;  shells  Mex, 
347-8  ;  loss,  350  ;  damage,  350-1. 

Penhoat,  i,  277. 

Pensacola,  i,  184-5. 

Pensacola  at  New  Orleans,  i,  40, 
45  ;  passes  forts,  47. 

Pequet,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Persano,  Count  Carlo  Pellion  di, 
Italian  Admiral  ;  his  record,  i, 
21 1 -2  ;  faith  in  Affondatore,  212, 
215-217  ;  want  of  character, 
214-5,  2I7  >  complaints  of  fleet, 
215;  declines  battle  at  Ancona, 


NAMES. 

216-7  ;  Puts  to  sea  and  returns. 
218;  ordered  to  sea,  219;  stra- 
tegy, 220 ;  attacks  Lissa,  220- 
224  ;  his  negligence,  224  ;  makes 
numerous  signals,  231-2;  disposi- 
tions for  battle,  232  ;  changes 
flagship,  233  ;  does  not  ram 
Kaiser,  238-9 ;  no  plans,  246 ; 
rage  against  him,  249  ;  his  trial, 
250;  condemnation,  251;  m.  ii, 
81,  86,  151. 

Persine,  i,  290. 

Peru,  quarrel  with  Spain,  i,  252  ; 
Callao  bombarded,  254-6  ;  re- 
pulse of  Spaniards,  256 ;  and 
England,  affair  of  Huascar,  i, 
306-312;  and  Chili  war,  i,  312; 
fleet,  312,  Tab.  xi  ;  geographical 
position,  314  ;  bad  gunnery,  317, 
319;  cross  raiding,  321-2  ;  battle 
of  Iquique,  315-321  ;  of  Anga- 
mos,  324-331 ;  blockade  of  Callao, 
333- 

Peterhoff,  case  of  the,  i,  198-200. 

Petrel,  ii,  283. 

Petropaulovsk,  i,  286. 

Petz,  Commodore,  commands 
wooden  ships  at  Lissa,  i,  230-1  ; 
engages  Ribotti,  234  ;  rams 
Portogallo,  238-9. 

Phaeton,  ii,  196. 

Philadelphia,  184. 

Philadelphia  target,  ii,  150,  285-6. 

Philadelphia,  U.S.N.,  ii,  286-7. 

Philippines,  i,  169. 

Phoebe,  i,  150. 

Phyong  Yang  or  Ping  Yang,  ii,  84. 

Piemonte,  i,  224. 
Pierola,  i,  306. 

Pifarefski  at  Sukhum,  i,  298-300. 
Pikysyry,  i,  264. 

Pilcomayo,  Tab.  xi  ;  des.  i,  312; 
at  Arica,  322  ;  captured  by 
Chilians,  332  ;  re-armed,  id., 
m.  333- 


IXDEX  OF 

Ping  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii ;  des.  ii, 
64  ;  at  Yalu,  84  ;  place  in  line, 
89  ;  holds  aloof,  95  ;  attacks 
Matsushima,  96  ;  attacks  Saikio, 
98  ;  loss,  109 ;  at  Wei-hai-wei, 
126  ;  m.  132. 

Pinola,  Tab.  ii ;  at  New  Orleans, 
rams  boom,  i,  44;  position  in 
attack,  45  ;  does  not  pass  forts, 
53-4;  m.  56;  loss,  60;  Vicks- 
burg,  70. 

Pinzon,  Spanish  Admiral,  i,  252. 

Pique,  ii,  2. 

Pirabebe,  Paraguayan,  i,  258. 

Piratiny  ex  Destroyer,  des.  ii, 
40. 

Pisagua,  Huascar  off,  i,  307,  308  ;  { 
m.  ii,  20. 

Pittsburg,  des.  i,  62  ;  at  Ft. 
Donelson,  64 ;  hit,  65  ;  passes 
Island  No.  10,  67  ;  passes  Vicks- 
burg,  78  ;  at  Grand  Gulf,  79. 

Pittsburg  landing,  i,  65. 

Plevna,  i,  287. 

Plymouth,  i,  170,  172,  273. 

Plymouth,  U.S.A.,  i,  111. 

Podgoritza,  i,  289. 

Point  de  Galle,  i,  171. 

Pola,  i,  229,  251. 

Poltio,  gallantry  at  Lissa,  i,  237. 

Polyphemus,  PI.  vii,  i,  132  ;  des. 
ii,  228;  utility,  147,  150. 

Pope,  General,  i,  66. 

Popoffkas,  circular  floating  bat- 
teries, i,  286.  * 

Port  Arthur,  docks  at,  ii,  66  ; 
Chinese  fleet  retires  to,  95,  107  ; 
withdraws  from,  126  ;  captured 
by  Japanese,  127. 

Porter,  Constructor,  i,  5,  107. 

Porter,  Admiral,  on  Monitor,  i,  12  ; 
commands  mortar  flotilla  at  New 
Orleans,  recalls  Itasca,  etc.,  i, 
54 ;  commands  on  Mississippi, 
74;  runs  past  Vicksburg,  77-8, 
84 ;    commands  at    Ft.  Fisher, 


NAMES.  371 

137-142  ;  on  strategy  of  com- 
merce destroyers,  q.  170;  on 
Port  Hudson,  77. 

Port  Hudson,  fleer  passes,  74-6; 
Mississippi  lost,  76 ;  Porter  on 
strategic  importance  of  passage, 
77- 

Portland,  ii,  134. 

Portland,  Maine,  i,  149. 

Porto  Karober  attacked  by  Italian 
fleet,  i,  222-3. 

Porto  Man  ego  attacked  by  Italian 
fleet,  i,  220,  222,  224. 

Porto  San  Giorgio  attacked  by 
Italian  fleet,  i,  222-3. 

Port  Royal  captured  by  Dupont,  i, 
56,  184;  m.  20,  89,  185,  281. 

Port  Royal,  Tab.  iv  ;    at  Mobile, 

i,  120,  128. 

Portsmouth,  i,  307  ;  ii,  195. 
Portsmouth,  U.S.A.,  i,  184. 
Pothuau,  ii,  267. 
Poti,  i,  301,  302. 

Powerful,  Tab.  xxiii  ;  des.  ii, 
155,  216,  256;  water-tube  boilers, 
254- 

Powkattan,  Tab.  v,  i,  137,  183. 

Prado,  General,  i,  315. 

Prat,  speech  to  his  crew,  i,  316  ; 
skill  and  daring,  315-16  ;  boards 
the  Huascar,  317  ;  killed,  id.  ;  a 
national  hero,  id. ;  reward  of  his 
courage,  320. 

Presidente  Errazuriz,  ii,  17. 

Presidente  Pinto,  ii,  17. 

Preussen  with  German  squadron, 

ii,  193,  x95- 
Prince  Albert,  ii,  224. 
Prince  Consort,  ii,  221. 

Prince  George,  see  Majestic,  ii, 
237,  n. 


372 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Principe  di  Carignano,  Tab.  vii  ; 
des.  i,  213;  at  Ancona,  216  ;  at 
Lissa,  219,  225;  place  in  line, 
232  ;  opens  battle,  234  ;  attacks 
Kaiser,  239  ;  damage,  245. 

Principe  Umberto,  Tab.  vii,  i, 
222. 

Prinz  Adalbert,  Tab.  x  ;  des.  i,  269  ; 
at  Wilhelmshaven,  273  ;  in  Elbe, 
278. 

Prinz  Engen,  Tab.  viii,  des.,  i,  227  ; 
place  in  line  at  Lissa,  230 ;  in  the 
battle,  243. 

Provence  in  Adriatic,  i,  227  ;  in 
Mediterranean  fleet,  1870,  267  ; 
in  North  sea,  275. 

Pullino,  ii,  259. 

Pulo  Condor,  i,  157. 

Puritan,  ii,  278,  289. 

Purvis  on  board  Chih  Yuen,  ii,  88  ; 
drowned,  101. 

q. 

Quaker  City,  i,  137. 
Queen,  ii,  212. 

Queen  of  the  West,  i,  68 ;  rams 
Lovell,  69  ;  on  Vazoo,  71  ;  passes 
Vicksburg,  73  ;  captured  by  Con- 
federates, 74 ;  rams  Webb,  id. 

Queenstown,  ii,  189. 

Quilio,  ii,  275B. 

Quinteros  Bay,  ii,  21  ;  Congres- 
sionalist  forces  land  at,  32. 

R. 

Radetzky,  Tab.  viii ;  i,  226,  227. 
Ragheb  Pasha,  i,  337. 
Raleigh,  English,  ii,  254. 
Raleigh,  Confederate,  i,  15,  19. 
Raleigh,  U.S.N.,  ii,  287. 
Ramillies,  submarine  attack  on,  i, 
102. 

Ramillies,  see  Royal  Sovereign,  ii, 
234.  n. 


Rappahanock,  ex  Victor,  i,  166, 
174. 

Ras-el-Tin,  see  Fort  R. 
Rattlesnake,  ii,  257. 
Rattazzi,  Italian  Minister,  i,  211. 
Razzetti,  gallantry  at  Lissa,  i,  237. 
Read,  i,  149. 

Rebolledo,  Admiral,  i,  315,  322. 

Re  di  Portogallo,  Tab.  vii  ;  des.  i, 
212;  at  Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa, 
219,  221  ;  position  when  Austrians 
appeared,  225 ;  place  in  line, 
232  ;  rammed  by  Kaiser,  238-9; 
damage,  245  ;  praised  by  Persano, 
249. 

Re  d' Italia,  Tab.  vii ;  des.  i,  212  ;  at 
Ancona,  216  ;  Persano's  flagship, 
219  ;  at  Lissa,  221  ;  position 
when  Austrians  appeared,  225  ; 
place  in  line,  232  ;  Persano  leaves 
her,  233,  234 ;  hotly  attacked, 
235;  rammed  and  sunk,  236-7  ; 
gallantry  of  her  crew,  237  ; 
rudder  damaged  (?)  243  ;  praised 
by  Persano,  249  ;  m.  237,  242, 
244,  246,  247,  250  ;  ii,  160. 

Redoubtable,  elevation,  PI.  xlii,  ii, 
262  ;  ii,  261. 

Red  River,  stores  destroyed  on,  i, 
73;  stores  collected,  74,  77; 
Federal  expedition  up,  80. 

Reed,  Sir  E.  J.,  ii,  221,  225. 

Reina  Regente,  Spanish,  ii,  207. 

Reindeer,  ii,  174. 

Reine  Blanche  at  Sfax,  ii,  2,  3. 

Renard,  i,  267. 

Rendel  gunboats,  carrying  one  very 
heavy  gun  forward,  ii,  65,  84, 
126. 

Rene  Adolphe,  i,  278. 

Rennie,  Messrs.,  i,  259. 

Renown,  Tab.  x'xii ;  des.  ii,  253  ; 

compared   with   cruiser,   140- 1, 

142  ;  m.  145,  271. 


IXDEX    OF  NAMES, 


373 


Renown,  see  Victoria,  ii,  196. 

Republica,  Tab.  xvii  ;  pins  Mello, 
ii,  36 ;  passes  Rio  forts,  37  ; 
rams  Rio  de  Janeiro,  38  ;  cap- 
tures Itaipu,  39. 

Repulse,  ii,  221 . 

Repulse,  see  Royal  Sovereign,  ii, 
234- 

Requin,  ii,  265-6. 

Research,  ii,  221. 

Resistance,  ii,  220. 

Resolucion,  Spanish,  in  Pacific,  i, 
252  ;  bombards  Valparaiso, 
253.4  ;  Callao,  255-6. 

Resolution,  see  Royal  Sovereign, 
ii,  234. 

Retribution,  privateer,  i,  143. 

Revanche  in  North  Sea,  i,  275  ;  m. 
257  ;  at  Sfax,  ii,  2,  3. 

Revenge,  ii,  234. 

Rhind,  i,  138. 

Rhode  Island,  i,  137. 
Riachuelo,  ii,  36. 

Riachuelo,  Battle  of  the,  i,  259-261. 

Ricasoli,  Italian  Minister,  i,  215. 

Richelieu,  ii,  261 . 

Richmond  dependent  upon  Wil- 
mington, i,  135,  142;  inland,  179; 
on  James  River,  1S0  ;  prices  at, 
196  ;  m.  4,  5,  35,  106,  107,  185, 
187,  205. 

Richmond,  Tab.  ii,  iv  ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  45  ;  passes  forts,  52  ; 
at  Vicksburg,  70-1  ;  at  Port 
Hudson,  74;  at  Mobile,  sand- 
bags, 119;  place,  120;  danger 
of  collision,  125;  passes  forts,  126. 

Rimac  captured  by  Huascar,  i, 
322  ;  hit,  333. 

Rio  de  Janeiro,  revolt  of  fleet  at, 
ii,  35  ;  desultory  fighting,  36- 
41  ;  collapse  of  revolt,  42  ;  m.  i, 
171,  259;  ii,  137. 


Rio  de  Janeiro,  ii,  38. 

Rio  Grande,  Mexico,  i,  185. 

Rio  Grande,  i,  263-4. 

Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  ii,  35. 

Riojo,  ii,  58. 

"  River  Defence  Fleet,"  i,  42,  58. 

Riveros,  Commodore,  commands 
Chilian  fleet,  i,  322  ;  action  with 
Huascar,  323-331. 

Roanoke  River,  i,  106,  no. 

Roanoke  Island,  i,  184. 

Roanoke  at  Hampton  Roads,  i,  14, 
18. 

Rochambeau  purchased  by  France 
from  United  States,  i,  266,  277  ; 
ii,  266. 

Rodgers,  G.  W.,  killed,  i,  101  ;  ii, 
168. 

Rodgers,  J.,  i,  101. 
Rodimyi,  \,  286. 

Rodney  of  "Admiral''  class,  ii, 
231. 

Rodolph,  i,  134. 
Rodriguez  killed,  i,  327. 
Rolf  Krahe,  Danish  turret-ship,  i, 
33- 

Rose,  i,  134. 
Rossia,  i,  286. 

Rostislav,  line-of-battleship,  i,  xxxi. 
Rostislav,  i,  304. 
Rouen,  i,  278. 
Roumelia,  i,  287. 
Royal  Alfred,  ii,  221. 

Royal  Arthur,  target  practice,  ii, 
166. 

Royal  Oak,  ii,  221. 
Royal   Oak,  see  Royal  Sovereign, 
ii,  234. 

Royal  Sovereign,  Coles'  turret-ship, 
elevation,  PI.  xxxvii,  ii,  220  ;  des. 
ii,  224  ;  ancestor  of  new  Royal 
Sovereign,  239;   m.  i,  33,  ii,  183. 


374 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Royal  Sovereign,  English  battleship, 
Tab.  xxii ;  PI.  v,  i,  56  ;  elevation, 
PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ;  des.  ii,  234-6  ; 
nickel  steel  decks,  253  ;  crew, 
213;  engines,  214;  unprotected 
surface  in,  1,311;  m.96,  ii,  123, 
135,  144,  178,  239,  253. 

Roydestvenski,  i,  293. 

Rugen,  i,  277. 

Rupert,  des.  ii,  226 ;  deck,  227  ; 
m.  272. 

Rurik,  i,  31 1 -4. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  afterwards 
Earl,  i,  147,  165. 

Russell,  Scott,  designs  Warrior,  ii, 
219. 

Russia,  war  with  Turkey,  i,  286  ; 
distribution  of  Russian  fleet,  id,  ; 
torpedo  attacks  in  Black  Sea, 
290,  303  ;  Vesta  and  Assar-i- 
Chevket,  303-4 ;  defeat  of  Turks 
at  Sinope,  i,  xxxi ;  bombardment 
of  Kinburn,  xxxiv-vi ;  navy  com- 
pared with  England  and  France, 
ii,  271-275. 

Rustchuk,  i,  295. 

s. 

Sacramento,  i,  31 1. 

Saikio,  Tab.  xix  ;  loss,  xxi ;  torpedo 
affair,  xxv  ;  speed,  &c,  ii,  61  ; 
at  Yalu,  85,  87  ;  not  in  line,  id., 
89;  hotly  engaged,  93;  torpedoes 
fired  at,  id.,  99  ;  sent  off  for 
repairs,  95  ;  part  in  battle,  98-9  ; 
loss,  109  ;  hits  on,  98,  II2A, 
H2B  ;  repaired,  126;  escape  of, 
175  ;  m.  1 12D,  144. 

St.  Andre,  Jean  Bon,  i,  218. 

St.  Augustines,  seized  by  North,  i, 
184  ;  distance  from  blockade- 
running  centres,  187. 

St.  Bon,  i,  223. 

St.  Helena,  i,  171. 

St.  John,  Knights  of,  lead-plated 
ship,  ii,  217. 


St.  Lawrence  at  Hampton  Roads, 
i,  14,  18,  20,  21. 

St.  Louis,  see  De  Kalb. 

St.  Louis,  ii,  264-5. 

St.  Marc,  i,  278. 

St.  Philip,  see  Fort  S. 

St.  Pierre,  i,  145. 

St.  Thomas,  i,  187,  195. 

Sakamoto,  killed  at  Yalu,  ii,  97. 

Salamander,  Tab.  viii ;  des.  i,  227  ; 
at  Lissa,  230  ;  part  in  battle, 
243- 

Salto  Oriental,  Paraguayan,  i,  258, 
260. 

Sampaio,  see  Gustavo  S. 
San  Diego,  ii,  33. 
Sandri,  i,  220. 
San  Francisco,  ii,  286-7. 
San  Francisco,  ii,  33. 
San  Giovanni,  Tab.  vii. 

San  Jacinto  stops  Trent,  i,  201  ; 
m.  i,  153. 

San  Martino,  Tab.  vii;  des.  i,  213  ; 
at  Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa,  219  ; 
position  when  Austrians  ap- 
peared, 225  ;  place  in  line,  232  ; 
in  battle,  235,  237 ;  damage, 
245  ;  praised  by  Persano,  249. 

San  Salvador,  ii,  42  ;  sent  against 
Aquidaban,  42,  43. 

Sanspareil,  see  Victoria,  des.  ii, 
232  ;  m.  174,  196,  272. 

Santa  Catherina,  torpedo  attack 
on  Aquidaban  at,  ii,  43. 

Santa  Cruz,  ii,  43. 

Santa  Rosa,  i,  306. 

Santiago,  ii,  17. 

Santiago  di  Cuba,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 
Santos,  ii,  35,  42. 
Sdone,  ii,  12,  13. 
Sardinia,  i,  211. 
Sargente  Aldea,  Tab.  xvi. 
Sartlie,  ii,  2. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


375 


Sassacus,  Tab.  v  ;  engages  Albe- 
marle, i,  108  ;  rams  her,  109 ; 
disabled,  no;  at  Fort  Fisher, 
137,  m.  168. 

Saugns,  Tab.  v. 

Savannah,  Atlanta  constructed  at, 
i,  97,  98  ;  fall  of,  185  ;  distance 
from  blockade-running  centres, 
187  ;  m.  190. 

Savoie,  i,  267. 

Scharf,  q.  on  U.S.  Navy,  i,  196;  q. 
i,  44,  89,  100,  119,  124,  143,  144, 
146,  185,  186,  188,  193,  201. 

Schichau  torpedo-boats,  ii,  84,  129. 

Schwartzenbevg,  Tab.  viii,  i,  226, 
227. 

Schwartzkopf  torpedo,  a  species  of 
Whitehead,  ii,  45,  135. 

Sciota,  Tab.  ii ;  at  New  Orleans,  i, 
45,  52  ;  at  Vicksburg,  70  ; 
destroyed  by  a  mine,  134. 

Scorpion  turret-ship,  i,  33,  168. 

Sea  Bride,  1,  156. 

Seaford,  i,  208. 

Sea  King,  see  Shenandoah . 

Sebastopol,  naval  attack  on,  i,  xxxi, 
xxxvi,  m.  288,  298. 

Sedan,  i,  276,  281. 

Seguranca,  ii,  41. 

Seife,  i,  289  ;  on  Danube,  290 ;  sunk 
by  torpedoes,  291-2  ;  Tab.  xxv. 

Selma,  i,  116. 

Selma,  i,  118;  action  with  Meta- 
comet,  127-8. 

Semendria,  i,  289. 

Seminole,  Tab.  iv ,  at  Mobile,  1, 
120. 

Semmes  commands  Sumter,  i, 
144-6,  151;  commands  Alabama, 
152-163  ;  himself  a  prize-court, 
153 ;  eludes  San  'Jacinto,  153  ; 
sinks  Hatter  as,  155  ;  challenges 
Kearsarge,  159  ;  his  strategy, 
170  ;  Porter  on,  id. 


Seneca,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Seoul,  ii,  67. 

Serpent,  loss  of,  ii,  208. 

Serrano  boards  Huascar,  i,  318. 

Serras,  ii,  275B. 

Sestrica,  i,  286. 

Seth  Low,  i,  23. 

Seward,  U.S.  Secretary  of  State,  i, 
202. 

Seymour,  Sir  Beauchamp,  later 
Lord  Alcester,  commands  at 
Alexandria,  i,  336  ;  ultimatum, 
337  ;  general  order,  342-3  ; 
tactics,  355  ;  m.  349. 

Sfax,  seized  by  Tunisian  insurgents, 
ii,  1  ;  bombarded,  2-3  ;  captured, 4. 

Sfax,  ii,  267. 

Shah,  des.  i,  307,  ii,  254-5  ;  pursues 
Huascar,  i,  307-8  ;  sights  and 
attacks  Huascar,  308,  action, 
308-9 ;  cannot  close,  308 ;  not 
hit,  310  ;  uses  torpedo,  309  ; 
comparison  of  force,  310;  m. 
331,  ii,  137,  239. 

Shanghai,  i,  169  ;  squadron,  ii,  62  ; 
docks,  66  ;  m.  61. 

Sliamion,  ii,  228,  255. 

Sheipoo,  torpedo  attack  on  Yu-yen, 
ii,  13,  14,  137. 

Shenandoah ,  commerce-destroyer, 
ex  Sea  King,  cruise  of,  i,  166-7  ; 
English  payment  for,  174;  pur- 
poseless destruction  by,  176. 

Shenandoah,  United  States,  Tab. 

v,  i,  137- 
Sherman,  General,  i,  73. 

Sherman,  Confederate,  i,  48. 

Shiloh,  battle  of,  navy  at,  i,  65. 

Shogun,  ii,  52. 

Shopaul  Island,  ii,  77. 

Shoppek,  Cape,  ii,  85. 

Sicily,  i,  211. 

Silvado,  ironclad,  i,  263. 


376 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Silvado  sent  against  Aquidaban,  ii, 
43  ;  part  in  the  action,  45  ;  hit, 
46. 

Singapore,  U.S.  ships  laid  up  at,  i, 
169. 

Singapore,  Straits  of,  i,  157. 

Sinope,  Battle  of,  i,  xxxi. 

Sinope,  at  Sukhum,  i,  298,  299  ;  at 
Batum,  301,  302. 

S.  J.  Waring,  i,  143. 

Slatina,  i,  289. 

Slidell,  Confederate  Envoy,  i,  201-3. 
Smith,  Commodore,  i,  11,  12,  13. 
Smith,  Lieutenant,  gallantry  of,  i,  18. 
Smith,  Melancton,  i,  76,  108. 
Smith-Dorrien,  i,  337. 
Smith's  Island,  i,  186. 
Sokul,  ii,  268. 

Soley,  Professor,  q.  i.  165,  206. 

Solferino,  Tab.  x,  i,  267. 

Sonoma,  i,  148,  200. 

Soto,  Col.,  Balmacedist,  ii,  20. 

Soto,  Aspirant,  Congressionalist, 
drowned  on  Blanco,  ii,  27. 

Sound,  The,  i,  277. 

Southampton,  i,  165. 

South  Atlantic  Squadron,  i,  185. 

Southfield  engages  Albemarle,  108  ; 
rammed  by  her,  id.  ;  wreck  of, 
in. 

South  Sea,  i,  269. 

Spain,  quarrel  with  Peru,  i,  252  ; 
squadron  despatched  to  Pacific, 
252  ;  loss  of  Covadonga,  253  ; 
bombardment  of  Valparaiso, 
253-4  ;  of  Callao,  254-6  ;  with- 
drawal of  squadron,  257. 

Springbok,  case  of  the,  i,  200-1. 

Stadium,  i,  230. 

Stag,  i,  188. 

Stanton,  U.S  Secretary  of  War,  i, 
20. 


Stchelinski,  i,  302. 
Stella  d'ltalia,  i,  220. 
Stenzel,  q.  i,  37. 

Stevens,  designer  of  floating  bat- 
tery, i,  3  ;  ii,  218. 

Stevens  at  Mobile,  i,  123,  127. 

Stettin,  i,  277  ;  ii,  62,  64. 

Stimers,  Chief  Engineer,  i,  26,  95. 

Stockton,  fitted  with  screw,  ii,  211. 

Stodder,  i,  28. 

Stonewall  Jackson,  Tab.  ii ;  at 
New  Orleans,  55  ;  abandoned,  id. 

Stonewall  Jackson,  ram ;  des.  i, 
168  ;  at  Corunna,  311. 

Stoney,  T.,  i,  103. 

Stowell,  Lord,  rule  of  "continuous 
voyages,"  i,  198-9. 

Stralsund,  i,  277,  278. 

Suenson,  Danish   Commodore,  i, 

226. 
Suffren,  ii,  261. 

Suffren's  attack  upon  Hughes,  i, 
150. 

Sulina,  ships  at,  1877,  i,  289; 
Russian  torpedo  affair  at,  293-4 ; 
attempt  to  capture,  295-6. 

Sulina  at  Sulina,  i,  296 ;  sunk, 
297. 

Sullivan's  Island,  i,  87. 

Sultan,  Tab.  xii,  xxii ;  at  Alex- 
andria, i,  336 ;  des.  338,  ii,  222  ; 
orders  to,  i,  342-3,  part  in 
bombardment,  346  ;  ammunition 
exhausted,  348  ;  loss,  349  ;  dam- 
age, 351. 

Sumter,  commerce-destroyer,  ex 
Habana  ;  des.  i,  144 ;  gets  to 
sea,  145  ;  at  St.  Pierre,  145 ; 
escapes,  146  ;  sold  at  Gibraltar, 

id. 

Sumter,  see  Fort  S. 

Sumter,  ram,  i,  67,  68. 

Sunda,  Straits  of,  i,  156-7;  I7l>  I72- 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


377 


Superb,  Tab.  x  ;  purchased  from 
Turkey,  ii,  224;  at  Alexandria, 
i,  338  ;  des.  338-9  ;  orders  to, 
342-3  ;  part  in  bombardment, 
346-7;  loss,  349  ;  damage,  351. 

Surprise,  ii,  6. 

Surprise,  privateer,  i,  173. 

Surveillante,  i,  267  ;  flagship  of 
French  Baltic  fleet,  272;  loses 
her  rudder  on  North  Sea  Coast, 
277. 

Suzuki,  ii,  131. 

Symonds,  Sir  T.,  Admiral  on 
Captain,  ii,  185. 


Tabarka,  seized  by  French,  ii,  1 . 

Tacna,  ii,  18. 

Tacony,  i,  149. 

Tacony,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Tacuari,  Paraguayan,  i,  258,  260. 

Tage,  ii,  267. 

Takachiho,  Tab.  xix;  loss,  xxi  ;  see 
sister  ship,  Naniwa  ;  des.  ii,  60  ; 
in  Gulf  of  Korea,  67  ;  at  Yalu, 
85  ;  place  in  line,  89 ;  opens  on 
King  Yuen,  94;  loss,  109. 

Takao,  ii,  85. 

Taku,  docks,  ii,  66  ;  transports 
leave,  67,  84;  return  to,  104;  m. 
75- 

Takushan,  ii,  90. 

Talien  Bay,  ii,  84,  96. 

Tallahassee,  ex  Atlanta,  destroys 
commerce,  i,  167-S  ;  threatens 
New  York,  168  ;  m.  170. 

Tamandare,  Admiral,  character  of, 
i,  258,  259;  his  battles,  261-2; 
recalled,  263. 

Tamandare ,  see  Almirante  T. 
Tamplin,  Mr.,  ii,  76,  77. 
Tang  commands  Chih  Yuen,  ii,  101, 
159- 


Tangiers,  ii,  207. 
Taranto,  i,  215,  229. 
Tarapaca,  ii,  18. 

Tatnall  commands  Merrimac,  i, 
35  ;  "  blood  thicker  than  water," 
35-  349. 

Taureau,  Tab.  x  ;  des.  ii,  265  ;  m. 
i,  267. 

Tavara,    surgeon    on  Huascar,  i, 

328. 
Tayi,  i,  263. 

Tchen  Kiang,  ii,  13  ;  sunk,  15. 

Tchesme,  line-of-battle  ship,  i,  xxxi. 

Tchesme,  torpedo-boat,  at  Sulina,  i, 
293-4  ;  at  Sukhum,  298  ;  at 
Batum,  301-2;  second  attack, 
302-3. 

Teaser,  i,  15,  19. 

Tecumseh,  Tab.  iv ;  at  Mobile,  i, 
119;  des.  id.;  position,  120; 
opens  fire,  122  ;  crosses  line  of 
torpedoes,  124;  sunk,?^. ;  heroism 
of  Craven,  id.  ;  loss  on,  132. 

Tegetthoff,  Baron  Wilhelm  von, 
his  record,  i,  225-6  ;  off  Ancona, 
216;  message  to  Lissa,  222; 
scruples  as  to  Venetian  sailors, 
227  ;  prepares  h\s  personnel,  228  ; 
ram  and  concentrated  broad- 
sides, id.  ;  appears  off  Ancona, 
229  ;  again  visits  it,  229  ;  doubts 
whether  Lissa  is  the  Italian 
objective,  230  ;  instructions,  id.  ; 
sails  in  battle  order,  230-1  ;  bad 
weather,  231  ;  breaks  Italian  line, 
234  ;  rams  Re  d' Italia,  236  ; 
reaches  Lissa,  241  ;  why  he  did 
not  renew  action,  241  ;  tactics 
247-8  ;  rewards,  251  ;  death,  251  ; 
m.  ii,  81,  105,  106,  ill,  151,  155. 

Telegraph  Tower,  i,  222. 

Temeraire,  Tab.  xii  ;  elevation, 
PI.  xxxvi,  ii,  220  ;  des.  ii,  223-4,  i, 
339  ;  at  Alexandria,  339  ;  orders 
to,  342-3  ;  part  in  bombardment, 
347-9;  no  damage,  351;  good 
shooting,  353 ;  armour  deck,  ii, 
227. 


378 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


Tempete,  ii,  265. 

Teneriffe,  i,  150. 

Tengchow-feu,  ii,  127,  129. 

Tennessee  River,  forts  on,  i,  61,  63  ; 
importance  of,  64,  83. 

Tennessee,  State,  i,  64,  65,  178, 
179. 

Tennessee,  des.  i,  116-7;  crosses 
flats,  1 17-8,  124,  at  Mobile  Bay, 
118,  119;  encounters  Hartford, 
125  ;  attempts  to  ram,  125-7  i 
retires  to  Fort  Morgan,  127  ; 
renews  action,  128  ;  rammed  by 
Monongahela  and  Lackawanna, 
129 ;  attacked  by  monitors,  130-1 ; 
strikes,  132  ;  damage  and  loss, 
132  ;  m.  ii,  137. 

Tenrio,  ii,  85,  133. 

Terceira,  i,  152. 

Terribile,  Tab.  vii ;  des.  i,  212  ;  at 
Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa,  219;  off 
Comisa,  221,  222,  224;  position 
when  Austrians  appeared,  225, 
232,  238  ;  comes  up,  240  ;  com- 
plaints, 250. 

Terrible,  English,  Tab.  xxiii  ;  com- 
pared with  battleship,  ii,  141 -3  ; 
des.  256;  m.  214;  water-tube 
boilers,  254. 

Terrible,  French,  ii,  265-6. 

Terror,  i,  xxxiii. 

Terror,  U.S.N.,  ii,  278,  289. 

Terry,  General,  i,  140. 

Texas,  i,  37,  180,  181,  185,  190. 

Texas,  ii,  289-90. 

Thames  Iron  Works,  ii,  58. 

Thames,  i,  212. 

Thetis  in  Channel,  1870,  i,  267  ; 

sent  to  Baltic,  272  ;  m.  273. 
Thomson,  Messrs.,  ii,  58,  208. 
Thunder,  i,  xxxiii. 
Thunderbolt,  i,  xxxiii. 
Thunderer,  built,  ii,  226  ;  hydraulic 

worked  guns,  247  ;  accidents  on, 

208,  248. 
Ticonderoga,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 


Tijucas  Bay,  ii,  43,  46. 

Timbo,  i,  262. 

Timby,  an  inventor,  i,  8. 

"  Tinclads  "  described,  i,  73,  182. 

Ting,  Ju  Chang,  Admiral,  portrait, 
PI.  xxvii,  ii,  84 ;  his  experience, 
n>  55»  57  !  his  strategical  ad- 
viser, 66  ;  knowledge  of  naval 
matters,  80  ;  his  wishes,  81  ; 
orders  of  Li  Hung  Chang  to, 
82  ;  general  orders  to  fleet,  81, 
86  ;  his  strategy,  83-84  ;  sees 
Japanese,  86  ;  tactics,  86-87  ;  at 
Wei  -  hai  -  wei,  126,  128,  133; 
commits  suicide,  133;  his  mistake, 
133-4.  87. 

Ting  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii  ;  PI.  xxxii, 
ii,  122;  elevation,  PI.  xxiii,  ii,  62  ; 
des.  ii,  62-4  ;  defects,  63  ;  Ting's 
flagship,  81,  84;  at  Yalu,  place 
in  line,  89  ;  Europeans  on  board, 
88  ;  opens  fire,  90  ;  Hiyei  passes 
her,  93;  terrible  fire  upon,  94; 
on  fire,  95,  99,  1 13  ;  military  mast 
hit,  99  ;  Nichols  killed,  99  ;  shots 
fired,  H2A;  hits  on,  112c;  6-inch 
gun  not  disabled,  121  ;  heavy 
guns  disabled,  122  ;  at  Wei-hai- 
wei,  126;  torpedoed,  131,  132, 
135  ;  m.  99,  H2D. 

Tiradentes,  Tab.  xvii,  ii,  36,  42. 

Tokio  Arsenal,  ii,  61  ;  university, 
ii,  52. 

Tonkin,  ii,  4. 

Tonnant,  ii,  265. 

Tonnante,  i,  xxxii,  xxxiii. 

Tonnerre,  ii,  265. 

Torpedoist  at  Sukhum,  i,  298,  300. 

Toulba  Pasha,  i,  357. 

Toulon,  line  Toulon-Algiers,  i, 
275,  280;  m.  219,  355. 

Toultcha,  i,  296. 

Tourville  at  Sfax,  ii,  1-2. 

Trafalgar,  loss  at,  ii,  no;  dura- 
tion, 115;  place  of  admiral,  151. 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


379 


Trafalgar,  see  sister  ship,  Nile,  ii, 
232. 

Trajano,  Tab.  xvii,  ii,  36. 
Treaty  of  Paris,  see  Paris. 
Tredegar  Works,  i,  107. 
Trehouart,  ii,  266. 
Trent,  case  of  the,  i,  201-3. 
Trenton,  \,  6,  ii,  278-9. 
Trident,  des.  ii,  261  ;  at  Sfax,  2. 
Trieste,  i,  230. 

Triomphante,  Tab.  xv  ;  des.  ii,  5  ; 
at  Foochow,  8 ;  sinks  Ching 
Wei,  9 ;  descends  Min  River, 
11-12  ;  m.  266. 

Tri  Sviatitelia,  i,  xxxi. 

Trusty,  i,  xxxiii. 

Tryon,  Sir  G.,  Commander-in- 
Chief  on  Mediterranean  station, 
1893,  on  the  Victoria,  ii,  196  ; 
his  fatal  order,  197-8  ;  executed, 
199;  the  Victoria  rammed,  200  ; 
on  the  chart-house,  202 ;  drowned, 
204 ;  blamed  by  court-martial, 
205  ;  system  of  following  the 
leader,  152  ;  maxim,  153. 

Tsao  Kiang  in  G.  of  Korea,  ii,  67  ; 
captured,  72.  Same  as  Tchen 
Kiang  ? 

Tshao  Yong,  Tab.  xviii  ;  des.  ii, 
65  ;  at  Yalu,  84  ;  slow  in  moving, 
87,  n.  ;  place  in  line,  89  ;  set  on 
fire,  92  ;  disabled,  95  ;  steering 
gear  damaged,  102  ;  men  crowd 
in  tops,  in;  fire  on,  113;  m. 
105. 

Tsi  Yuen,  Tab.  xviii  ;  des.  ii,  64-5  ; 
action  off  Asan,  67-71,  53  ; 
appearance  of  ship  after,  71  ; 
Japanese  version,  68,  77  ;  at 
Yalu,  84 ;  place  in  line,  89  ; 
European  on  board,  88  ;  runs 
away,  91  ;  cowardice  (?)  103  ; 
collides  with  Yang  Wei,  94,  ill, 
115  ;  part  in  battle,  102-3  ;  loss, 
109;  at  Wei-hai-wei,  126;  cap- 
tured by  Japanese,  153  ;  hit  on 
conning  tower  at  Asan,  69,  168  ; 
m.  78,  80,  144. 


!  Tsuboi  commands  flying  squadron, 
ii,  68  ;  at  Yalu,  85  ;  leads,  89, 
152  ;  raises  speed,  92  ;  m.  104. 

Tsukushi,  ii,  85. 

Tsung-li- Yamen,  its  strategy,  ii, 
56-7  ;  orders  to  Ting,  81,  83, 
105  ;  corrupt,  54. 

Tunis,  French  protectorate,  ii,  1  ; 
insurgents  seize  Sfax,  1  ;  bom- 
bardment, 2,  3  ;  captured,  4. 

Turenne,  ii,  266. 

Turkey,  war  with  Russia,  1877,  i, 
286  ;  state  of  Turkish  fleet,  287  ; 
has  command  of  sea,  287-8  ;  task 
before  Turks,  288 ;  precautions 
against  torpedoes,  293,  297  ;  in- 
effective blockade  of  Russian 
coast,  288-9,  290  ;  torpedo 
attacks,  290-302  ;  Vesta  and 
Assar-i-Chevket,  303-4;  Lutfi 
Djelil  sunk,  289,  290  ;  little  use  of 
fleet,  287-8  ;  defeat  of  Turks  at 
Sinope,  1,  xxxi. 

Tuscaloosa,  ex  Cojirad,  i,  156. 

j  Tuscarora,  Tab.  v;  at  Fort  Fisher, 
i,  137;  blockades  Sumter,  146; 
Nashville,  165. 

Tuscumbia,  des.  i,  73  ;  passes 
Vicksburg,  78  ;  at  Grand  Gulf, 
79- 

Tyler,  i,  62  ;  at  Fort  Henry,  63  ;  at 
Fort  Donelson,  64 ;  at  Shiloh, 
65  ;  chased  by  Arkansas,  71. 

Tyler  on  Ting  Yuen,  ii,  88  ;  de- 
scribes torpedo  attack,  135. 

u. 

Unadilla,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 
Unebi,  ii,  208. 

United  States,  object  of  Federal  or 
Northern  party,  i,  1  ;  navy  in 
1 86 1,  2,  181  :  measures  taken  to 
create  a  navy,  62,  182;  ironclads 
ordered,  7,  9,  62  ;  consequence 
of  naval  weakness,  2  ;  the  Moni- 
tor, 7-14;  Merrimac  defeats 
Congress  and   Cumberland,  15- 


38o 


INDEX    OF  NAMES. 


20  ;  alarm  in  North,  20  ;  Monitor 
faces  Merrimac,  26-31  ;  im- 
portance of  Mississippi,  &c,  37, 
82,  83  ;  New  Orleans  captured, 
39-56  ;  the  Mississippi  opened, 
63-81  ;  unsuccessful  attack  on 
Charleston,  92-102  ;  the  Albe- 
marle torpedoed,  1 10-3;  Mobile 
Bay  forced,  116,  132  ;  Fort  Fisher 
captured,  136-142;  Southern 
commerce -destruction,  143-168; 
effects,  168-9;  strategy  of  North, 
169-173  ;  Geneva  arbitration, 
174;  the  blockade,  181;  its 
objects,  177-8  ;  occupation  of 
Confederate  ports,  184-5;  block- 
ade-running, 185-196;  treat- 
ment of  neutrals,  197-8 ;  case 
of  Peterhoff,  199-200  ;  of  Trent, 
201-2  ;  doctrine  of  contraband, 
203  ;  the  blockade  crushed  the 
South,  196-7  ;  war  of  1812,  i, 
197;  and  Chile,  ii,  33-4;  navy, 
development  of,  ii,  277-301,  Tab. 
•  xxvi. 

Union,  Tab.  xi ;  des.  i,  312  ;  with 
Huascar,  cross-raiding,  314,  322; 
sighted  by  Chilian  fleet,  323  ; 
escapes,  324;  torpedo  attack  on, 
332 ;  Tab.  xxv ;  bombarded, 
333  ;  hit,  334. 

Urano,  Tab.  xvii,  ii,  38. 

Uribe,  i,  318. 

Uruguay,  i,  257. 

V 

Vacca  commands  a  division  of 
Italian  fleet,  i,  219  ;  for  attack  on 
Lissa,  220;  at  Comisa,  221; 
enters  San  Giorgio  Harbour,  223 ; 
quoted  on  Persano's  conduct, 
224  ;  left  unsupported,  234  ; 
wheels  on  Austrians,  234 ;  his 
conduct,  246  complains  of 
gunnery,  247  given  command, 
251. 

Valeureuse,  i,  267,  275. 
Valmy,  ii,  266 


Valparaiso,  bombarded  by  Spani- 
ards, i,  253-4 ;  neutral  property 
destroyed,  254;  futility  of  bom- 
bardment, id.;  no  docks,  314; 
open  port,  315  ;  revolt  of  Con- 
gressionalists  at,  ii,  16;  fighting 
at,  19-20 ;  captured,  32;  m.  i, 
322,  332  ;  ii,  30. 

Vanderbilt,  Tab.  v ;  at  Hampton 
Roads,  i,  35;  at  Fort  Fisher,  137  ; 
sent  in  chase  of  Alabama,  156, 
171  ;  coals  in  British  ports,  149. 

Vanguard,  des.  ii,  191  ;  with 
Channel  Squadron,  189;  collides 
with  Iron  Duke,  190;  sinks, 
190- 1  ;  court-martial  on,  192. 

Varese,  Tab.  vii ;  des.  i,  213;  at 
Ancona,  216;  at  Lissa,  219;  off 
Comisa  (?)  221,  222,  224;  posi- 
tion when  Austrians  appeared, 
225,  232  ;  arrives,  234;  in  battle, 
238  ;  collides  with  Ancona,  240  ; 
Persano  complains  of,  250. 

Vargus,  ii,  23. 

Varuna,  Tab.  ii ;  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45  ;  passes  forts,  47  ;  en- 
gages Confederate  flotilla,  54-5  ; 
rammed  and  sunk,  55. 

Vauban,  ii,  266. 

Venezuela,  i,  153. 

Vengeur,  line-of-battle  ship,  i,  17. 

Vengeur,  ii.  265. 

Venice,  cession  to  France,  i,  227  ; 
m.  211,  213,  230. 

Venus,  Tab.  xvii,  ii,  42. 

Verestchagine,  i,  295. 

Vergara,  lost  on  Blanco,  ii,  27. 

Vesta,  i,  286  ;  action  with  Assar-i- 
Chevket,  303-4;  m.  ii,  137. 

Vesuvius,  ii,  151,  283,  285. 

Vice- Admiral  Pop  off,  i,  286. 

Vicksburg,  fortified,  i,  61 ;  Farragut 
passes,  69-71  ;  a  second  time, 
72  ;  attempts  to  turn,  74  ;  Porter 
and  Grant  pass,  77-8  ;  fall  of, 
79,  81  ;  importance  of,  81  ;  m. 
77,  83,  282. 


INDEX  OF 

Victor,  see  Rappahanock. 

Victor  Emmanuel ,  Tab.  vii. 

Victoria,  ex  Renown,  Tab.  xxii ; 
PI.  xxxiv,  ii,  196 ;  elevations, 
PI.  xxxix,  ii,  232  ;  xxxv,  ii,  202  ; 
des.  ii,  196,  232  ;  with  Mediter- 
ranean fleet,  1893,  196  ;  dan- 
gerous manoeuvre  ordered,  197-8  ; 
executed,  199 ;  rammed  by 
Camperdoivn,  200;  capsizes,  204; 
loss  of  life,  204-5  I  court-martial, 
205-6  ;  why  she  sank,  206  ; 
value  of  armour-belt,  207  ;  m. 
233,  239;  triple-expansion  en- 
gines, 254. 

Victoria,  Peruvian,  i,  255. 

Victorieuse,  ii,  266. 

Victorious,  see  sister  ship,  Majestic, 
ii,  237,  n. 

Vigo,  i,  278. 

Villa    de    Madrid,     Spanish,  in 

Pacific,  i,  252  ;    at  Valparaiso, 

253-4 ;  at  Callao,  255-6. 
Vi liars,  Tab.  xv  ;  at  Foochow,  ii, 

4,  6,  9  ;  descends  Min,  11-12. 
Villegagnon   Island  and  Fort,  ii, 

37,  38. 
Villeneuve,  ii,  213. 
Vincedora,  Spanish,  in  Pacific,  i, 

252  ;     at    Valparaiso,     253-4 ; 

Callao,  255-6. 
Viper e,  Tab.  xv,  ii,  4,  10. 
Virginia,  State  of,  i,  180,  181. 
Virginia,  ironclad,  see  Merrimac. 
Virginia  Volunteer  Navy,  i,  188. 

Vishnevetski,  Lieut.,  at  Sukhum,  i, 
298,  300. 

Vladimir,  i,  286,  292. 

Vnoutchek,  i,  286. 

Volta,  Tab.  xv  ;  at  Foochowi,  ii,  4  ; 
position,  6  ;  torpedo  attacks  by 
her  launches,  8  ;  damage,  1 1  ; 
descends  Min,  1 1-12. 

Voltigeur  at  Sfax,  ii,  2. 

Voron,  \,  286,  296. 

Vulcan  Company,  ii,  62. 


NAMES.  38i 

w. 

Wabash,  Tab.  v,  xxv,  i,  137. 

Wachusett  attacks  Florida,  i,  150. 

Walke,  Rear-Admiral,  runs  past 
Island  No.  10,  i,  66,  67  ;  at  Fort 
Henry,  63;  at  Fort  Donelson, 
64. 

Walker,  Sir  B.,  ii,  184. 
Wampanoag,  ii,  212,  254,  277. 
Wandenkolk,  Admiral,  ii,  35. 
Wangeroog,  i,  270,  278. 

Warrior,  English  ironclad,  Tab. 
xxii  ;  elevation,  PI.  xxxvii,  ii, 
220  ;  des.  ii,  219-220  ;  compart- 
ments, 219,  n.  ;  armament,  id.  ; 
speed,  212  ;  superior  to  Monitor, 

i,  32  ;  m.  ii,  189,  221. 

Washington,  Tab.  vii. 
Washington  Commission,  i,  204. 
Wasp,  ii,  208. 
Watts,  Isaac,  ii,  219. 
Waymouth,  Capt.,  ii,  220. 
Webb,  Lieut.,  Confederate,  i,  100. 
Webb,  i,  74. 

Webb's  Yard,  New  York,  i,  212. 

Weehawken,  monitor,  Tab.  iii  ; 
action  with  Atlanta,  i,  99-100  ; 
action  with  Sumter,  92  ;  has 
bootjack  fitted,  id.  ;  opens  fire, 
id.  ;  damage,  94  ;  again  attacks, 
101  ;  injury  to,  102  ;  founders  off 
Charleston. 

Wei-hai-wei,  M.  xxv,  ii.  52  ; 
Chinese  naval  port,  ii,  66  ;  Tsi 
Yuen  reaches,  72  ;  fleet  at,  83  ; 
Japanese  off  (?)  85  ;  Chinese  fleet 
at,  after  Yalu,  126;  attacked  by 
Japanese,  127-8  ;  bombarded, 
128;  torpedo  attacks,  129-133; 
collapse  of  Chinese,  133;  m.  71, 
81,  82,  137. 

Wei  Yuen,  Tab.  xxv  ;  PI.  xx,  ii,  14  ; 

ii,  67  ;  ii,  132. 


382  INDEX  OF 

Welles,  Secretary  of  Navy,  U.S.A., 

i,  91,  202. 
West,  The,  i,  37,  65,  83,  180. 
West  Africa,  i,  269,  270. 
West  Gulf  Squadron,  i,  185. 

West  Indies,  i,  156,  170,  171,  270, 
279. 

West  Virginia,  i,  172. 

Whampoa,  docks  at,  ii,  66. 

Wharton,  Lieut.,  i,  30. 

Whitehead  torpedo,  cigar-shaped 
and  divided  into  three  compart- 
ments, containing  explosive  charge 
of  6o-20olb.  gun-cotton,  com- 
pressed air,  and  propelling 
machinery,  des.  ii,  258-9  ; 
range,  259 ;  defects,  161  ;  em- 
ployment in  war,  Tab.  xxv  ;  first 
used  by  Shah,  i,  309. 

Whitworth  gun,  an  early  rifle  with 
hexagonal  bore,  ii,  251. 

Wilhelmshaven,  state  of,  1870,  i, 
270,  273  ;  ships  at  278  ;  prac- 
ticability of  an  attack,  283 ;  m. 
281,  282. 

Wilkes,  Capt.,  i,  171,  201-3. 

Wilkinson,  Capt.,  blockade-runner, 
on  risk  of  blockade-running,  i, 
191  ;  runs,  195  ;  m.  189. 

Willaumez,  see  Bouet. 

William,  i,  199. 

William,  King  of  Prussia,  i,  270. 

Wilmington,  works  at,  i,  2  ;  im- 
portance of,  135,  142,  179-80  ; 
blockade-runners  at,  183,  192, 
194;  blockading  squadron,  185-6; 
distance  from  neutral  ports,  187  ; 
run  into,  190- 1. 

Windward  Island,  i,  148. 

Windward  Passage,  i,  176. 

Winnebago,  monitor,  Tab.  iv  ;  des. 
i,  119;  at  Mobile,  120;  turret 
jammed,  123  ;  saves  Oneida,  126  ; 
engages  Tennessee,  131. 


NAMES. 

Winona,  Tab.  ii  ;  at  New  Orleans, 
i,  45  ;  does  not  pass  forts,  53-4  ; 
at  Vicksburg,  70  ;  off  Mobile, 
147. 

Winslow,  Capt.,  of  Kearsarge,  i, 
157-165. 

Winslow,  Confederate  privateer,  i, 
143- 

Wisconsin,  ii,  297-8. 

Wissahickon,  Tab.  ii  ;  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  45  ;  passes  forts,  48  ; 
at  Vicksburg,  70. 

Wivern,  i,  33,  168. 

Worden,  commander  of  Monitor, 
i,  14,  24;  attempts  to  ram,  28; 
wounded  in  pilot-house,  30 ;  ii, 
168. 

Worth,  i,  275,  281. 

Wyalusing,  action  with  Albemarle, 

i,  108,  no. 
Wyoming,  i,  157,  172. 

Y. 

Yaeyarna,  ii,  77. 

Yalu,  Battle  of  the,  or  Haiyang, 
M.  xxvi,  xxvii,  xxviii,  ii,  88,  90, 
92  ;  fleets  at,  Tab.  xviii,  xix  ; 
compared,  xx  ;  loss  of  Japanese, 
xxi  ;  value  of  deductions  from,  ii, 
57,  1 16-7,  137;  Chinese  tactics, 
86-7,  106,  118;  battle,  88-103; 
compared  with  Lissa,  104-6, 
losses  on  both  sides,  108-9  ; 
life-saving,  in  ;  gunnery  at, 
112-112B;  structural  damage  to 
Japanese  ships,  112B;  artillery 
preponderance  of  Japanese,  id.  ; 
size  at,  n  2D  ;  fires,  113  ;  ram  and 
torpedo,  114-5  ;  signals,  119; 
armour  at,  119-20,  121-2,  159; 
special  circumstances  restrained 
Japanese,  106,  123  ;  speed  at, 
124 ;  place  of  commanders  at, 
152-3  ;  escape  of  Saikio  at,  175  ; 
m.  56,  73,  126,  133. 

Yalu  River,  ii,  67. 

Yamato,  ii,  85. 


INDEX  OF 

Yang  Pao,  ii,  65. 

Yang  Wei,  Tab.  xviii  ;  des.  ii,  65  ;  ! 
at  Yalu,  84  ;  slow  in  taking  up  ! 
position,  87  ;  place  in  line,  89 ; 
crushed  by  Japanese  fire,  92  ; 
rammed  by  Tsi  Yuen,  94,  102, 
103  ;  fire  on,  102  ;  sunk,  105  ; 
riddled,  1 12D  ;  weak  ship,  144; 
m.  113. 

Yang  Woo,  Tab.  xv,  xxv  ;  at  Foo-  I 
chow,  ii,  5,  6  ;  torpedoed,  8. 

Y antic,  Tab.  v,  i,  137. 

Yarrow  torpedo  boats,  ii,  84. 

Yazoo  River,  i,  71,  73,  80. 

Ybera,  i,  258. 

Ye  Sing,  ii,  65. 

Ygurei,  i,  258,  260. 

Ylo,  i,  307  ;  action  between  Shah  \ 

and  Huascar  off,  308-9,  310. 
Yokosuka,  Japanese  dockyard,  ii,  | 

58,  60,  61. 
Ypora,  Lake,  i,  264. 
Ypora,  Paraguayan  ship,  i,  258. 


NAMES.  383 

Yorktown  or  Patrick  Henry,  i, 
15.  19- 

Yorktown,  U.S.N.,  ii,  283-4. 

Yoshino,  Tab.  xix ;  loss,  xxi ;  PI. 
xxiv,  ii,  68  ;  des.  ii,  59-60  ;  action 
off  Asan  with  Tsi  Yuen,  68-71  ; 
bridge  hit,  71  ;  badly  handled, 
53  ;  at  Yalu,  85  ;  place  in  line, 
89  ;  sinks  Chih  Yuen,  94,  101  ; 
uses  cordite,  112D;  at  Wei-hai- 
wei,  130;  hit,  133. 

Yu  Sing,  Tab.  xv,  ii,  5. 

Yu  Yen,  Tab,  xxv,  ii,  13,  14. 

z. 

Z  and  Montechant,  q.  i,  209  ;  ii. 
156. 

Zalinski  gun,  ii,  20,  150- 1. 

Zatzarennyi,  Lieut.,  at  Sulina,  i, 
293-4 ;  at  Sukhum,  298-301  ;  at 
Batum,  301-3. 

Zealous,  ii,  221. 

Zouave,  i,  15,  18. 


Vol.  II. 


c  c 


INDEX 


III. 


SUBJECT-MATTER  AND   TECHXICAL  TERMS. 


A. 

Accidental  collisions,  in  action, 
Brooklyn  and  Kineo,  i,  48  ; 
Nahant  and  Keokuk,  93  ;  Lacka- 
wanna and  Hartford,  130  ; 
Ancona  and  Varese,  240  ;  Blanco 
and  Cochrane,  328  ;  7Vi  Fz<e?z 
and  Fawg-  fPiw,  ii,  103,  115  ;  dis- 
cussed, ii,  158,  169. 

In  manoeuvres,  &c,  during 
peace,  Iron  Duke  and  Vanguard, 
ii,  1S9-91  ;  K'bnig  Wilhelm  and 
Grosser  Kurfiirst,  192-6;  Cam- 
perdoivn  and  Victoria,  197-205. 

Accidental  hits,  on  Cochrane,  i,  329  ; 
discussed,  ii,  155-6,  181. 

All-round  fire,  Monitor  had,  i,  27  ; 
want  of,  on  Huascar,  326  ;  on 
Audacious  class,  ii,  222  ;  on 
French  designs,  263,  264-5,  2^9  ; 
on  Dupuy -de-Lome,  267,  269. 

Ammunition,  expended  at  Lissa, 
Italians,  Tab.vii;  Austrians,  Tab. 
viii  ;  at  Charleston,  Tab.  iii  ;  at 
Fort  Fisher,  Tab.  v ;  at  Alex- 
andria, Tab.  xiv;  heavy  expendi- 
ture against  forts,  i,  221  ;  in 
bombardments,  283-4  ;  Italian, 
exhausted  at  close  of  Lissa,  240  ; 
fails  Spaniards  at  Callao,  253  ; 
English,  exhausted  at  Alexandria, 
348-9  ;  short  supply  at  Alexan- 
dria, 342  ;  runs  short  on  A':;  vng 
Yi,  ii,  73  ;  Chinese  and  Japanese, 


runs  short  at  Yalu,  106,  96;  im- 
portance of  full  supply,  123; 
limits  action,  175;  danger  of  ex- 
posed, explosion  on  Cochrane,  i, 
335  ;  on  Matsushima,  ii,  97, 
180-1  ;  discussed,  180-1  ;  on 
Palestro,  i,  241,  ii,  180,  n.  ;  on 
Tamandare,  181,  n.  ;  hoists  to 
guns,  ii,  165  ;  180- 1,  n.  ;  difficulty 
of  supplying,  on  Akagi,  ii,  98. 

Arc  of  fire,  limited,  compels  end-on 
battle,  on  Ting  Yuen,  &c,  ii, 
63-4. 

Armour,  application  to  ships,  early, 
ii,  217  ;  adopted  by  Confederates, 
1,3;  by  Napoleon  III.,  i,  xxxii  ; 
by  Federals,  6 ;  quality  of  early,  ii, 
253  ;  improvement  in  quality  of, 
253  ;  at  Kinburn,  defies  perfora- 
tion, i,  xxxvi  ;  on  Monitor  and 
Merrimac,  28  ;  at  Charleston, 
94-5;  laminated  and  solid  armour, 
94  ;  perforated,  on  Atlanta,  99  ; 
on  Eads  gunboats,  62,  63,  70,  84; 
on  Tennessee,  130-1,  132  ;  at  Lissa, 
defies  attack,  243,  245,  246  ;  per- 
forated on  Brazilian  ironclads, 
262  ;  Huascar 's  defies  Shah, 
309  ;  fails  against  Cochrane, 
325-8  ;  Cochrane  and  Blanco 
not  perforated,  331  ;  resistance 
at  Alexandria,  350-1,  354-5;  at 
Yalu,  ii,  1 19-122  ;  withstands 
long-range  attack,  159,  170; 
summary,  246 ;  protects  life,  i, 
33,   93,"  132,    246;    ii,  108-9; 

C  C  2 


386  INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


assures  flotation,  ii,  179;  great 
resistance  at  sharp  angles,  155  ; 
methods  of  application,  Plates 
xxxvii,  ii,  220 ;  xxxix,  ii,  232  ; 
xlii,  ii,  262  ;  ii,  226-7,  24°  > 
keeps  out  high  explosives,  ii, 
172  ;  resists  ram,  207.  Thin, 
dangerous ;  Eads  gunboats,  i, 
62,63,  70,  84;  Huascar,  331  ;  on 
Tsi  Yuen,  ii,  70,  71  ;  on  Chinese 
fleet  removed,  87-8  ;  at  Yalu, 
170  ;  cloth  instead  of,  id. 

"Armour-clad."  A  vessel  carrying 
vertical  armour,  i.e.,  armour  on 
her  sides  and  gun -positions,  e.g., 
the  Royal  Sovereign. 

Army,  co-operation  of,  with  navy 
ineffective  :  Confederate,  at  New 
Orleans,  i,  44,  58  ;  on  Mississippi, 
81-2,  n.  ;  Albemarle,  113;  Fort 
Fisher,  137-8  ;  need  of  army 
for  offensive  naval  warfare,  i,  61, 
185,  205-6,  281-2,  284;  ii,  33,  50, 
127-8. 

Artillery,  see  Guns. 

Progress  of,  ii,  245-252  ;  Tab. 
xxiv. 

Auxiliary  battery  or  secondary 
armament,  carried  by  all  modern 
ships,  and  is  midway  in  power 
between  the  heavy  guns  and 
the  machine  guns,  ii,  229  ;  de- 
velopment of,  230,  234.  235,  238  ; 
protection  of,  on  older  ships, 
nil,  ii,  164;  easily  put  out  of 
action,  172;  on  "Admirals," 
230  ;  Victoria,  232  ;  Nile,  233  ; 
Royal  Sovereign,  235  ;  Majestic, 
238,  243  ;  improvised  protection, 
164. 

"  Axial  fire."  Fire  right  ahead  or 
right  astern,  parallel  to  ship's 
axis  or  direction  :  of  French  ships, 
ii,  154,  269;  of  English  "  eche- 
loned "  turret-ships,  228  ;  of 
Chinese  battleships,  63. 

Bow-fire  necessary  to  meet 
torpedo  attacks,  ii,  180;  strong, 
of  Conqueror  and  Victoria,  232  ; 
necessary  if  enemy  fight  stern 
battle,  118. 


Stern -fire,  powerful  French, 
154;  allows  stern  battle,  118; 
deficient,  of  Conqueror  and  Vic- 
toria, 232. 


B. 

"  Backing."  The  timber  cushion 
upon  which  armour  plates  are 
generally  mounted,  of  teak  or  oak. 
Improvements  in,  ii,  254. 

"Barbette."  A  circular  or  pear- 
shaped  armoured  inclosure,  inside 
which  is  a  turntable  carrying  the 
gun  or  guns.  The  latter  fire  over 
the  edge  of  the  armour,  not 
through  port -holes,  and  are  said 
to  be  mounted  en  barbette. 
PI.  xiii,  i,  280,  shows  a  gun  so 
mounted,  forward  ;  ii,  242. 

Descends  from  turret,  i,  33 ; 
on  Temeraire,  i,  339,  ii,  223 ; 
"Admirals,"  ii,  230;  Royal 
Sovereign,  234;  Centurion,  236; 
Majestic,  238  ;  French  type,  261. 

Danger  of  unprotected  bases, 
ii,  164,  230,  262,  269. 

Bases,  seizure  of,  by  North  on 
Southern  coast,  i,  184-5,  2°5> 
210  ;  the  Athenian  strategy,  184; 
Japanese,  in  G.  of  Korea,  ii,  84.- 

Battle,  forecast  of,  chap,  xxiii,  ii, 
136-182. 

Close  action  or  melee  at  Lissa, 

i,  234-248,  ii,  101  ;  may  be 
necessary  to  close,  117;  end-on 
attack  results  in,  154;  weaker 
side  may  close,  159  ;  hits  nu- 
merous in,  170;  its  features,  172  ; 
torpedo-boat  in,  149,  172;  artil- 
lery in,  180. 

Long-range  action,  Yalu  one, 

ii,  104,  106  ;  will  probably  be 
followed  by  close  action,  117,  159; 
hits  few  in,  120  ;  fire  discipline  in, 
159;  damage  done  in,  162-3; 
guns  in,  180. 

See  also  Loss,  Torpedoes. 


INDEX    OF    SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


387 


Battle  formations  discused,  ii,  153-8; 
Farragut's,  at  New  Orleans,  i,  45  ; 
at  Mobile,  120  ;  Tegetthoff's. 
230-1,  247-8;  Persano's,  232; 
Ting's,  ii,  86-7,  88  ;  Ito's,  89-90. 

See  Map  xxix,  ii,  156,  to  the 
figures  of  which  reference  is  made 
by  number  below. 

Bow  and  quarter  line.  Fig.  1 
shows  two  such  lines,  in  Eng. 
Navy  called  double  quarter ;  at 
Lissa,  i,  230-1,  247  ;  ii,  155-6. 

Groups,  Figs.  6,  9,  at  Yalu, 
ii,  86-7;  Amezaga  on,  118; 
discussed,  156. 

Line-abreast,  Fig.  2,  weak- 
ness, ii,  153-4,  155;  Ting's,  57, 
118;  leads  to  melee,  154,  160. 

Line-ahead,  Fig.  4,  weakness, 
ii,  153;  advantages,  155,  157; 
length  of  line,  145  ;  at  Lissa,  i, 
232  ;  at  Yalu,  ii,  88-9. 

Quincunx,  Fig.  8,  ii,  156. 
Battleship.  A  ship  designed  to  fight 
in  the  line  of  battle,  carrying 
vertical  armour  and  heavy  armour- 
piercing  guns.  Differs  from 
coast-defence  ship  in  its  superior 
sea-keeping  qualities.  The 
general  features  of  such  a  ship 
are  shown  in  Frontispiece,  vol.  i, 
the  Majestic. 

English,  French,  German,  and 
American  compared,  ii,  242-5  ; 
small,  145,  270  ;  antiquated,  145, 

270  ;  definition  of  standard  or 
first  class,  270  ;   homogeneity  of, 

271  ;  need  of  water-line  armour, 

177-  8;  ideal  battleship,  177-180; 
proportion  necessary  for  a  block- 
ade, i,  205  ;  battleship  versus 
cruiser,  i,  311 ;  ii,  138 — 144,  119 — 
121.  Mainstay  of  the  Brazilian 
revolt,  ii,  49;  at  Yalu,  120,  122. 
Development  of  battleship  in 
England,  ii,  209-242;  in  France, 
260-269.  Earlier  French  and 
English  compared,  ii,  269. 

Value  of,  ii,  280. 
Belt,     armour,    why    carried,  ii, 

178-  9;  protects  against  ram  (?) 
207  ;  on  cruisers,  143. 


Blockade  of  Southern  coast, 
1 86 1 -5,  why  it  was  proclaimed,  i, 
177  ;  when  proclaimed,  181  ; 
terms  of  proclamation,  id.  ; 
objects,  to  prevent  exportation  of 
cotton,  178,  and  importation  of 
arms,  179;  imperfect  at  first, 
181  ;  magnitude  of  task,  183  ; 
does  not  stop  trade,  id.  ;  in- 
different craft  blockading,  184; 
bases  necessary,  id. ;  the  work  of 
the  army  in,  185 ;  typical  blockade, 
185-6  ;  great  rise  in  prices  due  to, 
196  ;  effect  of,  196-7  ;  three 
periods  of,  186-7  I  invalidated  by 
escape  of  three  ships,  183;  ships 
too  close  hit  one  another,  192. 

Questions  arising  out  of.  See 
Neutrals,  England,  International 
Law. 

Northern,  of  Bermuda  and 
Nassau,  i,  186. 

French,  of  German  coast,  1870, 
i,  274  ;  difficulty  of  coaling,  276  ; 
escape  of  Arminius  and  Elisa- 
beth, 277  ;  of  Augusta,  278  ; 
becomes  observation,  278. 

Turkish,  of  Russian  ports, 
1877,  i,  288;  ineffective,  293. 

Chilian,  of  Callao,  1880,  i,  333. 

Japanese,  of  Wei-hai-wei, 
1895,  ii,  127-133. 

Blockade  of  French  coast  by 
England,  discussed,  i,  204-210; 
France  and  Confederacy  com- 
pared, 205-6  :  English  admirals 
on  blockade,  204-5  >'  types  °f 
ship  necessary  for,  208-9;  isolated 
ships  can  run,  277,  280-1. 

Blockade-runners,  starting  points, 
i,  187  ;  typical  run,  189- 191  ; 
Northern  precautions  against, 
186 ;  three  types,  187  ;  sailing, 
187-8;  fast  steamers,  188-9; 
these  could  do  what  they  liked, 
192,  203-4  ;  how  they  might  have 
been  stopped,  206;  magnitude  of 
traffic,  188,  193-4;  companies  of, 
formed,  188  ;  cargoes  carried, 
191,  193;  enormous  profits,  194; 
price  of  freight,  193 ;  wages  of 
captain  and  sailors,  195  ;  risk  of, 


388  INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


191 -2,  194-5  ;  insurance  on,  195  ; 
audacity  of,  192 ;  number  cap- 
tured, 195  ;  specialisation  in 
trade,  203-4 ;  illegal  seizure  of 
ships  by  North,  198-201  ;  ex- 
cuses for  North,  203  ;  number  of 
claims  against  North,  204;  m.  i, 
51,  136-7,  138,  146,  167,  168. 

Boats,  will  be  left  on  shore  before 
battle,  ii,  162  ;  Tsi  Yuen's  on 
fire,  ii,  70  ;  left  behind  by 
Chinese,  88. 

Boilers,  water-tube  or  tubulous. 
In  these  the  water  is  in  the  tubes, 
whereas  in  tubular  boilers  the 
gases  of  the  fire  pass  through  the 
tubes  around  which  is  the  water. 
On  Brennus,  ii,  254 ;  on  Powerful, 
id. 

Damage  to  boilers,  &c,  in 
action,  Itasca,  i,  53 ;  Essex,  63  ; 
Sumter,  68 ;  Little  Rebel,  69 ; 
Mound  City,  69;  Brooklyn,  75  ; 
Merc  edit  a,  88  ;  Sassacus,  109  ; 
Mackinaw,  139;  Villa  de  Madrid, 
255  ;  Ivahy,  262  ;  Huascar,  328  ; 
torpedo  boat  No.  9,  ii,  131. 

Bombardment.  See  also  High 
angle  Fire,  Forts. 

Of  open  ports,  Spaniards  at 
Valparaiso,  i,  253-4  ;  no  attacks 
upon,  in  American  Civil  War, 
153  ;  Bouet  ordered  to  attack 
German,  276-7. 

Danger  from,  i,  209,  n. ;  cf. 
334 ;  strategically  useless,  283-4  ; 
provokes  reprisals,  209,  n.,  284. 

Boom,  at  New  Orleans,  i,  42,  49- 
50,  59  ;  at  Charleston,  87,  93  ; 
round  Albemarle,  112  ;  at  Kiel, 
271  ;  at  Sulina,  293,  295,  296  ;  at 
Batum,  297,  n.  ;  at  Sukhum, 
298;  at  Callao,  333;  at  Sta. 
Catherina,  ii,  49  ;  at  Wei-hai-wei, 
128. 

Need  of,  i,  96 ;  ii,  50. 

Bow  and  quarter  line.    See  Battle 

Formations. 


Broadside,  weak,  of  monitors,  i,  136. 
Return   to   powerful,   ii,  154, 
242. 

Bunkers,  advantage  of  full,  in 
action,  ii,  164. 

c. 

Cap-squares.  The  metal  plates 
which  fasten  down  the  trunnions 
of  a  gun  to  its  carriage.  Most 
modern  guns  have  no  trunnions, 
h  95- 

Captain  in  action,  injury  to,  ii,  168  ; 
protection  of,  168-170.  See 
Conning  Tower. 

Capture  in  war  eliminated?  ii,  176. 
[Huascar  captured,  i,  327-330.] 

Casemate.  An  armoured  inclosure 
on  board  ship  in  which  guns  are 
mounted,  ii,  235,  236,  237,238. 
Casemate-ships  are  vessels  of  the 
Merrimac  type,  des.  i,  3-6. 

Central  pivot  mountings.  A  form  of 
gun-carriage  which  allows  the 
gun  to  sweep  a  wide  angle, 
generally  from  6o°  to  2700.  It 
is  usually  fitted  with  a  shield, 
and  sometimes  has  an  ammuni- 
tion hoist  coming  up  through  the 
pivot.  PI.  xli,  ii,  250,  illustrates 
this  form  of  mounting  ;  ii,  60. 

Clearing  for  action,  Farragut's  fleet, 
i,  39,  119;  at  Alexandria,  342; 
Tsi  Yuen  not,  at  Asan,  ii,  69  ; 
Chinese  fleet,  81,  87-8  ;  discussed, 
162-3  ;  time  taken  to  clear,  162,  n. 

Coal  supply,  bad  on  Sumter,  i,  144  ; 
runs  low  on  Italian  fleet,  240 ; 
poor  of  French  ships,  273,  n.  ; 
of  Royal  Sovereign,  ii,  235 ;  of 
various  battleships,  244. 

Smokeless,  Russians  use,  i,  298 ; 
Japanese  betrayed  by  smoke,  ii, 
86;  blockade-runners  use,  i,  189. 

Protection  improvised  on 
Chinese  ships,  ii,  81,  87. 

Discussed,  ii,  163-5. 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,    ETC.  389 


Coaling  at  sea,  Alabama,  i,  154 ;  | 
French  in  1870,  275-6. 

Coaling  in  neutral  ports.  See 
International  Law. 

Coaling  stations,  i,  173,  206. 

Coasts,  war  of,  demands  special 
types  of  ships,  i,  265-7  J  Huascar 
carries  on,  321. 

Colour  of  ships,  at  New  Orleans,  i, 
39 ;  at  Lissa,  235  ;  of  Russian 
torpedo-boats,  i,  298  ;  of  torpedo-  1 
boats  at  SheTpoo,  ii,  13 ;  at 
Yalu,  ii,  90,  104  ;  importance  of 
distinctive,  181. 

Commander-in-Chief,  place  of  (1)  j 
in  fleet  ;   Farragut's  views  on,  i, 
46,  120,  n.,  ii,  151-2,  n.  ;  Nel- 
son's view,  ii,  151 -2  ;  Tegetthoff, 

i,  231-2;  Persano,  233;  Ito  at 
Yalu,  ii,  152;  discussed,  151-2  ; 
(2)  on  shipboard,  Farragut  in 
rigging,  i,  121  ;  military  masts  (?) 

ii,  152. 

Commerce,  warfare  against,  South- 
ern against  Northern,  i,  143- 
176;  passengers  of  captured 
ships,  how  got  rid  of,  150,  154; 
surprise  rendered  it  effective,  153, 
157;  strategy  of  Semmes,  170; 
defensive  against  him,  170 — 173  ; 
transfers  of  Northern  shipping 
to  English  flag,  169,  n. ;  strategic 
inutility,  175-6;  causes  which 
may  have  contributed  to  ruin 
Northern  commerce,  169. 

Commerce-destroyers,  Tab.  vi; 
two  types,  i,  143-4 ;  Sumter, 
144-6;  Florida,  146- 151,  Flori- 
da's tenders,  148-9  ;  Alabama, 
152-7;  Tuscaloosa,  156;  Nash- 
ville, 165 ;  Georgia,  165-6  ; 
Shenandoah,  166-7  ;  Atlanta, 
167-8 ;  should  not  fight,  158  ; 
Northern  precautions  wanting, 
153,  157,  170-3;  prizes  taken  by, 
Tab.  vi. 

German  Augusta,  i,  278. 

Steamers  hard  to  capture,  i, 
168,  175. 

Geneva  rules   on   commerce-  j 
destroying,  174. 


English  will  be  assailed,  i,  143, 
169,  175,  176,  206,  209. 

Compound  armour,  iron  faced  with 
steel,  ii,  229,  253. 

Compound  engines,  have  two  cylin- 
ders, one  larger  than  the  other. 
The  steam  is  used  at  high  pres- 
sure in  the  smaller  cylinder,  and 
when  used  passes  at  a  lower 
pressure  to  the  larger  cylinder, 
where  it  is  used  again.  Triple  - 
expansion  engines  have  three 
cylinders,  quadruple  four,  ii,  254, 
261. 

Concussion,  injuries  from,  i,  26,  28, 
!3i>  327>  35°  I      9°>  99>  l69- 

Conning  tower.  An  armoured  struc- 
ture, generally  cylindrical  in 
shape,  from  which  the  ship  can  be 
directed  in  action.  Same  as  pilot 
house. 

Kinburn  batteries,  i,  xxxii  ; 
Merrimac's,  5  ;  Monitor's,  10  ; 
struck,  30 ;  struck  on  Missis- 
sippi gunboats,  65,  78 ;  in  later 
monitors,  89;  difficulty  of  vision, 
94;  Rodgers  killed  in,  101  ; 
struck  on  Salamander,  243 ;  on 
Assar-i-Chevket  ?  305  ;  on  Huas- 
car, 326,  330 ;  on  Tsi  Yuen,  ii, 
69  ;  tops  removed  from  Chinese, 

Hits  on,  ii,  168;  thick  armour 
or  duplication,  168-9  !  fte^  °f 
view,  153;  on  various  ships,  244. 

Continuous  voyages,  Lord  Stowell 
on,  i,  199,  n.  ;  U.S.  courts,  199- 
200. 

Contraband,  U.S.  hold  Confederate 
Envoys,  i,  201-2  ;  Northern  courts 
(U.S.)  on,  203;  rice  held,  ii, 
15- 

Crews,  of  modern  ships  small  re- 
latively, ii,  213. 

"  Cross-raiding."  [Colomb.  Naval 
Warfare,  3] .  Warfare  by  retalia- 
tory expeditions  seeking  to  burn 
and  destroy  without  an  effort  to 
control  or  command  the  sea.  See 
Coasts,  War  of. 


39o 


INDEX    OF    SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


Peruvian  in  1879,  i,  314,  321, 
322,  324;  ii,  33. 

Southern  cruisers  threaten 
Northern  ports,  i,  149,  150,  153, 
167-8. 

Cruiser.  A  vessel  of  less  military 
strength  than  a  battleship,  in 
which  offensive  and  defensive 
qualities  are  sacrificed  to  speed 
and  coal  supply.  Generally 
without  vertical  armour,  but  in- 
variably has  a  horizontal  armour 
deck,  which  usually  curves  up 
amidships,  descending  below  the 
water-line  at  the  sides  and  ends. 

Sketch  of  history,  ii,  254-7  ; 
in  naval  battle,  138 — 145  ;  com- 
pared with  frigate,  139-140  ; 
cannot  ram,  i,  22  ;  ii,  106. 

Against  battleship,  i,  308-311  ; 
ii,  106,  119-121,  138-145. 

Needs  armour-piercing  guns, 
i,  311- 

Classes  of,  ii,  143 ;  armoured 
cruisers,  id. 

Necessary  to  protect  commerce, 
i,  175  ;  for  blockade,  205  ;  place 
in  blockade,  209. 


D. 

Deck   armour,    on   early  floating 
batteries,  i,  xxxii  ;  on  Monitor, 

i,  10,  ii,  227  ;  on  Eads  gunboats, 

ii,  227  ;  adopted,  id.  ;  novel 
arrangement  of,  in  Renown, 
237  ;  in  various  battleships,  244  ; 
cuts  into  rammer's  bow,  205 ; 
discussed,  ii,  177. 

Injured  on  Affondatore,  i,  244; 
does  not  save  Chinese  cruisers,  ii, 
120;  danger  to,  172,  179. 

Declaration  of  war,  attack  without, 
ii,  77- 

Devolution  of   command,  ii,  169, 
181. 

Differentiation  of  warships,  ii,  215- 
216. 

Of  armament,  ii,  180,  234-5. 
Of  armour,  ii,  235. 


Difficulty  of  distinguishing  com- 
batants, ii,  104 ;  of  estimating 
fighting  force,  ii,  216. 

Dimension,  failure  of  small  ships 
at  New  Orleans,  i,  54,  n.,  60; 
Palestro  at  Lissa,  135  ;  at  Yalu, 
ii,  112D-3. 

Increased  by  steam,  ii,  212, 
241-2  ;  in  Western  fleets,  116. 

Resistance  of  large  ships, 
Aquidaban,  ii,  49;  cf.  ii,  116,  120. 

Disguise  in  general  action,  ii,  181. 

Distance  between  ships  in  action,  i, 
344  ;  ii.  145,  n. 

Distribution  of  armament,  ii,  178  ; 
in  French  battleships,  179-180, 
263,  264 ;  disadvantages  of,  269. 

Division  of  command  on  the  war- 
ship, ii,  169. 

Division  of  fleet,  ii,  144 — 147. 

Docks,  need  of,  i,  313. 

Double  on  enemy.  To  turn  the 
enemy's  flank  or  concentrate  a 
large  force  upon  a  small  section 
of  his  command,  ii,  118,  181. 

Duration  of  battle,  ii,  115,  175. 


E. 

Echeloned  turret-ship.  A  vessel  in 
which  the  turrets  are  placed  not 
in  the  keel  line,  in  the  centre  of 
the  ship,  but  diagonally  across  it. 
See  deck  plan  of  Chen  Yuen, 
PI.  xxiii,  ii,  62  ;  defect  of,  ii, 
63-4  ;  English,  154,  228-230. 

Electricity,  use  of,  ii,  247,  267, 
268. 

End-on  battle,  Ting  orders,  ii,  86; 

danger  of,  153-4 ;   French  may 

%ht,  154-5- 

End-on  fire.    See  Axial. 

End-to-end  collisions,  ii,  160. 

Ends,  unarmoured,  ships  with,  are 
technically  called  "  light-enders." 


INDEX    OF    SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


At  Yalu,  ii,  122  ;  danger  of, 
174,  179,  207  ;  adopted  by 
England,  227;  in  "Admirals," 
231  ;  compared  with  French  pro- 
tection, 269-270. 
Engines,  breakdown  (?)  ii,  71,  89; 

numerous  on  board  ship,  213-4. 
England  and  the  North,  the  Con- 
federate cruisers,  Florida,  i, 
146-7  ;  Alabama,  152  ;  Georgia, 
165;  sale  of  Victor  to  Con- 
federates, 166  ;  Shenandoah, 
166-7  !  coals  and  refits  at  Mel- 
bourne, 167  ;  ironclads  built  for 
Confederates,  33,  168  ;  sympathy 
with  South,  147,  173  ;  acknow- 
ledges as  belligerent,  181  ;  visits 
of  English  cruisers  to  blockaded 
ports,  147  ;  instructions  concern- 
ing blockade,  183  ;  and  cotton 
supply,  178. 

Case  of  Trent,  i,  200-3  I 
Peterhoff,  198-200;  Springbok, 
200-1  ;  interference  of  North  with 
trade,  197,  200. 

Northern  spies,  i,  171. 

Interests  antagonistic  in  peace 
and  war,  i,  197-8. 

Prize  law,  199  ;  commerce  will 
be  assailed,  143,  169,  176,  206, 
209;  national  insurance,  175; 
our  position  better  than  that  of 
North,  175;  dependence  on  sea, 
198,  205-6. 

And  France,  rice,  ii,  15. 

Strategy  in  war  with  France, 

i,  204-210;  fleet  necessary  to 
blockade  French  coast,  206-7. 

Want  of  reserve,  i,  207. 

Naval  strength  of,  i,  207  ;  ii, 
270-275. 

Personnel  of  fleet,  ii,  173,  274. 
Explosion  on  Cochrane,  i,  334-5 ; 
on  Matsushima,  i,  335  ;  ii,  97, 
180;   on  Palestro,  i,  241,  335, 

ii,  180;  on  Tamandare,  ii,  181. 

F. 

Fire  discipline,  ii,  159. 
Fires  in  action,  Sinope,  i,  xxxi ;  Con- 
gress,   i,    19  ;    Minnesota,    29  ; 


Pinola,  53  ;  Keystone  State,  88  ; 
Kennebec,  126  ;  Lackawanna, 
129  ;  Schwarzenburg,  226,  n.  ; 
Palestro,  235,  241-2  ;  Ancona, 
236 ;  Kaiser,  239  ;  Affondatore, 
244  ;  Maria  Pia,  245  ;  San 
Martino,  id.  ;  Castelfidardo,  id.  ; 
at  Lissa,  246 ;  Blanca,  256 ; 
Huascar,  325,  329;  on  Vesta,  i, 
305  ;  on  Chinese  ships  at  Foo- 
chow,  ii,  8-10;  at  Yalu,  ii,  113; 
Tshao  Yong,  113;  Yang  Wei, 
93  ;  Matsushima,  95  ;  Hiyei, 
gj  ;  Lai  Yuen,  98,  113;  Saikio, 
98;  Ting  Yuen,  99-100,  113;  Chen 
Yuen,  100,  113;  King  Yuen,  101, 
113;  Ching  Yuen,  94,  102,  113; 
Kivang  Kai,  113;  discussed,  ii, 
165-6. 

"  Fleet  in  being."  [Colomb.  Naval 
Warfare,  122-3.]  A  fleet  not 
contained  or  masked  by  a  superior 
or  equal  force.  May  be  com- 
pared to  an  army  acting  on 
enemy's  lines  of  communication 
or  flanks.  It  suffices  to  bar 
territorial  attacks  ?  \_Quarterly , 
clxxvii.]  Tegetthoff's  fleet  in 
being,  i,  220,  222,  224,  248  ; 
German,  275,  277  ;  Chinese,  ii, 
81-2;  Japanese,  83-4,  105-6. 

Floating  batteries,  Kinburn,  i,  xxxii- 
xxxvi,  3,  8,  207. 

Food  before  battle,  i,  231,  343; 
ii,  88. 

Forced  draught.  Artificial  current 
of  air  in  boiler  flues.  To  be  dis- 
tinguished from  induced  draught, 
ii,  254. 

Forts,  and  ships,  Kinburn,  i,  xxxiv- 
xxxvi ;  Duckworth,  i,  38 ;  New 
Orleans,  45-54  ;  not  silenced, 
59  ;  Vicksburg,  70-1  ;  Port 
Hudson,  75-/7  ;  Cincinnati 
sunk  by,  80  ;  McAllister,  90 ; 
Charleston,  92-96,  101-103  ; 
Mobile,  124-127  ;  forts  sur- 
render, 134;  Fort  Fisher,  135- 
142  ;  Lissa,  220-224 ;  Callao, 
255-6;  on  Parana,  262-3  ;  Alex- 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


andria,  336-357 ;  Wei-hai-wei, 
ii,  127-133;  at  Rio,  ii,  36-40; 
ships  cannot  silence,  i,  57,  128  ; 
monitors'  fire  too  slow  against, 
94,  136,  266  ;  advantage  of  forts, 
91,  96-7,  265-6,  282-3,  353-4. 

Ships  can  pass,  i,  45-54,  70-1, 
75-77,  124-127,  263-4,  282; 
ii,  11-12,  36-40,  49-50. 

Freeboard,  high,  necessary  for  sea- 
going ship,  i,  32-3;  325,  ii,  178, 
239- 

Frigates  at  Lissa,  i,  219,  221,  234; 
compared  with  line-of-battle  ship, 
ii,  138-140. 

Funnel,  damage  to,  Merrimac,  i, 
30  ;  Arkansas,  71  ;  Albemarle, 
109;  Tennessee,  129,  131 ;  Chicka- 
saw, 123;  Kaiser,  239;  Assar-i- 
Chevket,  305 ;  Huascar,  328, 
329  ;  Tsi  Yuen,  ii,  70. 

Effect  of  damage,  ii,  163-4 ; 
protection  of,  id.,  178  ;  i,  89. 

Fuses,  defective,  i,  162,  247,  352  ; 
ii,  71,  172. 


G. 

Gunnery,  changes  in,  i,  133;  value 
of,  159,  165,  215,  247,  ii,  123  ; 
bad,  i,  213,  247  ;  Chinese,  ii, 
99,  109,  112-112A;  English,  at 
Alexandria,  i,  345,  353,  Western 
better  than  Eastern,  ii,  117; 
quick-firer  has  improved,  166  ; 
influence  of  weather  on,  id.  ; 
errors  in,  155. 

Guns.  A  6-inch  gun  is  a  gun  of 
6-inch  calibre;  a  68-ton  gun  is  a 
gun  of  68  tons  weight ;  a  100- 
pounder  is  a  gun  firing  a  shot  of 
ioolb.  weight.  Increased  power 
of,  i,  34,  ii,  170;  sketch  of 
artillery  progress,  245-252  ; 
supreme  (?)  123  ;  has  beaten 
armour,  174;  long  range  of,  i, 
97  ;  moderate  size  best,  ii,  124, 
171,  179. 


Monster  guns  useless  against 
earthworks,  i,  353-4  ;  craze  for,  ii, 
247-9;  need  of  big  guns,  i,  .311, 
ii,  ill,  171  ;  weak  guns  useless 
against  armour,  i,  309,  ii,  n  1  ; 
destruction  proportionate  to  size 
of  shot,  139,  171  ;  disabled  at 
Asan,  70;  at  Yalu,  97,  101, 
103,  1 13-4. 

Early  guns  weak,  ii,  240,  246. 

Northern  (U.S.)  guns,  Tab.  i ; 
burst,  i,  65,  139. 

Southern,  i,  1,  40,  118,  179. 

At  Lissa,  compared,  i,  246 ; 
at  Yalu,  ii,  1 12-112A. 

English,  at  Alexandria,  i,  339  ; 
Egyptian,  341  ;  disabled,  351-2. 

French  and  Chinese,  at  Foo- 
chow,  ii,  5-6. 

Heavy  guns  in  long-range 
encounter,  ii,  159,  171  ;  at  close 
quarters,  172. 

Carriages,  improvements  in,  ii, 
247. 

Hydraulic-worked,  at  Alex- 
andria, i,  345-6,  353  ;  on  Chinese 
ships,  ii,  63  ;  on  Temeraire,  223  ; 
on  Dreadnought,  226 ;  Thunderer, 
247 ;  general  adoption,  id. ;  in 
French  fleet,  262. 

Light  (Gatling,  Nordenfelts, 
&c),  effective  against  Huascar, 

i,  326  ;  little  value  against  large 
ships,  ii,  30 ;  deadly  at  Foochow, 
10;  on  Aquidaban,  48-9;  little 
damage  by,  at  Yalu,  125. 

Long,  advantage  of,  ii,  248, 

25°- 

Pneumatic,  on  Nictheroy ,  ii, 
40-1,  42,  49  ;  accuracy  of,  150- 1, 
285-6. 

Quick-firing,  des.  ii,  II2A-B, 
251  ;  PI.  xl,  ii,  246;  xli,  ii,  250. 
Value  against  torpedo-boats,  i, 
303-4  ;  ii,  48-9,  149.  For  arma- 
ment of  merchant  ships  in  war,  i, 
175.    Promote  accurate  shooting, 

ii,  166  ;  in  long-range  engage- 
ment, 159  ;  structural  influence, 
227,  232,  238  ;  tactical  influence, 
156;  development  of,  250-1  ;  8- 
inch,  1 70- 1  ;  as  secondary  arma- 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


393 


ment  of  warship,  178,  179,  180  ; 
Thunderer  class  impervious  to, 
226.    At  Yalu,  ii,  91,  112-112B, 

II2C-D. 

Rapidity  of  fire,  ii,  180;  im- 
portance of,  1 12B  ;  of  heavy  guns, 
249. 

Smooth-bores,  U.S.,  i,  26  ;  low 
charge,  id. ;  short  range,  127  ; 
effective  on  water-line,  161,  165. 


H. 

Handiness,  i,  308,  316. 

High-angle  fire,  at  New  Orleans,  i, 
43-45  ;  effect  of,  57  ;  Farragut's 
belief  in,  id.,  75,  n.  ;  use  of,  in 
modern  bombardments,  96-7  ;  at 
Sulina,  296-7  ;  on  Vesta  against 
Assar-i-Chevket,  304-5;  Inflexi- 
ble1 s  at  Alexandria,  352  ;  Egyp- 
tian, 354 ;  value  of,  urged  by 
Lieut.  Goodrich,  355.  Howitzer 
ships,  i,  355.    Howitzer,  ii,  171. 

High  explosives.  The  name  given  to 
substances  exploding  with  greater 
violence  than  gunpowder,  as 
dynamite,  melinite,  and  cordite. 
They  are  used  as  the  bursting 
charge  of  shells,  ii,  252. 

Effect  of  shells  charged  with, 
ii,  163,  172  ;  at  Yalu,  113  ; 
structural  influence  of,  227,  241. 

Hits  in  action,  on  Monitor,  i,  32  ; 
Merrimac,  id. ;  Rolf  Krake,  33  ; 
gunboats  at  Fort  Henry,  63  ;  at 
Donelson,  65  ;  at  Grand  Gulf, 
79 ;  on  monitors  at  Charleston, 
93,  95  ;  Atlanta,  99-100;  second 
Charleston  attack,  101  ;  Ten- 
nessee, 132  ;  fleet  at  Fort  Fisher, 
139  ;  Florida,  148  ;  Alabama, 
164;  Kearsarge,  164;  Formid- 
able, 223  ;  at  Lissa,  245  ; 
Brazilian  fleet  at  Humaita,  263  ; 
flat-boat  action,  262  ;  Vesta,  305  ; 
Assar-i-Chevket,  id.  ;  Huascar 
against  Shah,  309  ;  against 
Chilian    fleet,    325-330  ;  Coch- 


rane, 331  ;  Alexandra,  346; 
fleet  at  Alexandria,  350-1  ; 
French  fleet  at  Foochow,  ii,  11  ; 
Blanco,  19-20  ;  Aquidaban,  37- 
38  ;  Tsi  Yuen,  69-71  ;  Matsu- 
shima,  96 ;  Saikio,  98  ;  Hiyei, 
97  ;  Akagi,  id. ;  Japanese  fleet, 
H2B;  Chinese,  112C-D. 

By  heavy  guns,  i,  240,  243, 
255.  256,  318,  325-330;    ii,  9, 

76,  96,  98,  IOI,  II2A,  II2C,  I72. 

On  torpedo -craft,  ii,  26-7,  46, 
99,  132. 

Percentage  of,  at  Charleston, 

i,  96  ;  Lissa,  246,  247  ;  Shah's, 
309-310;  Chilian  against  Huas- 
car, 330  ;  on  forts  at  Alexandria, 
352  ;  gunboats  3iga.\r\st  Aconcagua, 

ii,  30;  at  Yalu,  112A-B;  future 
battle,  166. 

Homogeneity  of  structure  in  battle- 
ships, ii,  236,  271. 

Hydraulics.   See  Guns,  Hydraulic- 
worked. 


I. 

Induced  draught.  See  Forced 
Draught. 

Insurance,  on  blockade-runners,  i, 
195;  national,  of  commerce,  175. 

International  law.  See  also  Eng- 
land. Commerce  -  destroyers  ; 
Sumter  not  allowed  to  coal,  i, 

146  ;  Florida  uses  English  flag, 

147  ;  coals  at  Nassau,  148  :  at 
Barbadoes,  149  ;  rule  in  regard 
to  coaling,  id.,  n  ;  at  Bermuda, 
id.  ;  Shenandoah  coals  at  Mel- 
bourne, 167  ;  negligence  of 
England  in  regard  to  commerce- 
destroyers.    See  England. 

Geneva  rules,  i,  174  ;  Alabama 
claims,  174-5. 

Sumter  at  Cadiz,  i,  146  ;  Ala- 
bama at  Noronha,  156;  coals  at 
Blanquilla,  153  ;  French  lay 
embargo  on  Victor,  166;  attitude 
of  France,  174,  n. 


394  INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


U  .S.  warships,  breach  of  French 
neutrality,  i,  145  ;  infraction  of 
English  coaling  rules,  149 ;  seizure 
of  Florida,  151  ;  complaints  anent 
Deerhound,  164 ;  repairs  in 
English  ports,  167 ;  precedents 
against,  173;  in  blockade  treat- 
ment of  neutrals,  197  ;  case  of 
Peterhoff,  198-200  ;  continuous 
voyages,  199,  n.;  Slidell  and 
Mason,  Trent  case,  201-3; 
doctrine  of  contraband,  203 ; 
English  claims  against  North, 
204;  pre-emption,  id. ;  illegali- 
ties in  blockade,  183. 

French  not  allowed  to  coal  at 
Heligoland,  i,  275  ;  nor  English 
pilots  to  act  for,  273  ;  but  Danish 
pilots  procurable,  id.  ;  cf.  283. 

Neutral  property  destroyed  at 
Valparaiso,  i,  254  ;  French  hold 
rice  contraband,  ii,  15  ;  coal  at 
Hong-Kong,  id. ;  blockade  of 
Formosa,  id. 

Neutrals  stop  blockade  of 
Valparaiso,  ii,  19;  of  Rio,  37. 

Case  of  Itata,  ii,  33-4 ;  of 
Kowshing,  77-80. 

Hostilities  without  declaration 
of  war,  ii,  77. 

Ironclad  against  wooden  ship, 
Merrimac  in  Hampton  Roads,  i, 
14-20  ;  action  off  Charleston, 
87-9  ;  Albemarle  and  gunboats, 
106-110;  Kaiser,  239. 

Against  unarmoured  ship, 
Assar-i-Chevket,  i,  304-5  ;  Shah 
and  Huascar,  308-11.  See  also 
Yalu. 


L. 

Landing  party  from  fleet  at  Fort 
Fisher,  i,  141  ;  diminutive  with 
modern  ships,  283. 

Lashing  of  ships  in  pairs,  i,  74,  120, 
263. 

Laws  of  war,  breach  of,  ii,  79-80. 


Life  -  saving  in  battle,  or  after, 
Kearsarge,  i,  163-4;  Lissa, 
237-8  ;  duty  of  victor,  ii,  78  ;  at 
Yalu,  iio-iii  ;  Tegetthoff  wishes 
for  conference  to  settle,  1 1 1  ;  life- 
belts, 163. 

Light  draught,  necessary  on  South- 
ern coast,  i,  7,  35,  40,  90,  117, 
125;  French  had  no  —  ships, 
266,  268,  273,  282  ;  value  of,  to 
Huascar,  308,  310 ;  to  Covadonga, 
316,  319;  to  Esmeralda,  316; 
English  want  of,  at  Alexandria, 
339  ;  value  to  Condor,  346 ;  to 
gunboats,  347  ;  at  Sfax,  ii,  2,  4. 

Lights  misplaced,  not,  i,  273. 

Line-ahead.  See  Battle  Formations. 

Line-abreast.  See  Battle  Forma- 
tions. 

Loss  in  naval  action.  Men,  Table 
of  six  great  battles,  ii,  no; 
past  and  present,  iio-iii,  173-4, 
181. 

At  New  Orleans,  i,  60  ;  Donel- 
son,  65;  Vicksburg,  71;  Port 
Hudson,  77  ;  Grand  Gulf,  79-80  ; 
Charleston,  96 ;  Mobile,  132  ; 
Fort  Fisher,  140 ;  Alabama  and 
Hatter  as,  155  ;  and  Kearsarge, 
163,  164 ;  Formidable,  223  ; 
bombardment  of  Lissa,  224 ;  off 
Heligoland,  226  ;  Kaiser's  at 
Lissa,  244;  total  at  Lissa,  id., 
245  ;  Spanish,  at  Callao,  256  ; 
Meteor  and  Bouvet,  279;  Es- 
meralda's, 319  ;  Huascar' s  at 
Angamos,  331 ;  English,  at  Alex- 
andria, 349-50  ;  French,  at  Foo- 
chow,  ii,  11  ;  Chinese,  id.; 
Blanco's,  26  ;  Tsi  Yuen's,  71  ; 
at  Yalu,  1 08- 1 10. 

Ships,  Lissa,  i,  244-5,  lh  io5  I 
at  Yalu,  ii,  105  and  n.  ;  in  future 
naval  battle,  174-6. 

M. 

Machinery,  influence  on  dimension, 
ii,  210-212  ;  on  size  of  crew,  213  ; 
quantity  of,  on  shipboard,  213-4. 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


Mantlets,  i,  52  ;  ii,  87. 

Masts  hit,  Tsi  Yuen,  ii,  71;  Akagi, 
96  ;  Hiyei,  97  ;  Ting  Yuen>  99  ; 
Chen  Yuen,  101. 

Value  of  military,  with  tops, 
good  field  of  view,  ii,  153  ;  faults 
of,  167. 

On  various  types  of  battleship, 
ii,  244. 

Farragut  places  pilot  in  top,  i, 
75  ;    climbs  rigging  at  Mobile, 

121. 

Materiel,  influence  on  tactics,  &c,  i, 

283 ii,  63-4,  86,  153. 
Melinite.     A  preparation  of  picric 

acid,  used  as  a  bursting  charge 

in   shells.     At   Yalu,    ii,  113; 

effects  of  explosion,  172,  252. 

Metallurgy,  progress  in,  ii,  253. 

Metacentric  height.  The  height, 
above  the  centre  of  gravity  of  a 
floating  body  with  a  list,  of  the 
point  through  which  the  resultant 
upward  pressure  of  the  fluid 
always  passes.  The  higher  the 
metacentre,  the  more  stable  the 
ship.    In  Captain,  ii,  184. 

Mines,  none  at  New  Orleans,  i, 
58  ;  Cairo  sunk  by,  73  ;  De  Kalb 
sunk,  84;  damage  M  out  auk,  90; 
Ironsides  over,  at  Charleston,  93  ; 
Northern  losses  from,  104,  113; 
at  Mobile,  115;  sink  Tecumseh, 
124;  Hartford  crosses,  125;  loss 
of  ships  in  Mobile  Bay,  134;  sink 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  262 ;  sink  Sulina, 
297  ;  attempt  to  destroy  Chilian 
ironclads  by,  334 ;  Loa  and 
Covadonga  sunk  by,  id.  ;  none  at 
Alexandria,  342,  354 ;  at  Sta. 
Catherina,  ii,  49;  at  Wei-hai- 
wei,  128. 

Influence  of,  i,  97,  122-4;  at 
Fasana,  228;  at  Kiel,  271,  276; 
at  Iquique,  316. 

Necessary  in  a  channel  for 
defence,  ii,  50  ;  ports  may  be 
closed  with,  i,  209,  n. 

Weehawkeu's  torpedo-catcher, 
i,  92. 


Misunderstanding  of  orders,  i,  28, 
52. 

Monitor.  A  class  of  vessels  with 
low  freeboard,  carrying  their 
armament  in  a  turret,  named 
after  their  prototype,  Ericsson's 
Monitor,  PI.  iii,  i,  26.  A  modern 
ship  of  this  type  is  the  Nile, 
PI.  iv,  i,  32. 

Small  target,  i,  26,  97,  308  ; 
invulnerable,  i,  101  ;  to  quick- 
firer,  ii,  226. 

Mortars.    See  High-angle  Fire. 

Muzzle  -  loaders,  Shah's  fail,  i, 
311  ;  Cochrane' s  perforate,  330  ; 
reason  for  difference,  331  ;  in 
English  fleet,  ii,  246  ;  why  aban- 
doned, 248. 


N. 

Naval  strength  of  England,  France, 
and  Russia,  ii,  270-275. 

Navy,  English,  sketch  of,  ii,  219- 
259- 

Navy,  French,  sketch  of,  ii,  260- 
275- 

Nickel  steel.  An  alloy  of  steel  and 
nickel  of  exceptional  toughness, 
ii,  253. 

Night  actions,  ii,  176-7. 


o. 

"Observation."  The  strategical 
plan  of  watching  a  hostile  port 
with  light  and  fast  ships,  the  main 
squadron  being  at  a  distance. 
Opposed  to  blockade,  in  which 
the  main  squadron  is  close  at 
hand. 

Organisation,  want  of  Italian,  i, 
248-9;  want  of  French,  271; 
German,  283. 


396  INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


P. 

Personnel,  Southern,  i,  2,42,99, 100, 
129,  159;  Northern,  62,  132-3; 
Italian,  213-4,  215  ;  Austrian, 
227  ;  Chinese,  ii,  55-7  ;  import- 
ance of,  i,  159;  long  service,  ii, 
274. 

Philanthropy  in  war,  i,  239-240; 
ii,  31- 

Physical  health  of  men,  i,  209  ;  ii, 
239. 

Plans,  Italians  have  none,  i,  224, 
246 ;  Chinese  have  none,  ii,  87, 
104. 

Plunging  fire.  Fire  delivered  from 
an  elevation. 

Popular  feeling,  leads  to  attack  on 
Lissa,  i,  217  ;  and  French  fleet 
in  Baltic,  280-1. 

Ports,  open.  See  also  Bombard- 
ment. 

Threatened,  i,  150,  153,  167-8. 

Prizes,  Sumter's,  i,  146  ;  Florida's 
tenders,  147  ;  Florida 's,  151  ; 
Alabama's,  157  ;  Nashville's, 
165  ;  Georgia's,  166  ;  Shenan- 
doah's, 167  ;  captured  by  North 
in  blockade,  195. 

Projectiles.  Those  most  commonly 
used  are  armour-piercing  pro- 
jectiles, or  shot  containing  a  very 
small  bursting  charge,  and 
common  shell  or  shell  containing 
a  large  bursting  charge.  In 
addition,  shrapnel  shell  is  used 
by  most  navies,  and  case  shot  by 
a  few. 

Bad,  of  Monitor,  i,  26  ;  of 
Merrimac,  27  ;  Chinese  supply 
of,  ii,  125  ;  early  rifled,  246  ; 
improvement  in,  252. 
Protection,  portions  of  ship  which 
need,  ii,  177-8. 

English  and  French  systems  of, 
270. 

Improvised,  cables,  i,  39,  64, 
67,  119,  159,  228.  Sandbags,  i, 
39,  85,  119.  Coal,  i,  64;  ii,  81, 
87,  163.  Timber,  1,  67,  78. 
Cloth,  ii,  170. 


R. 

Railways,  in  South,  i,  179  ;  on 
French  coast,  205  ;  German, 
281  ;  torpedo-boats  sent  by,  289. 

Ram.  [Laird  Clowes.  Journal 
United  Service  Institution,  1894.] 
Merrimac  uses,  on  Cumber- 
land, i,  16-7  ;  attempts  of 
Monitor  to  use,  28  ;  of  Merrimac, 
29-30 ;  of  Manassas,  48,  49,  50, 
56;  of  Mississippi,  56;  Cincin- 
nati sunk  by,  68  ;  Mound  City 
rammed,  id.  ;  Lovell  rammed, 
69  ;  Beauregard  rammed,  id.  ; 
Arkansas,  72  ;  Queen  of  West 
rams,  73  ;  Indianola  rammed, 
74 ;  use  of,  on  Mississippi,  84-5  ; 
Albemarle  rams  Southfield,  108  ; 
rammed  by  Sassacus,  109- no; 
Tennessee  uses,  at  Fort  Morgan, 
125,  126,  127  ;  rammed  by 
Monongahela,  126  ;  a  second 
time,  129;  by  Lackawanna,  id.; 
by  Hartford,  130  ;  latter  collides 
with  Lackawanna,  id.  ;  Florida 
rammed,  150;  Austrian  attempts 
to  ram  at  Lissa,  234-235;  Re 
d'ltalia  rammed,  236  ;  Ferdinand 
Max  rams,  238  ;  Affondatore 
dares  not  ram  Kaiser,  238-9,  244  ; 
Kaiser  rams  Portogallo,  239  ; 
Kaiser  Max  rams,  242-3;  Prinz 
Eugen  tries  to  ram,  243 ; 
Amazonas  rams  Paraguari,  260  ; 
Bouet  prepared  to  use,  272  ; 
Bouvet  rams,  279  ;  Huascar 
attempts  to,  309 ;  rams  Esme- 
ralda, 317-8;  Independencia  runs 
ashore  trying  to  use,  319; 
Huascar  attempts  to  ram  Magal- 
lanes,  321  ;  Blanco,  328  ;  Coch- 
rane attempts  to  ram  Huascar, 
329;  at  Angamos,  331;  Re- 
publica  rams  ?  ii,  38  ;  Ting 
thinks  of  using,  86  ;  Chih  Yuen 
attempts  to,  94,  101,  104;  Tsi 
Yuen  rams  Yang  Wei,  115  ;  Iron 
Duke  rams  Vanguard,  190-2  ; 
Kbnig  WilJielm  rams  Grosser 
Kurfurst,  192-6;  Camperdown 
rams  Victoria,  199-205. 


INDEX    OF    SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


Value  of,  i,  22  ;   Italian  con-  1 
fidence  in,  224 ;   why  Tegetthoff 
used,  228  ;   in  Chilian -Peruvian  j 
War,  331-2  ;  at  Yalu,  ii,  114  ;  in 
general  action,  159,  n.,  160,  172. 

Shock  of  ramming,  i,  236,  ii, 
190,  194,  200;  injury  to  "ram- 
mer," ii,  160  ;  Ferdinand  Max,  i, 
245  ;  Iron  Duke,  ii,  192  ;  Kbnig  \ 
Willi  elm,     195  ;      Camperdown,  j 
205  ;  Huascar,  i,  320. 

Special    vessels    for,    i,    22  ;  i 
Manassas,    41  ;    on  Mississippi, 
67  ;   Polyphemus,  ii,   147,   228 ;  i 
Katahdin,  150. 

Speed  necessary  for,  i,  32,  125, 
132  ;  ii,  150.  _ 

Structural  influence,  ii,  241. 

Resistance  to,  of  belt,  ii,  207. 
Ransom  of  prizes.     See  Tab.  vi ;  : 
vessels  bonded,  i,  146,  149,  154, 
157,  166,  167,  168. 
Recessed  ports,  ii,  221. 

Reserve  of  ships  for  a  blockade,  i, 
205  ;  of  men,  207  ;  English  lack  I 
of,   ii,   274  ;    in  general  action, 
145-7- 

Rice  contraband,  ii,  15. 

s. 

Sails,  speed  with,  ii,  213;  value  as 
auxiliary,  212. 

"  Scouts."    Light  and   fast  ships 
designed  to  watch  or  discover  a 
hostile  fleet.    More  lightly  armed  j 
than  the  cruiser. 

Screw,  twin,  ii,  254 ;   triple,   265  ; 
quadruple,  i,  119,  n. 

Sea  power,  its  influence,  i,  1,  13; 
victory  of  Merrimac,  20  ;  virtual,  \ 
of  Monitor,  31  ;  on  Mississippi, 
61  ;  at  Shiloh,  65  ;  Porter  on, 
77.  Grant  on,  82  ;  Lincoln  on, 
id.  ;  general  in  Civil  War,  82-3.  j 
Fort  Fisher  brings  fall  of  Rich- 
mond, 142  ;  South  exposed  to, 
37,  178- 181;  pressure  on  South, 
185;    blockade   crushed  South, 


196-7  ;  enables  turning  of  Hum- 
aita,  264  ;  action  of,  in  Franco - 
German  War,  280-5  ;  in  Russo- 
Turkish  War,  287-8;  Chili  and 
Peru,  314,  332  ;  in  Chilian  Civil 
War,  ii,  18;  in  China- Japan  War, 
86,  105. 

Search  lights,  use  of,  i,  337,  349, 
ii,  11  ;  Blanco  does  not  use,  25  ; 
Aquidaban's,  45  ;  in  night  action, 
\77- 

Shields  on  guns.  See  Armour, 
Thin. 

Signals,  smoke,  i,  190;  in  block- 
ading, 208 ;  at  Lissa,  Per.sano's 
unseen,  233-4,  240;  Tegetthoff's 
not  seen,  243  ;  at  Yalu,  Chinese, 
ii,  86,  100;  Japanese,  104,  119; 
in  general  action  discussed, 
r52-3- 

Mechanical,  on  shipboard,  ii, 
167-8,  201. 

Size.    See  Dimension. 

Smoke,  at  New  Orleans  hampers 
Federals,  i,  54;  at  Port  Hudson, 
75,  84;  _  at  Lissa,  234-5  ;  at 
Alexandria,  344 ;  at  Yalu,  ii, 
103,  104;  hides  Japanese,  90; 
from  fires  on  Chinese  ships,  99  ; 
with  weather-gauge,  smoke  blows 
on  enemy,  158  ;  used  to  escape, 
i,  192-3. 

Smokeless  powder  at  Rio,  ii, 
39  ;  in  Japanese  fleet,  58,  11 2D  ; 
tactical  influence,  252. 

Speaking  tubes,  break  down  on 
Monitor,  i,  28;  on  Hartford,  75  ; 
shattered  on  Tsi  Yuen,  ii,  70  ; 
mistakes  due  to,  on  Sampaio, 
44-5  ;  in  battle,  use  of,  167. 

Specialisation.    See  Differentiation. 

Speed,  influence  in  action,  Monitor, 
i,  27,  32  ;  Albemarle  too  slow  to 
ram,  109 ;  Tennessee  too  slow, 
125,  132;  Alabama  and  Hatteras, 
155  ;  and  Kearsarge,  158  ;  Drache 
cannot  catch  Palestro,  235  ;  Shah 
avoids  ram,  310;  want  of,  in 
Chilian  fleet,  314,  321,  322;  speed 
in  "war  of  coasts,"  321;  strate- 


398  INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


gical  value  of,  ii,  33  ;  at  Yalu, 
88,  90,  112D-113,  123-4;  in  stern- 
battle,  154;  may  allow  of  surprise,  j 
88  ;  advance  in,  212  ;  normal,  of 
sailing  ship,  213  ;  limitations  to, 
258  ;  of  various  battleships,  244. 

Springs  to  cables,  use  of,  i,  346. 

Stability,  importance  of,  ii,  166; 
Captain  unstable,  183,  n.,  184, 
189  ;  Vanguard,  191  ;  Hoche 
reported  unstable,  269. 

Steam  facilitates  rapid  movements, 
ii,  158;  renders  doubling  difficult, 
id. ;  effect  of,  on  naval  construc- 
tion, 210-4;  increases  size,  212. 

Steamers,  two  only  captured  by 
Southern  cruisers,  i,  150,  154,  157, 
168  ;  hard  to  destroy,  175  ;  cap- 
tured blockade-running,  195. 

Steering  gear  exposed  of  Tennessee, 

i,  117;  damaged,  131;  exposed 
of  Re  d' Italia,  212;  damaged, 
235 ;  of  Huascar  damaged, 
327-8 ;    of   Tsi  Yuen  damaged, 

ii,  70  ;  of  Saikio,  98. 
Stern-battle,  ii,  118,  154-5. 
Stokeholds,  heat  in  U.S.N.,  ii,  300. 
Stratagems,    masts    dressed  with 

branches,  i,  43  ;  dummy  monitor, 
75  ;  method  of  sending  message, 
77;  coal -torpedo,  105;  disguised 
powder-ship,  138  ;  Semmes'  at 
St.  Pierre,  146  ;  use  of  neutral 
flag,  147  ;  dummy  guns,  149  ; 
Alabama's  against  Hatter  as,  155  ; 
Tuscarora's  use  of  twenty-four 
hours'  law,  165 ;  use  of  smoke 
by  blockade  -  runners,  192-3; 
false  colours  at  Lissa,  229 ;  false 
hail,  291 ;  questionable  Peruvian, 
333-4 ;  Covadonga's  at  Iquique, 
316;  Imperial's,  ii,  32;  cloth, 
use  of,  170. 
Strategy,  of  Southern  warfare 
against  commerce,  i,  170-1  ; 
commerce  -  destruction  useless, 
175-6;  suggested  strategy  for 
North,  170-3  ;  strategical  im- 
portance of  blockade,  179,  196-7  ; 
Northern   occupation   of  bases, 


184-5  !  °f  blockade  in  war  with 
France,  204-210;  of  Italians  in 
1866,  218-220,  224,  248;  of 
Tegetthoff,  229,  230  ;  of  Franco- 
German  War,  271  ;  blockade, 
274 ;  French  force  in  Mediter- 
ranean, 275  ;  Bouet's  communi- 
cations, 277  ;  attacks  on  forts,  &c, 
281-285;  °f  Russians  against 
Turks,  288  ;  of  Peruvians,  321-2  ; 
of  Chilian  insurgents,  ii,  32-3 ; 
of  Mello,  37 ;  of  Chinese,  80- 
81,  83-84,  134;  steam  has  not 
changed,  119. 

Structural  damage  at  Yalu,  ii, 
112B-D;  in  naval  battle,  162, 
175.    See  also  Hits. 

Submarine  navigation,  i,  103-4;  ii, 
259,  268. 

Sun  in  enemy's  eyes,  ii,  159. 

Surrendered  ship,  position  of,  i,  88. 

T. 

Tactical  diameter,  ii,  197. 
Tactics.    See  also  Ram,  Torpedo, 
Battle. 

Mississippi  contests,  i,  84 ; 
Mobile,  1 20- 1  ;  faulty,  of  Bu- 
chanan, 127  ;  of  blockade,  208- 
210;  of  Tegetthoff,  228,  230-1, 
247-8  ;  of  Persano,  232-3  ;  of 
Huascar,  308,  310 ;  of  Esme- 
ralda, 316 ;  Chilians  against 
Huascar,  326,  327-8 ;  of  bom- 
bardment, 342-3,  347-8;  354-6; 
French  on  the  Min,  ii,  12  ; 
orders  of  Ting,  86-7  ;  of  Ito,  89  ; 
his  mistakes,  93,  118;  features  of 
Yalu,  114,  1 16- 124;  gun,  ram, 
and  torpedo,  123,  159-162; 
ulterior  motives  affect  Japanese, 
106 ;  structure  of  Chinese  ships 
affects  Chinese,  64,  87  ;  steam 
and,  158. 
Telegraph,  absence  of,  hampered 
North,  i,  173;  used  at  Lissa, 
222,  229-30  ;  cut  by  Italians, 
230  ;  used  by  Peruvians,  315  ;  at 
Alexandria,  337-8;  engine-room, 
ii,  167-8,  201. 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


Telephone,  ii,  167. 

"  Tonnage."  The  old  system  of 
measuring,  or  builder's  measure- 
ment, expressed  the  internal 
cubic  capacity  of  the  ship. 
Modern  or  displacement  tonnage 
gives  the  weight  of  water  dis- 
placed by  the  ship. 

Top-hamper,  ii,  162-3. 

Tops,  use  of,  i,  75,  244,  326,  345, 
ii,  10 ;  for  signals,  153.  See  also 
Masts. 

Torpedo,  instances  of  employment 
in  Tab.  xxv,  with  reference  to 
page. 

Invented,  i,  102  ;  development 
of,  ii,  258-9  ;  range,  259  ;  struc- 
tural influence,  215-6,  241. 

Loaded  on  deck,  danger  of,  ii, 
27.  3°»  7°»  73>  96,  101,  122. 

Tactical  value,  prevents  ram- 
ming, i,  22  ;  in  action,  ii,  160- 1  ; 
its  defects,  161,  n.  ;  equalises 
cruiser  and  battleship,  142  ;  use- 
less against  ship  in  motion  (?)  49. 

Effect  of  explosion,  Blanco,  ii, 
26  ;  Aquidaban,  47  ;  Ting  Yuen, 

Compared  with  pneumatic  gun, 
ii,  150-1. 

In  Russo-Turkish  War,  i,  303- 

304- 

At  Yalu,  ii,  93,  99,  114. 
At  Wei-hai-wei,  in  low  tem- 
perature, ii,  130,  131,  132. 
Controllable,  ii,  41,  161,  259. 
Spar  and  Whitehead,  ii,  258. 

Torpedo-boats,  Tab.  xxv,  early, 
Southern,  i,  102-3 ;  Northern, 
1 10- 1  ;  Russian,  286;  sent  over- 
land, 289 ;  Chilian,  332  ;  fight 
between  boats  off  Callao,  333  ; 
French,  at  Foochow  and  Sheipoo, 
ii,  13;  Brazilian,  at  Sta.  Cathe- 
rina,  43,  45,  46  ;  Japanese,  61  ; 
Chinese,  at  Yalu,  84,  93,  96,  99, 
125  ;  Japanese,  at  Port  Arthur, 
127;  at  Wei-hai-wei,  129,  130, 
131,  132  ;  Chinese,  make  a  dash, 
130. 

Vol.  II. 


Value  of,  in  blockades,  i,  208, 
284,  288-9,  333  I  stopped  by 
obstructions,  293 ;  difficulty  of 
finding  target,  301,  ii,  44,  48; 
danger  to  friends,  i,  ii,  149,  302  ; 
effect  of  quick-firer  on,  i,  303-4,  ii, 
48-9  ;  prevent  Japanese  pursuit 
at  Yalu,  96,  115  ;  in  general 
action,  123;  place,  148;  should 
not  lightly  be  exposed,  149  ;  in 
melee,  id.,  172;  ideal  torpedo- 
boat  officer,  149,  n. ;  save  life,  107. 

Precautions  against,  i,  297,  n., 
301,  n. ;  ii,  31,  49,  128,  134. 

Torpedo-boat  carrier,  i,  292-3,  304. 

Torpedo-boat  destroyer  in  blockade, 
i,  208 ;  English,  ii,  258,  274. 

Torpedo  flotillas,  French  and 
English,  ii,  275. 

Torpedo  gunboat,  Condell  and 
Lynch,  des.  ii,  16-7;  sink  Blanco, 
22-9  ;  attack  Aconcagua,  29- 
30  ;  Sampaio  or  Aurora,  des.  36; 
sinks  Aquidaban,  42-9  ;  useless 
for  open  fighting,  ii,  30 ;  place  in 
battle,  147;  English,  257;  French, 
268. 

Transfers  of  shipping,  United 
States  to  English  flag,  i,  169,  n. 

Triple  expansion.  See  Compound 
Engines. 

Turret,  Ericsson's,  i,  6-8  ;  Coles', 
8,  33  ;  Timby's,  8  ;  Monitor's, 
10;  defects,  27,  28;  concussion 
on,  28;  jams  of  monitor  turrets  at 
Charleston,  94;  at  Mobile,  123; 
Rolf  Krake's  works  well,  33  ; 
accident  in,  at  Callao,  256 ; 
Huascar's  perforated,  327-329; 
jams  for  a  short  time,  325  ;  early 
English  turret,  ii,  224 ;  double 
turret,  ii,  296. 

Turret -ship.  See  Index  II.  Moni- 
tor, Nile,  Devastation,  &c. 

Twenty-four  hours'  law  requires 
the  elapse  of  twenty-four  hours 
before  one  hostile  ship  can  follow 
another  from  a  neutral  port. 
Breach  of,  i,  145 ;  blockade  by 
use  of,  165  ;  mentioned,  158, 
278-9. 

D  D 


INDEX    OF   SUBJECT-MATTER,  ETC. 


u. 

Uniformity.    See  Homogeneity. 


V. 


Ventilation,  artificial,  of  floating 
batteries,  i,  xxxii ;  of  Monitor,  n  ; 
damage  to  ventilators  in  battle, 
ii,  163-4,  178. 


w. 

Water  ballast,  ii,  165. 

Water-line,  hits  on,  Cincinnati,  i, 
81  ;  Keystone  State,  88  ;  Gaines, 
128  ;  Alabama,  162-3  I  at  Yalu, 
ii,  121;  on  Ching  Yuen,  133; 
effect  of,  on  modern  ship,  174,  n., 
cf.  207,  n. 

Weak  ships  inline.  See  Dimension, 
Yalu,  New  Orleans. 

Weather,  influences  shooting,  ii, 
166  ;  cf.  i,  231. 


